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Editorial
Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944-1989, No. 18 (2020), pages: 5-6
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Articles and studies: Security Service 1957-1975 
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The Beginnings of Intelligence Activity by Department I of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Eastern Bloc Countries
Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944-1989, No. 18 (2020), pages: 13-55
Intelligence activity performed in other Eastern Bloc countries is one of the least well-known aspects of the Department I of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (the civilian intelligence service in People’s Republic of Poland). At first, the Department’s activity was limited almost exclusively to counterintelligence protection for Polish diplomatic missions. When the relations with some of the countries in the Soviet orbit cooled off or broke down in the 1960s, Polish intelligence began to gather information on those countries as well. This activity, however, was handled under a different set of rules compared to other countries. Department I was not authorised to recruit informants among local citizens and relied instead on intelligence gathered from so-called “non-informant sources”. The gathering of intelligence would be built up gradually over time, and the dynamics of the process depended on the local situation. At first the focus was primarily on China, Yugoslavia, Romania and Albania, followed by Czechoslovakia. A shift in focus was caused by the Prague Spring, and a decision was made to place a greater emphasis on activities in other “people’s democracies”. As a result, by the fall of 1969 Department I already had in place an infrastructure for intelligence gathering in all of the bloc’s main countries, the USSR excepted. In the early 1970s some of those structures became official outposts representing the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs to allied security services in other communist countries. Nonetheless, intelligence work continued, though with a limited scope. The system developed in that period persisted in roughly the same form until the system’s collapse in 1989.
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Concepts of the Disinformation of the Foreign Intelligence Services. New Traces in the Structural History of Department II of the Ministry of Internal Affairs after 1956
Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944-1989, No. 18 (2020), pages: 56-70
Following the lifting of restrictions on the so-called ‘restricted resource’ held by the Institute of National Remembrance, those documents threw a new light on the structural evolution and competences of Section VIII, in Department II of Poland’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, especially in the 1970s and 1980s. As it turns out, plans were in place for the section to form a unit for offensive activity against the Western intelligence services, primarily through disinformation. Ultimately, those original ambitions were scaled down on account of competency conflicts between different counterintelligence structures, and the section became a unit with a predominant focus on information and analytics for disinformation counterintelligence activity at central and regional levels.
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Division II of the Security Services and the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Population, Pro-German Attitudes and Polish-German Relations: A Case Study of Upper Silesia in 1957–1990
Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944-1989, No. 18 (2020), pages: 71-97
One of the most important tasks of the security apparatus in Poland’s Upper Silesia involved combating German identity or pro-German sentiment among the local Silesian population. This effort was predominantly aimed at protecting the European territorial status quo after World War II. Also, or perhaps predominantly, the security apparatus was involved in efforts to safeguard the interests of Communist power, which aspired to maintain complete control over society. This control was seen as a tool for implementing a utopian vision of a society that was fully homogeneous in terms of ideology, politics or ethnicity. This political ambiguity was particularly characteristic of the counterintelligence elements of the Security Services, known as Division II (pion II), tasked with the so-called ‘German issues’. Out of all the structures in the Security Services, that section’s tasks were the most closely aligned with Poland’s national interests. However, it would be a serious mistake to overlook the section’s other tasks, which were predominantly aimed at destroying social liberties and implementing the totalitarian aspirations of Communist power.
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Training System of the Polish People’s Republic Security Services – the Department IV of Ministry of Internal Affairs Case (an Outline of the Problem)
Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944-1989, No. 18 (2020), pages: 98-131
From the moment the People’s Republic of Poland was created, the Communists regarded the Catholic Church, along with other religious denominations, as a major opponent. In 1962, Department IV was established to provide effective surveillance and to counteract any hostile activity from those quarters. To improve effectiveness at the Department, it was decided that special training should be provided to its officers and employees. The issue of professional training and development should be considered as one of the most important tasks in state security. In terms of professional development, personal growth in society had to go beyond intellectual improvement or the emotional and formative processes that conditioned it. To keep Department IV in good working order, their training included elements of law, psychology, tactics and operational technique. A good understanding of the rules and options of physical coercion was fundamental to implementing certain tasks. The professional predispositions of the officers were seen as key. This article describes the system for training operatives at Department IV in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, explains the selection process for officers and civilian employees, and provides an overview of the course of study at college level, its eligibility criteria, and training effectiveness.
