Polish October 1956 and the Lublin branch of ZBOWiD (Society of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy) The Lublin branch of ZBoWiD was established simultaneously with the veterans’ organisation ZBoWiD, in 1949. In the Stalinist period the activities of the Lublin branch boiled down to propaganda. Its functions were limited by members from PZPR (the Polish United Workers’ Party, PUWP), striving to eliminate the Society, as e.g. Grzegorz Wajskop. After 1956 the organisation accomplished a strong comeback, based upon former AK (Home Army) soldiers. The catalyst of the organisation’s renewal after 1956 was the spontaneous voivodeship (provincial) convention staged by WW2 partisans of the Lublin region on 11 th November, 1956. As a result of elections held in individual local branches throughout the voivodeship, their managements were joined by mainly soldiers, former members of such underground organisations, as BCh (Peasant Battalions) and AK. They dominated the key positions in ZBoWiD, removing the representative of extreme leftist underground organisations (GL/AL, People’s Guard/People’s Army). At conventions numerously attended by partisans of the Lublin region, the Stalinist period (symbolised by Lavrentiy Beria) and the persecutions of those years were discussed, and harshly criticised by participants of the convention. AK/BCh soldiers maintained their influence in the Society until 1958. Subsequently to new elections to the Society’s authorities, strictly associated with the approaching 2 nd Congress of ZBoWiD (in 1959), AK and BCh members were pushed out of the Society’s authorities, former GL/AL soldiers (now members of PZPR) being selected to replace them. AK/BCh member again suffered marginalisation and discrimination from 1959 on, performing marginal, meaningless functions. The article presents how the events of one of the so-called Polish months impacted the functions and rebirth of the Society in the post-Stalinist period; it is also an attempt to outline the political position achieved by AK soldiers in ZBoWiD after 1956.

The People’s Republic of Poland (PRL) never had a real market. In their longterm policies on prices, the communist authorities sacrifi ced the rqeuirement of market balance, resorting instead to the principle of stable prices for basic prod- ucts. But, the rules of economy cannot be ignored for a long time. Therefore, when the market balance collapsed, triggering market turmoil, the prices had to be risen. In 1963, after a harsh winter during which the authorities were incapable, i.a. of supplying citizens with enough coal, two rises of prices of products necessary for every household, were carried out. On 1 st April, the prices of coal and fi rewood changed, as did the fees for electrical power, gas, central heating and water. Whereas on 15 th September the retail prices were risen of dairy products (milk, cream, cheese, quark, ice cream, milk powder and milk beverages) and of distilled vinegar, vodkas, wines, rectified spirit, denatured alcohol, and matches. The prices had not been consulted neither with trade unions, nor communist party structures. The rises were explained by the need to counteract wastage and force savings upon society. In a situation when mass media were under the complete control of the ruling party, society could voice its opinion only by independent forms of expression. In the second quarter of 1963, a popular measure consisted in distributing satirical verses that mocked the higher prices of energy and the socialist system of work. Discontent was basically expressed by jokes and rumours ridiculising the rulers, disseminated in various circles, anonymous signs or some leaflets. Mockery and joke are the weapon of the weak, as the citizens of PRL felt so against the communist state in the early 1960s. Inhabitants of the Poznań voivodeship in their majority refrained from any serious protests. The people of Great Poland were prevented from reacting by the still vivid memories of the ruthlessness of the system, demonstrated i.a. during the pacification of Poznań in June 1956. Also, the 1960s marked the definite end of open resistance against the new system. After the time of “wrestling” with the new rulers in the 1940s and 1950s, people tried to arrange their lives somehow, in the consolidated communist reality; traditions rejected by the communists, were transferred to private circles of friends and families.

