

ALEKSANDAR ŽIVOTIĆ

Department for History of Yugoslavia

Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade

ORCID: 0000-0003-3237-7518

COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE SOVIET MODEL AND REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE (1945–1948). INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE ACTIVITY OF THE CPY

The end of World War II marked at the same time the beginning of the breakup of the war coalition. The Soviet Union tried to consolidate its primacy in its own sphere of interest defined by the agreements with the allies during the war. It was a nationally, politically and economically heterogeneous area where the local communist parties, envisaged to support the future sovietisation of the region, did not have a strong foothold. The exceptions were Yugoslavia and, to some extent, Albania. The Yugoslav communists, who carried out the revolution during their anti-fascist conflict imposed themselves in an absolutely strategic location as an important ally. For the Yugoslav communists, the Soviet Union represented not only an ally, but also a model country for the future transformation of the Yugoslav State and society, while for the Soviets, Yugoslavia was more than a regional partner and trustworthy ally. Considering the character of mutual relations until 1948, but also the intensity of the subsequent conflict, the question arises as to whether Yugoslavia experienced complete sovietisation, like most Eastern European countries, or not?

The beginning of Cold War conflicts in Europe represented an extraordinary foreign policy challenge for Yugoslavia.¹ The Cold War tensions that were spreading in Europe put

¹ There are different opinions about the causes and the beginning of the Cold War in historical science. Cold War theoreticians differently define the notion, causes and beginning of the Cold War. About this, as well as about the beginning of the bloc division in the territory of Europe, see more J. Gaddis, *The Cold War* (London, 2005); G. Kennan, *Realities of American Foreign Policy* (New Jersey, 1954); V. Zubok, K. Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, 1996); N. Bystrova, *SSSR I formirovanie voenno-blokovogo*

this Balkan country that emerged from the previous war and revolutionary turmoil with severe traumas and high human and material losses into the centre of Cold War conflicts between the blocks that were still emerging in Europe. In the first years after World War II, Yugoslavia's foreign policy position was characterised by serious misunderstandings with the Western powers, the biggest of which was the conflict over the issue of Trieste, some involvement in helping the Greek guerrilla movement, supporting the position of the USSR in all important international issues and the attempt to build with other Eastern European countries, primarily Slovene ones, better relations.

Cooperation between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia after World War II continued on the closest possible basis, both on the political, ideological, cultural and economic level. What did Yugoslav society look like at the end of World War II? What kind of economic, social and ideological potential did Yugoslavia have when it tried to become closer with the “first country of communism”? At the end of the war, Yugoslavia was among the countries that were “restored” after the war. It entered the first post-war years as a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, agrarian state of small farms, with no developed industry. It was one of the countries that suffered biggest damage in the war, both human and material. Agriculture, the most important part of the economy was especially affected. At the same time, it was the state in which the government was replaced by the revolution, which resulted in a completely new social, political and economic system. Coming out as the winner of the Civil War, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) was strengthening its position every step of the way. Before the war, it had 12,000 members, in the end of the war it had about 140,000 members, and three years after the war, it reached almost half a million members. The CPY kept the press and radio in its hands, formed the opinion of common people in accordance with its needs, created policies in the fields of culture, science and art, controlled the state security services, the police and the army. Of the 140,000 members of the CPY at the end of the war, 80,000 were in the Army. After the demobilisation in 1946, when 400,000 people remained in the Army, the party organisation was still the most numerous one in the army – it counted more than 70,000 members of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and close to 90,000 members of League of the Communist Youth of Yugoslavia (LCYY). The communists and the members of the LCYY accounted for 41.9% of the total number in the Army.² The party controlled and directed the broader population through the system of its “transmissions”: the Women's Antifascist Front, the National Youth of Yugoslavia, and the Yugoslav League of Working People. The CPY policy used also the People's Front, which was not a classic political party, but it had the character of a political organisation and reflected the concept of the CPY about the “monolithic political structure of society”.³ The state was progressively becoming a one-party state, there was a sign of equality between the party and state organs, and the state

protiostoyaniya v Evrope 1945–1955 gg. (Moskva, 2007); O.A. Weastad, *The Global Cold War. Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (London, 2005).

² Archive of Yugoslavia (hereinafter: AY), 836-Cabinet of Marshal of Yugoslavia (hereinafter: KMJ), I-3-b, Soviet dispatch to Marshal Josip Broz-Tito, 19 V 1945.

³ *Ibidem*, 507/IX – KMOV CKSKJ, USSR, 119/I-7, Dispatch of Deda (Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin) to Valter (Marshal Josip Broz), 27 XII 1946.

organs became executors of party decisions. The new government, embodied in the ever-present monopoly of the CPY, changed the economic and social order with a series of laws. Yugoslavia became a country of nationalisation, confiscation, agrarian reform, state property, state enterprises and monopolies in the economy, ideological culture and arts.

