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JOSHUA D. ZIMMERMAN, *POLSKIE PAŃSTWO PODZIEMNE
I ŻYDZI W CZASIE II WOJNY ŚWIATOWEJ*
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After numerous announcements and a very long wait, the Polish version¹ of a book that Cambridge University Press published in English three years ago² has finally arrived. This publication has been issued under the patronage of the POLIN Museum of the History of Polish Jews. Let us add at once that the title of the Polish edition – *Polskie Państwo Podziemne i Żydzi w czasie II wojny światowej* [The Polish Underground State and the Jews during World War II] – differs significantly from the English original. The Polish Underground State is a narrower concept than ‘the Polish Underground’, something which probably has not been given the attention it deserves.

The book’s author is presented to the Polish reader as “a specialist in relations between Jews and other nationalities in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe

* J.D. Zimmerman, *Polskie Państwo Podziemne i Żydzi w czasie II wojny światowej*, trans. M. Macińska, academic editor M. Rusiniak-Karwat, reviewer Prof. Dr. hab. J. Żyndul, Warszawa: PWN, 2018.

¹ As the author maintains, the Polish version is ‘improved and updated’ in relation to the English edition (‘Od autora’, p. 7).

² J.D. Zimmerman, *The Polish Underground and the Jews, 1939–1945*, Cambridge University Press 2015.

at the end of the 19th and 20th centuries”, and a professor of history and a lecturer at Yeshiva University in New York.

The work under review consists of an introduction, fourteen chapters and an ending. The goals that the author set himself when writing the book are laid out as early as page 7 (of the Polish edition; the further mentions are referring to the Polish edition as well): “I wrote this work with the intention of presenting an impartial and thoroughly documented picture of the relations between the Polish Underground State and the Jews during World War II. I wanted the conclusions to arise only from the analysis of the documents cited”.³ Let us keep this statement about ‘the analysis of the documents’ in mind, because it is crucial to any evaluation of Joshua D. Zimmerman’s book.

In the Introduction (pp. 13–25), the author reviews the ‘historiography’ (pp. 17–25), focusing the reader’s attention on the publications of a selected group of historians. The ‘nationalist school historians’ mentioned in footnote 33 on page 22⁴ are only referred to by their names. In order to learn more about their views, the reader is referred to an article by Joanna B. Michlic from 2007. Rhetorically, one might ask: have these ‘historians of the nationalist school’ not written anything since then? Have they not published at all? Prof. Zimmerman discusses the achievements of other historians and journalists in great detail.

Unfortunately, neither the ‘Introduction’ nor the rest of the book (see below) are free from errors. As early as page 15 we learn that “The Polish Underground’s military wing – the Home Army – was the largest resistance movement in German-occupied Poland”. No! The Home Army was not a ‘resistance movement’: it was part of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland. Further (p. 22, fn. 32), the author writes that the Commander of the Home Army, General Tadeusz Komorowski, “allowed the Nowogródek District of the Home Army to exclude Jews from its ranks”. This is untrue. It is one thing to ‘exclude’ (ban, remove) someone from the ranks, and quite another not to accept new people into, for example, a partisan unit.

³ The translator of this article wishes to note that this version has been prepared with the aid of a copy of Zimmerman’s English-language original; however, it has not been possible to locate direct quotations therein of every citation given in this essay.

⁴ This group includes Marek Jan Chodakiewicz, Bogdan Musiał, Tomasz Strzembosz, and Marek Wierzbicki. Let us also add that apart from three publications by Prof. Strzembosz (the last from 2000), no studies by the other three historians can be found in the ‘Selective Bibliography’.

Considering the above, it is difficult to take seriously the author's proclamation on page 25, where he baldly states: "This publication's historical sources have been subject to critical analysis, including: normative documents from the ZWZ-AK [*Związek Walki Zbrojnej-Armia Krajowa*, the Union for Armed Struggle – Home Army], the press published by the Polish Underground State, as well as the accounts and memories of Holocaust survivors".

After the introduction, in the first chapter⁵ the author discusses the 'Jewish question' in Polish politics in the years 1936–39 (pp. 27–58). In the 'Summary' of this chapter, he also presents his admittedly quite original concept of the events of September 1939. He writes as follows: "In September 1939, the Polish president, the commander-in-chief of the Polish Armed Forces, and government ministers fled the country. [*sic*] For the remainder of World War II, the official Polish authorities abroad and in the underground would be drawn almost entirely from the leaders of the prewar opposition" (p. 58).

The body of Zimmerman's study consists of two parts. The first (pp. 59–134), entitled in the Polish edition 'The Polish Underground and the Jews during the German-Soviet Occupation⁶ (1939–1941)' consists of two chapters. The second⁷ is devoted to discussing the creation of the 'Polish resistance movement' from September 1939 to June 1941 (pp. 61–107).⁸ The author's acceptance of this timeframe raises doubts. The formation of the Polish Underground State's structures was completed by early December 1940. Judging by the title of the entire first part, we can guess that Prof. Zimmerman wanted to present the 'Polish resistance movement' – that is, in fact, the Polish underground ('the Polish Resistance Movement' in the English edition) from the beginning of its existence until the outbreak of the German-Soviet war in June 1941 (when the entire

⁵ In the English edition, this chapter was placed in the first part of the book, but it was excluded from this part in the Polish edition. As a result of this, the Polish version follows this order: Introduction, Chapter I, Part I (including chapters 2 and 3), Part II with 11 chapters (from 4 to 14), Conclusion. This construction is really strange.

⁶ In the English-language original, this part is entitled 'The Polish Underground and the Jews during the German-Soviet Partition, 1939–1941'.

⁷ The book chapters are numbered in continuity, so although this is the first chapter in this section, it appears numerically as the second.

⁸ Let us add that the title of Chapter 2 on page 61 reads: 'September 1936!' There are many more similar mistakes: it is enough to mention that in the Polish edition of the book by Prof. Zimmerman gives January 1944 as the moment of dissolution of the Home Army. See p. 6 in the Table of Contents.

territory of the Second Polish Republic came under German occupation). In chapter 3, entitled ‘The Polish Underground State and the Jews (October 1939 – June 1941)’ (pp. 108–34), the author outlines the process of how the attitude of the leaders of the Polish underground towards the situation of the Jews changed during the war’s initial phase.

Part II of Prof. Zimmerman’s book (pp. 135–522), entitled ‘The Polish Underground State and the Jews Under Nazi Rule (1941–1945)’, consists of eleven chapters, each of which is presented chronologically covering the period of 1941–45, from the ghettoisation process to the dissolution of the Home Army in January 1945. The author made an exception to his chronological approach for three chapters bearing the following titles: ‘The Home Army Turns Its Guns on the Jews’ (pp. 377–420), ‘Institutional Aid of the Polish Underground to the Jews’ (pp. 421–45) and ‘Individual Aid of the Polish Underground to the Jews’ (pp. 446–78).

As mentioned earlier, Zimmerman’s work unfortunately contains a significant number of errors. These are of varying natures, as they include both factual errors of a schoolboy level as well as distortions and serious substantive and interpretational errors resulting from an incorrect analysis of the sources. On the sidelines of this statement, a fundamental question arises: how many errors in a supposedly academic work does it take for this work to cease being academic? Several obvious mistakes regarding, for example, the date of Poland’s rejection of the German demands, the organisation of the Polish government in France, and the function of General Stefan Rowecki in 1940–41 are included in Chapter 2.

