The Germans from GDR and the Polish were like brothers born into a Soviet family; they could quarrel, but they could not leave it. They were curring favours of the father, carrying out their own policy according to their own interests which conflicted with each other. The result of such activities was a “cold war” of misunderstanding and distrust. There were moments of both thaws and crisis, but there were incompatible national differences between communist party of the GDR and the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR). The true reconciliation of the two nations was not possible also because of the lack of legitimization of the Polish and DDR governments. The ups and downs of the Polish- DDR relationship were of course connected with the policy of the Soviet Union and the cold war events. Understanding the strategic meaning of the GDR and Poland for the Soviet Union, the Kremlin could not let the Polish-German relationship transform into the open struggle, which nearly happened in 1956. Communists from the GDR and Poland let alone would by no means lead to the situation similar to the Tito–Stalin conflict of the end of the fourties or collapse of the Soviet-Chinese alliance in the beginning of the sixties. The tensed relationship of Poland and GDR after the second world war is another proof for the fact that the communist parties of Eastern Europe could not exchange national loyalty for marxist internationalism. Even the leaders and the rank and file of SED and PZPR were sworn nationalists. The fast collapse of the Warsaw Treaty after the 1989 showed the malfunctions of the socialist fraternity. In the current article three of the most controversial issues are discussed: the matter of the border between Poland and Germany, the ideological differences connected with choosing the correct way towards socialism and the controversy of the approach towards the West Germany.

The main task of operational groups of GDR Ministry of Public Security in Eastern block countries was controlling GDR citizens who stayed there for long or short periods. In countries to which people often went for holidays – like Hungary, Bulgaria or Czechoslovakia this usually meant preventing to escaping to West Germany. The control system engaged not only operational groups, but the whole Ministry of Security which created a sophisticated system of secret agents in all countries of the block. The system was linked also to state institutions which were responsible for sending staff and tourists abroad. The situation of an operational group in a country depended on its relationships with GDR. While Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia usually eagerly agreed for cooperation and provided help of their security services, Poland agreed for creating “Warszawa” operational group only in September 1980. The group became a center for enrolling and supervising agents and informers in the main environments in Poland. The control of GDR citizens had a little meaning in this case, a much more important thing was using all unofficial and official means of gathering information about Polish domestic situation, as well as cooperation with Polish security services on Polish opposition and members of secret services of western countries. When the perestroika began, the Soviet Union itself became an unreliable link for Germany and the operational group in Warsaw took the role of reporter informing of inner relationships and, as operational groups in the countries of people’s democracy it became the chronicler of its departing from the communist system.

In 1968 the main difference between SED (Socialist Unity Party of Germany) and KPCz (the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia) was different understanding of roots of totalitarian authorities in the countries. The Czechoslovakian communists were sure that they owe their power not only to the victory of the Red Army, but also to the society support, which they were given in free elections. The German communists, on the other hand, were quite conscious that they were given power in GDR only by the Soviet Union. In 1968 SED did not want to and could not agree for the reforms of the Prague Spring. The German communists’ party acted with the aggression of the vassal state and according to their specific situation, as the existence of GDR depended on the protection of the soviet leader. The Czech communists were undertaking activities to reform their own society for the monopoly of power of the “monopoly bureaucracy”. The crisis in Poland in 1980– –1981 was of a different kind – it was the expression of society emancipation which aimed not at the reform, but at the abolition of the communist rule. The SED leaders were conscious of his difference and understood, that Polish opposition after the Gdaƒsk agreement was aspiring to changing the political system in Poland. The German communist party was demanding the Polish government took definite counteractions against the “counterrevolution” danger and was determined to aid to the communist rule in Poland by all possible means, which included also armed intervention, according to the Brezhnev doctrine. The GDR army actively took part in preparations for widely planned maneuvers in Poland, in which also Soviet and Czechoslovakian armies were to participate. The Soviet leadership did not decide for intervention in Poland, which restricted SED activities, but did not reduce their eagerness to do with the Polish conflict using armed forces. When five countries of the Warsaw Treaty intervened in Czechoslovakia, SED in official propaganda created the impression that the army of East Germany took part in occupying Czechoslovakia. Nowadays it is known that its regular combat units were not introduced there.

