Conquering Poland in 1939 by Nazi Germany was a part of the Nazi „large space policy” (Großraumpolitik). It aimed at creating „a colony” on the territories of Mid- and Eastern Europe, so that the German nation would have its living space (Lebensraum) provided for the following centuries. Nations which inhabited those areas were to be denationalized and turned into slaves or exterminated, and Germans were to settle down in their place. In Poland Hitler began realizing his ideology of „living space”, a vision of settling the East by the Germans. The Nazis in Poland were also gaining practical experience before planned settlement in the whole Eastern Europe, thus millions of people were deported, sent to exile, displaced, settled down, made to leave or exterminated. In such a way the Holocaust was conducted on the territory of Poland, and not only Polish Jews, but also Jews from other countries were murdered. In Poland the Nazi occupants developed and practiced methods of „racist selection” (rassische Siebung), „ethnical decomposition”, „denationalization” and „violation” of the nation of over 20 mln people in order to settle down the Volksdeutsch. The balance of the German policy concerning nations in Poland in the period of 1939–1945 is terrifying: about 3 mln of Jews were murdered and about 1.5 mln of Poles died of Nazi terror. Moreover, millions of Poles were deported, „displaced”, „sent to exile” and made to run.

The Second World War brought radical changes in the shape of Poland, such as extermination of Jews and a large number of Sinti and Roma, and loss of eastern areas of Poland with their national minorities. Changes in social consciousness such as strengthening of national self-identification under the influence of war, and policy of the occupants and not acknowledging national minorities to be a part of the Polish nation were also of vital importance. In the communist Poland these mentality changes were not being researched. The first stage which had an influence on the national structure of post-war Poland was forced migration in the first years after the war. One of the reasons for it were territorial changes and compulsory displacement of German residents. This phenomenon is not connected with the national minorities subject. Another reason was a process of national homogenization of Central European countries, sometimes called ethnical purges, although it would be better to use the expression „etnonational”. Since the end of 1944 and the beginning of 1945 there was a two-way process of building the state of Poland, in which there would be no national minorities, and nationality and citizenship would be identical. Despite apparently large political changes in Poland, which were taking place since the turn of the forties and the fifties until the seventies, Polish nationality policy of all that period was constant. It was applied by various means depending on political and social conditions. In the eighties no new concept of the nationality policy was created. The policy changed according to current political needs or when it was raised by the opposition. The authorities continued the previously elaborated policy (administrative limitations, surveillance) to the extent to which the unstable situation allowed. A symbol of a breakdown of the previous policy and taking over the initiative by the opposition was the creation of the Committee for Co-operation with National Minorities (with Marek Edelman as a chairman) within Citizen Committee at the Chairman of NSZZ „Solidarność” (The Independent and Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarność).

A typical for a Nazi country racist ideology aimed at the Jews created the atmosphere of hatred against the persecuted Jewish community. It led to growing impunity of the society, both of Reichdeutsches and some Poles. Sometimes it resulted in committing murders on Jews. Court cases of the Polish Lipinski family and a reichsdeutsch Artur Eckert, accused of secret murder of Jews, which were heard in 1944 at Nazi special courts in Łódź (Litzmannstadt) and in Berlin give a new view on Nazi „justice”. Passing a death sentence for „Aryans” for murdering Jews („underpeople” according to the official interpretation of national socialism) contradicted both the official ideology and the policy of extermination of Jews. The cases described prove that using capital punishment for exceptionally brutal murders of Jews out of mean motives was a rule for courts no matter what the murderers’ origin was. It was important for the Nazi authorities to distinguish between a „state” extermination and individual murders out of robbery motives, that is why murders of Jews committed by „Aryans” were prosecuted by Criminal Code of Reich and anybody who killed them out of mean motives, that is without the institutional allowance, was treated as a murderer. Such a use of law, contradictory to the official ideology of the Nazi state, was applied only in cases when Jews were victims of individual murders, but even in those cases the reason for it was not their civil rights, but the need to keep order in the state. Jewish victims were only a pretext to prosecute lawless individuals acting out of institutional or state control, for whom there was no place within a totalitarian state. When proclaiming the racist ideology, Nazi authorities were on one hand creating favorable conditions for this kind of crimes, and on the other hand fighting individual criminal initiatives which could lead to anarchy.