These detailed remarks pale in relation to what the author, translator, academic editor and the Polish academic (as it seems) publisher PWN have included on page 67!

English edition: <i>The Polish Underground and the Jews, 1939–1945</i> , p. 40:	Polish edition: <i>The Polish Underground State and Jews during World War II</i> , p. 67:
Polish military losses amounted to 71,500 dead and 133,700 wounded. [...] In addition, German forces took 420,000 Polish soldiers as prisoners’	7150 Polish soldiers were killed and 133,700 were wounded. [...] Moreover, the Germans took 420 Polish prisoners of war.

Reading the above passages gives a depressing impression. Neither the translator nor the academic editor seem to have bothered to check anything.

A particular number of errors, of various kinds, concern the territorial organisation of the ZWZ-AK, the armed wing of the Polish Underground State. This mass of shortcomings leads to the quite simple conclusion that Prof. Zimmerman does not have any broader knowledge of the Home Army structures whose activities he discusses.

There are several factual errors in Chapter 3, which is less than 30 pages long. These concern both the organisation of the ZWZ (pp. 123–24) and the *Biuletyn Informacyjny* (Information Bulletin) (pp. 128–29), as well as the commander of the ZWZ's Vilnius District (p. 126). Regarding the first point, it should be emphasised that this organisation was made up of six Areas (and not districts, as the author writes on page 123⁹), then a dozen or so Districts (a District was more or less equivalent to a pre-war province – voivodeship), and finally over 200 counties [*obwód* = powiat]. The Home Army was headed by a Commander [*Dowódca*], and not the 'Commander-in-Chief [*Główny Komendant*] of the Home Army'. This description is all the more surprising as the author states that the deputy of the 'Commander-in-Chief' was indeed 'Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff' [*Zastępca dowódcy i szef sztabu*]. Another of the author's claims, including political parties in a strictly military organisation, appears equally incomprehensible. We must point out that – contrary to Zimmerman's claims – the National Party [*Stronnictwo Narodowe*] was not the 'nationalist wing' of the ZWZ.

I must also highlight the author's reprehensible practice of untruthfully assigning high positions in the underground to various people. Let us mention such figures as Franciszek Jusiel (allegedly the commander of the Home Army's Vilnius District) and Michał Borwicz (allegedly the commander of the Home Army's Miechów county). Borwicz never held any such position. This is an incomprehensible mistake. After all, in the publication *Dalej jest noc. Losy Żydów w wybranych powiatach okupowanej Polski* [Night without End: The Fate of Jews in Selected Counties of Occupied Poland] it is clearly written (vol. 2, p. 17) that Borwicz was active in the structures of the PPS-WRN [*Polska Partia Socjalistyczna – Wolność, Równość, Niepodległość*; the Polish Socialist

⁹ Interestingly, in the English-language edition (p. 81) the author uses the terms 'six geographical regions' and 'four regions'. It should therefore be assumed that these 'districts' only appear in the Polish translation. This again casts both the translator and the academic editor in a bad light.

Party – Freedom, Equality, Independence]; it then adds (p. 125) that at the end of 1943 he appeared in the Miechów *powiat* and... led the combat unit of the PPS-WRN People's Guard. Subsequently, it can be mentioned that Abraham Melezin (Adam Melżyński [Melzynski?]) was allegedly responsible for the 'area of western Lida' in the Home Army, and his direct commander was Capt Eustachy Chrzanowski. All that is known about this officer is that he was the head of the Military District Court in Lida in the years 1926–32.

The above-mentioned 'mistakes' pale in significance in relation to what the author has written on page 126. He stated that in January 1941 the commander of the ZWZ District Vilnius was 'Anna'! Every Polish historian¹⁰ who has at least a little interest in the period of World War II and the Polish underground knows well that 'Anna' was the codename of the ZWZ communications base in Stockholm! It was through the 'Anna' base that, at least for a time, the reports from the Polish underground structures in the north-eastern borderlands of what had been the Second Polish Republic were conveyed. We should clarify here that the claim that this 'Anna' was commander of the ZWZ District in Vilnius is not found in the English edition (p. 83).

In the subchapter on the creation of a Jewish office in the Home Army's Headquarters, and more specifically at its Information and Propaganda Office [*Biuro Informacji i Propagandy*, hereinafter: BIP] (pp. 178–82), there is a diagram entitled 'The Home Army's main structure, including the department for Jewish aid, 1944'. This diagram demonstrates Prof. Zimmerman's failure to grasp the nature of how the Polish Underground State was organised. The diagram shows that the Department of Press and Information was subordinate to Division VI of the BIP of the Home Army HQ. The author is in substantial error here. The Department of Information and Press was one of the dozen or so departments of the Office of the Government Delegate for Poland, and was at no time subordinate to Division VI of the BIP of the Home Army HQ.¹¹ Further errors in this diagram can be listed. There was no 'Subsection Z', but there was a 'Subdivision Z'. This included the 'Z 3' section, which dealt with national minority issues (Lithuanian, Belarusian, Ukrainian, Jewish, Russian issues). It was

¹⁰ With the exceptions of Dr. Martyna Rusiniak-Karwat and Prof. Jolanta Żyndul.

¹¹ It is difficult to understand where such an error came from: after all, the author included the Information and Press Department in his diagram of the Government Delegate (p. 253). One explanation comes to mind: Prof. Zimmerman has no control over the material.

within this department that the sub-department of Jewish affairs functioned from February 1942. There was no 'Military-Historical Office' [*Biuro Wojskowo-Historyczne*] in the BIP, but there was a Military Historical Office [*Wojskowe Biuro Historyczne*]. In his Summary of Part I of the book, the author states (p. 133): "ZWZ-AK intelligence reported accurate descriptions of the deteriorating conditions of the Jews in the period under examination". The problem is that the vast majority of the information quoted did not come from 'ZWZ-AK intelligence', but was contained in analyses of the information (press) services of both the ZWZ (BIP) and the civilian division of the Polish Underground State. This strange fascination with 'ZWZ intelligence' is present throughout the work under discussion.

There are also discernible lacunae in Prof. Zimmerman's book in understanding (and then scholarly describing) the principles underlying the production and circulation of documentation within the Home Army and the Underground State's structures. The researcher does not distinguish between the various types of documents: *sprawozdanie* (account), *raport* (report), *meldunek organizacyjny* (organisational dispatch), *instrukcja* (instruction), or *rozkaz* (order). These are all as one to him – but the differences between them are fundamental. For example, he writes (p. 162) that "the London government's Council of Ministers received a report from the Polish ambassador to Soviet Russia, Stanisław Kot, dated November 25, 1941, entitled 'News from the Homeland'"! At the same time, in footnote 97, he refers to a specific document from the Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum in London (PRM 45c, pp. 53–56). One needs only refer to this document to see that it was produced by the Ministry of Information and Documentation in London on 25 November 1941, and is clearly entitled 'From the Roman-Vatican office of the Min. of Inf. and Doc.' [*Z placówki rzymsko-watykańskiej Min. Inf. i Dok.*] – not from Ambassador Kot in the USSR, but from the local Polish mission in Rome. Such an error leads to the conclusion that the author has no control over the material he has collected. Nor does he display any knowledge of the organisation of the Polish authorities in London, or their subordinate Polish institutions in Europe and around the world more broadly. In turn, on pages 189–90 he writes about the report from the BIP of the Home Army HQ from January 1942. The most interesting are the findings that the author has made regarding the statement that the above 'report' was drawn up in sub-department 'P' of the BIP: here in footnote 72, the reader is referred to Marek Ney-Krwawicz's publication on the Home Army HQ,

and not to Grzegorz Mazur's book on the BIP. In addition, the monograph on the BIP by Prof. G. Mazur is mentioned by the author in the 'Selective Bibliography', but I dare say that he has not read it.

