The article is chronologically set against the dramatic events of the modern history of Poland. It begins with the political breakthrough of October 1956, marking the end of Stalinism in Poland, represented by the return to power of Władysław Gomułka, and culminates in the workers protests of June 1976 brought about by price increases. As a result of the protests, an opposition movement was established. Although not considered legal by the authorities, it was organized in nature and openly active. This period of Polish history remains insuffi ciently investigated despite undoubted progress in research. Is it justifi ed to distinguish the 1956–1976 period and, if so, what would be its specific features? Historians widely agree that a majority of classically totalitarian characteristics were apparent in Poland during the Stalinist period (1944–1956). The system which followed should be described more precisely as being an authoritarian regime, even though the intention until 1989 was to create a truly totalitarian state in Poland. This is confi rmed by the scale and nature of the invigilation of society. The importance of the breakthrough of 1956 has been discussed on more than one occasion. The communist system which had been gaining strength up to that date began to weaken, with some analysts believing that this was the beginning of its 30-year long torment. The scale of the events of October 1956 may be viewed through the changes seen (the spontaneous de-collectivization of agriculture, the signifi cant improvement in Church - State relations, the reduction of terror in public life, greater engagement with the outside world, and increased independence in Soviet policy), as well as through what remained unchanged (the legal system, the constitution, the economy). The fact is, however, that Poland did not cease to be a police state under dictatorial rule. The above may also be said to be true of the period after December 1970, when Edward Gierek replaced Władysław Gomułka as the 1st Secretary of the KC PZPR (Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party). Again, the system did not undergo signifi cant change, although the improvements (as seen by society) continued, to some extent, both after 1956 and 1970. The political changes were accompanied by economic enlivenment and an improvement in the quality of life.

Research into the history of the PRL (People’s Republic of Poland) tends to present the past in the rather simple terms of society versus regime, with the opposing sides being contradictory in their interests and values. Three types of concept prevail: „From One Confl ict to the Next”, „Socialist State, Rebellious Nation”, and the „Totalitarian” perspective. These viewpoints are as superfi cial as their imposed ideological anti-communist perspective. The assumed goal of such historical research is to reveal (to expose, to redress) rather than to understand (to clarify, to explain). To view the modern history of Poland simply in terms of confl ict results in a signifi cant imbalance in examining particular issues. There are examples of monographic work regarding the major social confl icts which occurred during the lifespan of the PRL, but the periods between these incidents have been less popular. Although the distinguishable and academically popular Stalinist period in Poland seems to have been suffi ciently researched, the same cannot be said of subsequent decades. It is the years 1956–1976 which deserve attention, for not only was this a „period of conflict” but it was also a time of signifi cant change within Polish society which affected the political system and its perception, the period’s changes impacting on the well documented conflicts. Important issues regarding Polish society in the second half of the 20th Century have yet to be researched. These include the forming of materialist aspirations, sources of information on the outside world – in particular the possibilities and extent of travel – and the infl uence of the mass media on people’s attitudes. Without an adequate investigation into such issues, bold statements about the system and its dynamics cannot be justified. There remain three main issues – regarding the mechanics of power still widely understood only at a local level – which deserve particular attention: the political culture of the PRL, the importance of ideology and pragmatism in the decision making process, as well as the activity of interest groups on various levels of authority.

The Catholic University of Lublin was the fi rst university reactivated in Poland after the second world war. The event took place on 21st August 1944 only a month after liberation of Lublin and the fi rst classes at the University were conducted on 3rd November the same year. It may seem paradoxical that the fi rst open university in the communist, totalitarian country was the private, Catholic University of Lublin. However, this university was necessary for the government as a political tool against the Catholic Church. There were two controversial tendencies concerning the policy towards Catholic University in Lublin for the whole period concerning this article. One of them assumed appointing priests on the positions at the University, which is equal to depriving the lay people the chance of being educated there. It would mean making the University less important and would not let realize the credo Deo et Patriae. The second conception which was implemented assumed that the University would be fully controlled by the government. The decree of 1947 and two regulations (from 1951 and 1958) concerning higher education made such a control possible. According to them the government was entitled to validate the statute and University authorities and have influence on didactic process and recruitment. of students. We must admit that the government was successful in administrative control over Catholic University of Lublin. The unwanted professors were dismissed from the University and the new departments were opened and closed according to the current policy. The limit of admission to the University was introduced. The government also used the capabilities of law enforcement agencies. None of the historians has established so far to what extent the University was under surveillance. The new reports are continually being published by the Institute of National Remembrance. The impact of security service to control Catholic University of Lublin was obvious. We should not also forget that the government used other equally efficient tools.

