Given their activity and positions, the relationship between Józef Piłsudski and Aleksander Kakowski during World War I deserves attention. Piłsudski’s activities as Commander in Chief of the Polish Legions created the political conditions for an ever-Stronger emphasis on Poland’s independence. For that reason, Aleksander Kakowski as Archbishop of Warsaw also played an important role in the political arena. His political significance grew after the Proclamation of 5 November 1916, and reached its peak in 1917–1918, when he sat on the Regency Council, which was an important element of the Polish State reconstituted after the period of partitions. The fates of both politicians were intertwined throughout the Great War, 1914–1918, and in its final stages Poland regained its independence in 1918. The article is an attempt to present their mutual relations during this period.

When military operations on the fronts of the Great War ceased, the attention of international public opinion shifted from military commanders to politicians. During numerous meetings and conferences, it was they who were to determine the new post- war order. Among the victorious superpowers, the leading roles were played by the

American President Thomas Woodrow Wilson and two Prime Ministers – Georges Clemenceau of France and David Lloyd George of Great Britain. Their most important meeting, which lasted several months, took place in Paris in the first half of 1919 and was one of the most important in the history of the past century. Its participants included the Polish delegation, in which the leader of the National Camp and the Polish National Committee in Paris, Roman Dmowski, played a key role. The Polish position on the future borders of reborn Poland had to be presented by him 29 January 1919, i.e. several days after the official opening of the debates (18 January). The text refers to his speech. It went down in history not only because of its length – Dmowski spoke before the afore-mentioned leaders for nearly five hours, which was influenced by the fact that he had translated the original French version of his speech into English himself – but above all because of its quality of content. It included statements by Dmowski himself as well as by other participants to the meeting. This article aimed not only to present the arguments used by the Polish delegate during his speech but also the atmosphere and mood that accompanied it. There is no doubt that the meeting, which took place in the office of the French Foreign Minister Stephen Pichon on the Quai d’Orsay, was one of the first essential chords of the political struggle for the borders of the Second Republic.

This article presents the issue of the international position and territorial shape of the Republic of Poland from the point of view of Spanish diplomacy in 1919. It is based primarily on the documentation of the Madrid Ministry of State. In the timespan discussed, the Ministry, which was responsible for foreign affairs, perceived these issues by acknowledging the fact of the rebirth of Poland’s statehood. In a situation of considerable confusion, little importance was attached to the territorial shape of the new republic, probably on the assumption that the matter was reserved for the decisions of the victorious powers in the war. However, general remarks on this subject can be found in the reports of the first head of the Spanish post in Warsaw after the renewal of diplomatic relations, the chargé d’affaires en pied, Fernando Gómez-Contreras y Ruiz de Granja. He was an enthusiast of Polish independence, and in his reports to Madrid he emphasised the enormous effort to rebuild the Polish state, and – with some exaggeration – its unjust treatment by the Allies, despite its contribution to the global struggle against Germany. He also noted the threat to the existence of the reborn Republic and the various flashpoints in relations between Poland and its neighbours. In the reports preserved in the Ministry of State’s files, he did not enter into discussions about the borders of the Republic, although the possibility that he did raise this issue, as some of the correspondence did not survive, cannot be excluded. Importantly, little happened in the period from September/October 1919 as regards border battles, especially in connection with the stabilisation of the Polish-Soviet front. Nonetheless, the Spaniard commented on the increasing burden of Polish spending on the war in the East against Bolshevism in a situation where the West was demobilising at the time. In his view, Poland’s role as a barrier to Bolshevik Russia remained in the interests of the whole world. The diplomat assured Madrid that the superpowers needed a ‘free Poland’, and that it would not hold on its own. The interest of the Spanish diplomacy in the Polish borders grew strongly in 1920 in connection to the intensification of the Polish-Bolshevik War and the imminent threat to the existence of the Polish state.

