The subject of this article is the protection by the Ministry of the Interior’s Security Service of an industrial facility that was important for the economy of the Polish People’s Republic, namely the Bolesław Bierut Steelworks in Częstochowa. The actions taken by the Security Service against the Steelworks’ staff, the legal basis for these actions and the surveillance methods used are presented. The author’s overview of the Security Service’s activity begins with the Stalinist era and leads the reader through the social revolts of the late 1960s and early 1970s as well as the year 1976 to the turbulent 1980s. Thanks to the documents preserved in the Archive of the Institute of National Remembrance, we can follow the unrest in the workers’ environment, the opposition of its representatives to the authorities of the Polish People’s Republic, and the mutual friction within the triangle of the steelwork’s blue-collar workers, supervisors and administration. Irregularities and ‘threats’ of a political, social (strikes) and economic (especially mismanagement) nature, including economic crime and espionage incidents, were the main areas of the analytical, operational and investigative activities of the communist security and repression apparatus. A reconstruction of the history of the operational control of the HBB Steelworks allows us to draw several general conclusions. These include the conclusion that the Security Service’s tasks in large state-owned workplaces were part of the range of tasks posed to secret services in modern states in general (including democratic ones), which were related to the protection of the economic interests of the state as such. At the same time, the Secret Service was also determined to carry out its political police function, persecuting workers for their views. A surprising conclusion from the author’s statistical measurements is the low rate of reclassification of exploratory cases into investigative cases. The Secret Service was generally unable to gather convincing evidence for the prosecution or the court, so convictions for hostile activities (with the exception of martial law) and for criminal and economic offences were rare.
In mid-1975, at the same time as a change in the administrative division of the country, a general reorganisation of the structures of the Security Service took place. This was due to a fairly significant reduction in the organisational and staff capacity of the service. However, over the next dozen years or so, this process was reversed and the Security Service in the Opole Province once again expanded its forces. Before the mid-1980s, the size of its staff in the region had even reached a level much higher than before the reorganisation carried out in 1975. This was due to the constant emergence of new challenges posed to the security apparatus by the period of the Solidarity revolution, which began in the summer of 1980. The Security Service tried to cope with the successive tasks set before it but ultimately found that, despite the effort put in, it failed to ensure that the communists maintained control of social reality.
This publication presents the provincial unit of the communist Security Service in Krosno, which was operating from 1975 to 1990 within the structures of the local Provincial Headquarters of the Citizens’ Militia and, from 1983, of the Provincial Office of the Interior. The article is divided into two parts. The first describes the circumstances of the establishment of the provincial unit of the Security Service in Krosno in June 1975 along with its structure, as well as the organisational and staffing changes that took place during the 15 years of its existence. It then presents the Security Service units subordinate to the Provincial Office of the Interior in Krosno that were established in 1983 in the district offices of the interior in Jasło, Brzozów, Sanok, Lesko and Ustrzyki Dolne, and from 1985 in Krosno. The second part, on the other hand, contains extensive biographical notes describing the course of service of the three heads of the provincial unit of the Security Service in Krosno: Stanisław Jamrozik, Jan Żak and Julian Szyndler. The article is supplemented both by photographs of the said unit heads and tables showing the structure of the Security Service unit in 1975 and 1981.
The surveillance by the secret services of People’s Poland of creative circles was intended to neutralise anti-system speeches and, for a certain period, also to limit international contacts. It intensified during periods of political upheaval (1968, 1970, 1976, 1980s). It did not really concern the substantive sphere but rather the social one (association activities, links with the opposition, trespasses of the law in the sphere of publishing and dissemination). However, the creative circles were not the main focus of the secret services, and it was left to party authorities and the administration to steer and control them. In the province, including Bydgoszcz, the scale of relations between the creative circles and the Security Service was much smaller than in such “capitals of culture” as Warsaw, Cracow, Wrocław, Łódź, Gdańsk, Poznań and Katowice. This was mainly due to the small size of Bydgoszcz’s artistic community along with the passive attitude of its members and their submission to the prevailing socio-political order. This, with better or worse results, secured the existence of the artists there and created the conditions for their development.
