Americans perceived communism in a hostile light from the time of its origins. Lenin’s withdrawal of Russian from World War I freed up German troops to fight in France against American forces just arriving, and many American perceived Bolshevism as linked to the German enemy. Further, traditional American support for a market economy, religious freedom mixed with an widespread religiosity, and emphasis on individual liberties clashed with Communist emphasis on collectivism, atheism, and proletarian dictatorship. American hostility to communism thereafter waxed and waned with the perceived seriousness of the Communist threat to American interests and institutions. After the fading of fears of world revolution, during most of the 1920s communism was regarded as an insignificant domestic nuisance while Soviet Russia was too far away and too weak to be of concern. During the 1930s the economic difficulties of the Great Depression caused a segment of Americans to view communism’s anti-capitalist stance in a more sympathetic light, and the anti-Fascist stance of the USSR also drew support although suspicious of communism remained predominate. Public anticommunism flared up once more with the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in August 1939 and the perception of fascism and communism as simply two varieties of totalitarianism. After American entered World War II, anticommunism subsided as a issue during the wartime alliance with the USSR. But with the Soviet Union’s emergence as America most potent foreign adversary in the Cold War and revelations that the American Communist Party has actively assisted Soviet espionage against the United States, anticommunism became a dominating public sentiment. And with the outbreak of armed combat between American troops and Communist forces in Korea in 1950 popular and political anticommunism became extremely intense with communism regarded not merely as a treat to American national interests but as a challenge to the fundamental principles of American democracy and individual liberties.

Researches in the field of the 20th century migration, achieved particular level, however an attempt of the overall look at the phenomenon of the political emigration in Central Europe, starting from II World War until transformations of years 1989–1991, is still required. In postwar Poland, it was allowed to write about the political emigration, identified until 1989 as a threat, either in secret papers intended for security service and for a small group of decision makers, or in publications which main purpose was to diminish the very idea of the emigration, or – after some time – in studies aimed to show the emigration only as a one out of many human communities, with no political beliefs and what is more – hostile to the political system of socialist states. In 1990s, two major synthesis of the history of the polish emigration were published: Materiały do dziejów uchodźstwa niepodległościowego [Materials for the history of the independence emigration] (London) and Druga Wielka Emigracja [The Second Great Emigration] (Warsaw). During the following decade several crucial works that extend, complement or revise the findings concerning the functioning of the parliamentarism in exile, the party system, important people’s life, day-to-day problems, as well as contacts between emigrants and Poland, appeared. Furthermore the opening of the former secret services’ archives delivered new types of sources to conduct researches on the history of the emigration. In addition to this, the development of research using sociological methods to study the phenomenon of the political emigration is also considered to have been an important achievement. The result of previous researches – mentioned above – should be treated as a good starting point to the next trail of making a synthesis of the history of the Polish emigration and also as a possibility to create a wider program of study the history of emigration during the Cold War. While concentrating on the 20th century processes of migration reveals the structure and the scale of people’s displacements, there is still a real necessity for the characteristic Cold War-migration to be focused on from the political reasons – the analysis of knowingly conducted state’s policies. Therefore, undertaking a study of this phenomenon seems to be essential to understand the undercurrent of the Cold War. Seeing that, it is important to confront with each other at least three perspectives – the Communist bloc countries, the countries of resettlement and the emigrants themselves. What is more, the synthesis of the history of the 1939–1991 Central Europe emigration is highly required to be published.