The beginning of the 1980–82 crisis in Poland reached Hungary in a time when the so-called Kádár-regime just got over the peak of its power and at the same time a process of decline – lasting for almost 10 years and finally leading to the downfall of the regime – got under way. The Hungarian party leadership developed a unique attitude towards the Polish crisis as compared to the other countries of the Communist bloc. The “1956-reflexes” were working in the different ways. On the one hand, the leaders believed that it was possible to avoid even the possibility of following the Polish example in the Hungarian society, that is, the formation of a Hungarian “Solidarity Trade Union”, therefore they started a shrill anti-Polish campaign in time. On the other hand, the Hungarian party leadership took the view that the crisis had to be solved by the Polish communist party, preferably with political means, and they did not make the situation of the Polish leaders even more difficult by criticizing their steps. On the contrary, the other socialist countries – with the exception of Romania – demanded a violent solution from Warsaw. János Kádár – who came to power with the backing of Moscow, by quelling the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 – found the military solution possible only in the case that the possibility of a peaceful solution would have been unfeasible or if the communist system itself would have been endangered. However, he suggested that the violent solution of the crisis should be done with the internal forces: with the state security forces, the military and the police. He could imagine a Soviet intervention only in the worst case, but even in this case the Polish Communists should have carried out“consolidation”. The members of the Polish party leadership looked at Hungary as an example to be followed and they wanted to transplant the political successes of Kádár into Poland. Kádár was undoubtedly highly respected in Poland and the Polish United Workers’ Party attempted to make use of the political capital attached to his name. It is not by accident that right after December 13th, 1981, General Wojciech Jaruzelski asked for and received detailed information about the “consolidation” made by the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party after November 4th, 1956, and the Polish leaders continued attempting to transplant the political achievements of Kádár into Poland later as well.

Although the dissidents of the Soviet Bloc declared their mutual solidarity in a number of proclamations, their real personal contacts were at the minimum due to the limited occasions to travel. Relations of the leaders of the Charter 77 and the Workers’ Defence Committee “KOR” were a certain exception. They managed to organize famous meetings at the Czechoslovak-Polish border already in 1987. A remarkable systematic cooperation was set up in the late 80’s and many personal meetings took place at “the green border”, not only in Karkonosze but also in Tatry, Jeseniky or Beskidy. Only a few of these meetings had any political meaning – many famous personalities used to meet there, public proclamations were published and many photographs of the participants were taken at the border stones and marks. Most of the other meetings happened in purpose to smuggle various samizdat materials and to prepare cooperative pressure actions. To the main organizers belonged young Poles from Wrocław who had already kept the contacts with Prague Charter 77 signatories from the early 80’s. Nowadays it is possible for the first time to use a wider range of the State Security (StB) archive funds for historic research related to these events. Czechoslovak secret police made huge impacts into life of regime opponents – they checked their correspondence, bugged their phone calls and flats and made their everyday life very difficult by all kinds of “arrangements for disintegration”. For monitoring and regulation of dissidents’ activities they also used a number of secret collaborators who outwardly presented themselves as regime opponents. One of them was a Czech language tutor at the Wrocław and Katowice Universities Stanislav Dvorák who used to operate as a main “connection” of Wroclaw’s Polish-Czechoslovak Solidarity and Prague Charter 77 signatories in a first half of 80’s. For the first time he collaborated with the secret police in 1981–1984 as counterintelligence agent under a codename “Michal”, for the second time in 1989–1990 when as a ideal collaborator (“ideovy spolupracovník”) of StB he chose his codename “Jilemský”. The secret police by mean of him controlled and influenced the relations of Polish and Czech dissidents for several years. The real image of Stanislav Dvořák was fully disclosed to his friends from opposition first in 2003 when author of this study gained an access to both files of “Michal” and “Jilemský” kept by secret police in 80’s. The subject of these files together with memories of witnesses makes the major base of this study.

