This essay presents the political situation in Central & Eastern Europe prior to and during World War II from the point of view of Soviet foreign policy and war plans. One part of this essay is a synthetic reconstruction of scenarios for the Sovietisation of the Central & Eastern European countries occupied by the Red Army in the years 1944–1945.

This essay outlines the sources of the myth of the Great Patriotic War that was used by the Soviet propaganda to legitimize the power of the authorities. It aims to discuss briefly the components of the myth, namely, emotions, the sacred element or sacrum, and the Great Russian nationalism. The German-Soviet 1941–1945 war has been described as a Manichaean confrontation between good and evil, sacrum and profanum, civilisation and barbarism. The significance of the myth is manifested to this day. On the one hand, Russian authorities still use it to validate the socio-political order. On the other, the memory of the victorious war is an important element of historical policy pursued by the countries that are part of the ‘Russkiy Mir’.

This paper focuses on the goals of the Museum of Cursed Soldiers and Political Prisoners of the Polish People’s Republic (currently being created) and the activities it offers. The Museum has been established in place of the former detention centre and prison. An outline of the prison’s history, presented here, is an introduction to the future mission of the emerging Museum and a permanent exhibition (in the works). The paper presents an overview of current exhibitions, educational programmes and commemorative endeavours.

The article discusses the Soviet Union’s position towards the Central-European (Czechoslovak) political crisis on the eve of the World War II (1938–1939). Special attention is given to the place and role of Carpathian Ukraine (Carpathian Ruthenia) during this international crisis since the conclusion of the Munich Agreement and German occupation of parts of the Czechoslovak territory.

This article presents the main directions and features of foreign service of the Republic of Latvia together with an analysis of its operation during World War II (1939–1945) when Latvia was occupied, and its independence de facto destroyed, but the Republic of Latvia continued to exist de iure. The international context of developments regarding Latvia as a sovereign state is examined briefly. Between 1940 and 1991, the foreign service of Latvia was the only institution of the Latvian State which, to a limited extent, continued to carry out the foreign policy functions of the Republic of Latvia.

The paper discusses the contexts of the political process that led to the subjugation of the Lithuanian state to the Soviet policy, and following annexation of Lithuania by the Soviet Union. The main focus of the text is on the development of the political situation in the Baltic region, that led to the disintegration of the local political agreements, starting from the 1938 Munich crisis, through 1939 March crisis up to the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, Polish defeat in 1939, forced dissolution of the Baltic Entente, and finally the annexation of the Baltic states, resulting in the Soviet occupation of Lithuania.

The Soviet occupation of Latvia in 1940 was “legitimized” by “People’s Saeima” which was “elected” on July 14–15, 1940. A significant role in these “elections” was carried out by The Communist Party of Latvia, which at that time was a branch of Comintern and therefore acted as a Soviet agency in Latvia. Some two dozens of candidates for MP of the “Working People’s Bloc” (which was openly backed by USSR officials) were at the same time members of various electoral commissions. “People’s Government”, which was appointed after the occupation of Latvia, Central Election Commission, local communists and their supporters were just executors in these “elections”. The real “master of puppets” who supervised whole process was Deputy Chairman of the Soviet government Andrey Vyshinsky and some other Soviet officials. These “elections” had nothing to do with elections in the common, democratic sense of that word. In fact, it was an affair of misleading, intimidation and fraud on a large scale. These events had grave consequences for Latvia – the loss of independence and establishment of extremely repressive regime in all three Baltic states.

This paper discusses the state of the armoured and cavalry units of the Red Army in the period directly prior to the outbreak of the “Great Patriotic War” in 1941. The paper contains information on order of battle of the Soviet armoured and mobile forces in the Western military districts in Summer 1941, as well as other organisation features and numerical state (including the number and types of weapons), along with remarks on the development of Soviet armoured forces in the years directly preceding the outbreak of the Soviet-German war.

Reworked Polish version of this paper was published under title:  Aleksander Smoliński, "Stan organizacyjny i liczebny kawalerii oraz broni pancernej Robotniczo-Chłopskiej Armii Czerwonej na dzień 22 czerwca 1941 r.", in Do szarży marsz, marsz... Studia z dziejów kawalerii, vol. 10, ed. A. Smoliński. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, 2024: 237-398. DOI: https://doi.org/10.12775/978-83-231-5308-5.

While preparing the Operation Barbarossa the Nazi Germany did not originally consider participation of other countries apart from Romania and Finland that had territorial demands against Soviet Union. German military planners considered for some time the possibility to appoint two Slovak infantry divisions with security tasks in the rear, and in May 1941 there were voices calling for the utilization of two Slovak divisions to enforce the 17th Army of the Army Group South even despite open distrust of Adolf Hitler towards Slavs. Since the preparations were taking place on the Slovak territory as well, Slovak Minister of Defence Gen. Ferdinand Čatloš, in a conversation with German military attaché, Lt. Col. Heinrich Becker, stated that in case of Hungarian participation Slovakia would like to take part in the campaign as well. Germans, at first, pointed out an overall unreadiness of the Slovak Armed Forces but finally – only shortly before June 22nd, 1941 – Hitler declared his wish that the “Slovak Army attended some prospective action”. With the goal to show more loyalty than Hungarians, Slovak politicians and especially the Prime Minister Vojtech Tuka acted proactively without waiting for the Germans to specify their requirements. The paper analyses the circumstances of Slovak entry into the war against the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941, and summarizes the latest findings of Slovak historiography.