The author attempts to trace the methods of the Polish authorities’ dealing with the Polish immigrants in Sweden between 1945–1968, seeks an answer to the question on how the immigrant communities were treated in this country and in what direction aims and methods of interfering of the Polish authorities in immigrants’life evolved. During the later months of World War II released prisoners from the Nazi concentration camps in Germany were transported to Sweden as a part of count Folke Bernadotte and the UNRRA (The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) action. The total number of Polish citizens staying in Sweden in the middle of 1945 is estimated to have been around 17 000. From November 1945 the Polish Repatriation Mission (Polska Misja Repatriacyjna, PMR) became responsible for the transportation of Polish citizens from Sweden to Poland. Its members were encouraging Polish citizens to coming back to their fatherland. Until June 1947 more than 8 000 Polish citizens had left Sweden which was just over 52 per cent of all Polish citizens residing in Sweden in June 1945. The radio appeals, brochures and personal visits in camps were the PMR’s methods of agitation for a come back to Poland as well as making efforts to discount the influence of those who remained in contact with the Polish Government in Exile in London. During that time, the “immigration environment” was trying to provide Poles staying in Sweden with the information about the dramatic political situation in the country and also about brutal behavior of Soviet soldiers towards Polish people, etc. That “battle for souls” yielded limited results. Soon after repatriation campaign Polish consulate, on the pretext on giving protection to their citizens, set up a registration campaign. It was announced that the consulate would offer help only those who had been registered whereas many of Polish immigrants had not applied for a residence permit. By the end of 1947, 63 per cent of Polish citizens had been registered. Political transformations in Poland during 1955–1956 caused a change in Warsaw authorities’ position. Since that moment, common aims of all Poles like: necessity of fighting for piece, defense of the Oder-Neisse borderline, maintenance of the language and Polish tradition also in immigration environment, were being emphasized. Actions aiming to induce Poles living in Sweden to build favorable atmosphere allowing a reconstruction of Polish-Swedish trade and political cooperation were widely undertaken. The employees of the Polish consulate and embassy were trying to create their own, rivalry organizations, separate Sunday schools. The Consular Department were editing two newspapers: „Det Nya Polen” published fortnightly and the monthly „Polska Odrodzona” („The Reborn Poland”). However, the majority of Poles living in Sweden remained apolitical because of their dispersion and working-class origins. Those, who considered themselves to be the independence immigrants were implacable.

Konrad Sieniewicz was one of the most prominent characters of the Polish emigration Christian Democracy (Chadecja). He was one of the closest collaborators of Karol Popiel. Sieniewicz was also active in the international Christian Democratic movement and for many years was the secretary general of the Christian Democratic Union of Central Europe (UCDEC – Chrześcijańsko- -Demokratyczna Unia Środkowej Europy) and of the World Christian Democratic Union (Światowa Unia Chrześcijańsko-Demokratyczna). In December 1945, he left Poland threatened with arrest. The security department continuously monitored his activity and regarded him as spiritus mo-vens of the Labour Party foreign centre and also as the main organiser of the actions aimed at the country. The attempts to get closer to Sieniewicz, which were conducted in the middle of the fifties by the Secret Police, were successful during the summer of 1957. Contact was established and was, for many years, sustained by comrade “Borowski”, one of Sieniewicz’s closest friends during war who played a key role in revealing the Labour Party’s environment in exile and in the country. Despite obstinate signals about Sieniewicz’s connections with American services, his reports eventually persuaded the intelligence to conduct attempts to recruit the Christian Democrat, who was now code named “Insula”. In the autumn of 1963, fundamental talks took place in Italy. Sieniewicz consciously decided to establish contacts with the Secret Police: however, he wanted them to be a political dialogue. Sieniewicz expected an agreement to the revival of any activity of the authentic Christian Democratic movement in the country in exchange for cooperation with Warsaw authorities in the territories recognised by the emigration as consistent with the Polish raison d’etat. In February 1966, after a few meetings, Sieniewicz suspended contact when he realized that the interlocutors did not want to treat him as a partner. They treated him only as a spy, a source of information. Two years later, the intelligence’s attempt to resume talks was unsuccessful. In the autumn of 1970, “Insula’s” surveillance was formally finished, however, the security department was still interested in his activity. In Sieniewicz’s game with the Secret Police, he did not achieve any of the assumed aims. His case illustrates well the attitude of the Security Service towards emigrants. Even those who were eager to search a modus vivendi with the Warsaw government were treated suspiciously and were used in an instrumental manner. The People’s Republic of Poland offered them only the role of informant for the secret services. In such conditions, all the emigrants’ attempts to conduct real dialogue with the communist authorities were doomed to fail.