In the second part of this article German diversion in Poland from August to September 1939 was described. The author tries to make reconstruction and analysis of the German diversion organized and realized by intelligence service of Germany at this time. At the end of August 1939, before the beginning of the Second World War, German diversionist agents reported to Reinhard Heydrich and Wilhelm Canaris made a lot of attacks on Polish-German frontier. The aim of this provocation incident was to give Hitler argument to attacks on Poland. In September 1939 at the beginning of the Second World War German diversionist agents carried out numerous attacks against the Polish army. Mission of German diversionist agents was also aimed at destruction across the rear of the Polish army, bridges, factories, industry, foundry and coal mines.

The article shows with what remarkable precision German diplomatic outposts, as well as consular agencies, scattered throughout Poland from Gdynia to Cieszyn to Lvov, gathered information about the Polish military potential. They used official materials, such as newspaper articles, Polish Armed Forces bulletins, as well information obtained from German citizens living in Poland and the ethnic German minority. The German military attaché who was also a member of the diplomatic staff in the German Embassy in Warsaw was in charge of the operation. The article reveals that in spring and summer of 1939, intelligence services stepped up their work. German diplomatic agencies in Poland were very helpful. Relations between Warsaw and Berlin were deteriorating and the initial distrust was replaced by open hostility. The article contains proof that agencies reporting to the German Foreign Ministry took part in drafting lists of Polish patriots to be deported or executed, as well Polish citizens of German nationality who were Nazi opponents. The Nazis later used these lists to track down and execute them. The article also explains what happened to the German diplomatic agencies in Poland in September 1939. It describes their evacuation by the Polish government to Lithuania and Romania, which was accompanied by some dramatic events, such as the possible assassination by the Polish military of the German consul in Krakow August Schillinger. The article also outlines the role played in Nazi-occupied Poland by German diplomatic agencies until the were closed down. The German Embassy in Warsaw was closed down in May 1940. German diplomatic and consular agencies on Polish territories provided essential information which enhanced the decision-making process within Nazi security agencies.

In the years 1941–1944 the Home Army, the representation of the government of Polish Republic for the country, and Polish government in London had to face the problem of Soviet guerrilla troops on occupied Polish land. The Polish government didn’t agree to carry out their own diversion action on such a scale that the Soviets expected from them. The Soviet guerrilla troops were not also welcome on Polish land because there wasn’t permission of Polish authorities for their activity. Moreover, they were accused that their activity caused German repression and quite often was a pure robbery. However, it was the reason of certain difficulties in the foreign policy of Polish government in exile. Sikorski’s job was to reconcile Soviet expectations, often supported by Western allies, with protection of Polish affairs. It was the reason, although a part of Polish politicians both in London and at home were in favour of military actions against Soviet guerrillas, that Sikorski was against giving such an order. The Polish government was aware that the argument about performing diversion activity without host’s permission also referred to Polish diversion on Soviet area and the argument about involving German repression – also Home Army guerrillas on truly Polish land. The charge that Soviet guerrilla troops committed robbery can be denied by the argument that Polish underground didn’t get provision for them. Besides the Soviets thought that performing diversion they had the right to do confiscation and they did not acknowledge that they could be killed as bandits. It seems that the attitude to the guerrillas was mainly caused by the fear of Sovietization of the country. This threat was obscured by the fact that there were also ordinary Soviet soldiers in the Soviet troops, e.g. escapee war prisoners, as well as Jews and members of the social or national groups that were persecuted. The attitude of Soviet government towards Home Army guerrillas had also political roots. The action „Storm” showed that the Polish concerns connected with the political evaluation of the Soviets were justified.