Unlike most of the other countries of the later Cominform, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had a decisive political influence in its country immediately after the end of the war. However, the remains of the old civil parties formally existed for some time, and the CPY implemented its policies and acted formally through the People's Front of Yugoslavia (PFY). The founding congress of the PFY was held on 5–7 August 1945 in Belgrade, where the territorial national fronts were united, the organisational structure was established, and its statute and program were adopted. Although the civil parties were also members of the PFY, the existence of the PFY did not create an opportunity for the development of a multi-party system, but it was an instrument of turning it into a one-party system in which all power was in the hands of the CPY. The president of the PFY was Josip Broz himself.

The key integrative factor in relations between the two countries was the power of communist parties. Unlike the Soviet model where the power of the Communist Party was constitutionally guaranteed, this was not the case in Yugoslavia. Its communist party continued to live and work in the form of a pre-war illegal and persecuted political grouping, which was one of the sources of future conflicts. The two parties were linked by traditional connections. By 1943, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was in Comintern and directed its membership towards the blind idolatry and admiration for the Soviet Union. The ideological basis of this conviction was in proletarian internationalism, together with the proclamation of the imperative for the defence of the Soviet Union. For the Yugoslav communists, the only measure of internationalism was its attitude towards the USSR and the state order that came out of the revolutionary changes after the October Revolution of 1917. All the bad ideological experiences of Soviet reality were ignored and treated as "Trotskyism", the intrigue of imperialists and the enemies of the Soviet Union. On such ideological grounds, coming out of the war as a completely new and transformed state, the new Yugoslavia relied on the Soviet Union in all segments of its life. For the Yugoslav communists, the Soviet Union was no longer a lonely "island of socialism", but one of the most important world powers without whose interference and decisive arbitration not a single important world question could have been solved.⁴ The war-torn, economically and demographically devastated post-war Yugoslavia, ready for further fundamental social transformations, perceived the Soviet Union as its natural protector, an equal ally, a force that should have advocated on the international agenda for Yugoslav goals and which should help the process of transformation of the Yugoslav State and society. Already the agreement between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, signed in April 1945, clearly indicated the reorientation of Yugoslavia towards the East and its distancing from, until then, an equal and balanced position between Great Britain and

⁴ *Ibidem.*

the Soviet Union.⁵ At the same time, in the focus of the two great powers, Yugoslavia was nothing more than a notable object of international relations, which gained its special position in the new world system with its anti-fascism and hundreds of thousands of victims built in the foundations of the post-war order. Also, with a more apparent deterioration of the relations between the Soviet Union and the Western powers and the intensification of Cold War conflicts, the West perceived Yugoslavia as the most important of the Soviet satellite states. On a global scale, Yugoslavia tried to act in accordance with Soviet foreign policy positions, but at certain times it acted contrary to Soviet policy and generally accepted attitudes. The regular line of communication between the Soviet and Yugoslav party leaders was maintained through a permanent Yugoslav party representative in Moscow and two embassies, but the relations between the two parties, and therefore the two countries in which they represented the leading, essential and the only political forces were resolved at the highest level during the visit of Josip Broz-Tito to Moscow in 1945 and 1946, and then during the visit of a series of the highest Yugoslav political, economic, military, cultural and trade union organisations to Moscow during the first post-war years as well as Kardel's consultations with Molotov at the Peace Conference in Paris. In addition, individual consultations were frequent during certain Yugoslav foreign policy actions, which Stalin particularly insisted on. The Soviet side especially stressed the need for consultations and coordinated foreign policy actions (Trieste Question, the problem of Yugoslav-Austrian border, the Middle East Crisis) when it came to problems implicitly binding the Soviet side in the international community, and above all in relations with the great Western powers regarding sensitive points of international relations.

During the first post-war period, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, despite a series of difficulties, misunderstandings, conflicts, managed to establish on a solid basis the foundations of future political, economic and military cooperation. With its strength of experience and political stamina, the USSR managed to impose its political and economic pattern on Yugoslavia. The reached agreements represented an important point in the process of mutual rapprochement as an important step on the path to creating a common political, military, economic and ideological bloc. Yugoslavia entered the years of post-war conflicts and divisions, as an allied and victorious state, a victim and a fighter against fascism with an apparent inclination towards the USSR in ideological and political terms. The foreign policy of Yugoslavia was in line with Soviet attitudes, and internal development followed the Soviet model. Soviet influence in Yugoslavia manifested itself in several ways.

