The main reason for the revolution which broke out in 1956 was the communist party itself. Until 1953 it opposed almost all the Hungarian society, the living standards of which was being lowered gradually since 1948. Income of most of the labourers was scarcely enough to cover the every day needs. Levelling the differences within the society was made only in the lowest class. Life conditions of most of the nation were worse. Living standards were lowered most for intellectuals (apart from those working for the communist authorities). In the country the conditions were even worse. Socialistic reforms of the agriculture, compulsory collectivisation led to lowering incomes of this social group. The regime could survive only because of the common terror and smashing the society, particularly by ÁVH (State Security Services) activities, which controlled the society with the developing net of agents. The change was made in the middle of 1953 when Mátyás Rákosi was dismissed, and Imre Nagy gained the power. His government led to serious changes in the inner policy. The most important steps were cleaning the atmosphere which had been soaked with terror. Nagy closed internment camps, stopped resettlements, and many of prisoners were liberated. He desisted from some investments in the heavy industry, which allowed for transferring the money to other branches of industry. Reducing condingents of compulsory supplies of farm produce led to improvement in food deliveries. The aim and the main task of Rákosi and ÁVH was stopping or slowdown or at least keeping control over the process of revision and rehabilitation. The process of division of the party began, which was the reason of disintegration of this monolitic structure into two parts. In the beginning of 1955 Rákosi with the help of Moscow could get rid of Nagy. In spring 1955 he was dismissed from the post of the prime minister. From the beginning of 1955 Rákosi tried to restore the previous order, and it was necessary to re-unite the party. Hungarian party authorities condemned the policy led from 1953. The investigation in the case of Rajk death and the reveal of the role that Rákosi played in it led to his dismissal in July 1956. Moscow chose the worst possible successor, that is Ernő Gerő. He was trying to stabilise the situation in the country and to close the past with no purges. He announced democratisation of the socialist system, but he did not do much to achieve it. Rehabilitation activities were such a big challenge for ÁVH, that it had less time to fi ght the enemy. In the name of restoring the law order they had to resign from surveiling political leaders. Thus there was a danger that it would loose its political power. The revision of Rajk case started a hail of events. The party leaders on the state level were not able to face the real problems, they were not even able to start the process of seeking for resolution. The activities taken were wrong and too slow. The party started to fall. At the local party level more and more members started to accept reforms.

The uprising in June 1953 in East Germany is besides the erection of the wall in 1961 and the revolution of 1989 the most decisive historical event in the history of the GDR. “June 17th” is of tremendous importance for the further development of the GDR – both state and society. This contribution aims at discussing the consequences of the riot. Moreover, the thesis is elaborated that there is an interrelationship between the failed revolution in 1953 and the erection of the wall in 1961 – an interdependence that has hardly been considered in academic discussions yet. The article starts off from a discussion of the West German transformation processes in the 1960s to 1980s in assessing “June 17th”. Relying on these thoughts, I consider in some detail whether developments in East Germany or political reasons in West German politics have caused this shift in evaluating the riot. This part aims at showing which exemplary continuities and fragmentations between 1953 and 1961 may be identifi ed. In doing so I will focus on the “inner state foundation” [“innere Staatsgründung”] – a concept that expresses another central thesis of mine. Since this process can be analysed only exemplarily, the article concentrates on some decisive developments such as the transference of internal party processes and structures onto the whole society, the process of structural and discursive subversion of the church and the militarisation of society as well as the hegemony of the party in some central sectors of society (industry, agriculture, university). This fi nally includes a brief glance at the changes in the relationship between the Soviet occupation army and the SED-leadership. In two following theoretical parts I aim at developing explanations for these empirical findings. Largely, I am concerned with the concept of the “inner state foundation” and then the concept of “revolution”. Both terms are being discussed highly controversial for the respective historical context. To wind up my paper, the consequences of the “inner state foundation” for the further progress of GDR-history are being discussed.