The Kraków structure of PZPR (Polish United Workers’ Party) was among the most important in Poland. October 1956 brought about signifi cant personal movements within the Kraków branch of the party, a large group of its leaders being dismissed together with the fi rst secretary of KW (Voivodeship Committee) Stanisław Brodziński, as well as many persons with roots in KPP (the pre-war Communist Party of Poland). For a longer time, until 1968, the party was not affected by any major crisis. From the beginnings of the 1960s, in the assessed voivodeship the numbers of party members and candidates rose importantly, from about 61,000 (in 1959) to over 110,000 (in 1969). Some of the old worthies (like Zofia Zemanek) disagreed with their removal to the margins of social life, subsequently they found a field of activity in the TPPR (Polish-Soviet Friendship Society). Also, the influence of activists who had emerged in the aftermath of October 1956, was successfully neutralised and weakened (Bernard Tejkowski, Marek Waldenberg, Zbigniew Jakus). The party certainly took advantage of the period of relative social calm, to stabilise its organisational/territorial structure with District, Municipal, City District, Plant and Basic Party Committees. The most important tool to exercise power used by the Kraków branch of PZPR, was the party apparatus and the system of “nomenklatura” (ruling class) enabling to create and control personnel policy in administration, economy, etc. The Kraków party was led in the assessed period by Bolesław Drobner, Lucjan Motyka and Czesław Domagała. Analysis of the regional structures of Poland’s communist party is an important, required direction of research.

Universal elections in the People’s Republic of Poland (PRL) were never free, therefore, they did not refl ect the true social attitude towards the system and individual governments; they only reaffi rmed the rulers’ political preferences in formal terms. They were a tool used to legitimise the system, perform a selection done by upper party authorities amongst the members of “upper bureaucratic class” and a peculiar survey to measure social support and the rulers’ ability to exert control over society. Social opposition to electoral incapacity was present with varying force through- out the period of PRL, even though historians were mentioning it sporadically and tritely, usually on margin of the descriptions of electoral campaigns that took place in times crucial for the nation, such as elections to the Legislative Parliament in 1947, or the fi rst parliamentary elections after the October turning point of 1956. Resistance to elections was proportionate to the restrictions of voting freedom imposed by the authorities, and the applied repressions. In the fi rst elections of the “Gomułka era” – in 1957 and 1958 – its relatively most frequent forms were open

The Basic Party Cell (POP) at the Warsaw Branch, was the Polish United Workers’ Party’s (PZPR’s) strongest party unit in the Polish Writers’ Association (ZLP). In Stalinist years, it was used to control and indoctrinate the community of writers. After the political “thaw” it was affected by very strong reformist tendencies, called “revisionist” by communist authorities. That was the difference between it and other PZPR’s cells in ZLP’s branches. Also, POP OW ZLP due to its numerosity and connections of some its members with the party leadership, exerted real infl uence on ZLP’s activities and on the relations between writers and the communist party. Nonetheless, internal divisions in the organisation were very deep. In addition to “revisionists”, the POP was also composed of a group of writers completely subordinated to the party’s instructions. Within the POP OW ZLP a discussion was held on the scope of writers’ duties, resulting from the fact of membership in PZPR. Should restrictions of free expression be accepted? Can writers-party members participate in creating the cultural policy, or should they only implement its guidelines? Are there perhaps any false intermediaries in the relations between POP, and the party leadership? The authorities’ actions towards communities of creators – mainly imposing restrictions of freedom of speech – promptly triggered protests, also of a part of the members of POP OW ZLP. In the 14 years of Gomułka’s rule, the highest emotions were provoked by the liquidation of the monthly „Europa” and founding of the Warsaw weekly „Kultura”, the dispute over the letter of 34 and the counterletter of POP OW ZLP, the expelling of Leszek Kołakowski from PZPR, and the March campaign. In this period, some writers-party members, ignoring the risk of disfavour – left the party’s ranks; while others remained in the organisation for a long time, forming an informal opposi- tion (“dissent within the party”), yet others remained members only in formal terms, the group of orthodox communists rapidly diminishing. In the late 1960s, when the anti-intelligentsia phobia among the party’s leadership became evident for everybody, it was hard to find any big names among the members of POP OW ZLP. The organisation became uniform in terms of ideology, but devoid of authority and despite the opposition’s resignation from struggle, it proved incapable of leading the community of writers. The fortunes of POP OW ZLP seem to be a good example of ideological reconsiderations and changing attitudes within the communist party’s intelligentsia towards the policies of Gomułka.