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The Structures and Personnel of the Security Apparatus Dealing with Intelligence Operations against Religious Orders in the Voivodeship of Silesia/Katowice in 1945–1989
Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944-1989, No. 18 (2020), pages: 132-160
This article presents the security apparatus structures and personnel conducting intelligence operations against religious orders in the voivodeship of Silesia/Katowice in 1945–1989. The analysis examines the personnel and structures tasked with activities aimed against religious orders at the voivodeship (regional) level, including special units within the voivodeship structures located in Częstochowa (1958–1975). The article contains three parts: a discussion of the structures in the voivodeship security apparatus in Katowice dealing with religious orders and their evolution over the years, followed by a discussion of the officers tasked with those activities, followed by a discussion of their backgrounds, education, ideological attitudes, party membership, family background and connections within the security apparatus.
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The Security Department of the District Headquarters of the Citizens’ Militia in Krosno in 1957–1975. Structures, Leadership, Activities
Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944-1989, No. 18 (2020), pages: 161-231
This article presents a district-level (powiat) unit of the Communist Security Service in Krosno, operating in 1957–1975 as the Security Section (Referat) at the District Headquarters of the Citizens’ Militia in Krosno. The article is divided into three parts. The first describes the unit’s structure and its organizational and personnel changes over the 18 years of its existence. The second presents the biographical information and careers of its three heads, Franciszek Włodarski, Jerzy Grodecki and Jan Żak. The third part presents its main areas of activity, its specific operations and its agents. The article contains photographs of the three unit heads and the building in which it was located, tables and a list of all the security officers employed in the unit in 1957–1975.
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Areas of Cooperation between the Polish United Workers’ Party, Local Administration and the Security Service. A Case Study of the Districts in the Cracow Voivodeship, 1957–1975. An Overview of Research Problems
Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944-1989, No. 18 (2020), pages: 232-290
This article deals with the areas of cooperation between the Polish United Workers’ Party, the local administration and the Security Service in matters of control and repression. The analysis covers the districts (powiat) in the Cracow voivodeship, 1957–1975. The introduction describes the role and position of each of those actors within the local power structure, with a focus on the mutual interrelations and impacts of those institutions, including at the personal level. Based on source analysis, this is followed by a list of areas where cooperation took place, as illustrated by specific examples. The summary contains conclusions based on an analysis of the documents. More research is needed into areas of cooperation between the party, local administration officials and the security apparatus. Attention is also drawn to possible other areas of cooperation between those actors in other voivodeships at the time.
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"The Spy Next Door". The Case of Alfons Grygier as an Example of Recruitment Efforts of the German Federal Intelligence Service Aimed at the Autochthonous Silesian Population (1958–1960)
Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944-1989, No. 18 (2020), pages: 291-325
The main aim of this article is to present the working methods used until the mid-1950s by the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) among citizens of Communist Poland staying in the Federal Republic of Germany under a temporary leave to remain. The analysis discusses the case of Alfons Grygier, recruited by the BND for intelligence collaboration in the autumn of 1958 after visiting his brother in West Berlin. The article is also based on reports by employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, containing a discussion of BND activities directed against Polish citizens. It describes the many activities undertaken by the counterintelligence services of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to identify and detain a person providing secret intelligence reports. Attention is also drawn to the unique situation of the autochthonous population in the context of the interest it attracted from the West German special services.
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Operation 'Małgorzata' – the Backstory of a Counterintelligence Operation against the German BND
Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944-1989, No. 18 (2020), pages: 326-344
In the 1980s, Department II of the Ministry of Internal Affairs used a secret collaborator codenamed "Lange" (formerly "Małgorzata") to engage in a counterintelligence game with the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND). While visiting family in Germany, the secret collaborator fed misinformation to BND operatives, who were mostly interested in military (defence) information as well as economic, social or political issues in Poland. The BND attached particular importance to information on the 10th Congress of the Polish United Workers’ Party, personnel changes in the party’s Politburo and the policies of the party and the government towards the dissidents ("Solidarity"). "Lange" was also "profiled" by the BND as a "source unit", providing information about the functioning of the Warsaw 20th Armoured Division and the 2nd Brandenburg Fighter-Bomber Division.