The April declaration of 1964 established a practical and theoretical basis for international relationships of Romania. Without it the period between 1965 and 1968 and Romania attitude towards intervention in Czechoslovakia cannot be understood. The isolated Romanian efforts within the Soviet block could be even more distinguished in 1967 by two attitudes which put this country in the centre of international attention. The fi rst case was a refusal to carry out Moscow guidelines to break diplomatic relationships with Israel because of the Six-Day 1967 Arab-Israeli War; the second was recognition of German Federal Republic and visit of its vicechancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs Willy Brandt in Romania, when Moscow satelite states recognised only German Democratic Republic. After these events Romanian diplomatic relationships with the free world entered a new stage. Between 1964 and 1968 the communist regime in Bucharest prepared a set of main rules of the foreign affairs policy. In the activities undertaken in that period one could notice all the elements which were revealed later in August 1968: rejection of the centre of authority in the communistic movement; the right of decision taking for every party; Warsaw Pact should not be domain of the Soviet Union only; its members should have more power within the organisation; Moscow guidelines concerning foreing affairs policies for members of the Warsaw Pact should be optional, and taking such decisions should be judged by national interest. Ceauşescu wanted independence combined with the Stalin model of socialism. Dubcek wanted socialism different from the Soviet one, staying under Moscow influence. For the USSR the Czechoslovakian model was far more dangerous: it was an alternative for a Soviet model. That is why in August 1968 ZSRR invaded Czechoslovakia and not Romania. Brezhnev and his comrads wanted to eliminate a team of reformers from Prague and to threaten Ceauşescu concentrating troops at the Romanian border. Ceauşescu declaration of 21st August 1968 is a benchmark of the peak of his popularity and the culmination point of independence activities of “national communism”. Definitely there were other moments of “riot” in Romania, but none of them had such wide repercussions of condemnation as intervention in Czechoslovakia. Lack of reaction of the Soviet Union shows that “the Soviet Union was not too worried about this kind of insubordination of its vassals, because the core, that is the though control of the society by the party and the Soviet model of developing country was not questioned. In the contrary to China in the middle of the sixties and Cambodia ten years later, these regimes were not dangerous according to Moscow, because they did not create a new model of communism which they would like to defend”.

SED [The Socialist Unity Party of Germany, Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands] accurately valued the situation in the case of both crisises, in Prague in 1968 and in Poland in the end of 1980 and the beginning of 1981, correctly judging the critical infl uence of triumph of communist reforms in Prague a “Solidarność” in Poland on its own interest. It was obvious, that the case was the power, and the bolsheviks had no doubts that if the case was the power there is no place for any compromise. Their diagnosis was thus correct. In 1968 and in the beginning of 1981 one could still think about the radical therapy. The system had to be cleaned from the germs, from any kind of seeking for reforms. The immune system had to be strenghtened, that is the marxism-leninism study. Although the diagnosis was correct, the therapy did not bring effects. The disease turned to be incurable, the immune system was becomming weaker and weaker with every illness, and the virus, the individual pursuit for freedom, for shaping one’s own life oneself, could not be fought with. SED accurately judged the danger: what happened in Prague could not be reconciled with the system, it was undermining its basis and had to lead to collapse of the bolsheviks’ regime. In the end of 1980 and the beginning of 1981 Prague was a point of reference for SED. The only thing to do was to analyse the situation in Poland, compare it to what had happened in Prague in 1968 to understand, how big was a risk of a danger. As soon as mid August the SED leaders were convinced that events in Poland are a great challenge for the whole socialist block, and for the SED itself. Two weeks later, after the August agreement between the government and the Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee it became clear for SED that this was a counterrevolution. When evaluating the dangers which resulted from the events in Prague in 1968 and in Poland in 1980 and 1981 for the power and unity of the Soviet imperium, SED was very real. Policy of Ulbricht and Honecker towards Moscow was not awkward at all, they were trying to gain as much as possible for SED in the generally unfavourable conditions. However, this is the knowledge that we have gained only recently. Moreover the Honecker policy – irrespective of its inner inconsistencies – fell not in Bonn but in Moscow. Honecker did not foresee the Gorbachov arrival. However, he was not lonely in this neither on the West, nor in the East.

