Poland and Hungary were experiencing very similar political transformations within their long history. Mostly, those changes were caused by a great similarity in the social and political structures between the two countries, but also by the simple fact of continued existence of the communist system in both societies. On the other hand, Poland and Hungary differed significantly on the issue concerning the specific Church’s position in Hungary and in Poland and on the role of masses in social movements. Peoples’ flexible attitude toward changing political situation in Hungary was revealed firstly, during the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 when the Imre Nagy’s government received an endorsement of the overwhelming majority of Hungarians. Then, after few years, people became drained of powerful emotions which led them – especially working class’ members – to the political inactivity. At the same time, in Poland, the opposition started playing crucial role in a way that, in the 1980s, resulted in establishing a framework of the civil society. This text deals with some major aspects of unique relation that existed between Poland and Hungary, especially from the mid-1970s till 1980s. For instance, the development of the opposition’s activity in both countries was dependent of each other’s influence. In consequence, it enabled them to build strong relationship thanks to which it became possible to commemorate the next anniversary of the 1956 Revolution (it happened for the first time on the east side of the Iron Curtain, before 1989). That relationship also provided a firm foundation for mutual assistance such as: Polish support for the development of Hungarian underground literature or formal visits in Poland of particular Hungarian activists (Gábor Demszky). The Hungarian authorities channeled their efforts into stopping the wave of Polish transformations from occurring in Hungary, therefore any attempts of making direct contact were impeded and limited. What is more, the Hungarian agents of the security apparatus were being sent in Poland in order to scrutinize the nature of Polish political transformations. This article is rich in opinions of the Hungarian society concerning the revolutionary changes in Poland, as well as in their reactions to the formation of trade unions in the PRL (the Polish People’s Republic). The Author makes an attempt to find out why Hungarian workers’ mass did not follow suit the Polish ones which might seem to have been a logical consequence of better economic situation in Hungary.

The Security Service (SB), especially the Department III A of the provincial Citizen’s Militia headquarter (KW MO – Komenda Wojewódzka Milicji Obywtelskiej) in Słupsk administrated by major/colonel Stanisław Kwiatkowski, took a close interest in the activity of the Independent Self-governing Trade Union “Solidarity” (NSZZ “Solidarność”), from the very beginning of its existence in that region. The SB functionaries tried not only to collect any piece of information about the activity of the Inter-Factory Founding Committee’s (Międzyzakładowy Komitet Założycielski, MKZ) presidium members and – from June 1981 – of the Regional Administration’s (Zarząd Regionu) members, but also to paralyse some of their projects. In order to achieve it, the SB made use of inner MKZ’s conflicts that occurred a few months after the foundation of the “Solidarity”. The main case concerning the trade union’s structures in Słupsk was codenamed “Aktyw” (the “Active members”). Apart from that, there were some minor operational activities carried out against particular company organizations or against individuals. What is more, all members of the Young Poland Movement – (“Ruch Młodej Polski”, “Odnowiciele”) and activists of the Committee for the Defence of Prisoners of Conscience – “Chameleon” (“Komitet Obrony Więzionych za Przekonania”, “Kameleon”) were being individually kept under active surveillance. The Security Service had dozens of its secret collaborators (tajny współpracownik, TW) working in the structures of the “Solidarity” in Słupsk. Stanisław Gargol (known as TW “Rakoczy” and TW “Roman”) – chief of the Office of Intervention (Biuro Interwencji), as well as Wojciech Zierke (TW “Jola”), who was recruited as secret collaborator probably after being elected leader of the Regional Administration’s in Słupsk, both of them were considered to be the most dangerous functionaries. After imposition of martial law, the SB did not cease its actions against “Solidarity” movement, however, new circumstances forced it to re-determined hitherto methods and purposes of its activity.