Author presents some of substantive law issues concerning crimes against humanity currently persecuted by Chief Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation of the Institute of National Remembrance. In the introductory part there are presented problems related to the virtues which led to introducing a regulation into the Act of 18 December 1998 on the Institute of National Remembrance – Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation (Journal of Laws, 19 December 1998), on the basis of which crimes against humanity, including both crimes of Nazi occupation and crimes committed in Stalin period, are currently persecuted. In the following part of the article issues which are vital for the correct interpretation and consequently for practical use of article 3 of Act on Institute of National Remembrance by the lawyers are explained. These issues are as follows: legal nature of the definition included in a regulation, elements which define the notion of crime against humanity, time of committing deeds recognized as crimes against humanity, relation to notions of crime and offence defined in the Criminal Code, interdependence between crimes against humanity and types of crimes defined in Polish criminal law, so called subject matters, especially intention to commit deeds recognized as crimes against humanity, subject of a crime, that is a person, who can be a perpetrator of a deed recognized as crime against humanity, the „mass character” of those deeds and a very important (especially for apprehended perpetrators) issue of so called intertemporal law. In the final part the author presents most often disclosed kinds of crimes recognized as crimes against humanity committed in 1939–1956 on the example of subjects of investigations by particular Branch Commissions for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation.

The intention of this study is to outline the problematical context of the massacres of Polish residents by armed forces – UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) of OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia in 1943 and 1944. By taking into consideration both historical background and the immanent context of the events which led to the outburst of violence in the Polish-Ukrainian borderland, it attempts to look beyond the well-known facts. In addition, the „anti-Polish action”, as a paradigm of relations between two nations, needs a revised evaluation of Polish-Ukrainian relations next to the tragic events in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia of 1943 and 1944. Gaining deeper insight into the reasons of this mass murder, a synthesis of multiethnic interaction in these regions throughout the 19th and 20th centuries is exposed: – The social, ideological and political roots of OUN built the framework of nationalism regarding the pre-war Polish policy towards Ukrainians; – The fundamental impact of nationality policy by Germany in occupied Volhynia and Galicia, cultural Ukrainization and the maintenance of traditional administrative relations for purposes of economic exploitation; – The OUN as a factor of the German policy of ethnic cleansing, while attacking Soviet Union, and its consequences for the future warfare of UPA in Eastern Poland; – The „anti-Polish action” of OUN-UPA and the strategy of ethnic cleansing against the Polish civilian population in the frame of the German-Soviet partisan war about Volhynia and Eastern Galicia. Apart from the Polish-Ukrainian historiography of the issue at hand, this paper and its hypotheses intends to serve as a stimulus to new approaches in the area of „Polish-Ukrainian relations” with reference to the time of Soviet/German occupation of Poland in general and the incidents in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia in particular. The results are rather suggestive than conclusive. They refer to the numerous factors, among them German/Soviet occupation politics or the protest against the Polish Ukrainian politics, which manifest in the „anti-Polish action”. Finally, there is the question to what extent the OUN-UPA at all continued the legacy of the Ukrainian national movement in their efforts for an independent Ukraine.

The Polish Section of Radio Free Europe is one of language sections of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, an American radio station which broadcasted its program from the Federal Republic of Germany (Munich), Spain and Portugal for listeners in communist countries in Bulgarian, Czech, Polish, Slovak and Hungarian languages. The Polish section operated in 1952–1994. It has an unshakeable role in struggle for liberty and democracy in countries of the Soviet block. Radio Free Europe supported and shaped resistance against communist regimes in Eastern Europe. It is believed that its programs were commonly listened to, despite intensive jamming. The article tries to define the number of listeners to the station. The author analyses currently available Polish and American source materials, which include results of researches conducted for Radio Free Europe which come from BIB (Board for International Broadcasting, an institution supervising the Radio since 1973 on behalf of the US Congress) and polls concerning receiving of Western radio stations broadcasting in Polish made by OBOP (Center for Public Opinion Polls) since 1969.

