The term ‘politics of history’ can be encountered in the narratives created by three distinct types of social practice: (1) the social practice of research (‘politics of history’ is the subject of the research, and not the practice); (2) the social practice of politics (‘politics of history’ is practiced, and may be either an instrument for gaining and retaining power, and/or an instrument for realising the state’s raison d’état); (3) the social practice of memory (where the practice of ‘politics of history’ also has a place, and is synonymous with ‘politics of memory’). The author argues that political raison d’état requires Poland to pursue an active politics of history which should be addressed abroad, and proposes that its guiding ideas should be based on three grand narratives: (1) the fundamental role of ‘Solidarity Poland’ in the peaceful dismantling of the post-Yalta system in Europe, (2) the Europe of the Jagiellonians, and (3) the Europe of the Vasas, as constructs simultaneously geopolitical and civilisational, in which Poland performed an agential function.

The article gives an insight into the challenges related to shaping the historical identity of the Estonian people in a broad historical perspective, with particular regard to the period when a sovereign Estonian state was being built after restoration of independence in 1991. Among the main issues related to “elaborating the past”, as discussed in the later part of the paper, are the revival process of Estonian statehood in the last years before the fall of the Soviet Union, rehabilitation of victims of Communist terror, as well as the question of Estonian citizens who served in the armed forces of both the German and Soviet regimes. The paper gives an overview of both the legal and symbolic elements of Estonia’s politics of memory, the history of commemorating the victims of the German and Soviet regimes, and the controversies and discussions that broke out over the Estonian ethnos in the Baltic Sea, as stipulated by a traditional vision of the Estonian history of ethnicity. Finally, the article examines the repressed nature of Estonian national existence before an independent state was created in 1918, while evaluating the authoritarian governments of 1934–1940, the Soviet annexation (1940–1941, 1944–1991) and the German occupation (1941–1944).

This article aims to analyse the transformation of the culture of memory in Lithuania and the most important directions of Lithuanian politics of history in the period from 1989 to 2018. While discussing these questions, special attention is paid to the role of political factors (internal and external) and interstate relations, as well as to changes in the relationship between Lithuania’s culture of memory, and the cultures of memory and identity of the national minorities in Lithuania. The paper emphasises the processes of transformation of the Lithuanian culture of remembrance which started around 2005, when it was most recently updated. The research material presented herein shows that Lithuania’s culture of memory is full of contradictions and conflicts, and that its central figure has changed.

The following article provides an insight into Lithuanian public holidays and days of remembrance in the period 1990–2018, established on the basis of national legislative acts, including legal acts and stenographic records drafted up during the sittings of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania. Both the Seimas and the president of Lithuania have made subsequent decisions on drafting the list of public holidays and days of remembrance, enabling to determine the most important dates and events that have laid the groundwork for Lithuania’s historical memory. The list of public holidays displays a clear pro-state and religious tendency while that of days of remembrance seems to be marked by clear anti-Soviet sentiment, tilting towards promoting a pro-Western system of values. Before adopting the relevant legal acts, members of the Lithuanian parliament held a discussion, under which two additional holidays commemorating the Constitution of May 3, 1791 and the Mutual Pledge of the Two Nations of October 20, 1791 were officially put on the list. Also, attention should be drawn both to the relevance and consistency of the list of public holidays and days of remembrance as the document is subject to constant updates. Endeavours to adopt legislation to commemorate the nation’s historical memory appeared unsuccessful while, given the 100th anniversary of Lithuania’s independence on February 16, 2018, all related efforts were forwarded to the relevant institutions; in consequence, a parliamentary committee was eventually convened on June 20, 2017. Nonetheless, too little time has passed since then to properly evaluate the works performed by the aforementioned body and the validity of all its decisions taken so far.

The fundamental direction of politics of history in Belarus under the rule of Aleksandr Lukashenko has been to maintain and cultivate the memory of the Great Patriotic War and the Soviet period. Although the Republic of Belarus remains the most faithful heir to the Soviet inheritance, over time its politics of memory has begun to shift towards the establishment and consolidation of its own history of Belarusian statehood. The last several years have more actively revealed the authorities’ new trend in the field of politics of history, which involves the creation of a heroic image for the secret service (NKVD, KGB) and the militia in the history of the Belarusian state. This tendency is characterised by a nonaggressive, but national-level, wide range of commemorative measures which are aimed at creating a myth of the KGB and the militia. Starting from the Great Patriotic War, which remains central to the Belarusian government’s politics of history, new historical heroes have begun to emerge in the form of officers of the security services. The military and intelligence services are still linked to the figure of Felix Dzerzhinsky, and the cultivation of his memory in Belarus still predominates over the commemoration of other historical figures. A number of events (including those at state level) dedicated to the commemoration of the 100th anniversary of the Belarusian militia and the KGB in 2017 gave a particular boost to these commemorative measures. In this article, the author will analyse the Belarusian authorities’ current politics of history in this regard by introducing readers to a variety of commemorative practices (the unveiling of monuments, official speeches, films, historical reconstructions, etc.). Moreover, attention will be drawn to the current policy in Belarus and the place within it for the special services, as well as the lack of any consideration of the Soviet past (the Stalinist repressions, Kurapaty, the NKVD, access to archives), the international aspects of Belarus’s current politics of memory (links to Russia), and the martyrological and sacral character of the memory of the KGB and militia.