The cult of Soviet leaders was nurtured in Yugoslavia, the situation in the Soviet country was idealised, the great success of the Soviet Union and the invincibility of its army were glorified, Soviet literature was translated, works by Russian writers reached unbelievable circulation, Soviet films were screened, textbooks were translated, articles about life in the USSR and photographs of Soviet leaders were regularly published, the Society of Yugoslav-Soviet Friendship was formed in Belgrade in April 1945, and Soviet cultural influence was becoming more present at every step. The society gathered the most influential representatives in cultural and public life. At the same time, foreign

⁵ *Ibidem*, 836-KMJ, I-2-a/117, Speeches between Tito and British Ambassador Stivenson, 8 XI 1945.

policy ideas were also implemented through the Slav Congress, held in Belgrade in late 1946.⁶ Although it essentially had the character of a public meeting, the Congress indirectly announced and promoted the need to unify the Slav people and support the Soviet Union. Until the formation of Cominform, the Slav Congress was one of the forms of Soviet supervision over the foreign policy of the countries that had been in the zone of its political influence after the war. In this way, an antipode was established against British initiatives in this Balkan gathering. Apart from the affirmation of each country individually, the congress also affirmed the position of Stalin as an undisputed leader. Just the fact that the congress was held in Belgrade marked the position of Yugoslavia in the eastern block, which was then gradually being formed. Yugoslavia was seen as the centre for the gathering of progressive forces in the Balkans. Yugoslavia accepted the role of a respected country in the socialist world that the Soviet Union had intended for it, but it did not accept the subordinated position in mutual relations, which would fundamentally negate its original revolution, the victims laid down in the struggle against fascism and the tendency to preserve the autonomy of internal development. Moreover, Yugoslavia and its party leadership did not agree to have their hands tied in international relations, no matter how much they identified with Soviet foreign policy. Thus, apart from the autonomy of internal development, the Yugoslav communists also sharply defended the position of equality in international relations.

Which role did the Soviet Union devote to Yugoslavia within its sphere of interest? What did Yugoslavia essentially mean for Soviet politics in Eastern Europe? The most picturesque answer to these questions is given by a series of intergovernmental agreements signed immediately after the end of the World War II, whose aim, on one hand, was to firmly bind countries of national democracy through contractual relations, and on the other hand, to enable through firm connections decisive Soviet influence, both on relations within the bloc and their internal development. For Yugoslav foreign policy, the unbreakable alliance with the USSR was then designated as “one of the strongest factors in our independent and peaceful development”. Czechoslovakia and Poland were next behind the USSR in the order of importance for Yugoslavia. They were not described in such nice words as the USSR, but they were given the epithet of states with which Yugoslavia had relations “similar” to the ones with the USSR. When it came to other countries, relations with Bulgaria and Albania were the best; relations with Romania were good and they had “good prospects”, Hungary was at the bottom and it was given the expressions of good will but trust with Hungary was undermined by the existence of Hungarian “chauvinism and revisionism”. The countries under the Soviet sphere of interest or the ones which were inclined to the USSR (Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland) should not be regarded as a single and homogeneous whole, nor should we think that there were no problems until the Cominform Resolution against Yugoslavia in their

⁶ More about Yugoslav-Soviet cultural relations, see G. Miloradović, *Lepota pod nadzorom. Ssovjetski kulturni uticaji u Jugoslaviji 1945–1955* (Beograd, 2012); L. Dimić, *Agitprop i kultura. Agitpropovska faza kulturne politike u Srbiji 1945–1952* (Beograd, 1988).

mutual relations.⁷ On the contrary, from all the aforementioned countries, Yugoslavia was not in conflict only with the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Poland, while the others were on the opposite side. The Soviet, Polish and Yugoslav victims in the war were much larger than those of other countries. Bulgaria and Albania were a bit closer to Yugoslavia, and this somewhat better treatment than that which Romania and Hungary had, primarily came from Yugoslavia's wish to strengthen its position in some way through the relations with these two countries, and especially in Albania to establish its influence. Yugoslavia really had some sort of domination and influence over Albania that at times had the characteristics of political guardianship, and it did consider the creation of a confederation with Bulgaria. Relations between the countries of "people's democracy" were burdened with a series of unresolved bilateral issues that had a wider significance. Soviet-Polish relations were filled with tensions due to the division of Poland, the Polish National Committee and the emigrant government, the Katyn forest affair, the role of the Red Army, which temporarily stopped on the Vistula in 1944 instead of crossing the river and assisting the Warsaw rebels. Czechoslovakia had major misunderstandings with Hungary regarding the exchange of minorities, and it also had territorial demands towards its southern neighbour. Polish-Czech relations were also burdened by disputes over Cieszyn. Yugoslavia aborted its territorial claims towards Hungary, it was very dissatisfied with the position of its minority in this country, and relations with Hungary would later be burdened with the problem of payment of reparations by Hungary to Yugoslavia. Further analysis of the mutual relations of the countries of "people's democracy" also shows that the societies of all these countries were agrarian, except for Czechoslovakia and later East Germany; that only Czechoslovak society had a tradition of genuine parliamentarianism, a multiparty system and democracy; that only Yugoslav and Albanian Communists managed to carry out a revolution during the war; and that all these countries were not members of the UN, because they were not all on the side of the allies in the war, and so on.⁸

