The Turning-point between ‘Totalitarianism’ and ‘Democracy’: Hypothetical Outcomes to Events in Czechoslovakia in 1989 The consideration of hypothetical alternatives to historical development in clearly established general conditions are, the author believes, a natural part of historical thinking. In this article he looks at the ‘Velvet Revolution’, that short period from the collapse of the Communist régime to the pushing through of a democracy in Czechoslovakia in November and December 1989, which for him becomes the space for such hypothetical reflections. In the historical records he seeks the key junctures in developments, and tries to outline the directions or paths that the political actors and members of the public could have set out on, but did not. In each case he starts from the assumption that one important factor of the previous events has changed. First of all, he asks whether a possibility of fundamental change had begun to emerge even before 17 November 1989, and he seeks to answer the question with regard to the influence of Gorbachev’s perestroika. He calls the Reform Communists, who had been expelled from the Party, the legitimate potential Czechoslovak actors of perestroika. These Communists were based around the Klub pro socialistickou přestavbu Obroda (Renewal, the Club for Socialist Restructuring), and sought to continue the ideals of the ‘Prague Spring’ of 1968. Like every other potential opposition group, however, they were kept down by the ‘normalization’ régime. In circumstances in which the Soviet Union, of its own accord, was ceasing to intervene directly in the affairs of the other Soviet bloc states (which in Czechoslovakia meant the petrification of the ‘conservative’ structures of power), the reformists’ chances were, the author argues, very limited. He then considers the fundamental interpretations, which emerged in the 1990s, of the Velvet Revolution as a conspiracy. The core of the article is a consideration of the probability, the concrete forms, and possible consequences of six possible outcomes of developments: (i) after the brutal police action against the demonstrators on Národní třída, Prague, on 17 November 1989, the would not have led to the spreading of the false report about the killing of a student named Martin Šmíd which mobilized the Czechoslovak public; (ii) the leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party would have tended to some kind of violent solution to the crisis with the help of the army on the ‘Chinese model’; (iii) in the revolutionary days the existing Communist leadership would have joined forces with the former reform Communists with the aim of preserving a Socialist régime; (iv) in December 1989 the Civic Forum would not have managed to get the Federal Assembly to elect Václav Havel President of Czechoslovakia, and in the following months the president would have been elected by popular vote from amongst several candidates, as had been proposed by the Communist Party; (v) the Civic Forum and the Public Against Violence as the revolutionary representatives would have rejected the compromise solution of handing over power at ‘Round Table’ negotiations, and would instead have dictated the terms and conditions of the victory, including the introduction of a plurality electoral system; (vi) the political actors of the ‘Velvet Revolution’ would, in the first month, have effectively concentrated on the problem of coming to terms with the Communist past, which, in the form of uncompromising anti- communism, began from January 1990 onwards to convulse the political scene, and remains a sore point to this day.