The political transformations of 1956 signifi cantly increased the options of scientifi c trips to the West, and stimulated the exchange of personnel between national scientifi c institutions and their Western counterparts. However, on consenting to the development of scientifi c co-operation with foreign entities, the communist authorities were fearful of opening to scientists a new path of emigration from PRL (the People’s Republic of Poland). Therefore, they were intent on controlling scientifi c exchange as strictly as possible, sending abroad mainly the politically trustworthy researchers. Both tasks turned out to be unachievable, but despite that, emigration to Western countries associated with scientifi c journeys (grants or scholarships) was marginal in the period of PRL. Furthermore, statistics suggest that most of Polish scientists traveling abroad, did not treat their stays as an opportunity to fl ee communist Poland. The article states statistical data confirming these conclusions. The decision to emigrate was always individual, nonetheless it used to be taken in a concrete social/political context. Conditions in the PRL apparently favoured decisions to stay abroad. Therefore, the small number of “defections” of scientists during their stays in western countries, is yet more surprising. It may be partly explained by the fact that scientists willing to emigrate had other ways to accomplish their aim, such as tourist travels, as well as the legal emigration procedure.

The catalyst of the June rebellion of 1976 was the dramatic rise of food prices, announced by the Prime Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz. The protest in Gdańsk differed substantially from the well-known protests in Radom, Ursus and Płock. Local workers remembered the massacre of December 1970 only too well. Fearful of provocation by the Security Service (Służba Bezpieczeństwa, SB) they chose to refrain from marching to city, beginning a sit-down strike instead; it was joined by 10,000 employees of the Lenin Shipyard, as well as a part of the personnel of ZREMB, BUDIMOR, and the Repair Plant of the Voivodeship Union of Dairy Co-operatives in Pruszcz Gdański. The Gdańsk strike was among the lar gest countrywide. Then why has the Gdańsk strike been forgotten? It’s no exaggeration to assert that in the Tri-City (Gdańsk/Sopot/Gdynia) the 1970s was a decade marked by the deep shadow of the December massacre. Very possibly the 1970 and 1980 events have erased the much less pronounced memory of the June protest. Neither did that June fi t the heroic mythology of “Polish months” of 1970 and 1980, when workers’ demands exceeded the anecdotic “sausage”. Whereas in 1976, stri king employees did not even formulate their own demands. They only protested against the rise of prices. The strike was too brief to reach beyond strictly economic issues. Therefore, there was nothing particular to be proud of years later. Neither did any spectacular government replacings occur in the aftermath of June. The disgraced Jaroszewicz remained in position of primer minister. Why? Maybe inside the Party there was no organised faction that could use the social unrest to carry out another reshuffl e among the Party’s bigwigs. Paradoxically, the image of the Coast “silent” in 1976, was permanently recorded by Andrzej Wajda’s fi lm The Man of Iron, which was inconvenient for Communist authorities. It was screened in the summer of 1981. In one of the scenes, Ms Hulewiczowa recalls that Maciej Tomczyk – the main protagonist – on becoming aware that “there have been workers’ protests in Radom and Ursus”, decided to organise a solidarity strike in the Gdańsk Shipyard: “And then something arose him. He wanted to make some protest at the shipyard, but people had too fresh memories of their own December, so they stayed idle”. That scene is very moving, but completely untrue.

The topic of this study is the situation of indigenous inhabitants of the Sztum district, that is the second most numerous such population in the area of Gdańsk Pomerania. Not only numerosity was relevant at selecting this group, also the fact that in over 70% is was composed of a rural populace. The preserved sources, the analysis of which has confi rmed their representativeness, realiability and features, have determined the topic and the chronologic scope of this study. It only presents a fragment of the life of indigenous people, illustrating their situation in the early 1950s. Preserved materials enable us to follow the activities of natives in many fi elds of social life. The fi rst part of the study is an analysis of the current status of research on the issues of the indigenous population of Gdańsk Pomerania. It enabled to point out the need of this study. A description of the period 1945–1950 makes it possible to understand the complexity of the problem of indigenous population. It was a turbulent time in the history of Western and Northern Territories (i.e., territories Poland took over from Germany after WW2). Many processes that characterise that period were the consequence of war, and the recent establishing anew of Polish state authority. All those events, beginning with the arrival of the Soviet army, migration of the population, and the establishment of Polish administration, had a tremendous impact on the local inhabitants. They experienced many difficult moments in those years, completely opposite to the expectations associated with desired freedom. The preserved archives that are the base of this study, were created as a consequence of PZPR’s new policy towards the indigenous population. The key decision in that regard was the Resolution of the Party’s Central Committee of July 1950, on the attitude towards natives. The provisions of the resolution were exercised by carrying out various analyses by the voivodeship, district and communal administration, relative to the situation of native people. The issues addressed by the resolution are reflected in preserved sources, therefore, in further sections of the study the resolution is thoroughly analysed, making it easier to understand the substantial structure of sources that are the basis of the study. Their in-depth verification enabled to bring closer the position of indigenous people within the social structure of the district. This is a basic element of the study, that demonstrates how complex are the problems related to the existence of natives in society. The study is contributory, and it is a start point for further research on indigenous population of Gdańsk Pomerania.