The highest expression of cooperation between Yugoslavia and Eastern European countries was the system of treaties on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance. The order for the signing of contracts was precisely known, and it fully reflected the views of the Yugoslav government on the relations with these countries, expressed on 2 February 1946. First, a treaty was signed with the USSR in April 1945, which was "an interstate framework for development of versatile connections" between the two countries.⁹ New Broz's visit to Moscow lasted from May 27 to June 10, 1946. A number of important issues were discussed then, and this visit also influenced the future important decisions of the

⁷ About the relations between the Soviet Union and its allies, see more in L. Borhi, *Hungary in the Cold War 1945–1956. Between the United States and the Soviet Union* (Budapest–New York, 2004); N. Bystrova, *SSSR i formirovanie voenno-blokovogo protivotoyaniya v Evrope 1945–1955 gg.* (Moskva, 2007); J. Gaddis, *The Cold War* (London, 2005).

⁸ Zapis besedi J.V. Stalina s glavoy delegacii Nacional'nogo komiteta osvoboždeniya Jugoslavii, o eeteritorialnyh problema i otnošeniyah s Bolgariëi i Albaniey, 9.1.1946. [in:] *Vostočnaya Evropa v dokumentah rossijskih arhivov*, vol. 1: 1944–1949, ed. G.P. Muraško (Moskva–Novosibirsk, 1997), pp. 130–131.

⁹ Zakon o Ugovoru o prijateljstvu, suradnji i uzajamnoj pomoći između Jugoslavije i Saveza Sovjetskih Socijalističkih Republika, SL FNRJ, 40/45, pp. 341–344.

Yugoslav leadership.¹⁰ In this paper, we bring a transcript of those conversations.¹¹ Prior to that, during the visit of Broz to Poland and Czechoslovakia, the Yugoslav-Polish Treaty was concluded on 19 March 1946,¹² and the Yugoslav-Czechoslovak one was signed on 9 May 1946, in Belgrade, on the return visit of the Czechoslovak delegation.¹³

The treaty with the USSR represented the attachment to a strong ally in which many hopes were laid, as the USSR was an older ideological brother and model, and whose internal system was sometimes even uncritically copied to the Yugoslav reality. Treaties with Czechoslovakia and Poland led to the creation of alliances with countries with which the alliances of equal partners were formed already during the war. The treaty with Bulgaria was a way for this, a war-defeated country, to withdraw from the defeated camp through connections with Yugoslavia and thus help the communist forces in these countries to fight for power after the war. Among other things, the military cooperation of the Yugoslav army with the Bulgarian units should have served this purpose and transform them from occupational forces into liberation ones. Unlike relations with Poland and Czechoslovakia, Broz entered the relations with Bulgaria and Albania as an older and stronger partner. However, the situation in these countries was not clear to Yugoslav leadership from the very beginning. The insufficiently clear situation in Bulgaria during the first half of 1946, coming from the fact that Bulgaria was a defeated country with a strong civil opposition, forced Broz to be cautious. Therefore, at a meeting of the Politburo on 27 March 1946, it was decided to treat Bulgaria “carefully”. It was easier to define a policy towards Albania, so it was already decided to sign a “friendship pact” with it, and Enver Hoxha was invited to Belgrade. Nevertheless, the visit of Hoxha was postponed for a while, precisely until the meeting of Broz and Stalin in Moscow on 27 May 1946. Broz then said that Hoxha’s arrival was delayed three times because the Yugoslav leadership waited for the meeting with the Soviet leadership. At this meeting, permission was given to sign an agreement with Albania on securing “sovereignty”, and Hoxha finally came to Belgrade on 23 June and stayed until 2 July 1946.¹⁴ It was then agreed to sign an agreement on friendship and mutual assistance. Seven days after the departure of Hoxha from Belgrade on 9 July, the contract was signed in Tirana by Hoxha and the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs Stanoje Simić.¹⁵ However, Bulgaria was still treated with caution. Like the Politburo of the CPY did on 27 March, Stalin and Tito took the stance as

¹⁰ About Broz’s visit to Moscow in 1946, see more in S. Selinic, A. Životić, “Conversation Between Soviet and Yugoslav Delegation in Moscow (27 May – 12 June 1946)”, *Bulgarian Historical Review* 2009, no. 1–2, pp. 180–202.

¹¹ Zabeleška o razgovoru predsednika Savetaministara SSSR J.V. Staljina sa jugoslovenskom vladinom delegacijom načelu s predsednikom Savetaministara FNRJ maršalom J.B. Titom, *Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi 1945–1956. Zbornik dokumenata* (Beograd, 2010), pp. 108–109.