Another serious breach is the repeated invocation of an alleged order by the Home Army Commander General Komorowski of 26 August 1943: let us add that the author does not indicate here any archive in which this order might be located.

Another problem is the Professor's lack of knowledge about the organisation and functioning of radio communications between the Polish Underground State and the Polish authorities in London. Hence, in the text of the book, we encounter such 'mistakes' as alleged dispatches from Tadeusz Myśliński¹² or Wanda Kraszewska-Ancerewicz, while in fact these were dispatches from Stefan Korboński ('Nowak'), sent from the Government Delegate's radio station codenamed 'Lena'. In footnote 49 on page 270, Prof. Zimmerman refers to a dispatch from Warsaw of 18 March 1943 to Stanisław Mikołajczyk, whose author he names as... Wanda Kraszewska-Ancerewicz! He writes on page 284, both in the body of the text and in footnote 114, about an alleged message from Myśliński to London of 29 January 1943. To explain these fundamental errors, we must refer to the original English-language edition, where with regard to the first case it was explained (on page 189 in footnote 45) that this was a dispatch from 'Lena'. In this particular situation, 'Lena' is not a pseudonym for Kraszewska-Ancerewicz; it is the code name of radio station 46, which was the radio station of the Government Delegate for Poland. Regarding the second case, the answer is to be found on page 200 (English-language edition) in footnote 107. It is a message signed 'N' – that is, 'Nowak'. So it is referring to Korboński, the head of the Directorate of Civil Resistance [*Kierownictwo Walki Cywilnej*, hereinafter: KWC]. This is dispatch 8 of 29 January 1943, which was read at the Ministry of the Interior in London on 5 February. The dispatch was actually sent on 4 February by station 43 (KWC), and received in London at 17.40 via station 39 (of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, *Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych*, hereinafter: MSW). Such mistakes indicate a kind of 'carelessness' on the author's part.

The same type of error recurs on page 262, both in the body of the text and in footnote 20. According to the author, on 1 January 1943, the Jewish National Committee

¹² As an aside, the author does not mention Myśliński's arrest by the Germans on 13 May 1943. He also fails to mention that between March and May 1943 at least six employees of the Security Cell in the Government Delegate's Department of Internal Affairs were arrested.

[*Żydowski Komitet Narodowy*, hereinafter: ŻKN] sent a dispatch (?) to Kraszewska-Ancerewicz! Nothing raised the Professor's curiosity here: why should the ŻKN's leadership, located in Warsaw, send a telegram to Kraszewska-Ancerewicz – who was also in Warsaw at the same time? From the ending of this message as cited by the author, it is clear that it is referring to 'spark (*iskrówka*) no. 15' (dispatch 15) – which was already published years before.¹³ And it is easy to establish that it is a dispatch from the ŻKN addressed through the Government Delegate and Mikołajczyk to Stephen Wise, Goldman and others in New York.¹⁴ The text of the dispatch is kept *inter alia* in the Central Archives of Modern Records in Warsaw (*Archiwum Akt Nowych*; AAN, 202/I-7, p. 4). As it is published, there is no need to send the reader to the archives, either in Warsaw or in London.

Also on page 262 in footnote 19 the author states, wrongly, that this is a letter or a dispatch (?), from the ŻKN to Piekalkiewicz! By the way, the Government Delegate Jan Piekalkiewicz had the pseudonym 'Wernic'. Therefore, footnote 17 on page 262 should read 'to Wernic' (*do Wernica*) – and not as written, 'to Wernica' (*do Wernicy*) – an error in Polish grammar.

On page 309, the author writes about the first dispatches from the underground about the beginning of the uprising in the ghetto, and highlights dispatches 70 (of 20 April) and 71 (of 21 April) from Korboński. At the same time, he makes a very strange distinction: dispatch 70 was to be addressed "to the Prime Minister's office", while dispatch 71 was "to the radio station 'Świt' [Dawn]". Stefan Korboński had no direct radio communication either with the 'Prime Minister's office' or with 'Świt'. Korboński's dispatches, as well as those of the Government Delegate, were sent to those radio stations controlled by the Radio Centre of the Ministry of the Interior; and only from there, after decryption (not after reading, as the author writes on p. 314) were they passed on to the Prime Minister or other institutions, organisational units, etc. Neither of the two dispatches mentions the addressees.

¹³ *Ten jest z Ojczyzny mojej. Polacyz pomocą Żydom 1939–1945*, ed. W. Bartoszewski, Z. Lewinówna, Warszawa 2007, p. 715.

¹⁴ Prof. Zimmerman's claim that the ŻKN "strongly rebuked the Polish Underground State" in this message, is scandalous. The dispatch was directed to Jewish leaders in the USA (the Arbeter Ring and the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee) and it was to them that the words in the message applied: "You have not helped us. Speak up. This is our last appeal to you".

On page 318, the author writes incorrectly that allegedly the Government Delegate, in a dispatch of 28 April, estimated the German losses at 1000 killed and wounded. But this estimate of the German losses came not from the Government Delegate, but from Leon Fajner ('Berezowski') and Adolf Berman ('Borowski'). This dispatch was published in the second volume of the 'Home Army's 1939–1945 documents' (*Armia Krajowa w dokumentach 1939–1945*), which Zimmerman writes about in footnote 94. So why this mistake?

As long as we are already considering the issue of radio communications from the Polish Underground State, it is worth submitting a request to those historians who write about the Holocaust and the Polish reactions to it. A comparison of the dispatches sent by the Government Delegate, the Commander of the Home Army, Korboński (KWC) and the Jewish organisations should be made. The dispatches of the Jewish organisations (the Bund, ŻKN, etc.) were sent by radio stations of the Polish Underground State, and it was not necessary to repeat the same information in additional messages. The content of the Jewish organisations' dispatches was known to both the Government Delegate and the Home Army Commander in Poland, and to the Polish authorities in London.

We must also remember that the radio operators were among the soldiers and employees of the Polish Underground State who were most assiduously hunted by the Germans. It is enough to quote here, following a dispatch sent to London on 1 December 1943, some figures on the losses suffered by civilian radio stations: on 10 November, the radio operator of station 50 (KWC) was arrested; on 11 November, the radio-telegraphist of station 58 (KWC) was shot; on 30 November, a radio operator from the People's Party (*Stronnictwo Ludowe, SL*) station was discovered. It should be added that in all these cases the radio stations devices themselves were also lost. The Home Army also suffered similar losses. It is enough to quote the data provided by General Stefan Rowecki in June 1942. According to them, eight people and four radio stations were lost, which resulted in a significant reduction in the number of dispatches broadcast.

The author's lack of familiarity with the structures and personnel of the Home Army makes it difficult for him to describe events properly. On page 385 we have a description based on Melezin's account of "a grouping of county commanders and junior commanders" in Lida in spring 1943. Ludwikowski was apparently

the commander of this 'grouping' (?), writes Prof. Zimmerman, and despite referring a few pages earlier to the book by the Commander of the Home Army District, he did not bother to try to at least identify this 'Ludwikowski'. In this case, he is most likely referring to Capt Józef Lubikowski, who in the years 1942–4 was chief of sappers at the District Command of the Home Army. On page 399, the author quotes an excerpt from Karolina Kremer's account from the spring of 1944: "Once I went out into the field [...] I was met by someone in a Home Army uniform..."; without calling the account into question, one may nevertheless ask: what did this 'Home Army uniform' look like?