Mieczysław Thugutt (1902–1979), he was trained as a mechanical engineer. Associated with the peasant movement. Son of the famous peasant and social activist, Stanisław. Firstly, during World War II, being in Sweden he mediated between the Polish government-in-exile in London and the Underground in Poland. Later, from 1942 he was in London. Thugutt was a close cooperator of Minister of Internal Affairs and then of Prime Minister Stanisław Mikołajczyk. He was also the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs’ supervisor of the clandestine radio station – codeword „Świt” [„Dawn”] broadcasting from Great Britain and pretending to be a national one. During the negotiations held in Moscow resulted in formation of the Provisional Government of National Unity (Tymczasowy Rząd Jedności Narodowej, TRJN) in June 1945 Thugutt was designated to be Minister of Posts and Telegraphs. However, he refused to return to Poland and did not hold the office. He was a close friend and cooperator of Stefan Korboński. In addition to this Mieczysław Thugutt was one of the activists of the PSL-Odłam Jedności Narodowej [the PSL-Section of the National Unity] (the PSL – the Polish People’s Party) and President of the constituency of Great Britain. In his career he became the editor of the party’s official paper-in-exile, the “Zielony Sztandar” and of the pre-war “Przegląd Techniczny” [Technical Review] – the biggest and oldest technical magazine in Poland. He was a member of numerous structures of the Polish political emigration: the Political Council (1952–1954), the TRJN (1954–1962) and the Federation of Democratic Movements (1962–1979). He was involved in the process of merging emigration circles as well as he was a signatory of the Act of Unification (1954). He was known as a incisive critic of both the immigration structures and of an inflexible attitude of those so-called “unbroken”. Remaining anti-German, Thugutt started referring more positively to the changes that took place in Poland as a consequence of the Polish October. Between 1957–1965 the Department I (intelligence) took an effort to recruit him to cooperate with communist security apparatus (case code-name “Tybr”). However these activities ended in failure, because the figurehead “Tybr” got an intelligence officer to understand clearly that he rejected any contacts with secret services. Since 1965 because of deteriorating health condition he became less active in politics. He never accepted the unification of the immigration peasant movement in 1968. Thugutt did not belong to the “Castle” movement (“Zamek”) nor to the Council of National Unity (Rada Jedności Narodowej, RJN). He died in London, in 1979.

New tactic of the PRL (the People’s Republic of Poland) authorities toward Polish emigration was initiated in the middle of 1950’s. The liberalization of the Communist system in Poland in 1956 and hopes for the “second stage” of the October; simultaneously - disappointment with the Western politics as well as constantly lessening chances to change a situation in Central and Eastern Europe and on the same breath, growing crisis and internal disunity of the emigration, created a fertile ground for pro-country orientation in exile. One of the form of communist diversion was offering financial support by the PRL’s intelligence services to those communities which opted for collaboration with the country and which were fighting the „unbroken” off. A weekly “Odgłosy” (“Sounds”), than renamed “Oblicze Tygodnia” (“The face of the week”), edited by the former activist of the Polish Socialist Party – Karol Lewkowicz, was considered to be one of such “dirty” initiatives after the “October”. In January 1957, Lewkowicz, on his own initiative, came into contact with the Polish embassy in London, where during the following talks, he suggested creating an all-party Polish organization in-exile (Kongres Polonii w Wielkiej Brytanii, The Polish Congress in Great Britain). He also highlighted a vital necessity for a new pro-country paper-in-exile to be edited. Lewkowicz, acting on intelligence services’ order, was preparing reports covering information about not only a political situation in exile but also about personal characteristics of particular emigration activists. He was paid regularly for it in return. In the end of June 1957 the first issue of “Odgłosy” was published. The main purpose of publishing that weekly was to stop the press monopoly held by the „unbroken” and what is more it caused some kind of “crack” in the emigration’s environment so hostile to the PRL authorities. Ostensibly for being independent and having an autonomy, actually the “Odgłosy” popularized an idea of cooperation between the country and the exile. It also unmasked a “harmful” activity of the immigrants. By publicizing conflicts between particular groups and inside them, the editors sow confusion and aggravated the breakdown of emigration. Lewkowicz stressed that after the October, the communist party in Poland was no longer a foreign agency. He also considered to be the only legitimate one the authority from the “Vistula country”. The Intelligence Service had grounds to suspect that Lewkowicz was also at British service, nevertheless the cooperation was continued. In 1966 the leadership of the MSW (the Ministry of Internal Affairs) finally decided to stop supporting financially the “Oblicza Tygodnia” as a consequence of too high costs of its upkeeping. Moreover, the magazine was no longer the only pro-country paper in-exile.

Exiles, defined as refugees or immigrants engaging themselves in opposition politics against their homeland, have been studied quite thoroughly. This research, however, does rarely exceed the frameworks of national history, treating exiles only as the trailblazers of the nation’s current political system. Only a few scholars have approached exile politics in a more systematic and comparative way. Their research, though, concentrates on exiles claiming legitimacy (governments in exile, national committees), while the political activities of other exiles seem to have been more influential.