In November 1918, only part of the Polish lands were able to enjoy independence. Whereas the north-eastern areas of the pre-partition Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were still under German occupation and had to wait several more months for independence. This was related to the military and political situation in this part of Europe, where Germany had at its disposal serious military forces, still maintaining discipline and combat capability. It should also be noted that the occupation system in the area subordinated to the Commander of the Eastern Front (Oberbefehlshaber Ost – abbreviated as Ober-Ost) was much more repressive and oppressive for the inhabitants than, for example, in the General Governorate of Warsaw. The occupation authorities conducted ruthless economic exploitation of the occupied territories. The inhabitants were subjected to strict control. A ban on political activity and strict censorship of the press and all publications were introduced. Public gatherings were banned and restrictions were placed on the movement of the population.

One of the main areas of struggle between the reborn Polish state and Bolshevik Russia was the territory of Belarus. In 1919–1920, the war swept through these lands several times. The Byelorussians’ attitude to the warring sides was varied. At least part of the Belarusian community took the side of Poland. In October 1919, a group of Byelorussian activists cooperating with Poland obtained Józef Piłsudski’s consent to form Byelorussian military units as part of the Polish Army. The organisation responsible for the formation of Byelorussian units was the Byelorussian Military Commission (BKW). Byelorussians were Poland’s first allies in the war with Bolshevik Russia. Polish-Byelorussian cooperation in the formation of Byelorussian units encountered numerous difficulties and, consequently, did not bring the expected results. In the face of the Red Army offensive in summer 1920, the Byelorussian Military Commission was evacuated to Łódź, where it continued its activities until the beginning of 1921. The peace treaty in Riga (March 1921) finally resolved the liquidation of the Byelorussian Military Commission and the Belarusian units within the Polish Army.

The article aims to present the current state of research concerning the genesis and beginnings of the Polish-Lithuanian dispute over Vilnius and the Vilnius Region in connection with General Lucjan Żeligowski’s action in October 1920. The author has described as broadly as possible the genesis (with an emphasis on the role of Soviet Russia), course and direct consequences of the so-called Żeligowski ‘Mutiny’ inspired by Józef Piłsudski, its internal background and international conditions. Żeligowski’s revolt against Lithuania, which resulted in the creation of the quasi-state of Central Lithuania in the Vilnius area, and the subsequent incorporation of that territory into the Republic of Poland, was an element of Piłsudski’s concept his the eastern policy. Because of the unfavourable international situation and the reluctant attitude of the Lithuanians, Marshal Piłsudski decided upon the incorporation of Vilnius and the Vilnius Region into Poland, rather than create a federation with Lithuania. This fact significantly influenced the Polish-Lithuanian relations in the interwar period. The article applies the inductive and deductive method and the direct and indirect method of establishing facts. The comparative method and inference from the silence of sources have been used as well.

Researchers of the Center for the Study of Ukrainian-Polish Relations at the Ivan Krypjakewych Institute of Ukrainian Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Lviv) analyse the contemporary scientific output of Ukrainian historians (collective and individual monographs, thematic encyclopaedias, cartographic publications), concerning the geopolitical contexts of the Polish-Ukrainian War of 1918–1919, and the statehood of the West Ukrainian People's Republic. Ukrainian historians consider the following reasons for the defeat of the Ukrainian revolution, primarily the West Ukrainian People’s Republic (ZURL) in the Polish-Ukrainian War of 1918–1919: the lack of unity among the political elite, the unfinished process of nation-building, the discrepancies between the national and social goals of the all-Ukrainian liberation movement, while they consider the influence of external and military factors as the key ones. The unilateral orientation of Ukrainian politicians in Eastern Galicia towards Austria-Hungary and Germany during World War I led to a lack of constructive contacts with the post-war Entente and US governments. In view of the new military and political situation in Central and Eastern Europe, mainly due to the threat of the expansion of Bolshevik Russia and the spread of communist regimes, Western states were inclined to settle the Polish-Ukrainian armed conflict over Galicia in favour of an internally compact Poland. On 14 March 1923 the Council of Representatives of the Entente states recognised Eastern Galicia as part of the Polish state, the government promised to guarantee national minorities the possibility of developing national and cultural life, and to grant autonomy to Eastern Galicia (which it failed to do). The cult of heroes and national/state/local mythology is an important source for the construction of historical narratives. Nowadays in the world, and partly also in Ukraine, the historical sciences accept the fact that historical perceptions function in social consciousness. For researchers of the period of restoration of modern Polish and Ukrainian statehood, national historical legends (about the Eaglets of Lviv and Przemyśl, about the November uprising of the Ukrainians) are not a manifestation of distorted historical knowledge, but a story about the past in different context. However, a critical approach, based on a reliable analysis of sources and a professional scientific debate, should prevail in the professional description of history.