The Revolutions of 1989. An Explanatory Framework This study puts forward a frame of analysis for explaining the 1989 revolu- tions in East-Central Europe (ECE). When analyzing the revolutions of 1989, one is compelled to address three fundamental issues related to their inception, unfolding and outcome, which can be summarized as follows: timing; sequence of events; and nature. In other words, one has to provide a convincing answer to the following questions: (1) Why those revolutions occurred precisely in 1989? (2) Why the communist regimes in ECE collapsed in that particular order? and (3) Why some of the 1989 regime changes were negotiated, others were non-ne- gotiated but non-violent, and only one of them was non-negotiated and violent? This study opens with a discussion on the problems of definition one faces when examining the 1989 events in ECE, and addresses the most significant similarities and differences between those events and the “classic” revolutions of the modern age. The 1989 events in ECE can be termed as revolutions, but a particular kind of revolutions, i.e. “postmodern” revolutions, because they were non-utopian, nonviolent – with the conspicuous exception of Romania, and were not carried out in the name of a particular class. The present study adopts a culturalist-structuralist approach and proposes an explanatory model that takes into consideration both the domestic developments and entangled histories of the Soviet Bloc countries over the period 1945-1989 in order to analyze the crucial issues of timing, sequence of events and nature of the 1989 revolutions, i.e. negotiated or non-negotiated, violent or non-violent. This author puts forward a general model for explaining these issues, which is based on path-dependency, agency and contingency. It is this author’s opinion that the 1989 sequence of collapse, i.e. Poland – Hungary – East Germany – Czechoslovakia – Bulgaria – Romania, consisted in fact of the demise of three types of communist dictatorships: (1) “national-accommodative” (Poland and Hungary); “welfare” (East Germany and Czechoslovakia); and (3) modernizing-nationalizing (Bulgaria and Romania). One can easily observe that the initiation of the 1989 sequence of collapse originated in the camp of “national-accommodative” communist dictatorships, where the 1989 revolutions took the form of “negotiated revolutions” based on the roundtable principle. The demise of the “welfare dictatorships” in East Germany and Czechoslovakia occurred through non-negotiated non-violent revolutions, and was influenced by the “negotiated revolutions” in neighboring Poland and Hungary. The modernizingnationalizing communist dictatorships in Bulgaria and Romania were the last in a row to collapse. In their cases, the emphasis on the “dynamic political stance” is crucial: the communist regimes in both countries perceived their party-states in the making as not completely modern and national, and therefore devised policies aimed at spurring industrial development and creating ethnically homogenous “socialist” nations. Drawing on the work by Ole Nørgaard and Steven L. Sampson, who in their 1984 study “Poland’s Crisis and East European Socialism” have explained the birth of the Polish Solidarity as an outcome of social and cultural factors, this author contends that the collapse of the communist rule in ECE was provoked by an intricate and sometimes unexpected interplay of structural, conjunctural and nation-specific factors.

The expiration of the “leading force”: The 1980s PUWP crisis in Gdańsk and Gdynia The article presents the situation within the Gdańsk party organization towards the end of the communist era based on previously unpublished documents preserved at the State Archives in Gdańsk and their Gdynia section, PUWP Central Committee materials held by the Archives of New Records, as well as secondary literature. This is a case study of the functioning of a local link of the PUWP. The author’s objective was to show selected aspects of the gradual disintegration since the 1980s of the communist party which had held almost absolute power in Poland for four decades. Most of the symptoms of the crisis enumerated in the article subsequently became visible on a national scale, greatly contributing to the fall of the regime in 1989. The establishment of Solidarity in August 1980 shook the foundations of the PUWP, As the first trade union in the soviet bloc to assert independence form national authorities, Solidarity proved a better representative of the workers. Within a short time, almost 10 million Poles had joined Solidarity, including 1 million PUWP members. As a result, the communists were forced into a defensive position. Once again the party leaders decided to use force in defense of their authority. In retrospect, the introduction of martial law by Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski should be considered the beginning of the end of the PUWP which proved incapable of playing its “leadership role” guaranteed by the constitution. The operation was successful but the patient did not survive—these ironic words aptly describe the situation within the party after December 13, 1981. Bringing out the army into the streets failed to prevent the decomposition of the PUWP.The communists’ electoral defeat of June 4, 1989 served as a strong impulse for accelerating the process of “folding up” the party, “enfranchising the nomenclature,” and transforming the PUWP into a modern organization professing a social-democratic doctrine.