Opposition in Poland in the seventies and eighties and emigration environments in the West were connected by multifarious relations. Historical and political emigration literature was one of the elements that formed the opinions of opposition activists in the country. Emigration press was a forum of opinion exchange for them before the independent publishing movement came into being. Since the middle of the seventies, emigration financially supported the opposition in Poland and was the main proponent of its interests in the West. The environment of the independent paper “Spotkania” presents the relations between the emigration and opposition in the country well. The paper came out between 1977–1988 in Lublin. One of the papers’ initiators was Piotr Jegliński who has lived in Paris since 1974. In 1978, he established there a “twin” publishing house – Editions Spotkania, which reedited the paper. During the whole period in which the paper “Spotkania” was published, the main source of financing was the help from the West. Its organiser was Jegliński and the donors were private persons, Polish foundations and also subjects financed by the governmental institutions in the West. Jegliński made many contacts with associations, institutions and private persons who had influence on public opinion in the West. He conducted information and lobbying activities – as, especially after the introduction of martial law in Poland, it was essential to publicise the problem of political repression in Poland, to obtain financial support for victims and to obtain the support of the West for the opposition activity in the country. Jedliński organised propaganda campaigns and happenings together with other circles of Polish emigrants in Paris, among others, the group of people concentrated around the paper “Kontakt” (“Contact”), which was published in Paris. In the eighties, it was essential to maintain social resistance in the country. On Jegliński’s initiative, among others, thousands of miniature publications from his and other emigree publishing houses reached Poland. The environment of “Spotkania” appreciated the enormous informative role played by Radio Free Europe. Over the years, Jegliński and an emigrant Jan Stepek, the editor of “Spotkania”, cooperated with RFE. The goal of the paper “Spotkania” was similar to the one of the Parisian paper “Kultura” (“Culture”). Since the first edition of the paper, editors and journalists stressed the importance of reconciliation and cooperation of nations in the Central-Eastern Europe. The paper also opened its columns to representatives of the Russian and Ukrainian emigration.

Historians highlight four periods of intense activities concerning guarding the eastern border of Poland, such as: 1921–1922 – a defense campaign conducted by both the Customs Battalions and the troops of the State Police 1922–1923 – the Border Guard responsible for maintaining border’s security 1923–1924 – eastern frontier under protection of the State Police 1924–1939 – the control of the border handed over to the Border Protection Corps (Korpus Ochrony Pogranicza, KOP). The decree passed by the Government on 13 January 1921 assigned the troops of “border militia” a task of providing the areas being a neutral zone with safety, peace and public order. On 18 March 1921 these troops were incorporated into the State Police corps. The Government’s instruction entrusted the Customs Battalions from 3 September 1921 with guarding the eastern border in the areas of Nowogródek, Polesie, Ternopil and Volhynia voivodships. In order to enforce their activities the State Police troops were ordered to support the Customs Battalions (BC). Soon, it turned out that in Volhynia, relations between the police and the BC were rather difficult. The Customs Battalions’ abuses leaded to many misunderstandings and furthermore to loss of contact and mutual agreement between the army and the police. In May 1922 the BC was replaced by the Border Guard which, in accordance with the relevant regulations, was obliged to cooperate with the State Police. The range of that cooperation included such activities as: prosecuting for criminal and political offences, patrolling the border, controlling documents and arresting those who were being thought as suspicious. Direct contacts between the police forces and the Border Guard were at border checkpoints as well as at border posts in Korets, Ostroh, Borshchiv, Szumsk and Mogilany. In the middle of 1921, in the area of Volhynia, it was organized the Control Station in Rivne which performed the function of the Branch Office of Department IV-D (Ekspozytura Wydziału IV-D). From 1 July 1923, the State Police (PP) – with 1300 police officers – took over from the Border Guard the control over the eastern border. Therefore the PP became responsible for controlling the movement of citizens, preventing smuggling by arresting suspicious individuals and sending them to the appropriate authorities and, in cases of reasonable suspicion of a contraband, by carrying out the revision of people and their properties located in the border zone, etc. On 1 November 1924, the Government recalled the police from the border zone in the area of Vilnus Region, Nowogródek and Volhynia voivodships. Defending of the eastern frontier was ordered to the Border Protection Corps which continued its mission until September 1939.