The issue of second circulation publishing in the Polish People’s Republic has recently attracted considerable interest among researchers, although there have been few publications describing the activities of the communist repression apparatus in relation to the independent publishing movement or taking this theme into account. For many years, the prevailing perception was that the Security Service had failed to penetrate its structures and that it knew little about their activities. Recent research has certainly changed the perception of this form of anti-communist opposition activity. Sources have been successively found the have made it possible to clarify some doubts and fill in the gaps in previous knowledge. Among other things, they testify to the fact that Security Service officials knew much more than has so far been believed. The present text is synthetic in nature. It summarises previous research on this aspect of the functioning of the communist repressive apparatus between 1980 and 1990, namely its actions against the independent publishing circulation, and attempts to identify gaps and research problems. It also aims to draw the attention of English-speaking readers to the complexity of this issue, which is presented in a highly simplified manner in English-language publications, without reference to sources, and not always interpreted correctly.
This article presents selected sources on the issue of penetration actions organised by Division IX of Department II of the Ministry of the Interior at the US consulate in Cracow in the 1980s. Researchers and journalists have only recently gained the opportunity to analyse these and related activities, as the so-called restricted collection of the Institute of National Remembrance has been liquidated. Although only incomplete documentation of the penetration actions undertaken and the technical means used to carry them out has survived, it shows the scale of the activities carried out by the civilian counterintelligence of the Polish People’s Republic in the broad framework of the surveillance of Western diplomats.
Following the imposition of martial law, an operational unit was established within the Ministry of the Interior to act as a team to coordinate activities undertaken against the underground Solidarity movement and other illegal groups. The Study Office of the Security Service of the Ministry of the Interior was established in March 1982 and became operational in the summer of 1982. It was given special prerogatives and could supervise the activities of other Security Service units as well as assist them in planning and carrying out their tasks. Its officers were also involved in uncovering anti-system circles. The available literature and documents show that they led complex games and operational combinations that even included the establishment of controlled underground organisations. This article outlines the circumstances surrounding the establishment of this office, its internal organisation and its basic tasks. The chronology of the establishment of its field cells, for instance the inspectorates No. 2 of the Provincial Offices of the Interior of the Security Service, is also described.
The article discusses more than two and a half years of the activities of Inspectorate No. 2 of the Provincial Office of the Interior of the Security Service in Nowy Sącz, which existed in the structure of the Provincial Office of the Interior from 1 April 1986 to the end of 1988. The article consists of five parts and an annex. It attempts to answer the question of the purpose of setting up an agency of the Study Office of the Security Service of the Ministry of the Interior in Nowy Sącz in a situation where the “threat” of opposition activity in the province – compared to other centres – was relatively low. It discusses the basic activities of this unit, introduces its personnel, lists the operational cases conducted along with their brief descriptions, and addresses the problem of personal sources of information used in operational work. Based on the surviving documentation of potential recruits, the most important operational needs of this unit were identified. The annex contains basic information on the service record of Security Service officers working in Inspectorate No. 2 of the Security Service.
The study aims to introduce the reader to a collective biographical outline of the life of four officers of the Security Service of the Polish People’s Republic who were sentenced to imprisonment by the court in 1985 for the murder of the chaplain of the Warsaw-based Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity”, Father Jerzy Popiełuszko. The murder became one of the most notorious crimes committed by officers of the communist political police in Poland during the Polish People’s Republic. Although a great number of studies have been written about the murder itself, both academic and popular science or journalistic, Polish historiography lacks publications showing who the people responsible for the offence were. The article presents the life paths of Waldemar Chmielewski, Leszek Pękala, Adam Pietruszka and Grzegorz Piotrowski from their birth until October 1984, when they either committed or inspired the murder of Father Popiełuszko. The text analyses many elements of these officers’ lives.
We date the commencement of trade union activity in the student community in Białystok to the end of September 1980. In October, Founding Committees were established at the three largest universities in the region. Their activity was monitored by the Security Service. After the imposition of martial law and the banning of the Independent Students’ Association (NZS), the repression apparatus intensified its activities aimed at students operating in the opposition. There were the first arrests, the cause of which was the distribution of illegal publications. In April 1982, the Security Service carried out a wideranging search and arrest campaign in the academic community. Therefore, on 3 November 1982, a high-profile trial of 21 students began, which became the most frequently covered political case in Białystok during martial law.