Polish authorities not only arrested hiding activists of the underground „Solidarity” („Solidarność”) movement but also made an effort to discredit them in society’s eyes. The official press emphasized the weakness of the opposition simultaneously exaggerating threats connected with its functioning. Besides, the „extremists” – as the underground’s leaders were called – were presented as those, who aimed for a confrontation with the authorities in order to take over the leadership of the country. What is more, the opposition was accused of betraying Poland and of going over to the PRL’s overseas enemies. An alleged “Solidarity’s” dependence on those countries was supposed to result from financial support for its activity received from western governments and secret services. In addition to that, “Solidarity’s” members were reproached for popularizing terrorist methods of fighting with the authorities as well as for exploiting patriotic symbols. Polish media were trying to prove that street demonstrations were principal methods of mounting active resistance to the communist government and its politics. Those events were presented in a way that only exposed a rowdy behaviour of the crowds, whereas aggressive actions taken by public law and order services were well hidden. On the other hand, particular strikes organized by the underground were being, as far as possible, ignored, because their existence was in opposition to the image created by a socialist propaganda, according to which the “working class” did not support the opposition. Furthermore, the authorities sought to marginalise a phenomenon of an underground literature by deriding its – alleged – poor essential content and low technical quality. It is difficult to state how far Poles believed in the “enemy’s” image created by the media. Presumably, an “anti-Solidarity” propaganda yielded the best results in small towns and in the country. Simultaneously, there were some social groups such as young people of intelligentsia backgrounds and urbanized “working class” which might have been resistant to its influence. Common stereotypes about the “Solidarity’s” leaders were perpetuated among pro-communist communities and also among some representatives of ruling elites. It resulted in expressing their anxiety at participation of particular opposition’s members in the Polish Round Table Talks.

This study describes a history of one of the most significant clandestine publishing houses in Poland, during 1980–1989. The article based on accounts of witnesses and archive records of the Institute of National Remembrance, is an attempt to make readers familiar with not only the history of the “Krąg” Publisher, but also with realities of functioning of the samizdat (illegally self-published and self-distributed literature) editions. Furthermore, the text concentrates on some important issues such as: technical facilities, sophisticated methods of acquiring printing materials and on the process of publishing books. According to the author, it is also worth stressing the fact of invaluable assistance of foreign countries, such as: the so-called “drops” (special transports with technical help) and a helpfulness in obtaining copyrights on particular publications. What is more, the article tries to trace the way of the “Krąg” Publisher being watched by the Security Service, which in consequence weakened its position on the independent publishing market.

Parisian “Radio Solidarity” started broadcasting a few days after imposing martial law in Poland, in December 1981. Frenchmen, who were its originators and founders, by creating that radio, they mainly set out to support fights against world’s totalitarian systems and to foster all bearing democracies in the communist countries, therefore new political situation in Poland played only secondary role. However, it was not long until Radio Solidarity became a “Polish voice”. Many creative, dedicated and young Poles, stopped in France by martial law, started creating strong basis of the radio crew. Among its members there were also emigrants from other countries – those of the Eastern Block and from Afghanistan and some French political, social and trade unions’ activists. Radio programmes were initially broadcasted in French because they were aimed at francophone listeners. Then particular transmissions were also in Polish. Due to the fact that the broadcast coverage was limited, no-one but people living in Paris and in suburbia was able to listen to it. Radio Solidarity was informing both, French and Polish listeners, about current political situation in Poland. It was also deeply engaged in organizing help for Poles staying in France and for fellow countrymen living in Poland – especially for the internees and their families. Furthermore, French trade unions’ activists and many nongovernmental organizations’ members were offered access to “live” radio transmissions in order to discuss and exchange opinions with the listeners. As the radio was developing, its engagement in activity for the defence of human rights increased, nonetheless the Polish issue was being raised the most frequently in many radio programmes. Radio Solidarity reached its climax of popularity in 1982 as a result of public concern in France about Polish problem. Radio Solidarity was not at service of any political organisations’ nor of trade unions’ and was not sponsored regularly. Moreover, the radio crew never derived financial benefits from their work, they worked for free – for the society. Despite the fact that the radio was being offered financial support from many its friends, the permanent lack of money was really problematic. Once, in 1991, the permission to broadcast expired – Radio Solidarity eventually stopped existing.