¹² Ukaz o ratifikaciji Ugovora o prijateljstvu, suradnji i uzajamnoj pomoći između Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije i Republike Poljske, SL FNRJ, 28/46, pp. 313–316.

¹³ Ukaz o ratifikaciji Ugovora o prijateljstvu, uzajamnoj pomoći i saradnji u miru između Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije i Čehoslovačke Republike, SL FNRJ, 42/46, pp. 449–452.

¹⁴ More about the problems in relations between Yugoslavia and Albania, see A. Životić, *Jugoslavija, Albanija i velike sile* (Beograd, 2011).

¹⁵ Ukaz o ratifikaciji Ugovora o prijateljstvu i uzajamnoj pomoći između Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije i Narodne Republike Albanije, SL FNRJ, 60/46, pp. 693–696.

well on 27 May that the situation in Bulgaria was still unclear. They explicitly rejected the idea of creating a federation with Bulgaria. Broz's negative attitude towards a federation with Bulgaria at that moment was supported by Stalin, and he added "but they need to be helped". In addition, Bulgaria had not yet signed a peace treaty. Nevertheless, Bulgaria was much closer to Yugoslavia than Romania and Hungary. Especially during 1947, when the situation in Bulgaria became clearer, and the communists were increasingly eliminating their opponents, the relations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria improved. Bulgaria, like Yugoslavia, was also a "new" and "front defensive" country, and with Gottwald, Dimitrov was the most praised foreign communist, right after the Soviet leaders.¹⁶ The conclusion of a peace treaty with Bulgaria on 10 February 1947 in Paris eliminated another obstacle to further Yugoslav-Bulgarian rapprochement. The talks between Dimitrov and Broz in Bled from 30 July to 1 August 1947 anticipated the maximum exchange of goods, cultural cooperation and preparations for the customs union. Yugoslavia even gave up reparations that Bulgaria was obliged to pay to it under a peace treaty (\$25 million). Finally, the Yugoslav-Bulgarian Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance was signed on 27 November 1947 in Varna.¹⁷ The process ended when agreements with Hungary and Romania were signed, with which it was difficult to establish cooperation after the war, and where the communists were still weaker than in Bulgaria and Albania. The Yugoslav-Hungarian Agreement was signed on 8 December 1947,¹⁸ and Yugoslav-Romanian one on 19 December 1947.¹⁹ Broz visited all the countries with which Yugoslavia signed contracts in 1946 and 1947, except for Albania. The receptions organised in these countries unmistakably reflected relations with them – he was the most cordially received in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. Moreover, the signing of these agreements was mainly linked to Broz's visits.

Assistance was expected in many segments of life from the USSR, from the sharing of intelligence, through the development of the economy to the strengthening of the military.²⁰ That is why 467 Yugoslavian students were sent to the USSR, goods were exchanged, and mixed societies were created. Furthermore, Soviet experts were working in Yugoslavia, and Yugoslav officers were trained in the USSR. However, in comparison to other East European parties, the Yugoslav Communist Party was much stronger, more successful, more monolithic, more independent and more willing to resist the pressure and directives of the Soviet party. Yugoslav party leaders showed great zeal in popularising in their country everything that was Soviet, but they were not ready to

¹⁶ Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation (hereinafter: AVPRF), f. 06, o. 8 d, p. 80, d. 166, l. 10, Letter from Kirsanov to Molotov of 4 IX 1946.

¹⁷ Ukaz o ratifikaciji Ugovora o prijateljstvu, suradnji i uzajamnoj pomoći između Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije i Narodne Republike Bugarske, SL FNRJ, 4/48, pp. 41–43;

¹⁸ Ukaz o ratifikaciji Ugovora o prijateljstvu, suradnji i uzajamnoj pomoći između Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije i Republike Mađarske, SL FNRJ, 4/48, pp. 43–45;

¹⁹ Ukaz o ratifikaciji Ugovora o prijateljstvu, suradnji i uzajamnoj pomoći između Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije i Kraljevine Rumunije, SL FNRJ, 5/48, pp. 49–51.

²⁰ Russian Archive of Social and Political History (hereinafter: RGASPI), 558, o. 11, d. 397, l. 89, Information to Josip Broz-Tito, 11 XI 1945.

renounce the autonomy and originality of their successful revolutionary endeavour.²¹ After all, the successfully executed revolution by the Yugoslav communists, for quite a long time during the war, was not supported by Moscow due to its consideration of the foreign political interests of the country, first of all relations with Britain, but also Moscow doubted the capability of Yugoslav communists to come to power without armed support from the USSR.