The paper aims to answer the question about the inspirations that guided Józef Piłsudski when preparing for the Battle of Warsaw. Sources indicate that the Polish Commander-in-Chief strongly rejected the western war doctrine based on the experience of World War I. Instead, he attributed the primary role to manoeuvre, using the Napoleonic pattern of striking the enemy’s lines of communication during the Battle of Warsaw. The text presents the views of French military theorist of the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, Hubert Camon, who analysed the components of the manoeuvres used by Napoleon and was the first to notice their similarity to the solutions used during the Battle of Warsaw.

After the end of the Russian/Soviet-Georgian war in February–March 1921, Georgia lost its independence and was occupied by Soviet Russia. Information about this war was collected, among others, by the Information Desk of the Second Branch of the General Staff of the Polish Army. The information prepared by the Information Desk was compiled at regular intervals (every two weeks). They covered, among other things, the Russian-Georgian war of 1920 and the establishment of Soviet power in Georgia. Branch II of the General Staff relied on information of official and unofficial origin. In the studies prepared by Branch II of the General Staff of the Polish Army it is difficult to find information that would be unknown to Georgian historians, but these studies help to clarify some detailed issues. These studies are interesting for two reasons. First, the information available to the Polish Army General Staff indicates how it was informed. Second, it is important to what extent the information in these Polish studies corresponds to reality. The very fact of including Georgia-related issues in these documents testifies to the importance of Georgia and, more broadly, of the whole South Caucasus for the Polish authorities. The first information about the Russian-Georgian war appeared in the study, which discusses the situation as of 1 March 1921. The last news mentioning Georgia’s affairs is found in a study dated June 1, 1921. The issue of the Russo-Georgian War and the establishment of Soviet power in Georgia was discussed in five studies. Except for minor and insignificant inaccuracies the whole process was described correctly. The main conclusion – the coup d’état and the establishment of Soviet power with the help of the troops of Soviet Russia – is also correct. Although Georgia was formally an independent republic after the establishment of Soviet power, in reality it was occupied and the Red Army was stationed on its territory. The information gathered in the studies discussed above confirms that the General Staff of the Polish Army was well informed on the Georgian question. The information about the events that took place in Georgia in 1921 confirms the interest of the Polish military and probably also political authorities in this region, especially Georgia.

At the threshold of Poland’s regaining independence, the Lublin Region was an exceptional area. Therein were the developed political structures of left-wing parties and the Polish Military Organisation, the Austrian occupation which was less severe in political terms than the German occupation, and the administrative centre of which was Lublin. All these created favourable conditions for the establishment of Ignacy Daszyński’s government in Lublin. The subject of this article is the staffing of starosts, i.e. officials at the head of poviats. While reflecting on the criteria for appointing people to this office in 1918–1921, the author shows that during the left-wing governments (Ignacy Daszyński and Jędrzej Moraczewski), starosts were usually appointed by activists from left-wing and independence organisations. Some political activists, unprepared for official functions, resigned from their posts, which opened the way to a relative stabilisation of the staff of the office in question in the Lublin area, which took place after 1921.

The text shows the activity of the representation of the Christian Democratic in the Legislative Sejm of the Second Republic of Poland. It presents the composition of the Christian National Workers’ Club, its authorities and the dynamics of changes in the size of its membership. An analysis is made of Christian Democratic political thought, reconstructed based on the first programme of the Christian National Labour Party of 1920 and an analysis of the activity of Christian Democratic deputies in the plenary forum of the Legislative Sejm (here, the primary basis for sources were transcripts

of sessions of the Legislative Sejm). The output of the Christian Democratic political thought was presented in regard to the following issues: the position of religion in public life, the role of education, the social question (especially the workers’ question), the political system (especially the contribution of the Christian Democrats to the work on the March Constitution of 1921) and policy. The analysis enabled reconstruction of the fundamental elements of Christian Democratic political thought, above all, their appreciation for a specific axiological system, and demonstrates the consistency of programmatic assumptions with legislative initiatives taken in parliament.