„Tygodnik Powszechny” – a Catholic socio-cultural magazine issued in Cracow gathered catholic opposition against communist authorities. The policy of so called „mild opposition” accepted by the magazine allowed for publishing a weekly magazine, the programme of which differed from requirements of the state authorities. The magazine was tolerated by the communists, who used the fact of its existence as a proof for the alleged pluralism and democratic rule in Poland. For all the period of its existence, from the first issue in 1945 till until the fall of the communist regime, the communist political police was interested in the editorial staff of the magazine. In 1957–1965 Security Service was leading a group operational action with a code names „Pióro” and later „Pismak” against „leadership active” of the editorial staff. The information was gathered from telephone bugs installed in the editorial office, room bugging (code name „Gawron”) operating since 1963 and personal sources of information, the most important of whom were secret agents „Ares” and „Erski”. The operational methods used allowed Security Service offi cers to be familiar with moods among members of the editorial staff, comments about current events and some of the plans of the staff. Moreover, Security Service was well informed of the fi nancial situation of the magazine and was able to name all the magazine co-operators, also those who wanted to be anonymous and used pseudonyms. Among the defeats of the Security Service in the period described one can name the fact that its offi cers were not able to enrol for co-operation no-one from the main editors of the magazine. Another issue was that the Security Service did not know about plans of Jerzy Turowicz to sign so called „Letter of the 34” and was not able to prevent it.

Witold Jedlicki, one of elite intellectuals of Warsaw, after his emigration to Israel in 1962 wrote an article entitled Chamy i Żydy (Jews and Louts), published in the „Kultura” of Paris. Vast popularity of „Kultura”, together with an enormous number of Radio Free Europe, which began promoting the text, listeners made Jedlicki’s ideas to be discussed widely among the emigration and in Poland. Jedlicki had proposed a new way of interpreting events connected with the Polish October, in which the struggle between puławianie and natolińczycy – PZPR fractions was the subject of changes, and people’s pressure on the authorities was a secondary process. The public was a victim of puławianie manipulation, who as the time passed got out of control of the group members. Jedlicki criticized the attitude of the public, especially of the intellectuals. In the current article the response to the publication of the article is presented: the discussion of J. Nowak-Jeziorański, T. Zawadzki, K. Jeleński with Jedlicki, recorded in Maisons-Laffitte, broadcast by the RFE; another two articles of Jedlicki corresponding with Chamy i Żydy, comments in the German papers about divisions in PZPR. In Poland Jedlicki work aroused many emotions, both when its content and way of presentation was considered – in Poland party problems had never been discussed in such a brave way with the use of names.

The author reconstructs one of the largest operations undertaken by the Security Service in sixties. It was a part of various activities of communist authorities to limit contacts of Polish citizens with the West and Polish emigration. On of the most fiercely fought enemies was Radio Free Europe, which was successfully breaking the information monopoly of the Polish communist authorities. In 1963 Władysław Bartoszewski, who during the war was an AK (Home Army) soldier and activist of Council to Aid the Jews, and during the stalinism period was imprisoned for many years, began conspiracy co-operation with Radio Free Europe. With a group of co-operators (who were also ex-AK soldiers) he regularly passed to Munich information about situation in Poland – repressions and harassment against the intellectuals, Church, opposition. This information was the basis of numerous important programmes of Radio Free Europe. SB found the traces of his activities in 1966, using the bug information and intelligence sources. Bartoszewski and his co-operators were kept under meticulous surveillance for many years, SB tried to intimidate them, enrol for co-operation, isolate in their environments. Help of Stasi and KGB was used. The most important aims of Security Service was to discover „transfer channels” (ways of passing the information from Poland abroad) and to fi nd evidence which would allow to sue Bartoszewski. They succeeded only in 1970, when his co-operators: Stanisław Salmonowicz, Danuta Bańkowska, Ewa Dreżepolska were arrested. Władysław Bartoszewski was questioned many times and the Service tried to enrol him. After his fl at refusal, the Service used their net of secret agents to spread rumours and forged documents, which were to discredit Bartoszewski as a professed agent of Ministry of Interior. Simultaneously a lawsuit, which was to be a propaganda blow against Radio Free Europe, was being prepared. These plans were ceased only after dramatic events in Gdynia, Gdańsk and Szczecin in December 1970 and changes on the authorities’ top. New Gierek’s team, who wanted to present their „liberal” face withdrew plans for lawsuit and released the three arrested people. Nevertheless they were still, together with Bartoszewski, subject to harassment and surveillance. Bartoszewski continued his co-operation with Radio Free Europe.

