This article examines reaction in Australia and Australian foreign policy responses to Poland’s June 1956 crisis - Poznanski Czerwiec. Poznan’s June events prompted immediate Australia-wide demonstrations and protests by Polish emigres who were supported by friends and allies in the Catholic Church and the anti-communist movement. Nation-wide and well-attended demonstrations in Australia and subsequent approaches by Poles and supporters required a disinterested government to develop a position on Poznan. Pressure on the government for a response, potentially disruptive to its foreign policies, was applied only by elements within the Australian political scene that posed little threat to its future. Poznan’s greatest impact takes place within the peculiar nature of Australian politics where the Poznan issue was used to fan the flames of bitter rivalry within the labour movement by a strident anti-communist faction seeking to displace the Australian Labor Party and establish itself instead, as the legitimate representative of Australian workers. In taking up the Polish émigré cause, the Australian anti-communist leadership claimed the moral high-ground, but lacked sufficient strategic commitment to use their considerable parliamentary advantage to pressure the government to adopt a more muscular position on Poznan.

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 undeniably constitutes the internationally most renowned chapter of twentieth-century Hungarian history. The most crucial historical issues of the Revolution, such as the nature of the uprising, its political history, its short-term and long-term national and international impact are all extensively researched and abundantly discussed in international literature. However, the history of the reprisals after the Revolution belong to the lesser known chapters of 1956. The aim of this paper is to offer an overview of the internal correlations and prominent events of the post-1956 reprisals – the dynamics, instruments, methods, and political objectives of state violence, as well as major findings of recent research on the propagandistic role the reprisals played in legitimizing the new Kádárian center of power. Further, I offer a brief summary of research problems related to the questionable role of court documents. I ask and propose to answer the question to what extent and in what ways the historical sources of the reprisals (produced by the oppressive authorities) are suitable for the reconstruction of the events of the Revolution of 1956. I also consider the alternative interpretation in which these documents are merely seen to mirror a process of how the regime created its own counter-myth of 1956 by constructing a systematic and symbolic narrative of the counterrevolution. The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 undeniably constitutes the internationally most renowned chapter of twentieth-century Hungarian history. The most crucial historical issues of the Revolution, such as the nature of the uprising, its political history, its short-term and long-term national and international impact are all extensively researched and abundantly discussed in international literature. However, the history of the reprisals after the Revolution belong to the lesser known chapters of 1956. The aim of this paper is to offer an overview of the internal correlations and prominent events of the post-1956 reprisals – the dynamics, instruments, methods, and political objectives of state violence, as well as major findings of recent research on the propagandistic role the reprisals played in legitimizing the new Kádárian center of power. Further, I offer a brief summary of research problems related to the questionable role of court documents. I ask and propose to answer the question to what extent and in what ways the historical sources of the reprisals (produced by the oppressive authorities) are suitable for the reconstruction of the events of the Revolution of 1956. I also consider the alternative interpretation in which these documents are merely seen to mirror a process of how the regime created its own counter-myth of 1956 by constructing a systematic and symbolic narrative of the counterrevolution.

Due to political, economic and cultural changes carried out by new communist authorities Yugoslavia became the most communisesed state after the Second World War. Independence of the Yugoslav leader Josip Broz-Tito, who found state interests more important than Soviet one and put a tremendous effort to affirmate Yugoslav position in the international policy, led him to the conflict with entire Eastern Block which remained under Stalin's impact. Soviet leader by using mechanisms from the 30's tended to present Tito as an „internal enemy”. So called Tito-Stalin's split in 1948 forced Yugoslavian leaders to find their own solutions (so called re-reading of Marx) in order to prove their legitimization of power. In the years 1948-1956 by so called self-managament, liberalization and democratization they tried to stay „true communists” that opposes Soviet distortion. In the internal policy they used political repression as the weapon against true or putative pro-soviets in Yugoslavia. 15737 were imprisoned and amongst them 13000 in the most famous camp on the island Goli Otok Repressive methods used against convicted people were focused on re-socialization of imprisoned in order to get rid of alleged or real endangerment. In the foreign policy after split with Soviet block Yugoslavs tended to keep their independent position. Unless at the beginning they found West (first of all USA) as their allies, which made them able to withstand Soviet pressure, Tito was reluctant towards any alliance with Western World as he did not want to abandon communist ideology. After Stalin's death in 1953 both Yugoslavia and USSR were seeking reconciliation after few years of conflict. That was finally fulfilled in 1955 and 1956 through Belgrade and Moscow Declarations. In such situation Tito abandoned any will to go on with political reforms and wanted to maintain predominance of communist party. Therefore he decided to convict and imprison pro-reformist high-ranked politician Milovan Djilas in 1956. Significance of the 1956 year as the crucial for Yugoslav foreign and internal policy may be perceived also in abandoning mass political repression towards pro-stalinists in Yugoslavia. The antagonistic interests of Moscow seeking Yugoslavia to get back to the communist camp and Belgrade being focused on its independent position, persuaded Tito to find its allies amongst the third world states as the counter balance towards Eastern Block and West. The meeting between Tito and leaders of Egypt and India is used to be treated as the first step in the Yugoslav policy in order to create non-align movement as the counter balance towards two main political blocks.

The principal purpose of the analysis is to accurately represent the relationship of the author of “A World Apart” to the Polish People’s Republic and convincingly prove that the works of Gustaw Herling-Grudziński are characterised by realism that is unusual among Polish authors, one which was apparent on a number of different levels: the lack of any intellectual illusion when looking at the “people’s” Poland, a careful and reasonably non--emotional presentation of one’s thoughts, and making valuable generalisations. This realism was primarily reflected in describing how the communist system worked in Poland and judging the attitudes of writers towards the reality of the “people’s” Poland.