In 1920, the Polish national team planned its Olympic debut at the Antwerp Games. Preparations for the competition had already started in 1919. Unfortunately, the Polish-Bolshevik war, which began in February 1919, had a major impact on the organisational and financial problems of the Polish Olympic Games Committee. The main pre-Olympic competitions of Polish athletes, in several disciplines (e.g. horse-riding, cycling, athletics, football, shooting, fencing), were held in Bydgoszcz, Cracow, Lviv and Warsaw, and abroad (tennis players). On 25 July 1920, Stefan Lubomirski – President of the Polish Olympic Games Committee – sent a communiqué to Belgium, in which he justified the absence of the Olympic Games by the difficult military situation on the front of the Polish-Bolshevik war and the patriotic attitude of Polish youth, who rushed to arms to defend their homeland. On the day of the inauguration of the Olympics in Antwerp, 14 August 1920, the fate of not only Poland, but of the whole of Europe was decided near Warsaw. The athletes in Belgium had no idea at that time that the Red Army was still planning to march westwards, over the ‘corpse of Poland’. There is not the slightest doubt that the victory of the Polish Army on the outskirts of Warsaw, in whose ranks the would-be Olympians fought, saved the freedom of the whole of Europe.

The turbulent history of Poland and the Polish nation’s struggle for independence found its reflection in national literature and art. In order to determine the linguistic determinants of national values encoded in the poetry of war (the so-called Tyrtian poetry), a collection of lyrics written by airmen fighting in Polish squadrons in Great Britain was examined. Air force poetry differs from legionary or insurrectionary poetry because of its combat, social and political conditions. It connotes a set of universal motifs, symbols, key words and values, which turn out to be common, but it also has its own peculiarities typical of it: space, the ocean, birds, flight, the wing, the white-and-red chessboard, longing, betrayal. A self-sacrificing struggle for the freedom of the homeland and the world ends in political betrayal, exclusion from the Victory Parade in London, social rejection and the impossibility of returning to Poland, which the poets express in works that imply strong emotions: anger, frustration, bitterness of disappointment and resentment. In conclusion, the analysis of the linguistic exponents of national values present in the analysed collection of war poetry demonstrates the uniformity of the Polish national identity and the universality of the national axiological system.

The death of Poland’s First Marshal was used by his adherents for political purposes. Piłsudski’s funeral ceremonies constituted an unprecedented and symbolic event aimed at highlighting his greatness and merits and portraying him as one of Poland’s most distinguished citizens. The ceremonies continued for a few days (and the national mourning for six weeks). The Chief Committee for the Remembrance of Marshal Józef Piłsudski was set up with a view to honouring the Marshal and his deeds. The Committee’s efforts were coordinated by the Executive Department (the WWNK), whose main task was to make sure that the coffin with Piłsudski would be deposited in the crypt under the Tower of the Silver Bells. Because of the scope of work to be carried out in the Wawel Cathedral, constituting property of the Catholic Church, the task was extremely difficult to carry out. It did not take long before it became clear that the goals pursued by both sides (secular and ecclesiastical one) were significantly different. The divergence of opinions led to the conflict that broke out almost immediately after Piłsudski’s body had been deposited in the coffin, and continued until 1937. This article deals with the origin of the conflict which has so far received little attention from scholars, who have focused mainly on the events which, taking place in June and July 1937, formed the most important part of it. Analysis of the source material has enabled the reconstruction of the events from 1935–1937, thus ensuring the possibility of looking at the issue from a new perspective and explaining the reasons for the escalation of the dispute over Piłsudski’s coffin. As shown in the article, the irresponsibility of Piłsudski’s adherents on the one hand, and Archbishop Sapieha’s obstinacy on the other, led to one of the greatest social crises in the inter-war Poland. The author takes his account to 23 June 1937, that is, to the point where the conflict got out of the cabinets of those directly involved in it and became a public issue. The author’s aim in this article was also to reproduce the whole process leading to the outbreak of the conflict in 1937, and to show the role played in it by particular individuals whose behaviour and attitude created a situation in which none of the sides felt responsible for the conflict’s outbreak and none was prepared to make any concessions. The conflict was brought to an end after months of efforts involving the President of the Polish Republic and both Polish and Vatican diplomacies. It is hard to say how it affected the public. It certainly affected the way in which Archbishop Sapieha was perceived. Suffice it say that some demanded that he should be imprisoned in the Bereza Kartuska prison.