This article examines the twists and turns of the relationship between the Communist Great Power and the political representation of an occupied country that was gradually establishing its provisional state apparatus in exile. The analysis proves that by the time the Second World War ended, Czechoslovakia had become a part of the emerging Soviet sphere of influence. That happened through a combination of concessions resulting from the Soviet pressure, and the conviction, on the part of the leading Czechoslovak political representatives, that Czechoslovakia, with its Munich experience, had to seek a new powerful strategic ally capable of providing a security guarantee against any repetition of German aggression.

Financial disclosure: This publication was created with support of the Czech Science Foundation (Grantová agentura České republiky, GA ČR) – project no. 21-33535S: “Československá cesta do studené války a sovětského bloku“ [Czechoslovakia’s Road to the Cold War and the Soviet Bloc].

The paper discusses the matter of the Soviet Army losses suffered in World War II as portrayed in the Soviet post-war propaganda and historical research, as well as in recent research and disputes. The calculations of losses of the Soviet Army have been a matter of academic research, mainly based on statistical estimations. The paper exposes also the problem of the unreliability of the basic data on casualties.

This article raises the problems the so-called ‘encircled people’ (in Ukrainian оточенці – otochentsi, in Russian окруженцы – okruzhentsy), i.e. soldiers and officers of the Red Army who, due to the fortunes of war, were surrounded by the enemy, yet managed to rejoin the Soviet military units. Deadly danger of the march out of the enemy rear, fear of captivity or death were just a part of these people's stories. Distrust, unfounded charges of treason, often cruel penalties followed upon their return to their units. Soviet authorities suspected that they had been recruited by the enemy and sent to the Soviet rear for intelligence or sabotage purposes. It has been rarely acknowledged that the ‘encircled people’ and prisoners of war were mentioned after the comma in repressive directives. This punctuation mark became a fatal conjunction during the war, as it was meant to de facto identify servicemen in their social and legal statuse, and stigmatize them as traitors/deserters along with war prisoners. This article focuses on the evolution of the Stalinist regime and the attitude of the punitive-repressive bodies towards this group of war veterans. Conceptual approaches and security check procedures, punitive practices, social and legal effects of the ‘encircled people’ discrimination are at the core of this paper. Based on the analysis of legislative acts, reports, archival investigations, and a wide range of other sources, the article analyses the evolution of the attitude of the Stalinist regime and its punitive and repressive bodies to this category of war veterans. The focus of the study is on the principles and features of the vetting procedure, punitive practices and the social and legal consequences of discrimination against the “encircled people” extending over several post-war decades.

This article reviews the current findings regarding the issue of Soviet prisoners of war held by the Wehrmacht. The author focuses on three main aspects of the Red Army soldiers’ captivity: extermination, mass labour and collaboration. The first phenomenon, which has often been associated with a deliberate extermination of prisoners as part of the so-called commissars’ order, resulted from the ideological premises of the war of annihilation which had been waged against the USSR. However, the author demonstrates that the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht was in fact pursuing the same goal, as it neglected the preparation of the camps, the so-called Russenlager, to house prisoners, and showed indifference to the high mortality rate of the Red Army soldiers. This happened despite the fact that a significant part of German administration was convinced of the need to send Soviet prisoners of war to work in the Third Reich. The use of the Red Army soldiers in labour, which rose steadily after 1942, was accompanied by attempts to improve their situation, but these activities were carried out only inconsistently. As a result, the Third Reich’s authorities did not fully exploit the potential of this workforce, nor did they make political use of the anti-Sovietism of those Soviet prisoners of war who joined the collaborative formations.

The mortality among the Soviet prisoners of war in Finland and the Finnish POWs in the Soviet Union during the Soviet-Finnish War of 1941–1944 was equally high. One third of the prisoners perished on both sides of the front. Thanks to the studies carried out recently in Finland, the situation of the Russian POWs and civilian detainees is fairly well known. Some Russian historians and official quarters have, however, begun politicizing the subject. It will hardly contribute to improving our knowledge and assessment of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1941–1944.