In 2015, as a result of implementing the Ukrainian decommunisation laws, the official name of the Museum of the Great Patriotic War was changed to the National Museum of the History of Ukraine in the Second World War. The current exhibition at the museum depicts internalisation of Soviet myths in Ukraine as well as the problem of no explicit guidelines from state authorities regarding an official narrative. Also, developing a new concept of a museum dedicated to the history of Ukraine in the Second World War has been impeded by the ongoing war in the eastern part of the country. This paper discusses mutual relations and mismatches between Ukraine’s politics of history and museum practices. The change of the latter is much more languid and complex than in the case of merely changing street names or dismantling old monuments and erecting new ones.

This article outlines the question of politics of memory in independent Georgia (since the collapse of the USSR). The author argues that Georgia is not yet conducting such a policy, but we may nevertheless discuss a sum of activities which during the rules of Zviad Gamsakhurdia (1990–1992) and Eduard Shevardnadze (1992–2003) were sporadic and intuitive, but since the Rose Revolution and the government of Mikheil Saakashvili (2004–2013) have become more thoughtful and methodical (the Museum of Soviet Occupation was opened in Tbilisi during this time). The actions taken were influenced by the political situation – the civil war, the wars in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the 1990s, and the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 – as well as the regional diversity of the country, its multi-ethnicity, and its position in the South Caucasus (which in Soviet times was known as Transcaucasia). This article discusses the most important topics that appear in Georgian narratives about the past, highlighting the historical ties between it and the West (the aim is to prove that in cultural-axiological terms Georgia belongs to Europe, and thus to justify Tbilisi’s aspirations to integration with the EU and NATO), and depicting Georgia as the victim of the Russian and Soviet empires (and whose successor is contemporary Russia). However, the Georgian message is hindered by the existence of the Joseph Stalin State Museum, which glorifies the Soviet dictator.

This article discusses selected publications which reinterpret Russian history in a spirit of rehabilitating the Soviet past and highlighting the USSR’s role as a vehicle for Russia’s assumed historical role (including Utkin 1993, Utkin 1999a, Utkin 1999b, Solzhenitsyn 1995, Solzhenitsyn 2001–2002, Mel’tyukhov 2001, Narochnitskaya 2005c, Narochnitskaya 2005a, Mitrofanov 2005). In addition to this, it contextualises them with initiatives undertaken by the Russian Federation’s government (including the standardisation of history textbooks’ content and the activities of the Presidential Commission to counteract attempts to falsify history to the detriment of Russian interests). The points of view presented here, which are considered representative for a certain part of the historical discourse in contemporary Russia, integrate Russia’s totalitarian period (the USSR from 1917 to 1991) into the course of its broader history, as the basis of an interpretation which accepts a priori statements regarding the sense of Russia’s history and her role in world history. Among the observed trends, this text highlights the approval of certain features of the communist dictatorship as corresponding to Russian ideology; the adaptation of Soviet ideology to Russia’s policy of memory; the emphasis on ideological, political and military confrontation with the Western world as a permanent feature of Russian history; and the reinterpretation of Russian history in such a way as to continuously justify all the actions of the Russian state over the centuries, both externally (interpreting Russian aggression and imperialism as a means of defence against her enemies, liberation, or the reintegration of the Russian community) and internally (presenting terror as a means of defence against an alleged ‘fifth column’, or as the modernisation of the country).

The term ‘wars of memory’ refers to the Russian specificity of the issues described in the West as ‘politics of history’ or the ‘politics of memory’. The historical arguments which are employed in the Russian Federation in the context of information and cultural warfare, and are identified with the war over the interpretation of history, are being used to achieve the Kremlin’s political objectives in both its domestic and external arenas: any visions which conflict with the official one are discredited as anti-Russian and falsifications of the history of Russia. This text consists of three parts. The first discusses the evolution of the problem in Russian public discourse since the collapse of the USSR; the second describes the historical-cultural standard currently operative in Russia (its pattern of assessments and historical interpretations); and the third, outlines the manifestations of the state’s involvement in implementing its specifically understood politics of memory, with particular emphasis on the role of the Russian Historical Society and Rosarkhiv. The ‘wars’ discussed in this article have become one of the systemic mechanisms for Russia’s confrontation with both the external environment and its internal opposition. The memory and historical-cultural identity as disseminated now are leading to a secondary Sovietisation of society and the mobilisation of imperial and nationalist (ethnocentric, ethnically Russian) resentments within the Russian Federation.