In the last period a several important works about economic delinquency have been published. One of the most interesting is a book by Dariusz Jarosz and Maria Pasztor „Meat swindle. Facts and conditions”. Issues discussed in the book cover not only the meat swindle in Warsaw. This is one of the reasons why the article „Law and jurisdiction of communist Poland and economic delinquency in 1956–1970” does not describe the economic delinquency, but presents struggle of structures fi ghting it, shows their relations and functioning at the regional level. The functional attitude means that not only normative institutions, such as public prosecutor or jurisdiction were investigated, but PZPR activities were also considered. When influence of PZPR on jurisdiction institutions is discussed, apart from the quasilaw system (e.g. resolutions of Central Committee of PZPR, directives of Politic Bureau of CC PZPR) the attention was drawn to the infl uence of high factor of PZPR membership of jurisdiction employees on their institutions. A look on the prevention and repressions against economic delinquency from the institutional point of view allows to answer the question of how much each of the activities was reaction to social moods, how much a derivative of communistic ideology, and how much the effect of institutions’ conditions. The author opts for the last interpretation (which is often underestimated) although he naturally does not omit the first two ones. The source analysis allows to see three turning points in the described period. The distinguishing feature of 1956–1959 was the decisional chaos in the institutions responsible for fi ghting economic delinquency, which was caused by weakened control of party and state authorities. In 1961–1965 the authorities regained control over jurisdiction and made it an obedient, although not always effi cient, tool, seeing the panaceum in tightening restrictions for economic delinquency. In the last fi ve years the stress was put on operational and prevention methods, and on the institutional level the role of jurisdiction and public persecutor was decreased in favour of e.g. citizen’s militia.

Security service became truly interested in the environments of creative intellectuals as late as in the end of the fifties. Former persecution of writers, journalists, scientists had been connected with their activities in independence or catholic organisations or with their anti-soviet expression from the pre-war period. Moreover, these were only occasional cases. In the Stalinism period in Poland intellectuals’ environments were pacifi ed: the indubitable fascination of communism ideology co-existed or mixed with fear of open terror. In the October 1956 the intellectuals collectively supported Władysław Gomułka, hoping for the system liberalisation. The disappointment came the very following year – dissolution of pro-reformatory magazine „Po prostu”, ban against printing the literary magazine „Europa” signalled leaving the October achievements. Soon the censorship was again blocking publications, discussion clubs were being closed down, the lawsuits of people who „slander the system and the authorities” started. Such actions of the authorities led to creation of non-institutional opposition existing within Polish Literary Society. After the Bent Circle Club (Klub Krzywego Koła) was closed, the Society was the last forum of criticism and discussion. It was the writers’ milieu, being less dependent of administrative means than scientists or journalists, who organised the best known protest against the cultural policy of the party (the Letter of 34), it were the writers to hand in their membership cards after closing of „Europa” or later when in 1966 Kołakowski was expelled from PZPR, fi nally it was the Literary Society to support the demonstrating students in March 1968. The Security Service used a wide range of operational methods against the intellectuals. In 1956-1968 this group was being invigilated by the Fourth Department of the Third Division of the Ministry of Interior, although due to the numerous contacts with foreign countries, much material can be found in inheritance of the Third Department of the above division. The basic source of information was agents’ network, however, there were few secret co-operators, more information was gained with the help of so called confi dential contacts, usually party members, who were obliged to help the Security Service because of the post they were holding. The most politically active people, such as Jasienica, Lipski or Kołakowski, had bugs planted, were being observed and their letters were being checked. In the current article two cases were presented as exemplification: one of J.N. Miller, who was proved to co-operate with the London „News”, and N. Karsov and S. Szechter, who were prevented to publish abroad materials from political lawsuits.

The article describes numeration and ways of identifying prisoners at the Stutthof camp in comparison with other concentration camps. The Stutthof camp operated since 2nd September 1939 till 9th May 1945 and belonged to the centrally organised system of concentration camps. It was a place of imprisonment for about 110 000 people, about 65 000 of whom became its victims. The way of numbering Stutthof concentration camp prisoners has not been a subject of a separate article yet. The method of labelling was settled on the basis of preserved camp documents: registry fi les, transport lists, personnel fi les, as well as accounts of people who survived at Stutthof. According to the available sources, in the Stutthof camp during all its existence there had been one series of numbers, which were given to the people staying both in the main camp and sub-camps. There was no double numeration and numbers of released or dead prisoners were not given to the new ones. People who were imprisoned for a second time were given another number. The documentation analysis allowed to estimate the number of prisoners shown in camp registry fi les in 1939–1945 and number of people put in Stutthof every month in 1939–1945. Registration of prisoners of Stutthof camp was done not only on the basis of numbers given to new prisoners, but also on the basis of special labels, which put prisoners into categories depending on the reason of imprisonment. The way of labelling with triangles of special colour had been worked out in Dachau camp and this scheme was used in other concentration camps, i.e. in Stutthof. The prisoner registration system was elaborate and bureaucratic. Prisoners were labelled as soon as they entered the camp, and labelling was accompanied with a „greeting ceremony” which was to show them where they had got into and what lot was awaiting them.