The foreign policy orientation of Yugoslavia towards the USSR was also determined by the position of the Soviet Union in the international community. As one of the world's leading powers, the Soviet Union was a permanent member of the Security Council with a veto. Yugoslavia consistently supported the Soviet side in one of the most important issues of post-war international relations – the denazification and disarmament of Germany. Yugoslavia wholeheartedly supported the Soviet policy of the division of Germany into occupation zones so that Germany could not ever be restored as a united state.²²

Political and ideological connections between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union were essentially determined by the character of mutual economic ties. At the end of the war, Yugoslavia fully relied on the Soviet side in the economic sense, counting on its crucial assistance in the process of the country's industrialisation. The foundations of post-war economic ties were set forth in the April 1945 treaties, although the political aspects prevailed in those agreements. The granting of foreign currency loans to the National Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia, plus aid in wheat and other necessities at the end of the war essentially determined future relations in the sphere of the economy. Most of the Soviet assistance was of trophy origin, but for the Yugoslav economy that suffered great destruction during the war it was aid that was vital. Nevertheless, the Yugoslav side was trying to put economic cooperation on a normal track. The level of expected assistance was considerably higher than that provided by the Soviet side, but it was in line with what the Soviet economy, which was completely devastated in the war, could provide with great effort. Objectively, it must be born in mind that there was a lack of all life necessities and transport resources worldwide, and that objectively, greater Soviet assistance could not have been expected. The exchange of goods was carried out by regular annual trade agreements and special contracts. The Investment Agreement of 1947 should have had great significance, according to which the USSR was supposed to deliver to Yugoslavia the goods necessary for the implementation of the Five-Year Plan in the amount of \$135 million.²³ On the basis of the agreements reached, the Soviet government tried to strengthen and accelerate the development of economic relations between the two countries, and establish its own influence in that country. Yugoslavia imported metals, oil, rubber, newsprint paper and solid fuels from the Soviet Union. For larger export contingents, the decision was made by the Soviet government. Most of the

²¹ M. Perišić, *Od Stalina ka Sartru: formirane jugoslovenske inteligencije na evropskim univerzitetima 1945–1958* (Beograd, 2008), pp. 225–226.

²² AVPRF, f. 6, o. 7, p. 15, d. 144, l. 18–26, Principal arguments of Soviet delegation for preparatory conference.

²³ About the economic situation in Yugoslavia after the World War II, see more in B. Petranović, S. Dautović, *Jugoslavija, velike sile i balkanske zemlje, 1945–1948. Iskustvo «narodne demokratije» kao partijske države* (Beograd, 1994).

problems arose with metal imports because metal was the most scarce resource at that time, so specifications and dimensions were often changed, and deliveries were delayed and prolonged, and the supplied models were often different from those required. A high degree of centralisation of Soviet foreign trade created special problems because Soviet companies could not, without the consent of their government, enter into independent arrangements. A series of regulations and bureaucratic restrictions hampered trade. The loading of goods took more time than anticipated due to a lack of proper transport capacity. Prices were set at the level of the world prices regardless of the political and ideological closeness of the two countries. The trade regime did not suit entrepreneurs used to more a liberal treatment of business partners. Moreover, the Yugoslav economy was not used to Soviet goods before the war, which was an additional problem.²⁴

The establishment of mixed companies started as a Yugoslav initiative. It was planned to form one mixed airline company and one that would be in charge of river traffic. For other mixed companies in which the Yugoslav side was interested (oil, black metallurgy, lead, aluminium and coal companies), certain commissions were tasked to get acquainted with the situation of the Yugoslav economy. In principle, it was agreed that these companies would not have a monopolistic character, to establish companies and mines for which the Soviet side would provide material that would enable these companies to develop rapidly, the parity would be ensured by equal initial capital investments. The Soviet side insisted on estimating value on the basis of actual prices while the Yugoslav side insisted on estimating the value of its investments on the world market with the deduction of a coefficient of obsolescence, and that the investments of the USSR and the new Yugoslav investments should be estimated based on the level of those in 1938 while adding a modernisation coefficient. The Soviets insisted only on the creation of a petroleum company among the proposed exploitation companies. Regarding a company for black metallurgy, the Soviet side committed itself to raising a metallurgical plant with appropriate facilities. As for the aluminium and bauxite companies, the Soviets agreed to build an alumina and aluminium factory in Strnišće, but they did not respond to the Yugoslav request for the construction of the same factory in the vicinity of Mostar. Negotiations on the creation of a mixed bank were postponed, its function depended on reaching agreements on other companies. The joint bank was conceived as a credit, accounting and treasury service for Soviet-Yugoslav joint-stock companies.²⁵

The first mixed economic Yugoslav-Soviet societies were created in 1947: the air transport society (JUSTA – Yugoslav-Soviet Joint Stock Company for Civil Aviation) and the River Transport Society (JUSPAD – Yugoslav-Soviet Danube Steamers' Joint Stock Company). The main objective of JUSPAD was the exploitation of river transport and construction of a shipyard. It turned out that these societies did not work in the interest of the development of Yugoslav transport and economy in general. JUSTA pushed out Yugoslav air transport from air traffic with abroad, and held the most profitable lines. Among the numerous problems that accompanied the work of JUSPAD, we would point

²⁴ AJ, 836-KMJ, I-1/ 7, Tito – Stalin Speeches, 27 V 1946.