From 1989 onwards, political situation in Poland started changing kaleidoscopically; for this reason, western diplomacy could not fully keep up with reassessing its strategies aimed at this part of Europe. That situation became clearly visible especially during the full of paradoxes period between the overwhelming victory of the “Solidarity” movement in first round of the parity elections on 4 June 1989 and swearing Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski in as the PRL’s President on 19 July 1989. The West, and mostly the USA, were amazed with changing political circumstances in Poland, therefore – in a surprising way – they started indirectly supporting Gen. Jaruzelski in his quest for presidency. Simultaneously, during the entire decade of 1980s, they tended to favour and lobby “Solidarity” movement in order to weaken significant Soviet influence in the Eastern Bloc. General’s election as President was to be treated as a guarantee of adherence to the terms of (the) Round Table Agreement and of preventing Polish political situation from excessive radicalization which could lead to an outbreak of acute crisis in the country and would provoke a negative reaction of conservative circles in Moscow. In view of what could have happened, President George Bush during his official visit to Poland in July, urged General Jaruzelski to stand for presidential elections, whereas U.S. Ambassador John R. Davis explained to the “Solidarity” leaderships how to discreetly support General in the election taking place during the National Assembly session. Moreover, somewhat earlier, French President François Mitterand, during his lecture in Cracow, exhorted the students “not to throw the socialism out of a window”. That astonishing political vote-face of the West (and of part of the “Solidarity” members) was only an episode in a chequered history of Polish political transformation process. Western politicians’ hitherto concerns about current World’s situation decreased within progressive dissolution of the Eastern Block. They gradually started changing – into the proper one – their attitude towards communist regimes and towards political opposition taking over power in the country.

The article raises the issue on the transformational justice relating to the theory of policy towards the past. The legal system, which can not only allow to exact compensation for the harmful history but also be used to oppose it actively, played a very important role in the process of coming to terms with history. To put it another way, in order to comprehend how the instrument of law was used by the state in the transformational justice process, one should refer to the jurisprudence. An overview of the post-war era philosophical and legal debate over the general problem of crimes against humanity is considered by the author to be a starting point to formulate a general concept of the necessity of referring to the philosophy of law in any process of settling accounts with the past. Furthermore, the other countries’ experience which went through the transformation process, as well as their scholarly achievements, may also be of invaluable help to Poland with its difficulties in solving problems with the difficult past.