In the second half of the seventies in PAX Association (Stowarzyszenie PAX, an official Catholic association depending on Communist government) some members started to disagree with the binding political option represented by Bolesław Piasecki. It was quickly noticed by the Security Service, which in the beginning of 1977 began a controlling investigation under cryptonym „Burza” („Thunderstorm”). A group of young activists gathered round Romuald Szeremietiew, the speaker of PAX voivodship department in Leszno, was thought to be the most serious danger. The group was questioning the leader role of the party and postulated equality of citizens’ rights and independence of Poland. On 21st March 1977 Szeremietiew was put under investigation with cryptonym „Taktyk” („Tactician”), led as a part of „Burza” investigation. Despite a good examination of the case, the Security Service had many problems when invigilating Szeremietiew. The most important one was lack of agents in his environment. Bugging had to be the basic source of information. In the end of 1977 the group of young activists was working on introducing vital changes in the Association. Apart from Szeremietiew the most active were Tadeusz Stański and Maciej Pstrąg-Bieleński. The systematic development of the group resulted in strong counteractions by PAX authorities. On 7th April 1978 Szeremietiew and Stański were being questioned. Ten days later they resigned from their posts in the Association. According to Szeremietiew, PAX authorities convinced them that their voluntary resignation would guarantee that no-one else would be repressed. Nevertheless Szeremietiew was still a member of the Board of the Association. The final decisions were taken on 6th October 1978 on the PAX Board meeting. Piasecki (who was very ill at the time) decided to exclude Szeremietiew from the organization. Four days later Szeremietiew took part in a press conference, where he presented his views on situation in PAX. He also presented the text of declaration in which five main differences between the young and the group of Piasecki were underlined. The differences included attitudes towards democracy, Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR), USSR, society and Church. Excluding Szeremietiew from PAX practically became an end of the group of young reformators.

Belarussians are one of the youngest European nations. In the first half of the 20th century they were still in the process of developing their national consciousness, which was difficult because of the country’s geographical situation between Poland and Russia. In the interwar period these countries divided Belarussia into two parts and started political, economic and cultural expansion on its territory. On the other hand, large international conflicts of the 20th century speeded up the formation of a modern Belarussian nation. The Second World War was in some ways a turning point for Belarussians. Vast material war damages, as well as sufferings and death of several thousand people (in western part of Belarussia) were accompanied by vehement political, economic and social transformations, which resulted in a change of the traditional lifestyle. One of the most important effects of the war was a rapid growth in national consciousness. Another phenomenon was Polonisation of those Belarussian people who identified with vastly Catholic Polish culture and state. The overwhelming majority of Belarussians still did not have a clear national consciousness and identified only with their region (the locals, „Poleszuks”) or religion (Catholic, Orthodox). The accelerated development of national identity was accompanied by a rather fast development of political consciousness. During the war pro-Polish, pro-Soviet and pro-German circles appeared among the Belarussian people and opted for the corresponding national status. War-time changes led to important transformations of social structure of the Belarussian society. Belarussian foresters, who were deported into USSR together with Polish foresters during the first large deportation of 10th February 1940, were gone, as well as innumerous Belarussian Orthodox gentry. New social and professional groups emerged, such as kolkhoz workers, civil servants and teachers. Changes of the social structure (consolidated with secular tradition), ownership and mentality of the Belarussian society had a great impact on the attitudes towards other nations who lived in north-eastern parts of pre-war Poland. One of their important effects were nationalistic conflicts, which emerged from breaking the „social balance” by nations who had been discriminated, i.e. Belarussians. The biggest conflict was between the Poles and the Belarussians. Another conflict was that between the Germans and the Belarussians, which was provoked by the wrong occupation policy of German authorities. The diversity of political options, caused by rivalry between several centers of power, led to a tragic division in the society. Belarussians often stood on the opposite sides of the battlefield, believing that they fought for their country. It resembled the situation of Poles during the WW I, who found themselves in the armies of three different invaders fighting with each other. During the war the process of modernizing the Belarussian society and of changing the traditional lifestyle started. It was also the beginning of Sovietization, which fully developed after the end of the war on the territory of Belorussian SSR. The Sovietization was accompanied by Russification, which in the post-war period led to the dominating role of the Russian culture.

The author of the article is trying to analyze the policy concerning nations during WW II in Upper Silesia, or, to be more precise, in the area included into Upper Silesian province by the Third Reich. The main elements of the policy were: classification of residents based on nation and race criteria (made by the police census in 1939 and within so called German National List (Deutsche Volksliste) in 1941–1945), displacement of Poles, settling down Germans from the territory of the USSR and extermination of Jews. The nationality policy in Upper Silesia was different than in other Polish areas included into Reich. The reason for it was usually seen in the different economic conditions and the necessity to keep qualified manpower essential in Silesian heavy industry. In some historical researches it has also been noticed, although less explicitly, that nationality policy of local German elites was also consciously different. It seems that gauleiter Josef Wagner, as well as his successor at the post, Fritz Bracht, saw the necessity to exclude Silesian people from qualification made only on the basis of race criteria which were emphasized by Heinrich Himmler when he was a Reich commissar for strengthening the Germanity. Fritz and Bracht used also political criteria, which made the situation similar to Pomerania and western areas included into Reich (e.g. Alsace and Lorraine). It resulted in comparatively low (when compared to demographic potential of Upper Silesia) number of displacements and in accepting the rule that majority of Upper Silesians could gain German citizenship, although their rights were limited compared to other German citizens. Those differences were underestimated after the end of the war by new communist Polish authorities, the representatives of which knew little about them. After 1945 Upper Silesians were treated suspiciously by Polish communist authorities and their loyalty towards Poland was questioned. Consequently in the fifties the area was acknowledged as endangered with so called revisionism.