The presented work tells about soldiers from Elbląg and Braniewo districts, directed to do their military service in coal and uranium mines, and in quarries. The geographical framework of the study was determined by the territorial competence of the Military Draft Offi ce (WKU) in Elbląg, the army records of which have been analysed for the needs of this article. In addition to general fi ndings, the author has managed to determine the names of 483 persons, inhabitants of Elbląg and Braniewo districts (then part of the Gdańsk voivodeship), directed to work in coal and uranium mines, and quarries. The fi rst four Labour Battalions were established on 15 October 1949. In the following years more were created, as result of which by the end of 1953 already 26,000 soldiers were working in the mining sector, grouped in 26 battalions. “The soldiers with pickaxes” were not authorised to carry weapons, nor to be promoted to suboffi cials; directed to torturous work 10–12 hours a day, soldiers-miners payed the price of their service in the army with loss of health, often even life. Of 200,000 recruits directed in the years 1949–1959 to work in mines, today only about 40,000 are still alive, and of 2870 soldiers sent to the uranium mine at Kowary near Jelenia Góra, only 200. As result of the dissolution in 1955 of the organisation “Service to Poland” (“Służba Polsce”) its subordinated units of Alternative Military Service (labour battalions) were transformed into the Military Mining Corps (WKG), from then on subordinated to the minister of mining. In total, soldiers of labour battalions (military mining battalions) were employed in 60 mines in Lower and Upper Silesia, and western Lesser Poland. In its peak (1956) the WKG was composed of ca 35,000 soldiers. The gradual process of abolishing military mining battalions began in autumn 1956 and was completed in 1959. Soldiers-miners from Elbląg and Braniewo districts were mainly persons aged 20–21, from working class and peasant families, graduated from 4 or 7 classes of elementary school. A good part of them – 93 – had criminal records. The list stated at the end of the article contains personal data of all persons subjected to universal compulsory military service, residents of Elbląg and Braniewo districts in the years 1949–1959, of whom documentation certifying their service in coal, uranium mines or quarries is preserved. The article also includes an annex stating a complete List of battalions, the soldiers of which worked in coal mines, uranium mines and quarries in the years 1949–1959.

Because of its size, importance and openness after 1956, Poland was from the start the most signifi cant East European target country of the Free Europe Committee’s book program. Accordingly, Polish visitors to the West were the fi rst to benefi t from a new book distribution method in addition to mailings. In the fi rst three-quarters of 1957, an unprecedented number (some 55,000) persons from the satellite countries visited the West, the vast majority of whom were Poles. This provided an opportunity to deliver directly to the recipients selected litera- ture, including politically signifi cant books and periodicals, without the hindrance of postal censorship. On the other hand, only those granted exit visas to leave Poland could receive books in this fashion. At the end of that year, Free Europe Press (FEP) initiated a permanent system for the purpose of distributing by hand books of political impact to Polish intelligentsia travelling to Western Europe. Stockpiles of no more than 100 books supplied from a central stockpile in Munich were to be maintained in London and Paris, the two centers that attracted the greatest number of important visitors from Poland. Three types of literature were envisaged: books requested by the visitor specifi cally, books selected by two Polish FEP editors in New York and Munich, and books published in Polish for this purpose under FEP sponsorhip. The project would operate as a branch of the mailing project through a network of Polish cultural institutions, libraries, bookshops, publishing houses, clubs and cultural associations. Among them were the Sikorski Institute in New York, the Kosciuszko Foundation, the Polish Library in London and Paris, the Polish Youth Center in Paris, and the Polish YMCA in Geneva. Their number eventually reached 30 in London and 11 in Paris and the two cities became the main publishing centers of Polish books outside Poland. The initial Polish project ran from 1958 till the summer of 1959 under the aegis of the East Europe Institute under Sam Walker and John Kirk in order to avoid any identification with the Free Eutope Committee. Through a network of distribution points in London, Paris, Rome, Stockholm, Brussels and Munich, it distributed over 1,000 books per month to East Europeans travelling in the West. After returning home, some recipients continued to request books to be sent to them by mail. This program was followed by a special book distribution project targeting the East European and Soviet delegation members attending the communist-organized 7th World Youth Festival held in Vienna from July 26 till August 4, 1959.