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A Rewritten Biography. Unknown Facts from the Life of Rev. Karol Nawa
Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944-1989, No. 18 (2020), pages: 345-385
This article supplements the known biographical studies on Rev. Karol Nawa, a Catholic priest sentenced to three years’ imprisonment in 1961 for alleged fraud concerning in the construction of the Church of the Holy Spirit in Chorzów. The article examines the priest’s recruitment as a secret Security Service collaborator code named "Doktor". The duration and frequency of his meetings with Security Service operatives and the amounts of remuneration he received has been established based on the records of the operative fund and the administrative materials of Section IV of the Security Service, Voivodeship Headquarters of the Citizens’ Militia/Voivodeship Office for Internal Affairs in Katowice. The information provided by “Doktor” is separately discussed, along with its intended use by the security apparatus. The summary presents the priest’s situation after his release from prison, his relations with the bishops in Katowice, and speculation concerning his motivations in engaging in a collaboration with the Security Service.
Articles and comparative studies: Apparatuses of Repression in Other Communist and Totalitarian Countries
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Defining the Ideological 'Enemy': The KGB’s Reports on 'Trends in the Tactics of the Enemy for Conducting Ideological Subversion', 1974–1988
Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944-1989, No. 18 (2020), pages: 389-403
Beginning in 1974, the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) began sending the other Soviet-bloc security services annual or semi-annual reports entitled "Trends in the Tactics of the Enemy for Conducting Ideological Subversion against the USSR". The reports focused on real and alleged efforts of the United States, as well as China, Islamic countries and foreign organisations, to encourage political opposition inside the Soviet Union. The reports, in conjunction with the triennial meetings of the divisions of the Soviet-bloc security services responsible for combatting "ideological subversion", served to mobilise these "fraternal organs" against increased foreign influence and contacts in the wake of the East-West détente of the 1970s. They also signalled areas in which the KGB would seek assistance from its allied security services. The article analyses the evolving content of the reports and the reaction of the Soviet-bloc security services to them based on the example of the East German Stasi.
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Surveillance Keeping Step with Integrating Elites: The 'Operativgruppe Moskau' of the East German Stasi
Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944-1989, No. 18 (2020), pages: 404-414
This paper deals with the collaboration between the East German Stasi and the KGB. It focuses on the Stasi outpost in the USSR, the Operativgruppe Moskau, which functioned since the mid-1950s to monitor East German citizens in the USSR. It examines the development and the expanding scope of this Stasi outpost, outlines its activities and describes its limits, which were caused both by the mentality of the Stasi officers and the subordinate role of the Stasi outpost within the collaboration of the two secret services. The Operativgruppe Moskau is seen as an expression of the Stasi’s claim to control GDR citizens even beyond the GDR’s borders, and in general as an element of the cross-border surveillance in the Eastern bloc, following the growing exchange between the European socialist countries and its citizens.
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The Impact of Soviet Ministry of State Security’s Advisers on Hungarian State Security Investigations, Late 1949–1950. A Case Study
Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944-1989, No. 18 (2020), pages: 415-430
Examining the first major case the Hungarian state security organ realised after the arrival in late 1949 of the delegation of Soviet state securitym advisers, the paper aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of their activities in Budapest. The paper’s focus includes the everyday working practices of the MGB representatives in cooperation with the local officers, with a special emphasis on the preparation of show trials, an essential element of policy making in the Eastern Bloc during the Stalin era. The case in question is the Standard Electric show trial of February 1950, featuring espionage and sabotage charges against the senior management of an American-owned company in Hungary, including a US and a British citizen, Robert Vogeler and Edgar Sanders. The exceptionally rich surviving archival material and officers’ accounts show that the Soviet delegation, led by Colonel Kartashov and his deputies Polyakov and Yevdokimenko, affected the preparations of the case both indirectly and directly. The examination was handled by a new department established by the advisers within the Hungarian state security organ (ÁVH). The Soviet officers also introduced some fresh working methods, as reflected in the Standard Electric files. Direct involvement by the MGB advisers in the case comprised of a failed proposal to make a substantial number of new arrests; the selection of a detainee from another case, Zoltán Radó, to be used as one of the key figures in the Standard Electric trial; as well as consulting and instructing Hungarian counterparts on a daily basis as to interrogation methods and the desired results. The advisers, whose activities also led to some conflicts with local officers, especially Colonel Gyula Décsi, even took part in some of the interrogations personally and received copies of all confessions made by the suspects. The paper concludes, calling attention to the importance of comparative research into other cases and examples from other countries, that even though the Soviet officers had wide-ranging powers that obviously exceeded a traditional advisory mandate, they did not have complete control over the case as the ultimate direction rested in the hands of Mátyás Rákosi, Hungary’s supreme leader.