The article gives a survey of the destruction of Vilnius Jews community, points out the most important stages in the history of Vilnius ghetto and typical features, provides statistics on victims, describes the inside structure of ghetto administration and its behavior, also activities by the anti-Nazi ghetto underground. The history of Vilnius Jews community and the ghetto in the period of Nazi occupation can be split into several periods: 1) discrimination and massacre of the Jews before the establishment of the ghetto (24 June 1941–August 1941); 2) the period when the ghettos No. 1 and No. 2 were formed and mass massacre was executed (September 1941–November 1941); 3) stability period (December 1941–March 1943); 4) the period when the small ghettos, work camps and the Vilnius ghetto were removed (April–September 1943); 5) imprisonment of Vilnius ghetto residents in concentration camps in Estonia, and in work camps in Vilnius (October 1943–September 1944). Discrimination and persecution of Vilnius Jews started from the very first days of Nazi occupation. Mass arrests and fusillades of Jews started in the middle of July 1941. The arrested would be first taken to Lukiškės prison and than to Paneriai (Ponary) to be fusilladed. The arrests and convoyment were executed by the German Gestapo, Lithuanian public police, self-defense units and the special squad members. The mass massacre in Paneriai would be usually performed by the special squad (Sonderkommando) subordinate to the German security police and SD. The biggest massacre took place at the initial stage of ghetto establishment and existence. In Vilnius, two ghettos were established. The big ghetto had about 29 thousand, and the smaller one about 9 thousand people imprisoned. Occupational power planned to let only the employable and qualified craftsmen and their families stay alive. The rest Jews were to be subjected to fusillades. During several actions of October 1941, the small ghetto was finally removed. Nonetheless, mass killings continued to take place till the end of 1941. Since the beginning of the war up to 1942, about 33 thousand of Jews (from about 58 thousand Jews who lived before the war) were killed. About 15 thousand of Jews remained in ghettos. Since the end of 1941 until March 1943, no mass killings were executed. This period became known as the stability (calm) period. Nazi authorities decided to leave the qualified workers and their families alive for some time. At this period, life in the ghetto became relatively normal and steady. The administrative system and daily work got settled. The ghetto became kind of “a state within a state” with its own authorities, police, manufactories, forms and institutions for spiritual and cultural life. Almost all men and women of employable age worked in different factories, manufactories and work camps. In summer 1943, about 14 thousand (two thirds of) ghetto residents had various kinds of occupations. In March 1943, the stability period in Vilnius ghetto came to an end. At that time, all small ghettos in Vilnius district were liquidated. Part of the residents were moved to Vilnius ghetto, others transported by train to Paneriai and fusilladed there (in total about 5 thousand people). In summer 1943, all provincial work camps of Vilnius ghetto were closed. During those Gestapo actions, several hundreds were killed. In August 1943 gradual liquidation of Vilnius ghetto started. By the end of September 1943, the Vilnius ghetto was liquidated. The majority of women and children (about 5 to 7 thousand) were moved to concentration camps in occupied Poland and killed there. The Jewish men (about 2 thousand) were taken to lagers in Estonia and young women taken to Keiserwald concentration camp near Riga, Latvia. In September 1944, Nazis killed Vilnius Jews imprisoned in Estonia. Fairly 2 to 3 thousand of Jews survived till the end of Nazi occupation and war.

The MVD-USSR special camp no. 4 (the Stiepnyj) was located in territory of the Kazak Soviet Socialist Republic. Under the guise of arresting “extremely dangerous criminals”, Soviet secret service (the NKVD) detained many political prisoners. The Stiepnyj camp was a complex of, initially eight, then nine smaller camps (sub camps) for 25 000 inmates. On 1 September 1949, the total number of “extremely dangerous criminals” was 23 223. In the end of December 1952, detained Ukrainians were in the majority, then Lithuanians, Russians and Latvians. Another group of detainees was mainly comprised of members of the Polish resistance movement – the Home Army (sentenced between 1944–1945 to imprisonment) and of soldiers of the self-defence groups in South-eastern Kresy Region fighting against Soviet dictatorship, after 1945. The political prisoners of the Stiepnyj’s camp were subjected to a rough regime. Every inmate was given the prisoner’s camp number which was to be visible on their uniforms. All buildings considered habitable – such as barracks and dugouts, had bars on windows and each night were closed. Moreover, the inmates were forced to work in mines of black and brown coal, iron, copper and manganese ores, in copper factories, quarries and to assist in building new dwellings. They were also exploited as farmers and brick factory workers. It was popularly believed that, mines’ and quarries’ works were extremely tough, and dangerous because of unsafe and unhealthy working conditions (heavy dust concentration) and of frequently occurring industrial accidents leading up to many serious injuries or to a physical handicap. What is more, none of the basic recruitments relating to occupational health and safety standards were not met. Many deaths at work were related to several diseases workers suffered from, like: disability, dystrophy, pneumonia, circulatory system malfunction. In addition to this, the barracks were overcrowded which meant 1,15 square meters per person of the square footage in sub camp no. 1 and 2,74 square meters per person in sub camp no. 8. The “Kengir uprising” began in Stiepnyj camp on 17 may 1954, which was one of the biggest rebellions in the Soviet camp system. During the night of 26 June 1954, with 1600 soldiers sent to quell it, 37 persons were killed and several dozen were wounded. The break out of the “Kengir uprising”, and solidarity of the prisoners in their fight for release, all those accorded to the Stiepnyj camp a special position in the history of the Soviet camp system.