Aside from the considerations on the structures of the Underground State and the Home Army, it is necessary to mention how Prof. Zimmerman describes the history of the Polish Workers' Party [*Polska Partia Robotnicza*, PPR] and its subsidiary, the People's Guard [*Gwardia Ludowa*, GL]. As early as page 16, the Professor of the Yeshiva University in New York states revealingly that "the underground forces of the Communist Polish Workers' Party (PPR) remained independent throughout the war": yes, the Professor really did write something like that. He only forgot to add that the PPR was independent of the Polish Underground State, but had been called into existence by the Kremlin, and for the whole time, including after the war, was completely dependent on it.

As an introduction to the main part of chapter five ("The Polish Underground's Initial Response to the Nazi Final Solution [of the Jewish Question], pp. 171–216), the author writes about the establishment of the Polish Workers' Party (p. 172). He titles the first subsection 'Rise of the Polish Worker's Party (PPR), January 1942', although the main text speaks of January 1941 which is a significant difference. Most importantly and most sadly, Zimmerman falsely presented the process of this party's creation. He showed a lack of elementary knowledge about the aims and circumstances behind the creation of this political formation. The scale of the simplifications here is shocking, and it is difficult to comment properly on the statement that "The establishment of the PPR is associated with two Polish Communists who were parachuted from the Soviet Union into occupied Poland on the night of 27/28 December 1941", (p. 172). In this fragment of Zimmerman's book there is not a word about Stalin's actions and intentions towards Poland, nor about these 'two Communists' dependence on Moscow (I omit the occurrence that in fact – as is common knowledge in Poland – there were not just two of them), or about the so-called 'initiative

group' [*grupa inicjatywna*].¹⁵ The description of the events was presented in this way, and no other, perhaps because Prof. Zimmerman did not take the effort to research the rich literature on the history of the Polish Workers' Party (see below).

There are more errors in the text about the PPR. Here is another example. On page 172 the author states that the Polish Workers' Party created 'its own armed wing' – the People's Guard [*Gwardia Ludowa*, GL] – in March 1942, while on the next page (p. 173) we can read that in May 1940 (sic!) about 50 soldiers of the GL were living in the ghetto. Of course, the author does not write about the fact that the PPR had stolen the name 'People's Guard' from the formation created much earlier by the PPS-WRN. Perhaps he is referring to the GL created by the PPS; unfortunately, he did not explain this inconsistency, thus introducing a great deal of confusion and erroneous information.

The book also abounds in examples of over-interpretation and manipulation of sources. One of the most important issues concerns the 'Instruction on ensuring the security of the terrain' issued by General Tadeusz Komorowski to Area and District commanders in letter 116/I of 15 September 1943. This document is incorrectly referred to by numerous Holocaust researchers as 'Organisational dispatch [*Meldunek organizacyjny*] 116'. This instruction has been compiled by Holocaust historians together with 'Organisational dispatch 220'. For some reason, these historians insistently and erroneously emphasise that this Instruction (in their opinion, Dispatch 116) was passed on to District commanders, while Dispatch 220 "was prepared for London alone"! True, the Commander of the Home Army gave instructions and orders to the districts' commanders subordinate to him, while he sent accounts and reports to the Commander-in-Chief and the Polish government in London. Zimmerman returns to the matter of these instructions later in the book. On pages 377–78 at the start of chapter 10, entitled 'Home Army Turns Its Guns on the Jews', he writes without reference to any documents that "The emphasis of the new Home Army commander – Gen. Komorowski – on combating banditry in the second half of 1943 was interpreted by some district and subdistrict commanders as permission to attack Jewish partisans". There is definitely no presentation of a broader context here. This chapter describes neither the attitude of the Home Army towards the Jews, nor the participation of Jewish

¹⁵ See P. Gontarczyk, *Polska Partia Robotnicza. Droga do władzy (1941–1944)*, Warszawa 2006, pp. 91 ff.

fighters in the Polish Underground State, as the author decided that in this case he will confine his analysis “to those testimonies that recorded fear, threats, and physical assault” (as the Polish translation reads).

Prof. Zimmerman has indulged in further over-interpretations in his discussion of the relationship between the Polish Underground State, the Soviet authorities and the Communist partisans (spring 1943). On page 300, writing about the Soviet air raid on Warsaw, he states: “Rowecki reported that Poles suspected that the Soviet bombers deliberately targeted civilians”. He paints the state of Polish-Soviet relations as much worse than the documents might suggest. There are no words attributed to Rowecki in the ‘Collective report (*Meldunek zbiorowy*) 194’ he refers to there. The extract he analyses sounds completely different: “The indignation and bitterness of the population is great for this reason”. The cause of indignation and bitterness was, of course, the suffering of the civilian population and the relative lack of damage done to the Germans.

On the other hand, Prof. Zimmerman includes a sensational statement in footnote 23 (p. 302) (in the English edition p. 213, fn. 23). According to the American researcher, as Polish translation reads: “about as many as 12,000 German policemen and militiamen” fled to the Soviet partisan units after hearing of the German defeat at Stalingrad (Polish: “około 12 tysięcy niemieckich policjantów i milicjantów”). (!) The English edition in this part reads as follows: “It has been estimated that as many as 12.000 Germans soldiers deserted the army in Eastern Europe after hearing of the German defeat at Stalingrad in February 1943”. (!) In addition, the author refers in this footnote to a publication by Timothy Snyder (*Skrwawione ziemie. Europa między Hitlerem a Stalinem*, Warsaw 2011, p. 268; *Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin*, New York: Basic Books, 2010). If the truth had been as the Polish translation of Prof. Zimmerman’s words reads, the occupation authorities would have been deprived of a large part of their own (German) police forces, and the occupation system would have trembled on its foundations. The Professor apparently did not read the paragraph from Snyder’s book to the end, as he would have easily noticed the following passage: “This meant [i.e. the desertion of policemen] that some Belarusians who had killed Jews in the service of Nazis in 1941 and 1942 joined the Soviet partisans in 1943”.

Let us cite a few more similar examples of Prof. Zimmerman’s manipulation of the documents’ content. On page 254 we read about the ‘communiqué from the

Government Delegate to the Deputy Prime Minister' in 1942. In that 'communiqué', the Government Delegate expressed the hope that the establishment of the Council to Aid Jews (*Rada Pomocy Żydom*) would help to counter the unfair opinions about prejudices against Jews within the underground. At this point, the author refers the reader to the Central Archives of Modern Records (*Archiwum Akt Nowych*) ref. no. 202/I-6, p. 30; however, in the content of Dispatch no. 148 the word 'hope' is not found. The situation is similar with another cited document, the above-mentioned 'Instruction for the Country' of 26 October 1943. On page 385, Prof. Zimmerman claims unfoundedly that it requested "an additional number of Home Army partisans as reinforcements for eastern Poland"; but there is no such text in the 'Instruction'!¹⁶ We find a similar example on pages 318-19, where the author writes about a dispatch from representatives of the CKRŻwP and ŻKN of 20 April 1943. He claims incorrectly that this dispatch never reached London! But it did arrive, and was even published in the third volume of the first edition of the *Armia Krajowa w dokumentach 1939-1945* (as document no. 436).¹⁷ On the same pages (318-19), the author writes twice about the same message. In addition, he cites two different publications when discussing it. In one footnote (no. 94) he mentions 'Armia Krajowa w dokumentach, second volume', while in the other (no. 97) he mentions the book *Ten jest z Ojczyzny mojej*. In both cases he is referring to the very same dispatch 81 from the Government Delegate for Poland of 28 April 1943, in which there was inserted a message from 'Berezowski' and 'Borowski'. This dispatch was entered in the logbook of the Social Department of the Ministry of Interior under the number 2517. This is not the number of the dispatch, as Prof. Zimmerman states in footnote 94 on page 318.