The PUWP leadership in the years 1986–1990: A sketch for a portrait Actual power in the Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP) was held by the socalled leadership, i.e. members of the Political Bureau and the Secretariat of the Central Committee (CC). The Political Bureau formulated the party policy and made strategic decisions, while the Secretariat managed the day-to-day operations of the party apparatus. Due to the presence of workers’ representatives within the Political Bureau, and the participation in its meetings of large numbers of invited guests, in the years 1986-1990 the Political Bureau turned into a discussion forum. The real center of decision-making was located in the informal circle closest to the first secretary of the PUWP CC, Wojciech Jaruzelski. In the period under discussion, 35 real members of the power apparatus and 7 figureheads formed part of the Political Bureau and CC Secretariat. The greatest personnel changes in the membership of both organs of power took place on the eve of the “round table” discussions, in December 1988. The following criteria can be considered as key for promoting new people to the leadership of the PUWP: organizing skills, experience in leadership positions, specialized education, negotiation skills, and public speaking skills. But above all, those selected were people who could be trusted. Between 1986 and 1990, the PUPW leadership was very diverse in terms of origin, generational experience, and career paths. It included representatives of four (idea-based) generations of party activists. The oldest, those of the “wartime generation,” had joined the communist movement in the Polish Army during the last years of World War II. The so-called “zetempowcy,” who had been active in the Association of Polish Youth at the turn of the 1940s and 1950s before joining the PUWP, were the largest group. Representatives of the “Gomułka generation” had joined the party in the 1960s. The two youngest leaders belonged to the “Gierek generation” and had started their political careers in the 1970s.

Anatomy of a defeat: The authorities’ camp in the 1989 electoral campaign As a result of changes in both the internal and external situation of the People’s Republic of Poland in the second half of the 1980s, Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski’s administration felt obliged to negotiate with the opposition. For the authorities, the key point of the negotiations was the electoral contract on the basis of which they Solidarity leaders agreed to participate in the still not fully democratic parliamentary election planned for June 1989. The present analysis of the authorities’ preparations for the election shows how many mistakes they made at the central and lower levels. At this early stage, the key element of those preparations which contributed to the scale of the defeat of the coalition-government camp was the method of nominating candidate for the upper and lower house of parliament. The fact that the Political Bureau renounced the initiative to nominate candidates for both houses of parliament led to uncontrollable fragmentation and the nomination of candidates by a wide range of coalitions. Interestingly, it is clear that the authorities ignored the results of all opinion polls, which indicated that they were unlikely to win many mandates. Why they persisted in believing they could win is difficult to explain, but the conviction that the society would soon tire of the opposition’s campaign and vote for the ruling camp was certainly one of the reasons. One of the party’s basic problems at the time was its inability to convince its members to play an active role in the campaign. Inducing its political allies cooperate created even greater difficulties. As a result, the coalition was unable to form a uniform front for the purpose of conducting the electoral campaign. The next challenge the PUWP had to face during the campaign were the efforts of allied parties to gain greater autonomy and emphasize their distinctive character.

Bonn–Warsaw–Solidarity: West German diplomacy’s relations with the People’s Republic of Poland and Solidarity In the late 1980s, the diplomacy of the Federal Republic of Germany had to confront long-term problems which had existed long before the emergence of mass opposition in the People’s Republic of Poland. For West Germany, Poland was not the most important player in relations with the eastern bloc; for obvious reasons, the German Democratic Republic was of paramount importance. From the perspective of Bonn, the most key issues in contacts with Warsaw were: the troubled legacy of World War II, the problem of borders, the German minority in Poland, and economic relations, particularly in the context of Poland’s debt. Even the turbulent events of 1989, with Poland’s systemic transformation and the fall of the Berlin wall, did not initially affect this list of key issues. Bonn’s diplomatic relations with Poland in 1989 were framed by two events: Mieczysław Rakowski’s visit in Bonn in January and Helmut Kohl’s far more important visit to Poland, which was interrupted by the Berlin events. The former took place according to the old rules and confirmed the impasse in mutual relations. By contrast, the November 12 symbolic embrace of prime minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki and the West German Chancellor opened the way for normalization in the new political context. Yet the breakthrough in the two countries’ relations occurred somewhat later than in the case of the other western powers. When Poland hosted François Mitterand (in June) and George Bush (in July), the West German authorities were conducting difficult financial and economic negotiations with their Polish partners. Significantly, the West German approach to Polish issues in this period was also less influenced by the Polish opposition than the approach of the French, British, or US diplomacies.