Experiences of the past, especially the horror of Nazi occupation, led to the opinion popular both among the Underground activists and the emigration politicians that Poland has to protect itself against another German aggression by moving the western border towards the Oder river. Such an attitude was often presented by the Polish government in the exile. It was also suggested that territories behind the Oder river should be occupied by the Poles. Similar opinions were held by the Communists, although their declarations concerning the borders were at first rather general. It was only later when, on Soviet inspiration, they started postulating border on the Oder and Nysa Łużycka rivers. It seems that also western powers during military operations could have supported Polish territorial postulates, but only under the condition that Stanisław Mikołajczyk had assumed authority in Poland. Such a large change of the western border must have raised a question of the future of German residents living in the borderland. The failure of international authorities to protect the rights of national minorities during the interwar period and the tragic experience of WW II caused hatred towards the Nazis to expand onto all German people. No-one could imagine living in one country with the Germans. Thus the idea of displacement of all the Germans beyond new borders of Poland was commonly accepted. At first Communist authorities thought that the problem of the German people could be easily solved. A great number of people ran away from the front, moreover, in June and July 1945 the Second Army of the Polish Army was ordered to drive the rest of the Germans out of a several kilometers wide area along the Oder river. It was believed that in such a way „accomplished facts” would be created, thus there would be a proof that areas demanded by Polish Communists are practically free from German citizens. The reality proved to be different. An exile of such a large number of the Germans (about 3.5 mln) was not possible in such a way and in such a short time. However, at that time both Soviet and Polish postulates concerning borders were supported by representatives of Western superpowers. On the Potsdam conference a decision was taken to displace all the Germans from areas on the eastern bank of the Oder and Nysa Łużycka rivers. The displacement started in the beginning of 1946 and it was led in an organized way in the following years. Nevertheless, it did not mean that it was really planned to displace everybody. Not only war criminals or prisoners, but also so called professionals were tried to be kept in Poland. It should be underlined that „professionals” often meant anyone able to work. The situation of the Germans in Poland began to change at the end of the forties. It was decided then that all the Germans had left Poland, although the official end of the displacement did not mean the end of the process itself. Motions of individuals to leave were voted down. For political reasons it was only possible to leave to the German Democratic Republic. The situation changed during the Thaw in the middle of the fifties. Agreements with the Red Cross of the Federal Republic of Germany were signed then, which began the series of departures to West Germany. In the second half of the fifties the vast majority of the Germans in Poland desired to leave for the Federal Republic of Germany. In the beginning of the sixties it was officially acknowledged that there are no Germans in Poland, consequently the number of departures was much lower, transforming gradually into emigration, for which German origin was only one of the reasons.

The article presents stages of policy of Polish authorities concerning 600–700 000 members of Ukrainian minority inhabiting areas in the South-East Poland. In the discussed period that policy was undergoing a large transformation. When communists gained power in Poland they had no elaborated way of behavior. At first it was believed that the problem would solve itself after the agreement with USRR of 9 September 1944 on people exchange. However, vast majority of Ukrainians did not wish to leave their land, thus a compulsory displacement was carried out using the army, often in a brutal way. As not all Ukrainians were deported that time, in spring of 1947 large military force with militia and security service carried out „Vistula action” (Akcja „Wisła”), which officially was to do away with the armed underground of Ukrainian OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists)-UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) forces. In such a way the rest of Ukrainians (about 150 000) were displaced to farms left by the Germans in northern and western Poland with no right to come back. Thus all the Ukrainian community was made responsible for actions of the underground. Almost 4000 people suspected of collaboration with the underground were placed in the Central Work Camp in Jaworzno, were they were brutally questioned. When „Vistula action” was completed, repressions against the Ukrainian community were softened and most of the people put in Jaworzno were set free. However, Ukrainians still had no chance to cultivate their religious and national traditions. Their further displacement into Soviet Ukraine was considered, but these plans were not realized. Actions of the authorities after 1950 shows gradual acceptance of a constant presence of Ukrainian community of 200 000 people and a growing awareness of their needs. Consequently, the policy considering minorities was evolving, so that material situation of the Ukrainians began to improve. Cultivating traditions within the frames of few cultural organizations and teaching in their own language was allowed, although still on the limited scale in totalitarian system. The culmination of this process were changes of 1956. The previous behavior of the authorities was criticized, issuing an own newspaper and setting up an organization to represent the interests of the minority was allowed. These changes led to equaling the situation of Ukrainian and Polish people. However, the most important postulate of Ukrainian community, that is allowing the majority of Ukrainians displaced within „Vistula action” to come back to their old farms, has not been realized.