If the reader tries to follow the quotes published by the author, they will have a real problem determining the sources of his knowledge, as an analysis of footnote 30 (p. 144) also confirms. Zimmerman unreasonably claims: "In September 1941, the Delegate

¹⁶ At this point, Prof. Zimmerman cites a publication by Dariusz Stola from 1995. In historical research, 20 years is a lot of time, so the professor should have analysed the documents himself, instead of using literature that contains glaring mistakes.

¹⁷ At this point it is worth explaining some complications with the above message. It was given the number 74 and was broadcast in two parts. Message 74/I was sent for the first time on 1 May 1943 from station 50 (KWC), and received in London at 11.30 by station 39 (MSW). It was broadcast for the second time on 21 May 1943 from station 58 (KWC), and received at 23.00 by station 39 (MSW). Message 74/II was sent on 3 May 1943 from station 50 (KWC), and received in London at 10.30 by station 39 (MSW). See *Armia Krajowa w dokumentach 1939-1945*, vol. 2, 2nd edn, Warszawa 2019, pp. 972-73.

published a report on the situation in occupied Poland [...]”. First of all, it should be stressed that the Government Delegate did not publish the ‘Pro memoria’ reports, as these were intended for the highest authorities of the Republic of Poland in London and were sent by couriers. Secondly, the researcher refers in a footnote to the document ‘*Pro memoria w sprawie sytuacji politycznej w kraju w okresie 22 VI – 30 IX 1941*’ (“Pro memoria study on the political situation in the country in the period June 22 – September 30, 1941”). In addition, he cites an extract of the document from the 1995 publication by Dariusz Stola! The author knows, then, that the ‘Pro memoria’ reports were published ten years later.¹⁸ If Prof. Zimmerman had reached for the document he ‘quoted’, he would have known that the extracts he gives are not present in this particular document. After all, Stola clearly writes in footnote 20 of his publication: “Depesza nr 126/2, 22 XII 1942, AAN, 202/I-2, s. 46” (Dispatch no. 126/2, December 22, 1942, AAN, ref. no. 202/I-2, p. 46).

Interestingly – and unfortunately, typically for some Holocaust historians – Prof. Zimmerman omitted a few sentences in the quote from the first part of this dispatch, marking only one such omission. This marked omission contained the sentence “Sewer outlets plugged up and surrounded by German posts”.¹⁹ On the other hand, the author did not mention at all the fact that the last three sentences from the first part of this dispatch were omitted: “Losses of Germans about a thousand killed and wounded. The attitude of the defenders arouses admiration among the people of the country, and embarrassment and rage among the Germans. The appeal of the Jewish Combat Organisation [*Żydowska Organizacja Bojowa*, ŻOB] to the population of the capital was published, Polish workers’ parties pay tribute to the ghetto fighters”.²⁰ The manner in which the message is presented in Zimmerman’s work suggests that it has been quoted in its entirety. Unfortunately, the reader will not learn anything about the clearly described attitude of Polish society towards the fight between the Jews and the Germans.

Further on, Prof. Zimmerman reports on successive documents produced by various structures of the Polish state (chapter 4, pp. 137–170); but contrary to his claims, not all of them were the work of the Polish Underground State. As an example

¹⁸ *Pro memoria (1941–1944). Raporty Departamentu Informacji Delegatury Rządu RP na Kraj o zbrodniach na narodzie polskim*, ed. J. Gmitruk, A. Indraszczyk, A. Koseski, Warszawa 2005.

¹⁹ *Armia Krajowa w dokumentach*, vol. 2, p. 983.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

of the freedom Prof. Zimmerman in dealing with documents, we should consider the extracts he has highlighted from the report entitled ‘Two Years of German Occupation in Poland’ [*Dwa lata okupacji niemieckiej w Polsce*]. The author points to page 99 in the archival collection kept at the Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum in London (ref. no. PRM 45c), and quotes two sentences from the final part of the report on the Warsaw ghetto. Significantly, the author omits the preceding sentence, which reads as follows: “There is more and more talk about cooperation between the Israelites and the Gestapo”. In the next sentence, Prof. Zimmerman goes so far as to insinuate that the author of the report “maintained that several pogroms were initiated by Poles”. There is nothing like that in the quoted report. In fact, it says: “During this period, the Jews in Chełm behaved in a completely provocative manner towards the Poles, so no wonder that after the Bolsheviks left, and before the Germans came, a pogrom almost happened. Naturally a few shops were looted”. There is no word about ‘several pogroms’.

In some places, the omissions the author has made are more than merely symptomatic. At the same time, they confirm that Zimmerman lacks a broader understanding of the tasks that were performed by individual cells of the Home Army. While writing about the uprising in the ghetto, he somewhat shortened the content of a dispatch by omitting opinions about the positive perception of the uprising among Poles; while in mentioning the report from the Home Army’s Warsaw Area, he does express his surprise at the lack of condemnation of the anti-Jewish policy pursued by the Germans. He writes: “In a monthly report for the period ending August 31, 1943, [...] However, no protest at all was voiced to the German round-ups and murders of Jews in hiding”. (!). According to Prof. Zimmerman, the leadership of the secret militarised administration (Division VII) in the Home Army’s Warsaw Area, while writing a ‘Situation account...’ to the Home Army Headquarters, expressed “protest to German round-ups and murders”?! Such tasks were not fulfilled by this unit. The purpose of such reports was to inform superiors about the actual situation in a given area, and not to express judgments, opinions, and so on, something which the Professor fails to understand.

We observe a similar practice where the author disregards the source basis for his own judgements when he discusses the situation of Jews in the north-eastern borderlands of the Second Polish Republic. These parts of Zimmerman’s work (pp. 383–97) are based on the accounts of Abraham Melezin. In footnote 22 on page 384,

the author refers to an extract from a book by Janusz Prawdźic-Szlaski (p. 194), although he abandons the quotation in favour of discussing what Prawdźic-Szlaski wrote. Here is an exact quote from Zimmerman's book (English edition, p. 272):

The language of the Nowogródek District Home Army commander and his chief of staff is extraordinarily revealing. Here, Jews were described unqualifiedly as enemies along with Germans, Russians, and collaborators. It also marked the growing divide between the Polish Underground authorities in Warsaw and the provincial field commanders in northeastern Poland. It is thus no surprise that when Col Szlaski [the Polish translation, p. 384, reads: "major Sędziak"] survived the war and published his own account of the Nowogródek Home Army, he displayed no understanding for the fate of the Jews as targets of genocide. He only remarked that the local population had little sympathy for the Jews during the Nazi Final Solution in Nowogródek due to Jewish behavior during the Soviet occupation.