The touristic character of the coastal part of the Koszalin province attracted foreign visitors, whose number had been increasing over the years. With their influx, the willingness of local Security Service units to control the movement of people increased. The best places for extensive surveillance were hotel facilities. The aim of the article is to present the principles of the organisation, functioning and activity of the hotel section of the Koszalin Security Service, to answer the question of the scope of tasks and their methods of completion, to explore the degree of infiltration of the environment being exposed and the difficulties associated with it. Drawing attention to the physical evidence of activity, specifically the documentation produced during the existence of the entity in question, also became an objective.
Articles and comparative studies: Apparatuses of Repression in Other Communist and Totalitarian Countries
The defeat of the Soviets in the Polish-Bolshevik War in 1920 marked the collapse of their hopes for the rapid and successful export of the proletarian revolution to Central and Western Europe. Józef Piłsudski became a longtime symbol of this grave geopolitical defeat for the Bolsheviks, so the fight against his legacy in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) was one of the most important tasks of the Communist security services in the 1920s and 1930s. Demonstrative in this respect were the numerous operational examinations and large collective criminal cases initiated during this period by the OGPU authorities, for in one way or another there was always a "Polish trace" present. An example of such activity is the liquidation of the All-Union Military-Officer Counterrevolutionary Organisation by the GPU of Ukraine (the "Vesna" case), as part of which Lt. Henryk Wieczffiński, an observer pilot, chief of staff of the 20th Aviation Brigade of the Ukrainian Military District, was arrested and subsequently executed (12 July 1931 in Kharkov).
The article presented concerns the operational activities of secret agent in prison Juliusz Wilczur-Garztecki (alias “Natan”), a former Home Army counterintelligence officer, in an investigation. Garztecki’s biography, the rich history of his collaboration with the communist state authorities and his recruitment in the Mokotów detention centre were discussed. The agent used his past in the independence conspiracy to gain credibility in the eyes of his fellow prisoners. The basis for the discussion on the “Natan” case is the investigation presented in the article into the complicated and hitherto undescribed case of a pre-war Polish Army officer, Captain Jerzy Lewszecki, who was sent on an intelligence mission to Poland from the American military centre Camp King in Oberursel, West Germany. The case study of the secret agent in prison was conducted by way of a comparative analysis of the material prepared by “Natan” with the investigation documentation, including the minutes of Lewszecki’s interrogations and interrogations of people directly involved in his case.
The Communist security apparatus took a special interest in uncovering the Polish Guard Companies of the US Army. In addition to obtaining general information on the organisational structure of these units and their location, attention was drawn to the need to establish the identities of those serving in them (including officers and non-commissioned officers), who might have carried out intelligence activities against the Polish People’s Republic. This had to be achieved with the help of the relatives of the soldiers of the guard companies who were in the country, repatriates and ‘fugitives’ who had decided to return to the country. An important aspect of the uncovering of the Polish Guard Companies was the use of secret collaborators outside the borders of the Polish People’s Republic. In addition, relatives and friends of former guards were to be subject to operational control. The aim of this article was to present a case study illustrating the maintenance by the structures of the Ministry of the Interior of the Polish People’s Republic, between 1959 and 1968, of contact with a secret collaborator operating in Germany, Stanisław Sumlet, a non-commissioned officer in the Polish Guard Companies of the US Army.
The article is an attempt to show the cooperation of an undeniably outstanding scientist, Andrzej Wiercinski (1930–2003), with the security apparatus of the Polish People’s Republic. The text is based on documents deposited in the Archive of the Institute of National Remembrance which make up the job dossier of a secret collaborator alias “Alik”.
The article shows the creation and functioning of the periodical Ancora. Pismo katolików poświęcone zagadnieniom odnowy soborowej Kościoła in personal and structural terms. Father Zbigniew Bonawentura Fróg (1920–1986), a priest of the Przemyśl diocese since 1943, a personal information source of the Security Service, and finally its clandestine officer, played a major role in this endeavour. The text is a contribution to further in-depth research into the disintegration activities carried out by various structures of the repressive apparatus in the Polish People’s Republic, with particular emphasis on the significance of Department IV of the Security Service of the Ministry of the Interior in this field.