The 1989 Revolution in the GDR Many factors — both domestic and those connected with the international situation — contributed to the fall of the communist system in the GDR. Crucial was the mood of the GDR society. At the end of the 1980s the people had had enough of the system. They were suffering from the economic crisis. The lack of perspectives and frustration triggered strong rebellious tendencies among the young. The Evangelical Church played a significant role in the shaping of such stances. In 1989 many priests and theologians took over the role of civil rights activists. The events in the GDR gathered momentum in May 1989. The dismantling of the fortified border between Austria and Hungary had more than a symbolic meaning. The Iron Curtain had been lifted for good. Thousands of East Germans tried to get to the FRG through Hungary or through Czechoslovakia and Poland. The FRG was an embodiment of the West they had been yearning for. The events accelerated in the fall. In Leipzig, demonstrations calling for freedom began after Monday masses. On 7 October, on the GDR founding anniver- sary, demonstrations of defiance were held in East Berlin and 50 other cities. The opposition, which had not been particularly numerous, consolidated and new formations were created. But most citizens waited to see what would happen. They expected reforms. Erich Honecker’s stepping down and Egon Krenz’s becoming the General Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party was insufficient. From the historical perspective the opening of the Berlin Wall on 9 November was a breakthrough forced by the societies of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the GDR itself. In March 1990 a free election to the People’s Chamber (Volkskamer) was held. It was to guarantee democratic reforms. The next step was the unification of Germany. The 1989 and 1990 events in the GDR and other communist bloc countries were a form of a revolution. They did not, however, call for progress or strive for something entirely new. Their participants wanted to live in open societies, like the ones that seemed to exist in the Western democracies.

The SS and the police penal camp in Maćkowy near Gdańsk The article presents the establishment and operations of the SS and police penal camp in the town of Maćkowy near Gdańsk in the years 1941-1945, as well as the role played by the camp in the years 1939-1941. In addition, the article outlines the special judiciary system of the SS and the police, and the system for establishing military and police units consisting of convicted SS and police officers. The camp was set up in 1939 to serve as the barracks of a new SS unit established in Gdańsk, which played an active role in the battle of Westerplatte and the attack on the Polish Post Office. From October 1940 to July 1941, Maćkowy was the site of a Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle camp for Volksdeutsche (ethnic Germans) as well as German settlers from Lithuanian territories. When the camp was taken over by the Main Judiciary Office of the SS, the center was reconstructed and modernized (new guard towers, fencing, and barrack were added). In January 1942, the first convicts brought from KL Dachau were admitted to the camp. As of March 1942, the Maćkowy camp served as the Third Reich’s central penal camp for the SS and the police. The inmates—convicted soldiers of the SS, policemen, as well as members of security and guard forces subordinated to the special judiciary of the SS—were put to work both within the camp and outside it, mainly on farms and in municipal and SS-operated industries in Gdańsk and its vicinity. With increasing numbers of inmates and camp personnel shortages, there were proposals to send large groups of inmates to other centers, but only one branch of the camp was eventually established in Berlin-Ludwigsfelde. Due to the growing need for new units on the eastern front, the camp also sent inmates to special Waffen-SS and police units (Bewährungseinheiten) in which convicts could get a reduction of part of their sentence. Numerous attempts to establish new SS and police penal camps failed and the Maćkowy camp remained the largest center of this kind until the end of the war. It was evacuated in February 1945.

Polish citizens in Nawanagar, India The history of the 1940 journey across India of Polish citizens evacuated by Gen. Anders is well known to historians. Literature on the subject presents the view that the journey to India and the provision of housing took place under the auspices of a program sponsored by Great Britain. Yet a careful analysis of documents has shown that it was the Indian princely state of Nawanagar that first offered to accommodate the Polish children evacuated from the USSR in 1941. The first 500 Polish children were hosted in Balachadi, Nawanagar, and supported with charity funds collected in India by Indian princes and other wealthy individuals. Between 1942 and 1948, Indian citizens’ donations for the maintenance of the Polish orphans amounted to the sum of 600,000 rupees (44,250 pounds sterling, the equivalent of 64,241.51 present-day pounds sterling).