To the present day researchers in cinematography have not expressed any deeper interest in Józef Piłsudski. There are only texts devoted to newly released history films (such as reviews and minutes of editorial discussions in film magazines) and a few popular overview pieces. In national community’s collective experience, Marshal Józef Piłsudski invariably remains a national phantasm – an imaginary myth, a specific charism identified with the regaining of independence (“the great builder”, “the father of the independence”, “the leader of the nation”, “the great Marshall”, “the commanding officer” etc.) and the victory over the Bolsheviks in 1920 (exemplum of anti-communism). This article consists of two internally complementary parts. In the introduction the author presents the figure of Piłsudski in the interwar cinematography (1918–1939). The main part is then devoted to the analysis of three major feature films from the People’s Republic of Poland period (Death of a President, 1977, Coup d’État 1981, Polonia Restituta, 1980), in which Marshal Piłsudski is a key figure involved in the narrative about history. This part of the article focuses on the falsification of the historical picture (historical figures, events, processes), the image that in effect was far from the historical truth and in line with the guidelines of the ruling communist party. Attention is also paid to the film makers’ and scientific consultants’ entanglement in the communist system. The analysis is based on source materials (scenarios, press publications) and subject literature.

Józef Piłsudski did not leave behind any written, verbalised and legible indications of how Poland would function in the international environment. During his time in power, he and his adherents made only assumptions about the need for Poland to function in conditions of independence and sovereignty in the international arena and about the necessity of attempts to shape the Republic’s immediate environment to limit Russian and German influence in Central and Eastern Europe. The principle remained unchanged regardless of the growing disproportions between the Republic and its most prominent neighbours. The Marshal’s idea of Poland’s position was brought about by his ideological heirs: before WWII by Józef Beck and later by Ignacy Matuszewski. However, none of these politicians questioned Piłsudski’s assessment of challenges and threats or proposed instruments for building the foundations of a regional security system. Beck’s and Matuszewski’s ideas differed from Piłsudski’s in their territorial scale and the involvement of those entities that the Marshal had omitted in his calculations. The solutions worked out by representatives of the circles of Piłsudski followers after the Marshal’s death (throughout the entire period of functioning of the Piłsudski camp in Poland and abroad) were the camp’s distinguishing features, and at the same time, they created an ideological bond in the conditions of political isolation that emerged in 1939.

The article refers primarily to 1947–1950 and the area of the Cracow Voivodeship. Its aim is to show the activity of a clerk for Jewish affairs functioning at the Voivodeship Department of Security (WUBP) in Cracow. So far, his activity has not been described in detail in the literature on the subject. In the period indicated, i.e. from February 1947 to December 1949, a special clerk was appointed (at first called “the minority clerk”, later “for Jewish matters”), who was responsible for collecting information and then attempting to
invigilate the local Jewish community. The activities of the secret police up to that time, e.g. regarding the return of Holocaust survivors, people coming out of hiding on the so-called Aryan side, trying to recover their property, or regarding the circumstances,
causes and course of the Cracow pogrom, etc., have already been partly described, so they only form the background for the considerations contained in this text. The author analyses the surviving reports on the activity of the said clerk and presents the main areas of interest of the “security service” in relation to the Jewish community.

The purpose of the article was to present the tasks of the Citizens’ Militia (MO) towards the Catholic Church in the years 1944–1990 as well as the attitude of MO officers to the performance of these tasks and the religiosity of the militiamen. In this text, an attempt
was made to present the evolution of the tasks of the militia against the Catholic Church, which increased from year to year. These tasks were assigned primarily by the public security apparatus, and then by the Security Service (SB). They mainly consisted in passing on information to the SB, assisting in SB activities, repressing clergy and the faithful in the form of filing requests for punishment and imposing fines. The Citizens’ Militia took part in many anti-church actions initiated by the state and party authorities. The author also tried to present religiosity among militiamen and to combat these attitudes by ministerial, militia and communist party authorities. The article was based primarily on archival and printed sources, which clearly show that the Militia was involved in fighting the Catholic Church in Poland.