²⁵ AVPRE, f. 6, o. 9, p. 81, l. 2–9, Report from Belgrade, 9 IX 1946.

out that the Soviet side did not abide by the obligation to invest funds, equipment and materials in the construction of Yugoslav river shipyards. Behind seemingly harmonious economic relations, there were essentially different views on their future. The Yugoslav side thought that stock companies would represent an important transmission of Soviet aid at the moment of intensification of industrialisation and the reorientation of the economy towards co-operation with the East, to which it was not accustomed.²⁶ Moreover, the formed companies did not request higher Soviet investments, which ultimately could not give the expected effects, and even less crucially influence the development of the Yugoslav economy. The unrealistic expectations, the limited Soviet aid, as well as the small volume of real cooperation were part of the cause of the future conflict between the Yugoslav and Soviet sides, with the economic factor having an extremely important role.

Although the USSR was in an unenviable economic situation, it made an effort to provide as much important assistance to the friendly country as possible. Soviet assistance to Yugoslavia came in different forms and had multiple importance. First of all, Yugoslavia was assisted by delivering significant quantities of food, industrial products and intermediate goods. The second segment of aid to Yugoslavia was military assistance that came in the form of arming the Yugoslav armed forces with weapons and military equipment, the training of Yugoslav officers in Yugoslavia, and the presence of Soviet instructors in Yugoslav army units, commands and facilities who were tasked with organising and training the Yugoslav army which was in the process of transformation from an armed guerrilla force into a regular organised military force.²⁷ Internal affairs services that were not reserved for the issues of independent activity in the territory of sovereign states cooperated also. The third important segment was the assistance in the field of education and culture, in the form of the education and training of Yugoslav experts, pupils and students in Yugoslavia, and the stay of Soviet specialists in Yugoslavia. The USSR also gave significant technical assistance to Yugoslavia by sending a large number of experts for the organisation of its economy, industry, agriculture, exploitation of mineral resources and the organisation of the state administration. In practice, there were often conflicts between Soviet experts and Yugoslav authorities, but such incidents were silenced and hidden from the public. They remained without publicity and were considered in partnership with the Soviet side.

At the end of 1947, there was a conflict between the Yugoslav and Soviet military leaders regarding the organisation of the Yugoslav naval forces. The Yugoslav side insisted on the creation of strong navy with a large number of fire ships and heavier torpedo boats, which the Soviet side opposed, stressing the need to build smaller, faster and more efficient naval units. Also, due to the losses suffered by the Soviet Black Sea Fleet during the war, the Soviets were unable to provide more assistance in the construction of the Yugoslav naval forces.²⁸ That is why until 1951, the Yugoslav navy relied on domestic shipbuilding

²⁶ KMJ, I-3-b/963, Report about Conversation with Stalin, April 1947.

²⁷ DAMFA, PA – strictly confidential, 1947, f. IV, document 166, Letter of lieutenant general Branko Poljanac, head of Military Mission of Yugoslav Army in the USSR to Assistant Head of the General Staff Lieutenant General Slavin, 3 III 1947.

²⁸ Belgrade Historical Archive (hereinafter: IAB), 1630, k. 3, Note, 28 III 1947.

and ships that were acquired from Germany and Italy for war reparations. Immediately after the end of the World War II, the Yugoslav Army faced major problems with regard to securing its military industrial base. Namely, during the war, most of Yugoslavia's military-industrial capacities were destroyed or dismantled and taken to Germany. Reliance on domestic capacities did not guarantee the rapid recovery of the military industry, and Soviet military aid and stockpiles of trophy armament and military equipment could not have refilled the arsenal, so the sole solution for the Yugoslav civilian and military leadership was to seek Soviet assistance in restoring existing and building new capacity for its military industry.²⁹

Although the newly signed interstate agreements of a political, military and economic character announced the development of future cooperation, already at the beginning of 1947, the first signs of a more serious crisis in Yugoslav-Soviet relations appeared. The crisis had a number of causes, and it also threatened to become a serious conflict that would have lasting consequences on the general relations between the two countries.³⁰ First of all, the Yugoslav side could not or did not want to realise that despite Soviet goodwill, Yugoslav aid was limited by its modest material capabilities. Both sides wanted to make the crisis unnoticeable from the outside and preserve intact external forms of intimate and allied relations. In the ensuing period, the crisis gradually began to emerge from relatively controlled frameworks and slowly began to slide into a serious and deep conflict whose contours were clearly seen at the end of 1947.