Having had Polish society under systematic observation, the security apparatus was able to carry out its basic operational activity which was maintaining control over people. Among those under surveillance, there were not only ordinary people but also those being imprisoned in detention centres/ custodies and in jails. They were deeply infiltrated by a group of informers, the so-called cell agent network (prisoners-stoolies) recruited among detainees. That special category of the TW (TW – tajny współpracownik, secret collaborator) was considered to be one of the most important elements of the operational activity. All pieces of information they managed to gather provided investigation functionaries with the solid base for further investigations, interrogations, arrestments, new trials and litigations. Those prison secret collaborators, operating within particular cells, were simultaneously fulfilling two categories of tasks: while they were acting like informants supplying investigation officers with information gained from observation and chats conducted with detainees, they also – by playing psychological game – incited them to particular behaviours. For instance, they made selected inmates accept all the accusations brought against them by imputing the acts never committed. What is more, cell agents reported to the SB not only their “friends” from jail but also the prison staff.

Adam Bromke, known Canadian political scientist of Polish origin, was born in 1928, in Warsaw. During World War II he belonged to the Home Army and actively fought in the Warsaw Uprising of 1944. He left Poland in 1945. He was an activist of the National Party in exile. Between 1955–1956 he conducted the National Committee for a Free Europe’s “balloon campaign” in Poland. In the following years Adam Bromke worked at many Canadian universities. In his researches he was concentrated on the situation in Communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe. In 1961, after 16-year absence, he came to visit Poland with the intention of collecting material for a new book and establishing contacts with Polish scholars. He quickly became an object of interest to/of the PRL’s intelligence service. He refused to pass on any information about other people (especially those of Radio Free Europe) to the intelligence service. However, he was willing to establish political contacts with Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the MSZ, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych). The intelligence, carrying out operational activity towards Bromke, used his friend from the conspiracy – Wojciech Sokolewicz, an employee of the Institute of Law Studies of Polish Academy of Science (the INP PAN, Instytut Nauk Prawnych Polskiej Akademii Nauk). Simultaneously, Adam Bromke treated him as a mediator enabling conducting political talks with the PRL’s authorities – initially with the MSZ, then with the MSW (Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych, Ministry of Internal Affairs). Bromke wanted to be regarded as a political partner, an expert, not an ordinary informant. During the following visits to Poland (in 1964, 1968 and 1969) he was ready to come into confidential contacts with the MSW’s leaderships (he did not manage to meet with Minister Mieczysław Moczar). What was his aim? Was he only a political analyst? As a well-known and highly regarded expert in the West, he probably wanted to have an access to the high-ranking PRL’s officials. Did he consider it probable that once the importance of Poland’s “Partisans” increased he would exert an “backstage” influence on their activity? Whenever being under the PRL’s intelligence service’s pressure, Bromke consequently refused to get involved himself in secret collaboration. He came to Poland several times, in the 1970s and 1980s. He also used to meet with the representatives of the PRL’s authorities. During that period, he was no longer under the Secret Service’s surveillance. What is more, he consciously played an opinion-forming role. His books and articles published in prestigious journals were watering down Western intellectual elites’ opinion on Communist rule in Poland and in Central-Eastern Europe. He was widely criticized by “Paryska Kultura” and Radio Free Europe for his openly presented view as well as for his activity in general. In 1988, Bromke settled permanently in Poland where he became a professor at the newly established Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Science. He died in Warsaw, in 2008.