The author undertook to analyse the attitudes of teachers of the Lublin region in the period less addressed by historians of education, that is, after 1956. The importance of teachers and their attitudes for the communist authorities is evidenced by the fact that both the party apparatus and security organs, had special structures competent for the representatives of the teaching profession, exerting influence on their views and attitudes. Teachers were among the social groups most eagerly encouraged to join PZPR’s (Polish United Workers’ Party’s) ranks, because of the fact that despite the political transformations of 1956, until the collapse of the socialist system in Poland they were meant to directly exercise PZPR’s ideological plans towards education and the young. Indoctrination and pressure by education administrative bodies, the party apparatus, and SB (Security Service) resulted in the emergence and consolidation of two types of teachers’ attitudes towards the authorities and the political system. The fi rst consisted in acceptance and participation in the system, expressed by membership in PZPR, confi dential and open collaboration with SB, and active participation in political/ideological indoctrination of the young. The second attitude boiled down to the desire to arrange their lives in the actual conditions, to avoid exposing oneself to confl ict with the ruling authority, to care for one’s own interests. Only some individuals functioned apart from these attitudes, demonstrating unacceptance of the authorities and the political system.

Since the very creation of “Solidarity”, the problem of mutual relations in enterprises between free trade unions and communist party structures, became highly important. From the fi rst months of Solidarity’s activities, the situation at workplace was characterised by an aggravating confl ict between the trade union supported by workers and the unaccepted communist party, generally blamed for the economic and social crisis. The foundation of free trade unions and Solidarity’s dynamic activity in enterprises emphasised the scale of social disapproval of PZPR’s policies, demonstrating how feeble were the social foundations of communist rule, and the extent of the helplessness of PZPR’s basic structures in face of a social subject that was not subordinated to the ruling party. The conflict was especially deep in the enterprises of Katowice voivodeship, that were strategically important for the economy of PRL (People’s Republic of Poland). Relations between the communist party and the trade union suffered additionally in Silesian coal mines, as a consequence of the government’s resolution no. 199/81 – adopted against Solidarity’s will – imposing production in coal mines on free Saturdays. In autumn 1981, the process of leaving the Katowice communist party organisation by its members continued, both by ordinary members of PZPR, and employed representatives of the party apparatus as well. Communist party’s units in plants, in many mines, mills and factories of the Katowice voivodeship practically lost their operating capacity, and their influence on workers was a complete fiction. The hierarchic structure of jurisdiction of the voivodeship executive over the ordinary mass of members, that had been developed for years, ceased to function in late autumn 1981. A few attempts, undertaken by the 1 st secretary of the Voivodeship Committee (KW) of PZPR in Katowice, Andrzej Żabiński, to stimulate the activity of party members in Silesian plants, ended in complete failure. “Solidarity” added dynamics to social processes, by increasingly extending its influence over the operations of enterprises. In October 1981, the first demands were put forward to eliminate communist party structures from workplaces, and to deprive party secretaries of their job contracts. These tendencies intensified with particular force in the next weeks. In November and early December such demands were already voiced by many mines and mills of the Katowice voivodeship, sometimes in form of ultimatum. Similar processes took place in enterprises throughout the country. The demands to remove the communist party from enterprises were usually justified by the party’s political nature inconsistent with the economic purpose of enterprises, and the destructive impact of basic party cells and committees both on the personnel of enterprises, and their economic activities. The introduction of martial law and suspension of Solidarity’s activities stopped the developments that were dangerous for the communist party.