Security apparatus in Greater Poland and the 1952 parliamentary elections The 1952 Parliamentary elections (the elections to Sejm), according to the communist authorities, were to be a crucial turning point in the process of enslaving Polish society. Simultaneously, the governing party was expecting mass endorsement for its policies. Therefore, all efforts to resist were totally eliminated. This article is an attempt to show a role the communist security apparatus played in electoral campaign and in elections to Sejm in 1952 in Greater Poland (Wielkopolska). Moreover, it concentrates both on organization and on election campaign process in Poznań Voivodeship and focuses on the most important issues concerning activity of the Voivodeship and the District Public Security Offices. Greater Poland was a specific region because of the existence of numerous groups having negative attitude towards authorities and, on the same breath, of the relatively low level of expressing protests. Due to agricultural character of the region, a large part of this article refers to the situation in the country. An attitude of the Security Apparatus towards Catholic Church as well as towards other religious associations, is pointed out in the article as well. It also presents main courses of actions of the Secret Services and their consequences against various social groups. The author described different forms and consequences of repercussions during an election campaign that took place in the region.

Selected aspects of the functioning of the PWP and the political-educational apparatus within the Polish Navy in the years 1944–1947 When the first Polish military units were formed in the USSR, it became clear that the future Polish armed forces would lose their national and democratic character. Already in May 1943 real control over the army was taken over by the Association of Polish Patriots, replaced in November 1944 by the Military Department of the Central Committee of the Polish Workers’ Party—an informal institution which nevertheless had unlimited power over all types of forces, including the navy. Guaranteeing the implementation of PWP directives were the so-called party plenipotentiaries within the military units. Together with the political-educational sections, the plenipotentiaries worked to maintain the “proper image” of the Polish navy. During the first period of the navy’s formation, the plenipo - tentiaries were generally Soviet officers—bolshevik members of the communist party, unfamiliar with Poland’s complex political situation. Consequently, they were replaced by the Central Team of the Ministry of National Defense made up of high-level PWP members. Similar teams were also formed at lower levels of command. It was through the agency of just such a navy District Team headed by Cpt. Józef Urbanowicz, deputy commander of the navy for political-educational affairs, that Rear Admiral Adam Mohuczy was removed from the command of the Polish navy. Mohuczy’s vision of a strong national navy grounded on the pre-war cadre, traditions, and Polish military thought, was at odds with the vision of the political decision makers. Moreover, Mohuczy did not conform to the directions of the party ideologues. It is worth emphasizing that the removal of Mohuczy from his position took place shortly after the formation of the Polish parliament and Bolesław Bierut’s election to the presidency—i.e., after the communists had taken complete control. This event initiated the first “personnel purges” and repressions in the navy. In just the month of March 1947, 90 personnel changes in key leadership positions took place, including dismissals from the navy. Based on accusations and denunciations collected by party activists and the navy’s District Team, Military Information prepared materials necessary for the arrest of Cpt. Adam Mohuczy in December 1949. In 1950, Ctp. Adam Mohuczy, together with other officers, was sentenced to long-term imprisonment. He died in the Sztum prison on May 7, 1953.