In autumn 1944 the activities of the Soviet repressive apparatus against Polish independence underground had been intensifi ed. Organs of NKVD, NKGB and „Smersh” counter-intelligence arrested massively (under the pretext of so called „cleaning the backgrounds of the Red Army”) soldiers of different conspiracy forms. The vast majority of them after a short stay in temporary camps at Polish territory was sent to NKVD USSR camps as the interned. One of the largest concentration of arrested soldiers of Armia Krajowa (Home Army) was POW camp No 270 in Borovichy in Novgorod district. The total number of Poles and prewar Polish citizens who were taken to Borovichy in 1944 and 1947 equals 5795. They were usually young people, in their twenties or thirties, of different origin and education, engaged into conspiracy activity of the Polish Secret State, both in its civil and military structures. Lot of Poles kept in the camp in 1944–1946 was the most tragic one because of the high death rate, caused by crippling work in the coal mines, lack of proper food and health care and terrible sanitary conditions. On the other hand, in that period the number of arrests and escapes was relatively small in comparison to the period of 1947–1949. Improvement of living, sanitary and food supply conditions, and above all reorganisation of camp work system had a big impact on the lowering death rate (from 11,5% in 1945 to 0,2% in 1948) and general improvement of conditions of Polish contingent. The repatriation process of Polish prisoners of Borovichy (the period of 1946–1949) was made on the basis of appropriate orders of NKVD ZSRR. Repatriations were usually preceded by quite intensive questioning on the territory of the camp by special operational groups.

On January 21st 1946 a District Jewish Committee was established in Olsztyn. At the moment of creation of the Jewish Committee there were 57 Jews registered in Olsztyn, and according to data of 30th April 1947, the Jewish society at Warmia and Mazury numbered as many as 288 people. In the fi rst years after the war fi nancial situation of Jewish community was usually quite diffi cult. It is estimated that in Olsztyn voivodship there were only about 5% well-off Jews, and 2/3 of them required constant fi nancial help and other aid. Among the Jews who settled down at Warmia and Mazury there were predominately young people, in so called production age (that is between 21 and 45 years of age). However, the situation of Jews in after-war Poland was shadowed by dramatic events in Kielce on 4th July 1946. Olsztyn Jews responded to Kielce pogrom by organising a protest demonstration on 9th July 1946, when a resolution condemning this crime was taken. Apart from the Jewish committee in Olsztyn there was also a Jewish religion congregation, which aimed at allowing Jews for free religious practices. In the end of forties, as many Jews migrated abroad, mainly to Palestine, their number at Warmia and Mazury also decreased. It was mainly the result of alienation of Jews in Poland. The stalinisation of the country led to closing down most of the Jewish organisations in Poland. Most of Jews who had lived at Warmia and Mazury left Poland with further emigration waves. The Jewish community left was sparse and does not make a separate group nowadays, its members has been widely assimilated.

The article presents the picture of National Military Forces (Narodowe Siły Zbrojne – NSZ: Polish right-wing politic and military organisation acting during the WW2 and fighting soviet occupation) in Polish historiography, journalism, literature and film in 1945–1989 in Poland and at the emigration. NSZ has been treated not only as an object of historical researches, but also as an element of the world-view discussion. Communists ruling Poland in 1944–1989 treated the organisation as an enemy, consequently in most of official works written in communist Poland it was criticised, and the truth about it was replaced with misinformation. NSZ soldiers were usually presented as „bandits”, German collaborators, „enemies of the people”, imperialism agents, successors of magnat traditions in Poland, ruthless fanatics: anticommunists and anti-Semites. It should be added, that historical researches on NSZ were often based on incomplete and one-track sources. Many of Polish intellectuals, also activists of democratic opposition in the seventies and the eighties treated NSZ with reluctance, mainly because it was blamed of nationalism and antidemocratic and antiliberal approach. Only at the emigration more free discussion about NSZ was possible, although it was limited to subjective comments of ex-members of the organisation and their polemics with their opponents. A great contribution to remembering NSZ anticommunist traditions were put by Paris „Kultura” editor-in-chief and co-author of „Zeszyty Literackie” Jerzy Giedroyc. Inspired by him, Zbigniew S. Siemiaszko started researches on NSZ at the emigration and wrote the fi rst monograph about it. The article also mentions ways of describing activities of independence underground, who fought for power with the communists, in Poland before 1989. Moreover, author of the article tries to show emigration and Polish trends of writing and understanding modern history of Poland.