The exceptionally turbulent years 1980–1983 made many people decide to flee Poland. One of the main obstacles in their way were the counter-intelligence structures of WOP (Border Defence Troops). Among them, the 2 nd Department of the Kashubian WOP Brigade in Gdańsk. The Department applied a very extensive range of methods to protect the state border. Special emphasis was put on preventive actions. Apart from border controls, i.a. operational activities were applied against persons suspected of intending to flee the country. Functionaries of the 2 nd Department subjected them to surveillance, exercised, among other, by the border units’ network of secret agents. It also included actions aimed at reducing to the minimum the potential escapee’s contacts with the border zone, what could seriously complicate the lives of persons professionally dependent on that area, cutter fishermen for example. The work of the functionaries of the 2 nd Department of the Gdańsk Brigade of WOP extended beyond purely preventive issues. Provided with competence proper for investigative services, they also handled cases of escapes as such, both accomplished and prevented. Suspects and witnesses were subjected to multiple interrogations lasting many hours, often combined with confrontations. If necessary, also home searches and on-site inspections were carried out. Investigations were very meticulous, applying not only to escapees. The 2 nd Department officers’ scrutiny also extended to persons that could be suspected of offering whatever form of assistance, factual or alleged, at illegal border crossing. Repressive measures were often applied against them, without proving guilt beforehand. The actions undertaken by the 2 nd Department towards the escapees, did not change after the formal end of martial law in July 1983. The character of service did not allow for any modifications of applied methods, that remained in continuous use until 1989.

The founding of the Federation of Fighting Youth (FMW) in Warsaw in June 1984, was triggered by stagnating activity of the political opposition against communist rule that was felt by young people, and their unfamiliarity with the underground opposition structures, composed of their peers. The Federation professed pro-independence and anticommunist ideas. Regaining independence was the imperative for its members, as was fighting against communism and promoting these concepts in opposition circles, especially of the youth. Such plans were to be carried out by closely collaborating with the “Solidarity” trade union. The organisation did not promote any ideology, it did not work out its own political programme. Its main formula was based on openness to different political, economic and social views of its members. The most important task of the Federation consisted in mobilising the young to battle communism throughout the country. To achieve that purpose, the organisation attempted to contact as many persons from broad opposition as it could. FMW did not take long to gain many followers and active members. It grew to the status of a supraregional, all-Polish structure. It was Poland’s largest youth opposition organisation in the post-1945 period, well known both for its so-called direct actions, as activities in clandestine publishing. The Warsaw structures of FMW edited the Federation’s leading publication, called „Nasze Wiadomości” (“Our News”). Many of its members were simultaneously active in other opposition groups in the capital, such as the Resistance Groups „Solidarni”. The Federation, weakened by internal dissent and facing the problem of specifying its role in the new political/social situation in the post-1989 years, definitely disintegrated in the early 1990s.

In 1939, the Police force of the Second Republic of Poland ceased to exist. No political option, be it associated with the legal Government-in-Exile, be it Soviet-backed, anticipated reactivating the security organs in a reborn Poland in their pre-war form. For those who survived World War Two (less than 50% of the police force personnel of the Second Republic), difficult times arrived. Pre-war functionaries were subjected to a special “rehabilitation procedure” to verify their past in the pre-war period and the Occupation, at which successive instructions in this regard, issued in further years, were increasingly restrictive, affecting not only policemen, but their families as well. An issue apart is the story of a group of about 800–1000 policemen who were hired by the newly established Civic Militia (Milicja Obywatelska, MO). Their situation, at least in the early period, was better than that of their colleagues. The communist authorities were forced by reality to use their skills and experience, as they did not have professionals at disposal. Many former policemen were removed from the MO in two waves, in 1946 and 1947. Only a few – with particular qualifications – remained until 1949 (when they were definitely dismissed from the MO). Policemen who concealed their past and joined the UB (Security Bureau), were exceptions. Simultaneously from the very beginning, security organs carried out operations against the representatives of pre-war law enforcement services. The Ministry of Public Security issued special instructions on repressive activities against former policemen. Many were imprisoned, then sentenced to death or long prison terms. Especially harsh treatment was reserved for functionaries actively involved in undeground pro-independence activities during the Occupation, people like e.g. Bolesław Kontrym “Żmudzin”, whose pre-war police service was “priced” at 10 years of prison; his wartime activity was qualified as deserving the death penalty. The changes of 1956 weakened the repression, nevertheless the group in question remained under scrutiny by SB (Security Service) actually until the very end of the People’s Republic of Poland. Also, the families of policemen were among the most discriminated social groups, as the mere fact of being a member of the family of a pre-war policeman was compromising throughout the period of communist rule in Poland.