The institution of the Chief Civil Commissioner by the Commander in Chief was appointed on 1 September 1939. Its aim was to provide proper functioning of the direct background of the front. This attitude was taken by the voivode of the Polesie Region, Wacław Kostek-Biernacki. Although the works concerning the actions of a similar unit were initiated at the beginning of the thirties, since the beginning of the war, the unit struggled with problems of organisational, logistic and personnel nature. In this connection, and also because of a very unfavourable course of war for the Polish side, the unit’s activity had an improvisatorial character. One may distinguish three periods of activity. The first was between 1–6 of September in Warsaw. At that time, the main issues to cope with were, above all, the organisational and legal preparations of the Chief Civil Commissioner Office to function efficiently. Signs of its activity consistent with the assumed aims of its existence were not found. Another period is the stay in Brest between 7–11 September. Only then a relatively ordered activity was developed. W. Kostek-Biernacki issued a regulation on the settlement of issues connected with masses of refugees, with fights against diversion and with reconstruction of roads. He won an increase in Polish State Police authority in relation to the army. The necessity to leave Brest by the Commander in Chief ’s staff caused also the departure of the staff of the Chief Civil Commissioner Office. On 16 September, the regulation reached Kolomyia, passing Vladimir-Volynsky, Lutsk and Tarnopol. During the evacuation, after leaving Vladimir-Volynsky, a temporary breach of relations with the Commander in Chief ’s staff occurred. At that time, W. Kostek-Biernacki interfered in the issues connected with the members of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) who were in prisons in the Tarnopol Region. Then, a conflict with the authorities of the Tarnopol Voivodship took place. Prime Minister Składkowski and probably the Commander in Chief were informed about the conflict. On 17 September, he issued an order for Leon Kniaziołucki to fill the post of the chief commissioner. This nomination had no practical meaning because of Soviet aggression. Information about it probably did not reach the personnel of the Chief Civil Commissioner Office. In view of leaving Poland, W. Kostek-Biernacki dissolved the Office and crossed the Polish-Romanian border.

The main purpose of a Soviet repatriation action carried out after World War II was to forcibly return to the USSR all Soviet citizens who during the war, for many reasons such as: captivity, forced labor in Germany, emigration or escape, lived their country and settled down in Western and Central Europe. This action did not omit Czechoslovakia. It is possible to highlight particular stages of the process of searching for, arresting and deporting people of Russian and Ukrainian origin and of other nationalities of the Soviet Union living in Czechoslovakia. Initially, those people who were under a relocation duty were appealed by Soviet secret service to appear in special camps or they were brought along by force. At the beginning of 1946, the second stage of repatriation action started. It was carried out by Soviet and Czechoslovak secret services acting in close collaboration. In assistance of Czechoslovak army, they were searching for displaced persons from the Soviet Union in the CSR and forced them to live the Republic. The fact of the matter is that the character of those actions was often rather brutal. Repatriation affected all Soviet citizens regardless their health condition like senility, pregnancy, marital status (some of them were already married to Czechoslovak partners), etc. The most violent acts characterized Czechoslovak forces. The last stage of repatriation action is dated from the beginning of 1947 until the end of 1948. Soviet forces provided Czechoslovak authorities with the list of people who were to be deported from the CSR, as a consequence they were captured and arrested by Czechoslovak secret service. Furthermore, cases of similar actions occurred even in the early 1950s. It is unlikely to estimate the exact number of Soviet citizens (immigrants and refugees) who, after Red Army’s occupation of Slovakia, were not only deported to the Soviet Union but also repatriated in subsequent years.

Historiography is not able to give a clear answer to the question concerning the issue of the complete and adequate picture of the public’s opinion on the Unification Congress. The majority of preserved historical sources were subjective and created under the influence of ideology and therefore often not consistent with the actual situation. As a result of it, private journals and letters shall constitute the most accurate source of knowledge of the above-said issue. All we can do is try and indicate certain tendencies of behaviour or else some partial attitudes and opinions. In fact, we can differentiate three groups of opinions: Persons who are satisfied with the consolidation of the Polish Workers’ Party (PPR) and the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), the majority of persons discontented with this and inconsiderable number of persons not interested in this subject matter. People’s interest in the congress resulted not in accepting the activities undertaken by the authorities and supporting the political system, but actually in fear of the family as well as personal future. There was a common depression. People were frequently afraid of making any opinions therefore they chose to talk only when accompanied by the closed family and reliable persons. Any resistance took rather a symbolic form. People complained about the splendour of decorations within cities, as well as, about the lack of emblems and national colours. It was widely believed, that the congress was the final proof of the communisation of Poland and its subordination towards the Soviet Union. Any incidents of putting anticommunist inscriptions on walls or tearing off communist posters were very rare. Within rural environment people were afraid of collectivisation and the Catholics expected that the churches would be closed. The majority of people expected deterioration of working and living conditions. Some anticipations concerning the future were rather fantastical and based only on unverified rumours. The possible ways for people to escape the present situation included irony, faith, as well as, wishful thinking.