The author describes economical conditions in which social and political crises occurred in Poland in 1956, 1970 and 1980. Repeated problems were caused by social ineffectiveness of the system which was based on the state ownership and controlled by political decisions. Since 1950, following the Soviet example, strenuous industrialisation and collectivisation of agriculture had been started. As a result the economy was not able to meet the basic consumption needs of the society. After the tragic events in Poznań in 1956 the authorities attempted to balance the economy and raise standards of living. Nevertheless, in 1959 they returned to dogmas of industrialisation. This effected in renewed economical problems and dissatisfaction of the society, which resulted in events of December 1970. Similarly, in August 1980 the economical policy of the seventies was over, the promising beginning of which was connected with foreign credits. In all the period of People’s Poland doctrinal justifi cation and preferences for machine industry led to insuffi cient level of consumption production. Negative effects in supply of market goods were brought by fi ghting private enterprises in the field of craft and small-scale production, and foremost – destructive agricultural policy which aimed at structural rebuilding of farming at cost of peasant’s economy. Polish economical situation and living conditions were constantly negatively influenced by excessive armaments, and in the seventies – speedily growing foreign debt. As a result a quasi-economical cycle could be observed, in which one could distinguish the following periods: acceleration based on accumulation growth (years 1950, 1959, 1971), overinvestment connected with lowering standards of living of the population (years 1953, 1968, 1976), fl ounder attempts of the authorities to correct economical policies (years 1954, 1969, 1976) and socio-political crises (1956, 1970, 1980). Each of the governments in Poland between 1950 and 1980 repeated this pattern, and the reason was reluctance towards deep reforms, which were rejected of doctrinal reasons or because of fear of unfavourable reaction of the Kremlin. Behind all these there was undisguised wish to keep the power given to Polish communists by Stalin.

The article depicts six main reasons, for which the crisis of the communist system in Poland in the eighties escalated. The most important factor were changes in the USSR after Mikhail Gorbachov’s accession to power and proclamation of “perestroyka”, the consequence of which was withdrawal from the Brezhnev doctrine. Among the internal factors the most important were: condition of the economy, which after the introduction of martial law was in the constant crisis; the phenomena of privatisation of the communist state, which in the last period of the PZPR rule led to the process of bestowing property on some people from the governing apparatus of the communist Poland; deregulation of the political system, the most important manifestation of which was impairment of the PZPR position, which had a hegemonic role in the political system of the communist Poland; evolution of mood of the public, which after 1985 became much lower; activities of hierarchy of the Catholic Church and political opposition, the main part of which belonged to the moderate stream seeking agreement with Wojciech Jaruzelski’s team.

The article describes Soviet partisan movement in Ukraine during WW2, its main periods and directions of activity, organisation and leadership of partisans, manning, distinguishing features of communist partisans in comparison with Ukrainian insurgents (UPA) and AK (Polish Home Army). The stress was put on little known aspects of partisan movement: relationships with civilians, terror, robberies, marauding, scorched earth strategy, postscripts to diversion and military operations, struggle of Soviet partisans and AK against Ukrainian nationalistic partisans. The article concentrates on conditions and causes of crushing defeat of partisan movement in the fi rst year of the war (1941/1942), a turning point in the second year (1942/1943) and impressive success of the third year of the war (1943/1944) reached in the environment of hostile west-Ukrainian citizens. The summary depicts structure, system distinguishing features of Stalin partisan movement in the Ukraine: its reckless, thus quite effective diversion and military activities, neglecting lives of partisans by their leadership, terror towards civilians ethnically similar to partisans, conscious provoking occupants’ terror against civilians and lack of desire to defend them, long-term activity in conditions of hostile or neutral civilians, badly organised and thought over system of requisitions of food and other material values from civilians, high level of marauding and robberies, low morals of troops (drinking, sexual violence, low discipline), numerous inner confl icts. Such distinctions can be explained by a simple fact that Soviet partisan movement was one of manifestations of belligerent stalinism.