Commemorating the victims of the former KL Lublin through art and spatial design at the site of the State Museum in Majdanek in the years 1944–1969 The German concentration camp KL Lublin, commonly known as Majdanek, which operated in the years 1941-1944, was the site of death of at least 78,000 people, including 60,000 people of Jewish origin. When the camp was liberated, establishing a museum in Majdanek and commemorating the victims became an important concern. The latter issue, however, proved far from simple. No models existed for commemorating such sites and the extermination of entire social and ethnic groups; nor did an institution exist that might coordinate the work involved in such a project. The first part of the article presents general information on the form and function of commemorating World War II events, focusing specifically on monuments. It also presents the institutions created to coordinate commemoration projects, such as the National Office for Museums and the Preservation of Monuments established in 1945, the Department of Museums and Monuments of Polish Martyrdom (a unit of the National Office), as well as the Council for the Preservation of Monuments of Struggle and Martyrdom appointed in 1947. All these institutions operating under the aegis of the Ministry of Culture and Art, as well as the Ministry itself, left an imprint on the work of the National Museum at Majdanek and the form of commemorating the victims of the former KL Lublin. When in the Museum was being created October 1944, the first monument commemorating those murdered in the camp was already in place. This was the so-called Column of the Three Eagles, built by the prisoners themselves under German orders as a form of decorating the camp; the SS officers could not have foreseen that it would serve a commemorative function after the war. The author of the first postwar spatial design was engineer Romuald Gutt. According to his project presented in 1945, the camp was to be transformed into a “Slavic grove” planted with thousands of trees, where the “peace of nature” would reign. Subsequently, the project was taken over by engineer Alina Scholtzówna. It was never fully implemented due to problems with determining the boundaries of the Museum and the expropriation of former owners of the real estate. As the years passed, the concept of the Museum’s spatial design changed. A new project designed by the Lublin architect Romuald Dylewski proposed the preservation of the maximum authenticity of the former camp at Majdanek: the conservation of the existing structures and the removal of the trees. The unveiling of the Monument of Struggle and Martyrdom on September 21, 1969 completed the work on this project. Dylewski’s well-conceived spatial arrangement as well as the group of memorials co-designed by sculptor W. Tołkin and engineer J. Dembek restored authenticity and dignity to the site after the failed tree-planting project.

Waldemar Sobczyk and Nasz Znak – Sabotage in the People’s/Peasants’ Movement Abroad In 1956 Sobczyk was recruited for cooperation with the intelligence of the People’s Republic of Poland (Polska Republika Ludowa, PRL). The secret service began subsidizing Nasz Znak, which changed its political profile. It criticized the policy of the government-in-exile, advocated cooperation between the govern- ment-in-exile and the country and praised the communist rule in Poland. The secret service’s activities intensified the controversies in the PSL and weakened its chairman’s position. Mikołajczyk became Nasz Znak’s public enemy no. 1. In the early 1960s the paper supported the initiative to create an organization competitive toward the PSL put forward by the activists expelled from the party by Mikołajczyk. Anti-Vatican, anticlerical and anti-German accents became a constant feature of the monthly. Consequently, in 1957 Sobczyk was excluded from the party. Suspected of spying for the People’s Republic of Poland intelligence, he was detained and investigated on several occasions by the Swedish police. Tadeusz Rozmanit, Henryk Polowiec or Klaudiusz Hrabyk were just a few authors who contributed to Nasz Znak apart from Sobczyk. In the mid 1960s, when the PSL chairman’s political activity subsided, the intelligence heads began to consider gradual liquidation of Nasz Znak. The paper aimed mostly at discrediting Mikołajczyk and destroying the people’s movement abroad ceased to be useful. The escape to the West of lieutenant colonel Janusz Kochański, who a few years earlier maintained contact with the agent, also contributed to the termination of the cooperation with Sobczyk. The last issue of Nasz Znak went out in 1967. Despite the termination of the cooperation he still tried to maintain contact with the PRL intelligence. He left for FRG in 1970 where he has lived ever since.

A disrupted anniversary: The German veterans’ visit to Gdańsk in 1979 in light of security apparatus documents The article takes up the issue of the postwar contacts between Polish and German soldiers who fought at Westerplatte in September 1939 – contacts which have not previously been the subject of in-depth historical analysis. The most important meeting of veterans took place in 1979 in Gdańsk on the 40 th anniversary of the outbreak of World War II. The author argues that the 1979 visit of the German veterans was the result of an improvement in Polish-German relations. On this occasion the Polish and German veterans exchanged signs of friendship which were duly registered on film by German reporters. Meanwhile, Polish security functionaries engaged in operations to censure information about gestures of reconciliation between the combatants. They also confiscated the film recordings. Subsequent meetings of Polish and German veterans in the 1990s received ample coverage in the Polish press, and while they led to disputes among the Westerplatte veterans, they also contributed to the general climate of reconciliation influenced by symbolic gestures made by the Polish and German leaders. The article draws on previously unknown documents preserved at the Archives of the Institute of National Remembrance, as well as the memoirs of Jacek Żebrowski, a participant of those events.