The article describes soviet partisan movement in Ukraine during WW2, its main periods and directions of activity, organisation and leadership of partisans, manning, distinguishing features of communist partisans in comparison with Ukrainian insugrents (UPA) and AK (Polish Home Army). The stress was put on little known aspects of partisan movement: relationships with civilians, terror, robberies, marauding, scorched earth strategy, postscripts to diversion and military operations, struggle of soviet partisans and AK against Ukrainian nationalistic partisans. The article concentrates on conditions and causes of crushing defeat of partisan movement in the fi rst year of the war (1941/1942), a turning point in the second year (1942/1943) and impressive success of the third year of the war (1943/1944) reached in the environment of hostile west-Ukrainian citizens. The summary depicts structure, system distinguishing features of Stalin partisan movement in the Ukraine: its reckless, thus quite effective diversion and military activities, neglecting lives of partisans by their leadership, terror towards civilians ethnically similar to partisans, concious provoking occupants’ terror against civilians and lack of desire to defend them, long-term activity in conditions of hostile or neutral civilians, badly organised and thought over system of requisitions of food and other material values from civilians, high level of marauding and robberies, low morals of troops (drinking, sexual violence, low discipline), numerous inner conflicts. Such distinctions can be explained by a simple fact that soviet partisan movement was one of manifestations of belligerent stalinism.

The proclamation of the Martial Law in Poland on 13 December 1981 caused a storm of protest in the West. Although some West European governments did not completely condemn Jaruzelski’s attempt to end the Polish crisis in an internal and ‘peaceful’ way, most Western societies reacted fi ercely on the delegalization of Solidarność, the arrest of thousands of its militants, and the return of repression. Dozens of committees were founded at both sides of the Atlantic Ocean by Western sympathizers, Polish migrants and even Solidarność members who were coincidentally kept abroad by the Martial Law. All these organizations tried to support the underground trade union in Poland by informing the public opinion of their country, lobbying at local and national authorities, and raising money to assist Polish victims and their families. In order to coordinate these actions, several umbrella organizations were set up. In many countries, Western trade unions created special forums on a national level. Polish migrants from their side, met in Zurich in December 1981 and in Brussels in January 1982, and decided that each country should have one coordinating offi ce. In some countries, this ambition of unifi cation was realized, but in other countries, ideological differences and personal tensions between local leaders were too big. Moreover, these committees could not be integrated by a Group of Delegates to the National Convention of the ISTU ‘Solidarity’ Currently Abroad, that was founded in Paris in February 1982 by delegates to the First (and only) National Congress of the NSZZ Solidarność (September 1981). However, when some leaders of the Polish underground created the Temporary Coordinating Commission (TKK) on 22 April 1982, and ordered their compatriots abroad to make a single representation in the West, a Coordinating Offi ce Abroad of NSZZ Solidarność (Biuro Koordynacyjne NSZZ Solidarność Za Granicą) was founded in Oslo in July 1982. At fi rst sight, the position of this Coordinating Offi ce looks very favorable. As it was created with the offi cial support of the TKK and was allowed to act as the offi cial intermediary between the leadership of Solidarność in Poland and foreign governments and institutions, it had an enormous advantage on most other exile organizations, that usually deal with problems of legitimacy, such as internal divisions and external recognition. Moreover, it could profi t from a very opportune climate: the events in Poland were followed in the West with a lot of attention and sympathy. However, the question presents itself whether these apparent trump cards were so permanent and useful as they seem to be on the face of things. Could the Coordinating Offi ce indeed narrow the gaps between all the different groups within the Polish emigration? Was the Western support really that widely spread and that continuous? Were there differences between countries, ideological groups and types of partners the Coordinating Office collaborated with (e.g. trade unions, human rights organizations, national governments, international organizations…). Finally, was the Coordinating Offi ce able to profi t from the support and to convert it in real influence? And if so, on which fields, at which moments and to what extent could it get a grip on events? These are the main questions that will be dealt with in this article.