A complicated perspective of mutual relationship of Greek Catholic Church and nationalistic movement in the period of the Second World War was an important factor of international relationships. The problem mentioned above is difficult to examine not only because of existence of various stereotypes, but also because it is diffi cult to establish unambiguous attitude of Greek Catholic Church towards anti-Polish activities and Ukrainian underground. Nevertheless, the difference of attitudes of Greek Catholic Church as a structural unit hit the eye, that is the difference between the offi cial attitude shown by the bishops and the attitude of common clergymen, which also was not unambiguous. The attitude of the majority of church hierarchy towards Polish-Ukrainian conflict was constructive and aimed at communicating. Activities of Greek Catholic Church in that fi eld sometimes led to tension in contacts between Ukrainian church authorities and Ukrainian underground (SS „Halychyna”, pastoral epistles against murders of Poles and Ukrainians etc.), but they allowed for softening a harsh ethnic and religious conflict. It must be admitted though, that this influence was limited and the main role was played by secular factors. The urgent need to fi nd solutions to various, sometimes very complicated, dilemma forced a Greek Catholic priest to form his point of view on events and phenomena of the time on the basis of his own world view. Greek Catholic clergymen represented the educated layer of the society, and in some cases they were the only representatives of Ukrainian intellectuals in the country, influencing the shape of national identity of the Ukrainians. Their authority among the Ukrainian people could be envied by many political powers. That is why Ukrainian underground controlled Greek Catholic clergy and sometimes took appropriate measures against priests who defended Poles. It is also worth to mention that evolution of relationships between Greek Catholic Church and nationalistic underground was strongly infl uenced by first German, and then Soviet policy. During the Second World War these relationships were transformed according to the historical reality of life. These relationships made the diffi cult way from negating the need of existence of radical nationalistic movement to being aware in the last years of the war that the underground became the only hope for the future.

Both in quasi-historian literature and in serious historiography one can find statements that in Poland after 1948 structures of Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) existed. To support this thesis authors bring information about activities of so called “Zenon’s” net and of “partisan groups” in provinces of Olsztyn and Włocław. In “Zenon” case, despite the complexity of the problem, in the light of researches led by i.e. I. Hałagida, it is clear, that that was a provocative structure, organised and controlled by Ministry of Public Security (MBP). As far as the case of partisan groups in Olsztyn province, is concerned, their activities did not go beyond 1948. In the current article the author tries to determine what can one call activities of “Volodko” and “Bilyj” in Wrocław province. Was it a temporary organised group which aimed at transferring ex-members of UPA abroad, or it was, just like C-1 operation, a provocation of MBP to work out the environments of OUN and UPA, or else – was it an ideological or criminal organisation? The material posessed authenticated the statement, that “Volodko” group was not UPA “sensu stricto” or any kind of armed formation. It can be treated as a germ of civil underground structure at most. The least probable seems to be a hypothesis about the criminal nature of the group, although it accepted some people of very poor reputation. MBP posessed some information about the group, thanks to “Skała” agent among others, nevertheless, according to all possible data, “Volodko” was an agent of local activities aiming to open a transfer channel for exmembers of UPA, ordered by a rival of Bandera fraction of OUN – the Foreign Representation of Ukrainian Main Liberation Committee (ZP UHWR). The subject of the analysis was also determination of the real sequence of events happening because of “Volodko’s” “organisation” existence. It is known, that at least one transfer abroad of the ex-member of UPA was accomplished (Bogdan Stańko). It was confi rmed that the turning point in the activities of the group were events of October 1949, when “Volodko” was murdered by Jan Kret with pistol shot in the head. Previously unknown threads of Jakub Hirnyj arrest were reconstructed. It was also found out that in connection to “Volodko” case in the period between September 1950 to May 1959 seventeen people got sentences ranging from one year imprisonment to the capital punishment. Authenticity of “Volodko’s” real name, which had “a priori” been accepted to be Włodzimierz Karasiewicz, was questioned. A very probable hypothesis was taken, that “Volodko”, asa “Wujek” was really called Dymitr Tychanicz. The article presents also some information on further lot of main characters connected with the “Volodko’s” case.