Western Ukraine – the beginning of the Sovietisation (September–December1939). From the Perspective of the Ukrainian Historician On 17 September 1939 the Red Army attacked eastern Poland. On 28 September the USSR and Germany signed a pact which delineated, among others, a new border between Polish territories occupied by the two countries. The Soviets occupied the territory east of the San, Bug, Narew and Pisa Rivers. The official names for the territory were: Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. Lithuania was also included in their zone of influence. Functionaries of the communist party and security service came to Poland together with the Red Army. They were tasked to gain full control over the occupied territory. The Soviet security service commenced arrests of those accused of anticommunist activity, Polish administration representatives, the intelligentsia, and the so-called “enemies of the people” i.e. land owners and entrepreneurs. Tragic was the fate of the Polish POWs detained in special camps. The Soviets began organizing their own local administration. They introduced a new political system. They forbade the activity of the political parties and social organizations, and new ones following the Soviet model were set up in their place. There were also radical socio-economic changes. In October 1939 a Soviet-controlled election to the People’s Assembly of Eastern Ukraine was held. The deputies adopted a declaration unifying the territory of Eastern Ukraine with that of the Ukrainian Soviet Social Republic. In November the Polish territory was incorporated into the USSR. The inhabitants of the western districts of Ukraine were granted Soviet citizenship. Wołodymyr Baran The Sovietization process was quite intensive and was carried out on a massive scale. It influenced all areas of life, including the political and socio-economic systems as well as the spiritual and cultural spheres. Such a radical transformation had severe consequences for millions of people. On 17 September 1939 the Red Army attacked eastern Poland. On 28 September the USSR and Germany signed a pact which delineated, among others, a new border between Polish territories occupied by the two countries. The Soviets occupied the territory east of the San, Bug, Narew and Pisa Rivers. The official names for the territory were: Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. Lithuania was also included in their zone of influence. Functionaries of the communist party and security service came to Poland together with the Red Army. They were tasked to gain full control over the occupied territory. The Soviet security service commenced arrests of those accused of anticommunist activity, Polish administration representatives, the intelligentsia, and the so-called “enemies of the people” i.e. land owners and entrepreneurs. Tragic was the fate of the Polish POWs detained in special camps. The Soviets began organizing their own local administration. They introduced a new political system. They forbade the activity of the political parties and social organizations, and new ones following the Soviet model were set up in their place. There were also radical socio-economic changes. In October 1939 a Soviet-controlled election to the People’s Assembly of Eastern Ukraine was held. The deputies adopted a declaration unifying the ter- ritory of Eastern Ukraine with that of the Ukrainian Soviet Social Republic. In November the Polish territory was incorporated into the USSR. The inhabitants of the western districts of Ukraine were granted Soviet citizenship. The Sovietization process was quite intensive and was carried out on a massive scale. It influenced all areas of life, including the political and socio-economic systems as well as the spiritual and cultural spheres. Such a radical transformation had severe consequences for millions of people.

On the Waves of Radio Free Europe. The story of Jaroslav and Pavel Pecháček Radio Free Europe represented a significant phenomenon for more than 40 years, a symbol of struggle against the distortion of information, concealing of events, and against censorship. The name Pechaček was connected with this radio station throughout its existence. The life story of Jaroslav and Pavel Pechačeks, father and son, is another story typical for Czechoslovakia of the 20th century. The father was forced to emigrate due to the communist takeover in 1948 while his son stayed in Czechoslovakia. They met again only after two decades when the son had to leave Czechoslovakia in consequence of another historical upheaval in the centre of Europe. Both of them achieved success in the same field, working for the Radio Free Europe and Voice of America stations and heading them for many years. They were both kept under close watch of the State security (StB) service, but both lived to see the fall of the communist regime in their home country. Prokop Tomek’s biographical study embraces the Pechaček family’s struggle against both the Nazi and the communist regimes, their professional career, problems with the State Security, as well as Pavel Pechaček’s activities following November 1989. It is not by chance that the study is included in the section called Against Totalitarianism.