The answer to the question of why Zimmerman departed from the citation in favour of its discussion seems very simple: the quote does not match the author's arguments. Let us quote an exact excerpt from Prawdźic-Szlaski:

The regular German army was used not for these murders, and the German soldiers were not even allowed to watch these scenes. But again, I have not heard of any case where Christian feelings were awakened in a German so he would help – in the name of that Christ whom he professed – the murdered victims. The Jews were isolated and left to their own fate. They generally harassed the local population a lot with their behaviour during the Soviet occupation.²¹

Zimmerman takes equal liberties with the document from the Ministry of Information he quoted (pp. 162–63), wrongly attributing it to Stanisław Kot.²²

²¹ J. Prawdźic-Szlaski, *Nowogródzyczna w walce 1940–1945*, London 1976, p. 194.

²² It is worth noting that this document is signed: MINISTER (typewritten) and handwritten: S[tanisław] S[troński], which Prof. Zimmerman read as a 'K', and creatively turned into 'Kot ?!' By the way, in the entire book, Stroński is only mentioned once (p. 71), as minister of social welfare – which he was not. For some reason, the author has not read the publication: S. Stroński, *Polityka rządu polskiego na uchodźstwie w latach 1939–1942*, vols 1–3, ed. J. Piotrowski, Nowy Sącz 2007.

In addition, he interweaves the quotes with his own original comments containing untruths. For example, he says that Kot stated that the Jews did not get involved “in the Polish cause” (!). There is nothing like that in the document he cites and discusses. However, he finds differences in the attitudes of the two peoples: the Poles proceed “with their heads held high”, whereas the Jews “break down most often”. These over-interpretations undermine the author’s academic reliability, a feature which should characterise every historian, especially those dealing with such a difficult topic.

At times, the author’s failure to make an in-depth archival and bibliographic query means that his expressive theses turn out to have no basis in reality. For example, on page 150 Prof. Zimmerman cites an excerpt from the declaration of the Polish government from July 1941, and states authoritatively “No similar declaration was made by any of the wings of the Polish underground” (!). This scandalous statement proves the Professor’s profound ignorance about the activities of the Polish Underground State. It is enough to refer to the repeatedly published Declaration of the Council of National Unity [*Rada Jedności Narodowej*] of 15 March 1944, where we read:

This parliament²³ will amend the constitution, which will formulate the principles of universal civil freedom, freedom of religion, conscience, political beliefs, speech, print, assembly and associations, and the principles of equality of civil rights with equality of the duties and independence of the judiciary.²⁴ [...] The Polish nation will take full consideration of the interests of other nationalities living within the state. By requiring them to be loyal and faithful to the Polish State and to have a benevolent attitude to the rights and interests of the Polish nation, Poland will base its attitude towards these nationalities on the principles of political equality and of providing them with conditions for full cultural, economic and social development within the framework of state unity and the common good of all citizens.²⁵

²³ This refers to a parliament which would be elected ‘as soon as possible’ on the basis of a new, democratic electoral law.

²⁴ *Armia Krajowa w dokumentach 1939–1945*, vol. 3: *Kwiecień 1943 – lipiec 1944*, London 1976, p. 364.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 364–65.

The failure to conduct research correctly also results in Zimmerman repeating the false report that Marian Sołtysiak ('Barabas'), one of the Home Army's most famous commanders in the Radom-Kielce district, gave orders to murder Jews. On pages 409–17, the author describes quite broadly (considering the size of the entire book) the activities of the 'Chosen Ones' unit commanded by Sołtysiak. He largely relies on the text by Alina Skibińska and Joanna Tokarska-Bakir and on the published by them post-war testimonies of both Home Army soldiers and Jewish survivors.²⁶ Unfortunately, he did not read the trial files, let alone the article written by Tomasz Domański who, without denying the criminal activities of some Home Army soldiers, shows the various problems resulting from relying on the materials of the Communist-era Security Department (*Urząd Bezpieczeństwa*, UB). Domański called into question the basic thesis of Skibińska and Tokarska-Bakir's text about the criminal instructions issued by Sołtysiak.²⁷

Prof. Zimmerman is also making a fundamental error when he analyses the underground authorities' formal declarations warning Poles against cooperating with the Germans in persecuting the Jews. According to the author, referring to the 'Information Bulletin' (*Biuletyn Informacyjny*; hereinafter: *BI*) of 6 March 1941 (and he claims – for some reason – that it was published on 6 February 1941), it was only then that the underground press warned Poles against cooperating with the Germans in persecuting Jews. The author does not seem to know about the publication from 19 January 1940 in the same *BI* where it was clearly written: "We declare than any direct or indirect cooperation with the Germans in persecuting the Jews is as much an act of sabotage as any other cooperation with Poland's deadly enemy". Equally important, Zimmerman, again quoting *BI* (allegedly from February 1941), supports the thesis that there was a 'new direction in government policy' towards the Jewish question. The analysis of the documents shows that the sequence of events Zimmerman sets up at this point is simply not true.

²⁶ A. Skibińska, "Dostał 10 lat, ale za co?". Analiza motywacji sprawców zbrodni na Żydach na wsi kieleckiej w latach 1942–1944, in *Zarys Krajobrazu. Wieś polska wobec zagłady Żydów 1942–1945*, ed. B. Engelking, J. Grabowski, intr. K. Persak, Warszawa 2011; A. Skibińska, J. Tokarska-Bakir, "Barabas" i Żydzi. Z historii oddziału AK "Wybraniec", *Zagłada Żydów. Studia i Materiały* 2011, no. 7.

²⁷ T. Domański, 'Z historii oddziału "Wybranieckich" czyli o wiarygodności materiałów śledczych i operacyjnych UB', part 1, *Arcana* 2012, no. 4–5, pp. 253–79, part 2, *Arcana* 2013, no. 1, pp. 120–44.

A little further on (p. 129), with another reference to the *BI* of 6 March 1941, the researcher includes the following (alleged) quote: “The sick lie on the floor without dressings. Infectious diseases are spreading among the patients”. (!) But this is what this extract from the *Bulletin* really looks like: “The only Jewish hospital – has makeshift equipment: the sick are lying on the floor, there are no dressings, the infectious ward is overcrowded. Sanitary conditions throughout the ghetto – terrible”. Considering the context of the description – the reactions of the ZWZ press to the deteriorating situation in the ghetto – it is hard to suppose that this kind of procedure was aimed at ‘colouring’ the report in order to achieve a better effect. The situation of the Jews was growing worse every day, and it was becoming more and more difficult to put into words. It is difficult to understand what the basis was for Prof. Zimmerman to modify the quotes. Nevertheless, this lack of diligence results in undermining trust in the author of the text, who is freely distorting the documents he cites.

In the same section, we have examples of what is at the very least a lack of critical analysis of the content of the documents cited, not to mention the manipulation of their content. First, on pages 176–77, the author describes the alleged ‘Report by General Rowecki of May 1942’, and in footnote 23 gives information about its publication in the second volume of the *Armia Krajowa w dokumentach 1939–1945*. In this place the document number (265) and the page number in the second volume are identical. On pages 265–66 of the second volume, General Rowecki’s dispatch no. 419 containing a ‘Dispatch on the political situation #1’ (*Meldunek o sytuacji politycznej 1*) is published. But this text does not contain any proposal to ‘resolve the problem’ of influence by the PPR as Prof. Zimmerman sees it. We are dealing here with a simple inability to read the document.²⁸ On the other hand, document no. 265 contains dispatch 424 from General Rowecki of 25 November 1941, which concerns the liaison officer between the Commander-in-Chief of the ZWZ and the Government Delegate.