The Ukrainian resistance security police established in 1940 by S. Bandera and S. Łenkawskyj performed the role of a secret service and counter intelligence agency within Bandera’s faction of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). The first security police was commander was M. ¸ebed. From March 1941 he was replaced by M.Arsenych. The hierarchy of the service was closely connected with the hierarchy of OUN. Besides the leadership centre, there were also local departments consisting of two sections: information gathering and investigations. Fighting squads of the security police, which among others arrested people and executed death penalty were reporting to the department empoloyees of each level. Security police members were the most reliable members of OUN. The investigation conducted by OUN security police was merciless. What are known as third degree methods, i.e. torture, was used. In the case of minor offences, security police members thrashed suspects with beech sticks. People sentenced to death were shot or hanged. There were also cases of brutal murders. Between 1943 and 1945 OUN security police took an active part in the slaughter of Polish people. In the years 1945–1948, those Poles who collaborated with the communist government or were actively opposed to the Ukrainian resistance were executed. In practice, executions of Poles were not just limited to those two groups. OUN security police applied the principle of collective responsibility (i.e. killing entire families). At the same time, Ukrainians suspected of collaboration with the communists were also executed. The orders to apply solely the principle of personal responsibility were not given until May 1945. However, entire families were massacred beyond that date. Local OUN security police department employees were entitled to order the execution of a person. They enjoyed practically unlimited prerogatives. As a result, investigations were often brief and resistance members were executed in spite of unsubstantiated charges. The Soviets took advantage of the situation by staging numerous provocations, the result of which was the death of many OUN members wrongly accused of cooperation with the communist security police. OUN security police was law unto itself. The power of the OUN security police chief M. Arsenych (until his death in January 1947) was almost equal to the power of the leader of the Ukrainian National Insurgent Army (UPA). Separate departments of OUN security police survived until 1951 when most of the remaining members of this organisation took over positions as leaders of the OUN underground. The activities of OUN security police stirred a lot of controversy among Ukrainian researchers. On the one hand, they emphasize that the collective responsibility used by the OUN security police OUN discouraged local people from supporting the underground, but on the other they regard the liquidation of communist agents as legitimate.

One of the numerous mysterious episodes of Polish – Ukrainian civil war are among others events that took place on 6th June 1945 in the village Wierzchowiny in the Krasnystaw district of Lublin province. Until now it has been a burning issue raising disputes, discussions accompanied by negative emotions, and accusations of ignorance and manipulations of historical facts. The discrepancies concern not only basic issues such as finding the actual perpetrators or settling the real number of Ukrainian victims but also the accurate interpretation of those events. Spring 1945 was the turning point in extremely hostile Polish – Ukrainian relations in Lublin region. In order to meet the expectations of the people tired of a long-lasting Polish – Ukrainian civil war (the conflict escalated in the spring 1944), Home Army-Delegation of Armed Forces (AK-DSZ) and nationalistic Ukrainian underground entered into a local agreement reconciling the sides and stopping unnecessary bloodshed. At the same time the nationalistic wing of Polish underground stated that the ruthless fighting should be continued as a retaliation for Ukrainian attitudes during the war, especially for the so called anti-Polish action by Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia. Nationalistic wing leaders were also convinced that there was a necessity to make a post-war Poland an ethnically pure country without minorities so numerous until 1939 (Ukrainians being the largest minority group). In spring 1945 the National Armed Forces intensified their activity against the Ukrainians, what violated the agreement concluded by the Home Army-Delegation of Armed Forces and Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists and Ukrainian Insurgent Army and could have lead to the revival of a conflict and increasing the number of victims on both sides. Moreover, such conduct resulted in deterioration of already strained relations between both freedom organisations tending to become leaders in the fight against the communist security apparatus. In this article the author concentrated above all on the activity of the troops of Special Action of National Armed Forces against Ukrainians and communist activists and sympathizers among them in the period from August 1944 till June 1945 in Chełm, Hrubieszów, Krasnystaw and Lubartów districts. Presenting the genesis of events in Wierzchowiny the attempt was made to prove that pacification of Wierzchowiny was not accidental, but it was, perhaps, a well planned action within the wider reprisal operation under a codename „Beyond the Bug river”. Reconstructing the events various sources of many origin were used (National Armed Forces, Security Police, NKVD, Polish Army, local civil administration, contemporary and later accounts of eye witnesses and participants) published earlier and also the ones which saw the light of day for the first time. Nevertheless, recapturing the events which took place over 60 years ago we should remember, that the decisions made by the leaders of National Armed Forces in Lublin region concerning the way of settling the Ukrainian problem had disastrous consequences for the organisation itself and were perfectly exploited by the communist government in their fight with „home reactionaries” – opposing the communist regime.