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Some Aspects of the Cooperation between the Hungarian and Soviet Intelligence Services
Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944-1989, No. 18 (2020), pages: 431-446
In the spring of 1950, the Soviet government forbade intelligence work against the so-called people’s democratic countries. Simultaneously, on 17 April 1950, the Politburo of the CPSU decided to create links between the intelligence services of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries in order to help them in the intelligence against the Western states and “Tito’s clique” and to create Soviet political intelligence representation in these countries. In Hungary the ways and methods of the cooperation were worked out in May 1950 and the first group of Soviet advisors also arrived. In the first period the cooperation meant the exchange of intelligence information, later it included also advice on structural and technical questions, using the intelligence opportunities of the partners, and joint actions.
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Bulgaria’s Participation in the System of Joint Acquisition of Enemy Data (SOUD)
Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944-1989, No. 18 (2020), pages: 447-456
The System of Joint Acquisition of Enemy Data (SOUD) ushered in a new stage of the cooperation between Bulgaria, the GDR, Mongolia, Poland, Cuba, Vietnam, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR in the sphere of intelligence and counterintelligence. Its ideology and organisation were designed by the Soviet Union – an initiative that started in 1975. The system was inaugurated and came into force in 1981. By the end of 1989, when it started falling apart, there was an intense and active exchange of intelligence data between the member countries. Over this period of time, Bulgaria collected information on 17,000 persons and Moscow on more than 260,000. This information was shared with the rest of the SOUD member countries.
Articles and studies: Varia
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From Yalta to Potsdam. Soviet Special Services and the Establishment of the Provisional Government of National Unity in Poland (TRJN)
Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944-1989, No. 18 (2020), pages: 459-480
The Polish question was one of the main reasons of disputes between the Soviet Union and Western Powers, the United States and Great Britain, in the final phase of World War II. The problem of which government should exercise power in Poland had absorbed the attention of the Big Three since the Yalta Conference (4–11 February 1945) to the end of June 1945 and became one of the first signs of the collapse of the coalition of Western Powers and the Soviet Union. Throughout this time, British and American intelligence services played an unequal game with the Soviet security apparatus. Soviet intelligence successfully penetrated the US and UK diplomatic services. The decisive factor in Stalin’s success, however, was not intelligence, which came mainly from agents such as Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess and Kim Philby, but the fact that the territory of Poland was seized by the Red Army and the Communist government was established there, supported by the Soviet security apparatus. Great Britain and the United States had limited possibilities to influence the situation in Poland. This country, like the rest of Eastern Europe, was not in area of their strategic interests. Moreover, the Anglo-Saxon Powers made before 1945 a number of diplomatic mistakes that made it easier for the Soviet Union to include Poland in the Communist sphere of influence for over four decades.
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The Case of Colonel Jarosław Gintrowski as an Example of 'Security Assistance' Provided to the Army by the Internal Military Service
Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944-1989, No. 18 (2020), pages: 481-515
Colonel Jarosław Stefan Gintrowski – father to Przemysław Gintrowski, a musician and songwriter later known as ‘the Bard of the Solidarity’ – was a loyal and committed officer of the Polish People’s Army and a member of the Polish United Workers’ Party. His superiors valued him as an intelligent and gifted officer with foreign language skills and considerable military expertise. Col. Gintrowski came to the attention of the Internal Military Service owing to his contacts with Col. Włodzimierz Ostaszewicz and Col. Ryszard Kukliński. However, what the military counterintelligence found the most objectionable was the artistic activity of his son Przemysław, who provided support to the dissident activities of the underground Solidarity movement. As a result, the Internal Military Service had Col. Gintrowski released from the army. This demonstrates that the military counterintelligence served as a sort of political gendarmerie for the Polish army with the final say in all things.