The Polish-Jewish relations are often described by the stereotypes. The one of them is the view on the preference of Communists in Poland gave to the Jewish question and Jewish society after WW II. The article deals with the Jewish question in the activities of Polish Workers Party (PPR) (from 1948 Polish United Workers Party, PZPR) from 1945 to 1953. The author does not focus only on theory (official documents, declarations) but also analyzes the activities of Communists in Poland with regard to Jews. The article also discusses the Communist policy toward other minorities living in Poland after WW II to put the situation of Polish Jews in context. An emphasis is placed on a description of Jewish activities in response to Communist policies. The author concludes that post-war Communist policy towards Jews was not monolithic. Many factors affected the PPR’s views on the Jewish question and the expectations of Jewish society with regard to Communist rule varied widely (e.g. the Zionist’s main problem was emigration of Jews from Poland while Jewish Communist and Bundists were determined to rebuild the Jewish life in Poland after Holocaust). The PPR’s activities in relation to Jews were not monolithic either, but there was one constant goal for the entire period described (1945–1953) – subordination to Communist ideology. The creation of Communist state in Poland was the priority. In this context the Jewish subject, as well as every issue in Poland at that time, had to be consistent with this goal. Some of the concession or privileges granted by Communists in first period of their rule were only part of their takeover in Poland and these concessions or privileges did not go beyond the limits of Communist orthodoxy. The next factor which influenced Communist policy towards Jews deals with the specific situation of Jews following the Holocaust (the necessity of assistance) as well as postwar issues (anti-Semitism, migration of Jews from USSR and emigration to Palestine). An important feature of PPR’s Jewish policy was to use the Jewish question for its own political aims, included wining the approval of the West for new government in Poland through influential Jewish groups or discrediting political opponents by accusing of anti-Semitism. The various views on the described issues were the reason that in PPR the pro-Jews group represented only one of the attitudes towards Jewish question in Poland after WW II. There were anti-Semitic views as well. The article was based on documents coming from archives from Poland, including some new documents from Archive of Institute of National Remembrance.

Accusing Kaszuby inhabitants of separatism was not the idea of communist security service. In the interwar period the „sanacja” authorities suspiciously treated activities of some of the representatives of Kaszuby movement. When after the end of WW II in the autumn of 1945 Kaszuby movement became active again and began making efforts to edit a magazine in Kaszubian, Security Service became interested in it. Into the circle of „zrzeszeńcy” (people connected with a paper „Zrzësz Kaszëbskô”) secret agents were introduced. They reported the initiatives of each of the activists. Representatives of Kaszuby movement were being observed (cases such as „Działacze” – „Activists”, „Odrębność – „Separation”, „Ratusz” – „City Hall”), it was to provide evidence for their anti-state activity. Their private correspondence was read, their telephones and rooms were listened to, special „preventive” talks were led with them to intimidate them. Among those under special surveillance were Jan Trepczyk, Jan Rompski, Aleksander Labuda and Ignacy Szutenberg. Starting with 1956 the Security Service was weakening the activity of Kaszuby Association, which, according to the Service, gathered opponents of Communist regime. It was tried to set its members at variance, to isolate and disgrace the most active of them. Secret agents were reporting on meetings of Main Board and in local branch offices, so the Security Service was well informed about personal conflicts within the Association and used that knowledge to weaken its activity. The repressions of Security Service against Kaszubian intellectuals gathered in Kaszuby movement have by no means limited their activity. It was not possible to publish some of important papers on Kaszuby inhabitants or in Kaszubian. However, actions of the security service did not prove Kaszubian aspirations to found their own republic or to collaborate with the Germans. That accuse was so groundless that no representative of Kaszuby movement was prosecuted by the Communist administration of Justice.