The arrest and internment of Roman Catholic Primate Stefan Wyszyński (September 25 1953) created an unusual situation for the communist regime of Bolesław Bierut, which allowed it to completely subordinate the Roman Catholic hierarchy. A great obstacle in achieving this aim were convents, whose structures were much more resistant to the destructive religious policy. Thus the authorities of the People’s Republic of Poland decided to accomplish their aim using repressions. Based on actions conducted in the 1950’s in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, it was decided in Poland to some nuns and priests in internment camps and force them to perform compulsory work. Similar repressions were used in the case of convents in the south-western provinces of Katowice, Opole and Wrocław. The aim of this action was also to seize convent estates and to Polonize the territories given to Poland under the Potsdam Conference (July – August 1945). The displacement of nuns (code-named X-2) took place in August 1945. Those actions were justified by mostly fabricated accusations of anti-Polish activities (the displacement of ethnically German nuns), because the authorities were aware of Polish society’s anti-German bias and its anxiety over what was perceived as German revisionism. To secure acceptance for resettlements the communist authorities tried to use the authority of the Church, which was put under particular pressure, as well as ad-hoc regulations. Substantial forces and means were used during the operation, within which a crucial role was played by the security police. As part of the X-2 operation, over 1,300 nuns and 318 convents were displaced. Terror used during this action proved an efficient means. There was no resistance either from the frightened Roman Catholic Episcopate, or from lay Catholics. It could be assumed that the displacement of the nuns from the western provinces provided testing ground for a major operation whose aim was to subordinate convents to the state. However, this action was abandoned, because of the progressing liberalization in Poland from the end of 1954, political thaw and a crisis in the security agency – which spearheaded the war against the Church. Roman Catholic Primate Wyszyƒski, who was released following the political changes triggered by what came to be known as the Polish October of 1956, eventually managed to strengthen the structures of the weakened Church. He was able to muster enough strength to oppose the communist government. Thanks to his intervention, at in the winter months of 1957–58, the displaced nuns were released.

Revolution committees existing in the period of national uprising in Hungary in October and November 1956 were an extremely important element of the activity of democratic forces and an expression of revival of self-government institutions, which in the previous centuries played an important role in shaping a parliamentary democracy in this country. The committees tried to organize the political life and provide solutions for current political and social problems. They were created in almost every institution and plant in Hungary, and often their aim was to draw the authorities of communist origin back from the power. In the countryside their introduction was arousing hope for restoring the pre-war land owning situation. There was a wide range of revolution committees and councils, they were also created among political prisoners who were released during the uprising, ministry employees and in such strategic companies as Hungarian State Railways. The Central Workers’ Council of the Great Budapest in Budapest was a kind of supervisory authority. These institutions were also advisors in the Nagy government. Their functioning was at large terminated by the Soviet intervention. The most important committees, as the Central Workers’ Council of the Great Budapest, had to be counted with to such an extent, that Soviet authorities had negotiated the way of dissolving them with their members, after which the latter were arrested and sentenced. The functioning of committees and councils was connected with revival of political parties existing in the interwar period, because one of the basic demands of the committees sent to the government was reintroduction of the multiparty system, common and democratic parliament elections and leaving the Warsaw Treaty.

The Solidarity Press Agency was launched during the First Nationwide Congress of Trade Union Press, which took place January 24–25 1981 in the Huta Katowice steelworks. The Security Police became interested in it almost immediately. The first information about it comes from the beginning of February. Although the formal uncovering was not finished before 1985, most surveillance work targeted at the agency and the people involved in activities was practically completed in the first half of 1982. Using operational procedures, Security Police functionaries, with the help of collaborators, closely watched the work of Solidarity Press Agency, the people connected with it and papers published by the agency, especially the Bulletin of Trade Union Papers, „because of the real threat of smuggling anti-socialist views and opinions in journalism”. In the case of the agency’s surveillance, contrary to e.g. the Solidarity weekly, the Security Police relied on a group of people, the substantial part of which was involved in the resistance movement. It was even more difficult for the Security Police to work during the Solidarity heydays, because they found it harder to recruit agents. It also happened that the people already recruited refused to continue to cooperate. Although it succeeded in planting a spy nicknamed „Misio” among the members of auxiliary staff, but that contact was able to provide the Security Police with scant information of a general nature. Not surprisingly, although the functionaries had broad general knowledge about the activity of the agency, they had little influence on its work. One can venture the opinion that like in the case of other links of legal Solidarity, the security police had no time for detailed surveillance of the Solidarity Press Agency.