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The Activities of Regional Censorship Offices under Martial Law in Poland
Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944-1989, No. 18 (2020), pages: 516-593
The article presents the activities of regional censorship offices operating at voivodeship level during the Martial Law in the 1981–1982. Those were created out of personnel from Sections W and Sections T of the Voivodeship Citizen’s Milicia Headquarters and Voivodeship Offices of Internal Affairs (KWMO/WUSW) and operated for over a year (13 December 1981 to 31 December 1982). The main task of those regional censorship offices was to censor mail correspondence and telecommunications messages, and to provide surveillance of telephone calls. The article is based on the Security Service sources relating to postal censorship and reports on the telecommunications censorship activities of individual regional censorship offices. The article looks at the activities of the censorship offices in two sets of voivodeships created by the administrative reforms of 1975: the first set comprises the 17 previously existing (“historical”) voivodeships, the second one comprises the 32 extra voivodeships created as a result of the reform. A comparative analysis of the activities of different offices shows that the censorship of telecommunications messages and phone call surveillance were first handled (until the end of December 1981), and then only supervised, by Section T operatives. The burden of censoring telegrams and telex messages and conducting phone call surveillance fell to regular telecommunications workers. According to the heads of the relevant censorship sections this resulted in a drop in the quality and effectiveness of the censorship and produced inferior outcomes. The leadership of the Main Censorship Office believed that censorship fulfilled its intended role as a major constraint imposed across a broad spectrum of society. By censoring mail correspondence it was possible to gauge the public mood and opinions in different social groups (students, academics, culture) on the state of martial law as well as on government and party policies. The censorship also helped to curb the activities of the dissident opposition through seizure of clandestine publications published in Poland and abroad, and exerted a psychological impact on society, who kept hearing the recorded message, "this phone call is being monitored").
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What is There in Those Archives... An Exploration of the Allocation of the Records and Archives of the Communist Interior Apparatus in 1989–1992 (Part I)
Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944-1989, No. 18 (2020), pages: 594-627
The article is the first part of a study concerning the allocation of the records and archives of the communist Interior apparatus in 1989–1992. Following some introductory comments the article focuses on the events from June 1989 until April 1990. It primarily describes the decision to move the archival records from the Central Archive of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Bureau C) to the Central Archives of Modern Records (AAN) in 1989. It also discusses the clash between two institutions at the end of 1989 and early 1990, namely between the Head Directorate of State Archives (NDAP) and the Main Commission for the Investigation of Nazi Crimes in Poland – Institute of National Remembrance (GKBZHwP – IPN) the takeover of the archival records of the Ministry of Internal Affairs held on deposit in various locations in Poland since 1966. The final part of the article describes the mutual contacts between the representatives of state and voivodeship (and Warsaw) archives of internal affairs offices concerning the takeover of any materials held by the Ministry of Internal Affairs but originating from other institutions.
Articles and studies: Biographies
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Marian Janicki (1927–2020) – A Member of the Citizens’ Militia and Diplomat
Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944-1989, No. 18 (2020), pages: 637-646
The article attempts to offer an overview of the career of Marian Janicki within the structures of the Security Service, the Citizens’ Militia, and the diplomatic service. It examines the period from his birth in 1927 (including information on his family background) until 1985, the year he left service. The article presents Marian Janicki’s entire professional career beginning with his joining the Citizens’ Militia in the Voivodeship Headquarters in Wrocław and ending with his mission as the Polish ambassador to Tunisia. The article examines Janicki’s participation in, and impact on, major events such as the strikes of June 1976 or the imposition of martial law on 13 December 1981. As a Chief Commandant of the Citizens’ Militia and a deputy minister of internal affairs Janicki worked for a number of years on important cases connected with safeguarding communist interests in Poland. His professional career illustrates the considerable Commitment of Militia officers in the work of the security apparatus and their loyalty to the party.
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Bolesław Halewski (Heller) (1919–1999) – Exceptionally Cruel or a Typical Security Service Officer?
Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944-1989, No. 18 (2020), pages: 647-684
Following the end of World War II, a large group of people with a Jewish background joined the justice system, the propaganda apparatus and the security services in the Polish People’s Republic. Bolesław (Heller) Halewski was one case in point. He spent the war in the Soviet Union and returned to Poland in 1944. After a several months of training as a political army officer, he was assigned to work for the Ministry of Public Security. During his time as an officer in the Security Department, he exhibited exceptional brutality and callousness. This led to several deaths, which he was also involved in covering up. After several years he was expelled from service and sentenced for criminal offences committed while in service. An investigation into his crimes was launched after October 1956, then discontinued. The criminal justice system did not investigate his crimes again until after 1989. However, Halewski avoided liability by legally emigrating to Israel, where he remained until his death. He was one of a group of several hundred Jewish people who left a particularly negative mark on the Polish public opinion after 1945 as a result of their involvement in the Communist regime.