The article is an attempt to present briefly the extent and variety of forms of help that Ukrainians being resettled from southeastern territories of Poland into the USSR (the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) between 1944–1946 as well as during the Operation Wisła campaign in 1947 were provided with by Polish people. First of all, they were assisted by Poles in obtaining new identity cards confirming Polish nationality and also they were helped in changing the Orthodox or the Greek-Catholic Church membership into the Roman-Catholic which automatically exempted them from the relocation duty and what is more, they were not required to register for resettlement list. Polish people interceded with the authorities on behalf of the particular Ukrainian individuals who were supposed to have gone to the USRR, guaranteeing for their loyal attitude towards Poland and Polish nation during the war. According to the author’s approximate estimates, as a result of those actions, over a dozen thousands of families avoided the repatriation. When the compulsory resettlement in the USRR, starting from September 1945, was being conducted by the army, [not only did Poles offer their houses as a shelter for Ukrainians but they also interceded with commanders of the resettlement troops and committees or even paid bribes to set them free.] there were Poles who offered their homes as a shelter for Ukrainians, what is more, they interceded with commanders of the resettlement troops and committees or even paid bribes to set Ukrainian people free. Thanks to the agreement reached in 1945 (between Ukrainian Insurgent Army [UPA] and a Polish underground anti-communist organization Wolność i Niezawisłość WiN [Freedom and Independence]), in the spring of 1946, WiN members from the county of Hrubieszów provided many Ukrainian families with help hiding them among Poles of the neighbouring county of Chełm. Another important matter to be mentioned is that during the military resettlement campaign carried out in border counties of Lesko, Lubaczów, Nowy Sącz and Sanok, many public appearances of particular starosts as well as of members of local national councils (especially in counties of Sanok and Lubaczów) were being made to prevent Ukrainians and Lemkos – the most – from being relocated. Whenever those interventions failed another forms of help were used like: assistance in obtaining Polish identity cards or attempts of gaining new Ukrainian professionals considered to be indispensable for local economy. Similar efforts were being made a year later during Operation Wisła campaign, but in that case, the effects were weaker because of the fact that the authorities in Warsaw decided to expel all Ukrainians even those considered by the local administration to be loyal towards Poland as well as those of mixed families.

Local leaderships in Poland significantly affected the consequences of the open conflict between Rome and Moscow in new political conditions. Anti-catholic actions carried out by communist authorities resulted in reaching an agreement between the Soviet government and the Polish Committee of National Liberation (Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego). It concerned a displacement of Ukrainian citizens from the Polish territory as well as of Poles from the USSR. Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic hierarchs negatively referred to the Polish-Ukrainian settlement. The vast majority of Polish society decided not to leave their homes. That decision was attributed to the significant influence of Roman Catholic clergy they had on Polish worshippers. Communist authorities, with all possible methods of persuasion (extortion, deportations and arrests), tried to use that influence in order to accelerate the process of displacement. At the request of Archbishop Eugeniusz Baziak the authorities of the Greek Catholic Church officially expressed their opposition against such actions taken by the government. Soviet officers not only put the clergy and worshippers under intense pressure but also used permanently existing Polish-Ukrainian conflicts to achieve their goals (distributing threatening leaflets with UPA signature, resettling Ukrainian citizens in areas yet uninhabited by Poles, etc.). The clergy of both Churches – Greek and Catholic – took an effort to prevent the worshippers in their parishes from creating tension between them. Polish parsons kept on Greek Catholic rectories their liturgical vestments, parish registers and another pieces of church property. Due to the fact that Polish clergy had friendly relations with Greek Catholic parsons, Polish priests used to give them the keys to their churches before being displaced. During the action of liquidation of the Greek Catholic Church the Soviet authorities extensively used the Russian Orthodox Church to erupt a dispute inside the Greek Catholic environment. Between 1944 and 1946 both Greek Catholic priests and laymen were required not only to declare their personal attitude to church (in general) but also their religious affiliation. It was caused by remarkable variety of opinions existing in Ukrainian society rich in many religious beliefs, family traditions etc. Moreover, that society was also deeply and constantly affected by the influence of the Ukrainian clergy, underground and it felt intense pressure from the authorities. In addition to this, the USSR leaderships took under consideration the possibility of carrying out a similar action against Roman Catholic Church. However, any attempt of taking such an action met with strong resistance of the clergy. The underground activities of the Greek Catholic Church only confirmed the lack of effectiveness of that kind of campaigns. After World War II, there was a new stage in relations between not only the Roman and Greek Catholic churches but also the Ukrainian and Polish societies. All conflicts and pretences between them, connected with political repressions, eventually ended and turned into a mutual cooperation and help. Despite existence of totalitarian regime, both Churches – Roman and Greek Catholic were allowed to preserve their religious identities.