At the end of this thread, it is worth devoting a little more space to the analysis of one of the documents included in Zimmerman’s book, and more specifically the alleged ‘Order no. 152’ from General Władysław Sikorski of 25 January 1942. In a footnote, the author indicates a document in the Central Archives of Modern Records (AAN, ref. no. 203/I-4, p. 1). There is indeed a photocopy (not the original) of this document (or

²⁸ The ‘Task’ contained in General Rowecki’s dispatch does not concern the actions of the Home Army, but the actions of the Communist party in Poland as identified by the Home Army!

actually a photocopy of its transcript) – a very strange document, significantly different from all other dispatches and letters from the Prime Minister and the Commander-in-Chief, addressed to the Home Army Commander (*Dowódca*, and not: *Komendant* – i.e. ‘the Commandant’ – as the translator of Prof. Zimmerman’s book stubbornly insists on writing erroneously) or the Delegate of the Polish Government in the country.

In presenting the document, Prof. Zimmerman departs completely from its content – the title reads as follows:

London, January 25, 1942

Order no. 152/42

TO: Government Delegate of the Republic of Poland

FROM: Sikorski, Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces

On the other hand, the photocopy of the document from the AAN shows:

C-in-C

London, 25.I.42

Forces Armed Polish.

Order no. 152/42

First of all, no addressee is given on the photocopy! Secondly, General Sikorski (and his office) were never in the habit of writing ‘*Nacz[elny] Wódz Sił Zbrojnych Polskich*’ (C-in-C, Forces Armed Polish – not in line with used order of the official name)! The same strange record is found in the caption ‘*Nacz[elny] Sił Zbrojn[ych] Pol[skich]*’ (in-C[hief], Forces Armed Pol[ish]) – the Professor’s attention should have been drawn by the lack of the key word *Wódz* (Commander).

But an even more interesting note is below the alleged signature of General Sikorski. It reads as follows:

For the veracity and compliance
of the above order

/... signature/

on behalf of the Pol[ish] Government Del[egate].

So the Government Delegate was not the addressee of the alleged 'Order no. 152/42'; he could at most certify the compliance of the transcript! Let us add that General Sikorski did not give orders to the Government Delegate; if anything, he issued directives or recommendations to him. The Commander-in-Chief issued orders to his army, including the Home Army, which was part of the Polish Armed Forces [*Polskie Siły Zbrojne*], and not the 'Armed Forces Polish' [*Siły Zbrojne Polskie*].

Prof. Zimmerman's statement that the alleged 'Order no. 152/42' concerns the national minorities is also untrue. The 'national minorities' are only discussed in point five of this photocopy of the transcript; the previous four points deal with quite different issues.

The language of this 'document' is so different from all the other orders and writings by General Sikorski that the thesis that this 'document' is false is justified. Historians should pay close attention to statements about collecting contributions for the 'FWP', and also the announcement of the establishment of a 'Military Tribunal' after independence was regained!

As if that were not enough, in the second point of the alleged 'Order no. 152/42' it is written: "Due to the lack of financial funds for the organisation of the Polish Army in Poland, all Polish citizens should be taxed immediately, regardless of their financial possessions". There were no such ideas in London or Warsaw; in fact, it was the Communists who were in favour of taxing everyone and everything.

It is worth paying attention to one more rather unacademic activity by Prof. Zimmerman, which involves sending the reader to a copy of the document kept in the archive while the document itself has long since been published. Zimmerman ceaselessly resorts to this method of work. Listing all the examples would take many pages, so I will limit myself to a few specific cases out of necessity. On page 268, the author writes about the alleged 'Report 291 by the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Army' of 4 March 1943. In footnote 43 he refers the reader to the Archives of the Jewish Historical Institute. This document has been known of at least since 1989, when it was published in the sixth volume of the *Armia Krajowa w dokumentach 1939–1945* (p. 303). It can be easily confirmed that it is in fact dispatch 291 from the Government Delegate and the Home Army Commander. It is also untrue when Prof. Zimmerman refers (p. 261) to the content of an excerpt from the 'Review of the most important

events in the country for the period from [4] 5 to 12 December 1942' (*Przegląd najważniejszych wydarzeń w kraju za czas od [4] 5 do 12 grudnia 1942 r.*), while at the same time directing the reader to the Archives of New Records (AAN, ref. no. 203/I-18, p. 244). It is difficult to guess why the author did so, since this document was published in the second volume of the first edition of the *Armia Krajowa w dokumentach 1939–1945* (p. 384).

Chapter eight (pp. 298–336), entitled 'The Warsaw Ghetto Uprising and the Polish Underground, April 19–May 15, 1943', yields more 'mistakes' by Prof. Zimmerman. Writing about the discovery of the Katyn massacre (p. 299), he mentions a message from General Rowecki to the 'prime minister's office in London'²⁹ of 21 April 1943. In footnote 6, he refers to the copy from the Archives of the Institute of National Remembrance (AIPN BU 1558/3, pp. 29–30). However, he does not report that this dispatch was published in the second volume of the *Armia Krajowa w dokumentach 1939–1945* (document 425).

The situation is similar in the case of message 733 (and not 738) from the Government Delegate: this document was published (1761) in the sixth volume of the *Armia Krajowa w dokumentach 1939–1945*. In addition, the dispatch says that "Further action of exploitation of the Katyn tragedy with the aim of stimulating anti-Bolshevik sentiment and attempting to discount these sentiments in order to obtain a voluntary application for a trip to work in Germany [is conducted]". So this does refer to the German actions in the 'Katyn' case.

The author's use of (not very accurate) copies of documents leads to the dissemination of false information. On page 175 of the Polish edition, he quotes excerpts from General Sikorski's message to the Home Army HQ of 3 March 1942, incorrectly stating that they came from a dispatch of 7 March. Moreover, there are mistakes in the quoted Polish text: for example, 'they came' (*nastali*) instead of 'they found' (*zastali*), 'the German e[astern] front' (*niemieckiego frontu wsch[odniego]*) instead of the 'e[astern] front', and also 'retained' (*zachowanych*) instead of 'appointed' (*mianowanych*). It should be noted that the English edition (p. 121) does not quote directly this part of the document mentioned, however, it reports its content without blunders other than erroneous date of the dispatch.

²⁹ This strange note, which appears occasionally throughout the book in question, is incomprehensible. I do not know why the author has decided to include it in two footnotes (5 and 6) here.

The author's fairly arbitrary treatment of such quotes is one of the features of this publication.

Another problem is that when the author discusses the same document several times, he always refers to different copies of it kept in different archives. Here, too, I have a request for the future: these documents should be grouped together under the catalogue numbers from various archives, so that all readers (and also writers) about these matters will have clarity about which document is being referred to. This is extremely important, especially in the case of archives which have only fragmentary copies of documents.

Finally, it is worth analysing the selective bibliography included in the book (pp. 575–604). Anyone who studies Polish-Jewish relations – including the attitudes of the Polish Underground State (and its organs) towards the Jews – is aware that this is an extremely complex topic. There are also a huge number of various publications with relevant thematic threads. The selective bibliography provided by the author also has its shortcomings, and above all, there are quite significant gaps that should be filled. An analysis of the publications omitted could influence the content of the book.