The PRL leaderships’ private life was one of their best-kept secrets. Hardly had they retired (voluntarily or compulsorily) form being politicians, when deep silence fell over them. Jakub Berman, who between 1948–1956 was the closest aide, collaborator and adviser of the PZPR leader Bolesław Bierut was eventually treated in a way as mentioned above. After being dismissed from the party in 1957, he officially stopped existing in political circles. He simply vanished and in consequence, he never faced trial for crimes committed either with his agreement or on his own initiative. In the 1960s, Jakub Berman was under Security Service’s surveillance therefore, he was carefully watched and eavesdropped. He attracted this interest as a potential – which sounds bizarrely – party follower of the Revisionist Zionism. Berman used to “politicise” at his home so he was constantly visited by particular interlocutors. They altogether were provided with various subjects for those discussions. They were derived from newspapers, radio programmes (especially Radio Free Europe which was very often listened to in the Bergmans’ home), television and the latest editions of the journal “Le Monde” which the most interesting articles Berman used to read aloud. Regardless of the fact that almost nobody among his guests still kept political influence, their discussions – of the retired communist politician like Berman and of his friends – proved a long-lasting existence of an intellectual vitality and activity of their brains. Constant surveillance Berman was put under, was rather fruitless, however, between 1966–1971, the Security Service intensified its efforts. The operational files that the SB managed to gather, provided their readers with basic information on Berman’s and his guests’ personal opinions on many problems, such as: future of the World and Europe, perspectives on the development and transformation of the communist ideology and practice, political and social crisis in 1968 and 1970, assassination of Jan Gerhard, the Arab-Israeli conflict, personality of Władysław Gomułka and Edward Gierek. It was highly probable, that being aware of living in wired house, Jakub Berman practised a self-censorship. As a political retiree, Berman modernized his hitherto point of view – remaining communist, he stopped being a pragmatist. What is more and very interesting, all his family members along with himself, they used to talk about party leaders by using words “they” or “those”, thereby showing that it was no longer their party; yet, they – as communists – toed its line.

The article focuses on the Syrian journalist Michael Mounayer’s commitment to an activity of the party “left” during 1978–1986. The Arabian correspondent, of the “Al-Riada” magazine arrived in Poland in 1964. In 1978 he came in contact with the circle of Ryszard Gontarz, with whom he maintained close ties until his departure from Poland in 1986. A group of people called “the left” embraced an anti-Zionist point of view – but in practice – anti-Semitic. It also criticised both the anticommunist opposition, and the regime for “dogmatic” and “national-communistic” reasons. Mounayer became engaged directly in the political activity of “the left”. He participated in editorial board meetings of the weekly “Rzeczywistość” (“The Reality”), kept in touch and collaborated with the Association of Social and Political Knowledge Clubs “The Reality” (Stowarzyszenie Klubów Wiedzy Społeczno-Politycznej ‘Rzeczywistość’”) and with the “Grunwald” Patriotic Association (Zjednoczenie Patriotyczne “Grunwald”). Furthermore, he provided both groups with financial assistance which meant – Arab support for Polish political organizations fighting against Zionism. Mounayer was truly interested in the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ inner games, as well as in high-ranking party officials of Jewish origin. Apart from this, he gathered information about the Polish United Workers’ Party’s (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PZPR) factions and coteries. As a consequence, the communist security apparatus started taking an interest in Mounayer’s activity. Ministry of Internal Affairs officers conducted an operational dialogue with him about his political view, contacts with party activists, connections with Syrian and Libyan embassies, and about the Arab diplomats’ interest in “The Jewish problem” in the People’s Republic of Poland (Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa, PRL). The publication of two text by Mounayer on Polish – Israeli relations in the London – based Arabic Al-Arab magazine ended his collaboration with “the left” in 1986. It is known that he was incited by the Libyan Embassy to publish them. Both articles criticized Genaral Jaruzelski’s foreign policy and accused the Polish authorities of being pro-Zionist. For the abovementioned reasons Mounayer was forced to leave Polish territory and was put on the Peoples’ Republic of Poland persona non grata list. The diplomatic missions of Syria, Libya and the Palestine Liberation Organization [the BAAS party] as well as high-ranking members of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party in Syria with its Vice-President, all interceded with the Polish authorities on behalf of the expelled Mounayer.