The aim of this article is to present the history of the foundation of the Kalmyk Cavalry Corps and its combat activities from August 1942 to May 1945. The author will first present the history of the Kalmyk nation and their relations with the tsarist state from the 17th to the 20th century, followed by their social, political and economic situation within the USSR. The next part examines the activities of the Soviet authorities in the period from June 1941 to July 1942, when the Kalmyk Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was incorporated into the Soviet Union’s war economy. The author then explores the reasons behind the formation of this collaborative unit composed of Soviet citizens, as well as the founder of the Corps and its first commander, Otto Vierba, alias Dr. Doll, a mysterious personality. The article outlines his combat journey in the years 1942–1944, leading through the steppes to the Volga region and Ukraine. The last part of the article presents the activities of the Kalmyk Cavalry Corps in the years 1944–1945, including its participation in anti-partisan operations in the Podkarpacie and Lublin regions as part of the Grosseinsatz Maigewitter, Sturmwind I, Sturmwind II and Wirbelsturm operations. The article then describes the organisational changes and political activities of the Kalmyk National Committee, which led to its accession to the Committee for the Liberation of the Nations of Russia (Комитет освобождения народов России, Komitet osvobozhdeniya narodov Rossii, KONR). It also presents the group’s combat actions in the Kielce region of the German-occupied Poland from the end of the summer of 1944 to January 1945, during which it faced heavy struggles as it was retreating before the advancing Soviet troops. The group ended its combat trail in Austria in May 1945, subordinated to the 15th SS Cossack Cavalry Corps.

One aspect of the Anglo-American military aid to the Soviet Union under the Lend-Lease Act during World War II was the supply of several types of vessels that became part of the Red Fleet. In addition, the supplies included arms, engines, power generators, and components of naval equipment. The supplies significantly strengthened the Soviet Navy, both during and after the war.

The article presents the events accompanying the occupation of Upper Silesia by the Red Army in 1945, with particular emphasis on the actions of the latter which directly affected the inhabitants of this region. In this context, the problem of the division of Upper Silesia into Polish (the Silesian Voivodeship [województwo śląskie]) and German parts (the Opole district [Regierungsbezirk Oppeln]) and the consequences for the civilian population are outlined. The author has attempted to synthesise the phenomenon of terror that ensued when the towns of Upper Silesia were occupied by the Soviet army. The examples include phenomena such as suicides out of fear or terror, the killings and executions of civilians, the rapes of women (including nuns), abuse of victims, internment and deportation to the Soviet Union of males of working age, the disassembly of industrial plants, and the organised and methodical looting of property, and the destruction of builtup areas which took place after the front moved away and the fighting ceased.

This article is part of a current of research into social history during the Second World War, dealing with how the Red Army’s Sandomierz-Baranów bridgehead on the western bank of the Vistula operated from the second half of 1944 to the beginning of 1945. It draws upon testimonies confirming the occurrence of the phenomenon of the so-called ‘frontline oppression’ at the Sandomierz bridgehead. This term has been used to describe the negative aspects associated with the period when Soviet troops were stationed there. The forms of oppression included crimes and offences committed by individual soldiers or groups of Red Army soldiers against the inhabitants of the bridgehead or their property. In addition, other forms of oppression included organised actions, involving the over-exploitation of the products and raw materials from the area. Both individual and collective actions of this nature contributed to the deterioration of the quality of life and the condition of the community residing at the bridgehead at the time. The Sandomierz bridgehead was one of several parts of Polish territory where the German occupying authorities’ writ had ceased to run. The civilian administration was being exercised by offices subordinate to the Polish Committee of National Liberation (Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego, PKWN), an authority dependent on and subordinate to the Soviet Union. Thus, the region of interest was part of a state which the Soviet authorities recognised as their ally. Despite that, the circumstances accompanying the stationing of the ‘allied’ Red Army at the bridgehead are much different from those that have been perpetuated over the years giving a one-sided and false picture of the presence of Soviet troops on Polish territory after 1944.

This paper is an overview of the situation in Estonia in 1944–1946. Estonia was occupied by the Soviet Union in 1940 and by Germany in 1941. In 1944, the Soviets returned. The attempt of re-establishing of the Estonian statehood in September 1944 failed, though a government in exile was formed in Sweden. Estonia lost about 20% of its population during 1940–1945. In the summer of 1941 more than 50,000 Estonians were mobilised to the Red Army or evacuated to the rear area of the Soviet Union. As part of the Sovietization plan, they were subsequently recruited and trained to fill in positions in the administration. In addition to that, a party and Soviet cadres were dispatched to Estonia by various Soviet offices and institutions. The real command and control of Estonia as well as other Baltic countries was firmly in the hands of special plenipotentiaries of the CC of the CPSU as well as the representatives of the NKVD and NKGB. Between 1944–1946, the Soviet terror continued. 20,000 individuals were arrested and most of them were to the GULAG camps outside of Estonia, more than 400 were deported to Siberia as Germans and their family members. Thousands of individuals were repatriated to Estonia from Germany and other European countries or transferred through a control-filtration camp in Estonia to the Soviet Union. Many corps and divisions of the Red Army as well as units of the Baltic Fleet were stationed in Estonia. Crimes committed by the military, from the robbery and plundering to rape and murder, were a serious problem not only for the population but also for the powerless local communist and Soviet authorities.

Sovietization and imperial expansion were two sides of the same coin in postwar Soviet policy towards Hungary, two simultaneous processes that were closely interrelated. Economic penetration in Hungary was an end in itself and it also served to remove the economic pillar of Hungarian independence. Besides promoting the goal of imperial conquest and the rooting of Stalinism, exploitative economic policies benefited Soviet reconstruction and militarization, and yielded well over a billion dollars for the Soviet economy.