As for the collections of documents, a serious drawback in the bibliography – even if selective – is the lack of the collection of documents from *Żegota* (*Rada Pomocy Żydom przy Delegaturze Rządu na Kraj* – Council to Aid Jews with the Government Delegation for Poland) issued by the Head Office of State Archives.³⁰ Nor did Prof. Zimmerman resort to even one volume of the Minutes of the meetings of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Poland, October 1939 – August 1945 (*Protokoły posiedzeń Rady Ministrów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej październik 1939 – sierpień 1945*) published by the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences (PAU) in 1994–2010. Was there nothing interesting for the author therein? Meanwhile, there are many examples of documents published by PAU that are related to the subject of the book in question. I would like to draw the reader's attention, for example, to a document of 11 March 1942 entitled *Stosunek Sowietów do polskich mniejszości narodowych* [The Attitude of the Soviets

³⁰ *Rada Pomocy Żydom "ŻEGOTA" przy Pełnomocniku Rządu RP na Kraj i Referat Żydowski "Żegota" Departamentu Spraw Wewnętrznych Delegatury Rządu RP na Kraj. Dokumenty z zasobu Archiwum Akt Nowych 1942–1944*, ed. M. Olczak, Warszawa 2015.

to the Polish National Minorities].³¹ In Zimmerman's bibliography one may also note the lack of any documentation concerning the national minorities from the archival collection of Adam Bień,³² the deputy Government Delegate for Poland. This publication came out in print in 2001, and there has been ample time to read it. Without going too deeply into its content, let us only mention the copies of the *Nasze Ziemie Wschodnie* [Our Eastern Lands] periodical, or the periodical study entitled 'Information on the nationalities' [*Informacja narodowościowa*] published therein. We can find a great deal of information about Jews there.

On pages 301–2, Prof. Zimmerman writes about the reports from the Polish underground about Jewish–Communist ties in occupied Poland and about the anti-Polish, mainly propaganda activities undertaken by Communist paratroopers. Since he refers practically exclusively to the documentation prepared by the structures of the Polish Underground State, attention should be paid to the other existing literature on this issue. Personally, I would recommend reading the memoirs, for example, of Leon Bielski³³ or Adolf Matysiewicz.³⁴

Finally, in the published bibliography, there are numerous editorial mistakes that cause confusion and do not offer the best testimony to the editorial work. The Central Catalogue of the Polish Underground Press 1939–1945 [*Centralny Katalog polskiej prasy konspiracyjnej 1939–1945*], compiled by Lucjan Dobroszycki, is placed in the 'Atlas, encyclopaedias, dictionaries, catalogues' section (p. 588), but the Władysław Chojnacki's bibliography of 'compact and ephemeral underground publications' [*Bibliografia zwartych i ulotnych druków konspiracyjnych*] (p. 590) is found under 'Studies.' Such inconsistency is surprising. There is an incomprehensible bibliographic entry on page 585 regarding the collection of documents published in 2001 by the Council for the Protection of Memory of Struggle and Martyrdom [*Rada Ochrony Pamięci Walk i Męczeństwa*]. The correct entry should be as follows: *Polacy – Żydzi 1939–1945*.

³¹ *Dokumenty rządu RP na obczyźnie. Suplementy do tomów I–VIII protokołów posiedzeń Rady Ministrów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, październik 1939 – sierpień 1945*, ed. W. Rojek, A. Suchcitz, Kraków 2010, pp. 275–81.

³² *Archiwum Adama Bienia. Akta narodowościowe (1942–1944)*, ed. J. Brzeski, A. Roliński, Kraków 2001.

³³ L. Bielski, *Spotkanie z ziemią*, Warszawa 1965.

³⁴ A. Matysiewicz, *Przez linię frontu*, Warszawa 1983.

Wybór źródeł [Poles – Jews 1939–1945. Selection of sources], ed. A.K. Kunert, preface by W. Bartoszewski, Warsaw 2001. Further confusion is introduced by the description on the same page. Two publications by Stefan Korboński are given here, one from 1956 and the other from 1975;³⁵ however, Korboński's work directly referring to the subject of Prof. Zimmerman's book is not mentioned there. This refers to Korboński's book *The Jews and the Poles in the World War II*, published in New York in 1986. Its Polish edition, entitled *Polacy, Żydzi i Holocaust* [Poles, Jews and the Holocaust], was published in 2011 in Warsaw.

The bibliographic errors and lapses seem to be less important in a situation where analysis of the selective bibliography leads to the conclusion that the author does not know the content of at least some of the publications he has himself listed there. If Prof. Zimmerman had become acquainted with these works, he would not have written untruthfully, for example, about the creation of the Social Anti-Communist Committee (*Społeczny Komitet Antykomunistyczny*).³⁶ On the other hand, page 583 lists the first edition of the essential publication of the Home Army's 1939–1945 documents (*Armia Krajowa w dokumentach 1939–1945*); the second edition of the first volume of this publication has been added below. The problem is that I did not find any reference to this particular volume in the text of the book. The legitimate question therefore arises of whether Prof. Zimmerman did use it, or rather whether the academic editor of the Polish edition decided to 'enrich' the list by adding this volume.

Taking the number of comments I have submitted above into account, I am forced to say that the book by Prof. Zimmerman raises serious, well-founded objections. It would take too much space to list all the author's mistakes and faults; I found over a hundred such cases throughout the work. I am sad to say that Prof. Zimmerman knows neither the literature of the matters he writes about,

³⁵ Significantly, in the case of Korboński's book *Polskie Państwo Podziemne* [The Polish Underground State], the 'Selective bibliography' includes an underground edition published by NZS Wrocław, which is in fact a reprint of the Paris edition from 1975. We do not have information about the first, at least partially critical, edition of this book from 2008. Also, the title of the publication included in the 'Selective bibliography' is incomplete, because in fact it should be *Polskie Państwo Podziemne. Przewodnik po Podziemiu z lat 1939–1945* [The Polish Underground State. A guide to the Underground from 1939–45].

³⁶ The lack of any such discernment makes this alleged order from General Sikorski, no. 152 of 25 January 1942, appear as if it were an authentic document.

nor the documents (even the published ones), nor the underground structures. Therefore, his book cannot be regarded as a reliable description of the attitude of the Polish Underground State towards the Jews during World War II. It is also very surprising that this publication was issued under the patronage of the POLIN Museum of the History of Polish Jews.

In addition, I have to raise serious objections to the work of both the academic editor, Martyna Rusiniak-Karwat, and more generally the Polish Scientific Publishers PWN SA. The number of errors indicates that the readers are being treated very frivolously. Let us add that a significant part of them have appeared in the Polish edition alone, and do not appear in the English edition! This, in turn, calls into question the declaration of the Editor: “We are offering the reader a changed – and we hope – refined version of the book published in 2015 by Prof. Zimmerman” (p. 606). But no – the Polish edition of this book has not been ‘refined’. On the contrary. As an example of the ‘achievements’ of the editors of the Polish edition, let us examine the title on p. 252 of the subsection ‘Struktura Polskiego Państwa Podziemnego z uwzględnieniem Delegatury Rządu na Kraj (1944)’ [The structure of the Polish Underground State, including the Government Delegation for Poland (1944)]. Such a title is surprising, because from the beginning to the end of the subsection (p. 255) the text has not moved beyond the year 1942. This issue can be explained when we read the original English-language version, where on page 176 we find a diagram entitled ‘Main structure of the Polish Underground State with special reference to the Delegates’ Bureau, 1944’: so the title of this diagram in the English version has become the title of the sub-chapter in the Polish version.

At the very last, then, it should be said that the money invested by the various institutions listed on page 10 of Prof. Zimmerman’s book could have been much better spent.