Engagement in university enrolment was one of the elements of security apparatus activities within so called ideological offensive among the youth, which was led by party and state authorities. UB played an important role in changing the social origin of students. Information about students provided by UB officers were one of the main premises in allowing such a person for matriculation. Thanks to close cooperation with members of enrolment commissions, especially with so called “social factor”, UB officers had an impact on the examination results of “unwanted” people, who, despite they might have got positive marks, were not accepted, for example under the pretext of lack of vacancies. Participation in selecting students-to-be was at the same time a perfect tool to “discipline” all the youth and even their families. Such activities included also a specially understood “protection” of academic environments, that is expelling “undesirable” people and providing for places for people “with the proper class origin”. Judging on accessible UB documents it is not possible to decide what number of students got negative response. According to the data of Lublin Provincial Office of Public Security from 1948, 18% of people who applied for Maria Curie-Skłodowska University were deprived of the possibility to study. The security authorities admitted that verifi cation of candidates made by UB brought some planned results. It did not mean though that the sieve was dense enough. There were cases when “undesirable” from the point of view of party and state authorities people would begin their academic studies. That is why security organs with local party committees and university authorities tried to lead “prophylactic actions”, that is to expel the given students. Nevertheless, party and state authorities, and thus security organs were avoiding making the number of young Poles with “negative” marks too high.

A large part of Polish Armed Forces in the West fi ghting on the western fronts during the Second World War were soldiers from north-eastern borderlands of the Second Polish Republic. Although most of these soldiers decided to stay abroad after the war, between 1946 and 1948 about one thousand men from borderlands came back, mainly because of family reasons, to their homeland, the territory of which belonged now to the USSR. The Soviet side had been trying to persuade as many “Anders’ soldiers” as possible to come back, even as early as in the last years of war. Despite that fact, after coming back the were treated as “hostile elements” and “soldiers of Anders the traitor”. After repatriation to the Belorussian Soviet Socialistic Republic ex-soldiers of Polish Armed Forces in the West did not receive any combatant rights, and many of them even suffered repressions (arrests, faked criminal accusations, expropriations). Despite their heroism, medals or wounds suffered in the war with the Nazi, in their Soviet army booklets it was often written: “did not take part in warfare activities”. These people did not match an artificial, created by Soviet authorities pattern of an USSR citizen – a Soviet patriot, who participated in a Great Patriotic War, thus because of their moral standards, which were different from “valid” ones, and because of their different world view and freethinking, they were decided to be not useful for Soviet society. In April 1951 ex-soldiers of Polish Armed Forces in the West together with their families were deported to Siberia. Only after Belarus obtained independence, these people were given status of the Second World War participants and due combatant privileges.