In the 1970s Polish-Australian relations were seen as marginal both in Warsaw and Canberra. From the perspective of Australian foreign policy the plight of Poland was fixed under Soviet control and, in bilateral relations, only limited trade and the Polish immigrant group constituted points of some interest. The diplomacy of the Polish People’s Republic strove to improve political relations with a view to developing economic cooperation. This static picture was complicated by the rise of the Solidarity
movement in Poland. This study seeks to identify and document the most important areas in official Polish-Australian relations, as defined by the Foreign Ministry in Warsaw and the Embassy in Canberra, during the legal functioning of Solidarity in 1980–1981. Drawing on sources from the Archives of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the article examines how Polish communist diplomacy attempted to achieve its aims and to what extent it was successful. It argues that Warsaw managed to exert some influence on the Australian perception of the situation in Poland, particularly at the time of Minister Tony Street’s visit in November 1981, and consequently mitigated the immediate Australian reaction to the imposition of martial law.

This study presents an article published in the second half of June 1920 in the Madrid conservative daily “ABC” about the head of the Polish state, Marshal Jozef Pilsudski, which was previously unknown in the Polish literature, and which also discusses an interview with him. The author of the correspondence from Warsaw was Sofía Casanova, wife of the philosopher Wincenty Lutosławski, an eminent Spanish poet, novelist and journalist, mentioned as a candidate for the Nobel Prize in Literature. From 1915 onwards, she sent regular correspondence to “ABC”, written first from Russia and then, from autumn 1918 onwards, from Poland. The article analyses the circumstances that led to an interview with the Polish leader, which took place between 11 February and 18 April 1920, and the publication of a text about it. Casanova presented the most important aspects of the Marshal's biography, drawing attention above all to his unwavering belief in Poland's regaining independence, and focusing on his views on the conflict with Russia. Despite her strong ties with National Democracy, the Spaniard presented the head of state in a very favourable light. The appendix contains the original transcript of the interview in Spanish and its translation into Polish.

The rapidly advancing digitisation of Russian archival collections opens up new possibilities for Polish historians. The Red Army troops entering the Polish territory in 1944 appointed military commanders in towns and villages, who for some time were the chief authority for the Polish population and the Red Army troops staying there. After launching the January 1945 offensive, the Soviet Army occupied Central Western Poland and entered the territory of the Western and Northern Territories, which had belonged to Germany before the war. Military commanders were also established there, but due to the lack of Polish administration, their rule was more extensive and lasted longer, also in 1946. Under the commanders' rule, which lasted for months, about one-third of the area of the Polish state, where millions of Germans still lived, came under their rule. Thousands of murders of civilians, rapes and the large-scale transfer of looted property to the USSR took place. These events placed a heavy burden on the Soviet military administration and the commanders. The paper aims to present three regulations concerning the work of Soviet military
commanders in Poland. They were found in the resources of the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. They show the changeability of the concept of activities of military commanders in the Polish lands. The scope of their influence also changed. The first one, from July 1944, concerned only Lublin. The second one, from August 1944, concerned the area of operation and stationing of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front (Przemyśl, Rzeszów, Sanok). The last one, issued in October 1944,
came from the highest level, the General Staff of the Red Army, and regarded all troops stationed on Polish territory.
The instructions indicated the intention to introduce “limited occupation” in Poland, masked by the “sovereignty” of the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN) (the Polish government subordinated to the Soviets). The commanders were to support
the PKWN, fight the representatives of the London government, but not to interfere with religious practices, probably in order not to escalate the conflict at all levels and not to alienate the villagers. The commanders had the right to impose compulsory labour on the Poles. They also had police powers, i.e. to check the Polish population, confiscate weapons and documents. The wide range of control powers also over the Polish Army is noteworthy. For the Polish independence underground, the key regulation was to “disarm and arrest individuals, groups and units if they refused to surrender their weapons voluntarily”. The postulated description of the military commander’s profile, his character traits and attitude towards the Polish population is also interesting. It was recommended not to interfere with the activities of the authorities dependant on PKWN (i.e. the communist ones). It was ordered to respect places of religious worship, assuming that the Red Army soldiers brought up in atheism could by acts of vandalism deepen Poles’ dislike of the Communists.