The article analyses the documentation produced between 1963 and 1990 by the security authorities in the course of their operational examination of Father Stanislaw Tkocz, editor-in-chief of the Gość Niedzielny weekly, and his alleged collaboration between 1986 and 1989. It also presents the profile of Captain Ryszard Skokowski, an officer of Department IV of the Ministry of the Interior, who registered Father Tkocz as a secret collaborator under the pseudonym “Lis”. The author seeks to identify the nature of these contacts, as well as to find out the motives that may have led Father Tkocz to engage in them. It presents various possibilities for interpreting the situation, which was part of the operational dialogue for the security authorities, while Church representatives treated it as political talks, an informal contact with the political authorities of the communist state.
The Citizens’ Militia (MO) after the Stalinist period was looking for a new operating model. Operational instructions created after 1956 were aimed primarily at combating criminal and economic crime. The goal of the MO’s management was to include the main issues of operational work (spies, surveillance, operational matters) into one normative act. Ultimately, this was achieved in 1974, when a new operational manual was introduced, which generally covered all aspects of the MO’s operational work. The search for the concept of MO’s operational work bore fruit in the seventies and eighties, when certain standards of this work were in force, and the operational manual of 1974 was not repealed until the end of MO’s activity, that is until 1990.
The aim of this article is to describe the most debatable element of the structural transformation of the Citizens’ Militia and the formation of the Police, specifically the liquidation of the economic crime division. In public discourse, it is an emblematic example of the state’s weakness in prosecuting fraud crimes and fraudulent enrichment during a period of political and economic change. The text comprehensively describes this transformation – starting with the establishment in August 1989 of the Department of Economic Protection of the Ministry of the Interior, located within the structures of the Security Service, which was to play a leading role in economic affairs. Meanwhile, in the period from October 1989 to February 1990, the integration of the Office for Combating Economic Crimes and the Criminal Bureau of the Citizens’ Militia Headquarters was planned, agreed on and officially implemented, resulting in the establishment of the Criminal Department of the Ministry of the Interior. However, the merger did not actually take place and the two divisions functioned separately until the end of the Citizens’ Militia. They were merged during the establishment of the Police in mid-1990. At that time, the Operational and Exploratory Office of the Police Headquarters and Operational and Exploratory Departments in the Provincial Police Headquarters were formed. It is indisputable that the organisational separation of the Economic Crime Division was abolished at the time of the establishment of the Police. The article cites a wide-ranging academic and political discussion in this regard.
This article continues the study of the structural transformation of the Citizens’ Militia between 1989 and 1990. It discusses the planning of the integration of the Investigation Bureau of the Citizens’ Militia Headquarters and the Investigation Bureau of the Ministry of the Interior, which was to result in the establishment of an Investigation Department. The study takes a close look at the intra-departmental dispute in this regard and describes the paradoxical attempt of militia structures to take over one of the organisational divisions of the Security Service. In the end, the merger did not take place due to the resistance of Security Service representatives to the subordination of the Investigation Bureau of the Ministry of the Interior to the Commander-in-Chief of the Citizens’ Militia.
The end of the 1980s brought changes to the operation of fisheries in the Baltic Sea. As a result of the deteriorating economic situation, fishing and fishing services companies, including the “Koga” enterprise from Hel, started to cooperate with foreign entities. The process involved sending cutters abroad, which could entail crewmen fleeing or committing misdemeanours or crimes. Therefore, the Reconnaissance Division of the Border Protection Troops stationed at that time in the port of Hel was engaged in the matter. The soldiers began their surveillance of the suspected fishermen. The purpose of this article is to present selected cases related to the cruises of “Koga” cutters to Denmark, operated by the Border Control Post of the Border Protection Troops in Hel. It discusses issues related to the activities of Border Protection Troops in securing the maritime border of the Polish People’s Republic and presents three operational cases that involved the company’s crew. Each had different foundations, and the investigations carried out by the soldiers revealed the different motives of the fishermen involved in the cases. The cases mostly ended with the suspects being excluded from the cruises to Bornholm. Thanks to the materials produced and preserved, it is possible to investigate the influence of the Reconnaissance Division of the Border Protection Troops on the daily life of the fishermen working on the “Koga” cutters and the extent of this interference.