The article presents the results of thorough research on an attempt to explain the circumstances of Teodor Jałowski’s murder in April 1947 who was an officer of National Police Forces during Second Polish Republic and Citizens’ Militia in the beginning of People’s Republic of Poland. The problem of verification and the following discussion of the circumstances of his death have been an opportunity to publish this material. Family ties with the character of this work – my grandfather – have been the reason for endeavoring to uncover the family mystery. Archival material collected by the author enables to trace the description of 13 April 1947 event concerning the murder of Teodor Jałowski in a fairly detailed way. Existing archives of UB and Citizens’ Militia repressive forces are the basis of reference in this material as they provide an authentic picture of that event. The article includes several authentic descriptions of security apparatus which was created after the liberation of Radom by the Soviet Union army and soon subordinated to NKVD. Existing UB reports as well as those of Citizens’ Militia Headquarters in the County of Radom (Komenda Powiatowa MO) verified in the text question the circumstances of the death of Jałowski presented at the time of People’s Republic of Poland, until 1989 to be exact. At the time of People’s Republic of Poland Second Lieutenant Tadeusz Zieliński “Igła”, who was a leader of an underground group struggling for independence in the region of Kielce and in places surrounding Radom, was considered, together with his people, to be responsible for the death of Jałowski. In the given period of time a substantial body of literature confirmed this opinion and placed Jałowski as a victim of military underground groups acting in the region in works by S. Skwarek and r. Halaba. A detailed archival study of existing documents as well as meetings with still living eye witnesses remembering that tragic 13 April 1947 event deny findings revealed before 1989. The successful attempt to prove that Jałowski was not killed by the group led by “Igła” showed a misleading picture of the lists of victims, who died or were murdered in the post-war period, constructed at the time of People’s Republic of Poland. Enlisting Jałowski as a victim of anti-communist underground was undeniably unreasonable.

The study presents the development of the military and defence expenses during the period of 1949 to 1979, based on so far unknown, formerly top secret sources. It describes the decisional mechanisms, the party and state organisations having the competence to determine the mentioned expense, as well as the international circumstances and internal events influencing the volume of the military expense. From 1949 till 1956 a dual budgetary system was in application in Hungary as well: beside the official, public budget existed a secret budget containing the military expense and state dotations to be dissimulated. Concerning the military expenditure, as from 1956 another hiding technique was also in use: the budget line of the Ministry of Defence contained exclusively the operational costs, while the cost of investments and weapon acquisitions was placed among the items of the national economy investments and the trade expenditure.

One may find many comments concerning the social-political situation in the Soviet Union in the Polish journalism of the political opposition. Most attention was paid to the authority and its actions both in the USSR and in the international arena. Above all, Moscow was the place where people saw every of evil which was experienced by Poles after 1945. Criticism of communist governments in the country was always directly aimed at Kremlin authorities. In second-hand publishing houses, there are many texts which lack a deeper afterthought and are full of megalomania. One may also encounter those in which submission to Moscow or the realities in the USSR were analyzed in many aspects and various ideas to solve the complicated situation were proposed. In this way, we have the attitudes of absolute anticommunism connected with the lack of faith in any changes until communists would exercise power. Such an approach created a rejection of compromise with the representatives of communist authorities both in Poland and in the USSR. Fighting Solidarity (Solidarność Walcząca) with Kornel Morawiecki or Leszek Moczulski’s Confederation of Independent Poland (Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej) are the best examples. A different point of view was represented by Adam Michnik or Jacek Kuroń, who obstinately stressed that the authority in Moscow was changing. They inferred the creation of a modus vivendi along the line authority-opposition. A totally different view was represented by Stefan Kisielewski, who distantly commented on the social-political situation both in the country and in the USSR. It is worth mentioning the environment of the Parisian “Kultura” which has, above all, permanently promoted reconciliation with the nations which were part of the USSR. Perception of Moscow’s policy in the international arena and its influence on Poland’s recovery of independence is a more complex issue. To put it simply, the national opposition may be divided into two camps of perceiving this problem. One of them would be that in which the role in the process of independence recovery would be attributed only to Poles. The second stated that Poland’s recovery of independence would be the result of a defeat of the Soviet Union in the international rivalry with the United States and the West. However, such a division would be too far-reaching a simplification. Each faction of the Polish opposition was convinced that two factors complementing one another are essential in this process. The difference was only in the role ascribed to each of the factors. It definitely needs to be stressed that none of the opposition factions presented rejected any of the attitudes.