Materials and documents
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A Report from a Clandestine Meeting of Security Chiefs from the Socialist Countries, 7–12 March 1955
Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944-1989, No. 18 (2020), pages: 687-713
In parallel with the preparations for the establishment of the Warsaw Pact, arrangements were made by the KGB to build closer co-operations between the state security services. On the Soviet side, they aspired to convene a joint meeting as soon as possible, where the intelligence leaders of seven socialist countries could discuss a better organization and management – instead of the looser contacts through ubiquitous Soviet advisers – of intelligence, espionage, radio reconnaissance and operational technology. Following the motions adopted at the meeting, socialist intelligence became more cooperative against the major Western states, within the counter-espionage, offensive intelligence had become dominant. The specific tasks of the intelligence services of each country have also been defined separately, e.g. the reconnaissance of the American emigrant military force became a priority joint task of the Hungarian and Polish intelligence services. An important consequence of the decisions of the Moscow conference was that state security agencies in all participating countries further strengthened their positions within the repressive apparatus, which had serious consequences in the political struggles that soon became critical in some states of the alliance.
This paper is a translation of a publication Jelentés a szo-cialista országok állambiztonsági vezetőinek titkos moszkvai tárgyalásairól, 1955. március 7–12, „Hadtörténelmi közlemények”, no. 114 (2001).
Research and review articles
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[Review] Tomasz Kozłowski, Koniec imperium MSW. Transformacja organów bezpieczeństwa państwa 1989–1990, Warsaw, 2019
Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944-1989, No. 18 (2020), pages: 717-738
The book under review here, Koniec imperium MSW. Transformacja organów bezpieczeństwa państwa 1989–1990 by Tomasz Kozłowski, is the first book-length publication devoted entirely to the transformation in the Polish apparatus of internal affairs in 1989–1990. It covers the background, course and results of that process. The author offers a critical verification of popular ideas about the transition from the Security Service and the Citizens’ Militia to the Office of State Protection (UOP) and the Police. The publication features little-known or previously unavailable historical sources. The book has a major significance for understanding not just the premises and mechanisms of reorganization in the interior apparatus but also the mechanisms of transformation in Poland as a whole.
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The Soviet Secret Services in Lithuania (1940–1990). Research and Evaluation in Lithuanian Historiography since 1991
Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944-1989, No. 18 (2020), pages: 739-746
Historical research in independent Lithuanian of the crimes of the Soviet regime and the activities of the KGB is vital in dealing with the heritage of the Soviet system, in searching for the truth, implementing justice, retrieving the victims, and bringing to light the names of perpetrators of the crimes against the Lithuanian nation. Research on the Soviet secret services became possible just after 1991 when Lithuania regained its independence, and KGB documents became available. However, not all the documents remained in Lithuania. During the perestroika period, some were brought away to Russian archives. The lack of documents is a big obstacle in researching KGB activity, especially KGB agent activity. Research on Lithuania’s Soviet secret services can be described in different forms. Chronologically, scholars deal with two periods: 1940–1954 and 1954–1990. Thematically, they researched the secret services’ structure, methods, relationship with the communist party, the struggle with armed and unarmed anti-Soviet movements. They have also paid attention to the secret services’ struggle against the Catholic Church, dissidents, emigrants, individual and organised economic and cultural resistance and their activities in the spheres of economy and culture.
Discussions and polemics
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Editorial Board's Information
Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944-1989, No. 18 (2020), pages: 749-750
Editorial Board's information concerning Krzysztof A. Tochman's paper Michał Fijałka (1915–1983), cichociemny, żołnierz AK, tajny współpracownik UB-SB o pseudonimie „Osiecki”, published in „Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944–1989” no. 1(7) (2009), and Grzegorz Fijałka's response, published in „Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944–1989” no. 18 (2020) (DOI: 10.48261/ARPRL201826).
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Reply to the Krzysztof Tochman’s Paper "Michał Fijałka (1915–1983), a Secret Collaborator of the Security Department and Security Service Pseudonym »Osiecki«"
Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944-1989, No. 18 (2020), pages: 751-776
The article is a polemic against Krzysztof Tochman’s arguments presented in his article ‘Michał Fijałka (1915–1983), cichociemny, żołnierz AK, tajny współpracownik UB-SB o pseudonimie »Osiecki«’, published in Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944–1989 (no. 1[7], 2009). As a witness to those events, the author critically assesses the Security Department records held by the Institute of National Remembrance.
Most read
162 Ministry of Education and Science evaluation points:
40 (2024)
Research areas: humanities
Disciplines: history, security studies, political science and public administration
Editor-in-chief: Dr. habil. Filip Musiał
- Institute of National Remembrance
Commission for the Prosecution
of Crimes against the Polish Nation
1 Janusza Kurtyki Str.
02-676 Warsaw (Poland)
NIP: 525-21-80-487
- tel.: +48 22 581-87-78/77/76
e-mail: wydawnictwo@ipn.gov.pl