The article presents a collective portrait of those who headed the District Office for Public Security in Biłgoraj between 1944 and 1956. It describes elements such as geographical origin, age, social background and social status, education, nationality, and religion. Attention was paid to political activity. The careers of successive managers and heads of the District Office for Public Security in Biłgoraj and their deputies are characterised. The officers described were mostly from the Lublin region, they were raised and grew up in a rural environment, and usually finished their education at the primary school level. Most of them did not acquire secondary education until the late 1950s and early 1960s. Statistically, they assumed the position of manager/head or deputy head of the District Office for Public Security in Biłgoraj after the age of 30. Except for individual cases, working for the repressive apparatus meant social advancement for them compared to the pre-war period. For most of them, working in the Security Service was the only professional activity in their life. Their promotions were between district and provincial structures. Only one person was promoted to a managerial position at the headquarters of the Ministry of Public Security/Committee for Public Security.
The publication takes a closer look at the profile of Lieutenant Colonel Waldemar Więckowski (born in 1944), head of Department II of the Metropolitan Headquarters of the Citizens’ Militia/Metropolitan Office of the Interior (metropolitan counterintelligence) from 1983 to 1990. His career in the police and the Security Service was reconstructed on the basis of archival materials available. The author draws particular attention to the fact that he completed a course at the Higher School of the USSR State Security Committee and maintained contacts with KGB representatives in Poland. This points to the knowledge he possessed in connection with his work in this position, which took on particular significance in the context of the formation of the new political and economic system, and describes the role he played, among others, in the case of a secret collaborator under the pseudonym “Konarski”.
Cooperation between the intelligence structures of the socialist states involved in examining the activities of so-called centres of ideological diversion and neutralising them has taken on a new formalised character since the mid-1970s. The documents presented indicate an exchange of information in this regard between the Ministry of State Security of the German Democratic Republic and the Ministry of the Interior of the Hungarian People’s Republic. One of them identifies the Centre for the Study of Religion and Communism, commonly referred to as Keston College, as an anti-communist church organisation with the “greatest significance” in Anglo-Saxon countries. The centre was established in 1969 in the UK on the initiative of Michael Bourdeaux, Sir John Lawrence, Leonard Schapiro and Peter Reddaway. Through their information services, periodicals, expert opinions and book publications, as well as conferences and meetings, the staff and associates of Keston College influenced a change in the awareness of Western societies about religious freedom in the USSR and its satellite countries, and supported the activities of dissident groups emerging there. The presentation of the “voice of the voiceless” as part of these activities influenced not only the reassessment of the situation of communities living behind the Iron Curtain but also the expansion of the sphere of civil liberties in the realities of the functioning of communist states.
John Pomfret’s book on intelligence cooperation between Poland and the United States, two former Cold War adversaries, has attracted significant interest in both countries. The author offers an intriguing yet somewhat unconvincing and quite romanticised view of the Polish-American friendship and intelligence services. In his struggle to deliver the book jacket’s promise of “the epic story”, some factual precision gets lost in the process. Particularly his outlook on Poland’s history is fraught with inaccuracies and sheer factual errors. Moreover, the bibliography leaves something to be desired. The scope of interviews carried out by the author (some of the interviewees were top-tier politicians and officers) is admirable, but the data gathered does not appear to have been sufficiently evaluated. There are many examples of extensive generalisations that lead the reader to distrust the entire content of the book. Disappointingly, it is more of an emotional essay than a full-blown analysis of the complex issue. “From Warsaw with Love” works well as an introduction to the subject, but the narrative lacks depth and clarity. In many respects, the findings are not as novel as the author implies. It does, however, provide some valuable insight into the behind-the-scenes politics of the post-Cold War order. Although not without its flaws, the book constitutes a noteworthy contribution to the research on the subject. As debates over US-Poland relations are far from being conclusive, it creates a framework for both addressing existing questions and raising new ones.