During People’s Poland (the People’s Republic of Poland) after having dispose of the independent underground and the overt political opposition, Communistic authorities started the fight against the Catholic Church. Its spiritual influence on children and adolescents was being systematically eliminated by reducing religion classes and elimination of the Catholic educational-tutorial institutions. These repercussions were also felt by Catholic convents, especially by the Convent of the Daughters of Mary Help of Christians (The Salesian Sisters), which sisters during the 1930-1939, in the house at 85 Franciszkańska street, in Lodz established and were keeping (running) nursery school, workshops, school, oratory and youth associations. Shortly after World Word II they rearranged and re-brought to the life educational-tutorial institutions which were liquidated during the German occupation. In 1948 “Ochronka Bałucka” (the shelter located in Białuty district in Lodz, where children from the poorest families could gather to play together, learn, pray and hide from harm) was finally liquidated, as well as sodality and oratory – probably in the next year. In 1952 the territory authorities seized the nursery school, while in 1963 the Vocational School of Clothing (Zasadnicza Szkoła Odzieżowa) which was the last Catholic educational institution in Lodz, was eventually closed. Practically from 1948 until 1963, the Salesian Sisters in Lodz were struggling constantly to maintain the operation of their ongoing educational works. The activity of the territory authorities and of the Security Apparatus in Lodz took various forms and methods like: inspections, bans on the recruitment of female students to the 1st class of the primary school, using various types of pressure, which consequently led to the removal or resignation of the work the most resistant teachers (for example sister Maria Lipińska – the headmaster of the school), attempts of creating communistic youth organizations, persuading into organizing chats, wall magazines, rallies, events and celebrations of occasional national holidays, rivalling in work between female school students, calling for nuns for „talks” which took place in the Department for Religious Affairs (Wydział ds. Wyznań) and in the office of the security service and also attempts of recruitment new members into the net of secret service agents as well as taking control over the most indomitable Salesian Sisters.

This paper aims at giving an overview on Estonian historiography on contemporary history since the regaining of independence in 1991. I will focus on authors living and working in Estonia, but have to mention also some research done abroad. With few exceptions, document editions and lists of victims of repression will not be dealt with. Because historians have not really started to investigate the 1990s, I will cover the period from establishing independence in 1918-1920 until the end of the Soviet regime. Different factors shaped the writing of history in Estonia in recent years. The Socialist past – Estonia was part of the Soviet Union as a Soviet republic – influenced greatly research on contemporary history. Professional history in Estonia was established by Baltic German scholars in the 19th century and Estonians entered the field as professional historians mainly in the interwar period, thus German and Soviet/Russian traditions were important. History is often seen as a ‘national science’ (rahvateadus) and an indivisible part of constructing national and state identity. Thus, many historians are on the track of a ‘national narrative’ of history. Additionally, Estonia is a small country with 1.3 million inhabitants, thus the community of historians is rather small, too. The brunch of quality research and publishing is conducted by a group of approximately 55 historians holding a PhD or the equivalent and not being retired yet. Most of the publications are in Estonian, but there is a growing trend to publish in English, Russian or German, too. The profession of historians faced like in other post-Socialist countries serious changes during transition. Some well-established Soviet historians lost influence and maybe their position. Others retired. The Soviet past had a serious impact, too. The distortion of history under Socialist rule led to the tendency since the late 1980s to explore the ‘blank spots’ of history in a certain positivist way stressing facts and not analysis, interpretation or a theoretical approach, but the further integration into European research structures has clearly a beneficent impact. Political history, the repressions under Stalin or military history seem to be at the moment far more important than let us say social or economic history. The main fields of interest remain the interwar period of independence, World War II and Stalinist rule, which have been presented in a rather distorted way by Soviet historiography.