Longtime stability of the voting behavior is a phenomenon often observed and its importance is appreciated by researchers. Election results show that since 1989 Poland has been divided by cultural and civilization gap: the north-western part expresses its commitment to the liberal and left values, while the south-eastern part remains strongly traditional and Catholic. The direct background of the nowadays voting divisions goes back to the period of 1940–1947 characterized by dramatic events of war and the considerable change of borders. Signifi cantly, in the beginning of XXI century voters living in the great towns changed their voting behavior and instead of supporting the political camp being still very popular in the anticommunist south-east, began to prefer the moderate political parties that also use to dominate in the north-west Poland.

In post-Soviet Ukraine one can observe the coexistence, competition and interplay of various images and memories of World War II. The modified Soviet scheme remains the most influential despite the problems with adaption of the notion of the victorious country with the notion of Ukraine as the victim of two totalitarianisms. And this scheme has to interact with the memories of nationalistic underground in East Galicia and Volhynia as well specific memories of the Crimean Tatars and the Jews. Ukraine`s salvatory pluralism of memory functions not as a space for dialogue but rather as a number of closed and mutually exclusive narratives. In their struggle both post-Soviet and nationalistic narratives tend to avoid the questions of their own responsibility: for pogroms, deportations or mass killings. The lack of the social and political consensus over the image of World War II, on the one hand, complicates the formation of the all-Ukrainian vision of the past, but, on the other hand, prevents from the one-sided instrumentalization of such vision.

In September 1939, in accordance with secret agreements concluded with Germany, the Soviets occupied the territories of so-called Western Ukraine, meaning Poland’s eastern voivodeships. In November, those territories were annexed by the USSR. Soviet administrative structures were introduced there, and the process of implementing radical socio-economic transformations was launched. The process of changes began by profound ownership transformations, comprising nationalisation of industry, transport, telecommunications, banks. Transformations also affected agriculture. Latifunds, lands of convents and owned by high-ranking state officials, were confiscated. Lands were nationalised. The authorities started creating state farms and farming co-operatives. All land purchase/ sale transactions were forbidden. In December 1939, the ruble became the official currency. The Polish zloty was withdrawn from official circulation. The introduced changes set the foundations for a new economic system. The second aim of Soviet authorities was to industrialise Western Ukraine. In the plan for 1940, the development of the industrial potential of Lwów (Lviv) – a city that had until then been primarily an academic and cultural centre – was deemed a task of particular importance, for ideological reasons. Economic transformations triggered radical social changes, an element of shaping society to emulate the Soviet model. Implemented changes met with ambiguous reactions of different social groups. For example, the collectivisation of agriculture was opposed by peasants-owners of private farms. However, the process was supported by the rural poor, that hoped for a better life thanks to socialism. The authorities suppressed all types of resistance with ruthless administrative methods.

The dismissal of the non-communist politicians was the key event of the February 1948 political crisis in Czechoslovakia. The communists offi cially claimed that there were 12 dismissals even though on the critical day of 25 February 1948 President Beneš signed the total number of 14 dismissals. He could do something completely different in that situation to overcome the political crisis. His unconstitutional decision to support the Prime Minister and Communist Party of Czechoslovakia leader Klement Gottwald aided the communists’ smooth overtake of power, which was actually a coup. There are various speculations as to why he did that. It seems, however, that he was under pressure of Soviet secret agents, who threatened line with the expectations of the Soviet government and, fi rst and foremost, of Stalin himself.