For communists in Poland, especially in 1948–1956, shaping social and political attitudes of young people, the vast majority of whom were not connected with PPR/PZPR was one of the main aims crucial for creating totalitarian system from the top. The model elaborated by Marian Spychalski assumed by the decree of February 1948 common and compulsory subordinating the youth by means of Common Organisation “Service for Poland” (PO SP) with the help of the military institutions. This was the status of labour brigades of PO SP, and until 1949 young people went for work singing “Rota” [Rota – (“Oath”) is a 20th-century Polish poem and anthem, the fi rst verse of which says “We’ll not abandon the land of our folk”]. This is the way Władysław Gomułka imagined creating new labour class. One should remember than the vast majority, that is 73% of these young people lived in the country, and before the 6-year Plan was realised, urban youth had made only 27% of the population. Statistically, the output of PO SP, which was dissolved in 1955, had been impressing. According to the offi cial data, almost 1.000.000 of youngsters worked in SP brigades, and 120 000 continued their education in vocational schools. Parents of these people associated work in SP brigades with forced labour for the Third Reich. In 1948 youngsters brought with them suitcases full of food, because it was thought that in the brigades the Lenin rule of no meals for those unable to work would be introduced. Parents as well as their children tried in both legal and illegal ways postpone recruitment to the brigades. Mass interventions of school authorities, institutions, plants, sport associations mushroomed, all these organisations were issuing releasing certifi cates without any important reason. Young people with the help of their environment escaped recruitment by changing their address or job, or just declared to pay a bribe. In the country it was popular to hide in the forest. Urban youth would rather volunteer to brigades in which their stay could be the shortest, for example to agricultural ones.

Polish communist intelligence worked on the large group of emigree activists and politicians. It managed to enroll some of them for co-operation. Bolesław Świderski was one of the enrolled. He was a known editor, bookseller and journalist in “Polish” London. In the interwar period he was connected with the nationalistic movement, he was a member of National Radical Camp Falanga (ONRFalanga). During the occupation he was kept in Nazi concentration camps. After the war he emigrated to Great Britain. In 1949 he established his own bookselling company. Świderski’s bookshop was one of the fi rst places, where one could buy not only emigration publications, but also books and magazines from the homeland. In 1955 Świderski opened a publishing house, which soon became one of the biggest publishers in “Polish” London. After the Polish October 1956 he began to demonstrate his pro-communist views, which led to severance of his contacts with political emigration. In 1958 he started co-operating with PRL intelligence. Four years later a fi rst issue of “Kronika” was published. This magazine was finansed by Ministry of Internal Affairs. “Kronika” was a kind of a socio-cultural weekly magazine, adressed to a wide target. The magazine was to be a germ of a group with “positive” attitudes towards Polish communistic authorities. In his colums Świderski would give one-sided and extremely critical opinions on emigration leaders. Soon he began not only attacking “Polish” London, but also praising Communistic Poland, glorifying Polish communistic political elite, playing for Russia and expressing anti-German phobia. A coalition with Russia was to guard Poland against danger from Gernany. Using patriotic ideas, “Kronika” opposed the division between emigration and homeland. The editor-in-chief of the magazine tried to convince readers that despite different world-views, the interest of Poland requires co-operation of the emigration and homeland. In articles published in “Kronika” Świderski negated rationality of political emigration. He asked the emigration to be reasonable, to accept the reality and to accept the permanence of post-war layout of forces. Świderski died in London in April 1969. Just before his death he had been planning to come back to Poland. He did not manage. Two years later the last issue of “Kronika” appeared.

The proclamation of the Martial Law in Poland on 13 December 1981 caused a storm of protest in the West. Although some West European governments did not completely condemn Jaruzelski’s attempt to end the Polish crisis in an internal and ‘peaceful’ way, most Western societies reacted fi ercely on the delegalization of Solidarność, the arrest of thousands of its militants, and the return of repression. Dozens of committees were founded at both sides of the Atlantic Ocean by Western sympathizers, Polish migrants and even Solidarność members who were coincidentally kept abroad by the Martial Law. All these organizations tried to support the underground trade union in Poland by informing the public opinion of their country, lobbying at local and national authorities, and raising money to assist Polish victims and their families. In order to coordinate these actions, several umbrella organizations were set up. In many countries, Western trade unions created special forums on a national level. Polish migrants from their side, met in Zurich in December 1981 and in Brussels in January 1982, and decided that each country should have one coordinating offi ce. In some countries, this ambition of unifi cation was realized, but in other countries, ideological differences and personal tensions between local leaders were too big. Moreover, these committees could not be integrated by a Group of Delegates to the National Convention of the ISTU ‘Solidarity’ Currently Abroad, that was founded in Paris in February 1982 by delegates to the First (and only) National Congress of the NSZZ Solidarność (September 1981). However, when some leaders of the Polish underground created the Temporary Coordinating Commission (TKK) on 22 April 1982, and ordered their compatriots abroad to make a single representation in the West, a Coordinating Office Abroad of NSZZ Solidarność (Biuro Koordynacyjne NSZZ Solidarność Za Granicą) was founded in Oslo in July 1982. At first sight, the position of this Coordinating Office looks very favorable. As it was created with the official support of the TKK and was allowed to act as the offi cial intermediary between the leadership of Solidarność in Poland and foreign governments and institutions, it had an enormous advantage on most other exile organizations, that usually deal with problems of legitimacy, such as internal divisions and external recognition. Moreover, it could profi t from a very opportune climate: the events in Poland were followed in the West with a lot of attention and sympathy. However, the question presents itself whether these apparent trump cards were so permanent and useful as they seem to be on the face of things. Could the Coordinating Offi ce indeed narrow the gaps between all the different groups within the Polish emigration? Was the Western support really that widely spread and that continuous? Were there differences between countries, ideological groups and types of partners the Coordinating Office collaborated with (e.g. trade unions, human rights organizations, national governments, international organizations…). Finally, was the Coordinating Offi ce able to profi t from the support and to convert it in real influence? And if so, on which fi elds, at which moments and to what extent could it get a grip on events? These are the main questions that will be dealt with in this article.

In a democratic country elections are the basis of its system. In the period of 1972–1980 voting was a kind of a fetish made for western countries to legitimise communistic authorities. Polish society was threatened and lied to. After the December events and changes on the top of the authorities new elections had to be held. In the atmosphere of common enthusiasm and with fascination with the new leader, Edward Gierek, little attention was paid to the fact, that “Silesian” government resigned from introducing changes in electoral law and that propaganda apparatus was alleged to fi t to new demands. In 1972 in the fi rst pre-election period the information given covered: decision on the date of elections, State Election Committee activities, and division into electoral districts. “Gazeta Robotnicza” and “Słowo Polskie” quoted speech of Henryk Jabłoński in Citizens’ Committee of the Front of Nation’s Unity (OK FJN) and a text of election declaration. “Gazeta Robotnicza” began a series of articles “Before we stand at the Ballot Box” with the article by Julian Bartosz. This was a kind of a commentary for directives of the Sixth Assembly and FJN programme. “Słowo Polskie” concentrated on two topics: checking election lists and preaching about the importance of voting in parliament elections. In 1976 pre-election campaign in Lower Silesia press began after changes in the Constitution enacted by the parliament. In “Gazeta Robotnicza” a series “Elections to the parliament and Provincial National Councils” led by Jacek Sarnowski was proposed. The series was to explain the important differences between voting in 1972 and 1976, underlining the relevance of implemented changes. Members of parliament were to be shown as hard working and responsible people, who were having a great impact on development of the state and its economy. A series of socio-political articles popularised decisions of the Seventh Assembly, and journalists would repeat sentences about building strong, socialist and rich Poland. The most interesting election campaign in 1980 was presented by “Wieczór Wrocławia”. In the series of articles Wrocław society was shown the most important building sites of the socialism, which were to make life easier. When analysing election campaign in 1980 in Lower Silesia one must not forget that official press was not the only source of information any more. In the second issue of 1980 “Biuletyn Dolnośląski” it was stated, that “Elections should be elections. They are a comedy”. None of the activities undertaken by PZPR to attract people to ballot boxes brought desirable results. The authorities had to use forgery and lies. Official number of 97–99% of voters did not convince anyone, instead, the growing crisis led to anger among the society.

Communistic authorities of Poland were trying to simulate democracy, thus they had to decide to be verifi ed in elections every few years. All plebiscites that were organised in Poland in the period between the war and 1988 national councils elections were forged. The hereby sketch shows, in the light of Solidarity underground press, mechanisms of election forgery used by the authorities in the nineteen eighties in Łódź province during elections to national councils, the parliament and referendum. In the period between Solidarity foundation until the first partly free elections to the houses of parliament held in June 1989 the authorities decided to conduct four plebiscites. National councils elections were held twice (on 17th June 1984 and 19th June 1988), once were held parliament elections (13th October 1985) and referendum (29 November 1987). Election forgery used by the authorities had various form and conditions. In the current work the time criteria was taken under consideration, that is the moment of using forgery: before elections, during elections or after elections. Preparations of the authorities each time would vary from propaganda campaign to arrests of independent activists. Moreover, people with voting rights could be made to take part in elections by threats or promises, providing special people for election committees and to be confi dential agents, and manipulating the quantity of voting rights holders (it was underrated). During the plebiscites the authorities were not only threatening the voting rights holders, but also members of the election committees, voting in substitution was allowed, vote cards were put into ballot boxes in the name of the absent, voters were forced to come by threats, promises and specially organised transport, there were prepared vote cards in envelopes for the elderly to “make voting easier”. The authorities tried also to enlarge the so called “visible” turnout. The last stage was forgery made after the end of plebiscites. The most popular were altering numbers, adding numbers in front of written ones, crossing numbers and replacing them with new ones, writing the results in pencil, which was later corrected or written over with a pen, including invalid votes into the turnout, as well as all of those who signed the ballot lists, and even adding cards in the name of the absent. All these methods were nothing when confronted with imperious decisions of chairmen of district election committees taken together with 1st secretaries of PZPR (Polish United Workers’ Party). Such forgery was implemented by committees of all levels. The methods used show that imagination of the authorities to legitimise their power was just unlimited.

Life of Rafaël Lemkin (1900–1959), born in Bezwodne (“Kresy” – polish Eastern Borderlands) was determined by his origins, his experience during the wars and his passion for law. Born in a Jewish family that had been immerged in the conflict between Germans and Russians, Lemkin’s fi rst idea was to dedicate himself to literary studies, but the assassination in Berlin of Talaat Pacha, one of the instigators of the Armenians’ massacre in Turkey in 1915, led him to study law in order to promote the protection of minorities and to offer them rights that would ensure them decent living conditions. The young lawyer was soon confronted with many drawbacks both in Poland and at the international level. Thus his whole life made one with his plan to create an international law that would establish responsibility for the states. A soldier in 1939, he became a refugee fi rst in Lithuania and then in Sweden, before managing to reach the United States where he got on with his fi ght, which became even more urgent because of the discrimination and persecution policy carried out against the European Jews by the Nazi regime, which ruled the old continent. That is how he was led to coin the Genocide concept to define this policy. A long time ahead of the historians, he pointed out the significance of the economic, fi nanciary and social measures that progressively open the path to extermination. Lemkin pled for a broad view of things: for him extermination began with destruction of the cultural elements of the minorities or of the peoples under Nazi rule. In 1948, he succeeded in having the recently established United Nations Organisation adopt a convention that declared genocide a crime under international law. Jean-Louis Panné, who is currently editing in France an anthology of Lemkin’s writings, delineates here for us Lemkin’s personal and intellectual career, with an emphasis on the important legacy left to mankind by this Polish man who would deserve to be better known. Lemkin died in 1959, exhausted by a struggle that led him more than once on the fringe of misery. Rafaël Lemkin, who lived through most tragic days of the twentieth century, is not only a witness, he is one of those great men who dedicated their heart and soul to elaborate an international law.