From the moment when its activity was prohibited by law in the 1920, and until the beginning of the World War II, the Yugoslav Communist Party acted secretly, following ideological instructions and patronage of the Comintern. The beginning of the World War II in Yugoslavia, and especially Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, represented the initial moment for the Yugoslav Communists to begin the anti-fascist Partisan war, and soon afterwards the civil war that was to result in the revolution. As the Soviet Union recognized the government of the Yugoslav kingdom in exile, the leadership of the Yugoslav partisans often came into conflict with Moscow in terms of war strategy, the taking of revolutionary measures and the compromise policy with the government representatives in emigration. The arrival of the Red Army in the Balkans and bringing the focus on the fighting taking place in Serbia represented the moment for the Yugoslav Communists to begin the process of taking over power in Yugoslavia. Supported by Soviet military forces on the ground and by the allies, in the final phases of the war, they gradually established control over the entire Yugoslav territory and gradually built up communist structures of power in a broad coalition with the remains of former civil political parties,

²⁹ About the situation in Yugoslav Army during 1946 and 1947, see more in B. Dimitrijević, *Jugoslovenska armija 1945–1954. Nova ideologija, vojnik i oružje* (Beograd, 2006); B. Dimitrijević, *Jugoslovensko ratno vazduhoplovstvo 1942–1992* (Beograd, 2006).

³⁰ AJ, 836-KMJ, I-3-b/639, Report of Yugoslav Ambassador from Moscow, 19 IV 1947.

within which the Communists played a decisive role. For the Yugoslav communists, the Soviet revolutionary experience in the process of taking power and building basic state structures had a decisive role. Material and expert assistance was expected from the Soviet Union. The authorities were being structured by the image of the Soviet ones. Soviet brochures and professional manuals were translated. A large group of Yugoslav students were sent to Soviet universities for education. Soviet military experts were in charge of the organisation of the Yugoslav armed forces and state security authorities, while Yugoslav officers were trained in Soviet military schools and academies. In the economy, the nationalisation of industrial plants was carried out, and collectivisation began according to the Soviet model. From the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia received food, as well as the necessary machinery and raw materials for its industry. There was also the delivery of weapons and military equipment for the Yugoslav Army. As regards foreign policy, the Yugoslav communists followed the basic course of Soviet foreign policy in terms of relations with the West, their Balkan policies and proclaimed policy of strengthening relations with the countries of “national democracy”. However, Soviet patronage on the field collided with the intentions of an ambitious Yugoslav party leadership motivated by the success of anti-fascist struggle and revolution carried out in a complete strategic environment. Exaggerated Yugoslav expectations from the Soviet both in terms of providing material assistance and in terms of expected assistance on the international plane (the Trieste crisis, the demand for the occupation zone in Austria), the Soviet opposition to ambitious and unrealistic development plans and criticism of rural politics and the role of the communist party in Yugoslav society led to complications of mutual relations and the beginning of an open ideological conflict in 1947/48.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ARCHIVES

Archive of Yugoslavia

Belgrade Historical Archive

Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation

Russian Archive of Social and Political History

Printed archives

Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi 1945–1956. Zbornik dokumenata (Beograd, 2010).

STUDIES

Borhi L., *Hungary in the Cold War 1945–1956. Between the United States and the Soviet Union* (Budapest–New York, 2004).

Bystrova N., *SSSR i formirovanie voenno-blokovogo protivotoyaniya v Evrope 1945–1955 gg.* (Moskva, 2007).

- Dimić L., *Agitprop kultura. Agitpropovska faza kulturne politike u Srbiji 1945–1952* (Beograd, 1988).
- Dimitrijević B., *Jugoslovenska armija 1945–1954. Nova ideologija, vojnici i oružje* (Beograd, 2006).
- Dimitrijević B., *Jugoslovensko Ratno Vazduhoplovstvo 1942.–1992.* (Beograd, 2006).
- Gaddis J., *The Cold War* (London, 2005).
- Kennan G., *Realities of American Foreign Policy* (New Jersey, 1954).
- Miloradović G., *Lepota pod nadzorom: sovjetski kulturni uticaji u Jugoslaviji 1945–1955* (Beograd, 2012).
- Perišić M., *Od Stalina ka Sartru: formirane jugoslovenske inteligencije na evropskim univerzitetima 1945–1958* (Beograd, 2008).
- Petranović B., Dautović, S., *Jugoslavija, velike sile i balkanske zemlje, 1945–1948. Iskustvo «narodne demokratije» kao partijske države* (Beograd, 1994).
- Selinic S., Zivotic A., “Conversation Between Soviet and Yugoslav Delegation in Moscow (27 May – 12 June 1946)”, *Bulgarian Historical Review* 2009, no. 1–2.
- Weastad O.A., *The Global Cold War. Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (London, 2005).
- Zubok V., Pleshakov K., *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, 1996).
- Životić A., *Jugoslavija, Albanija i velike sile* (Beograd, 2011).

Communist Party of Yugoslavia between the Soviet Model and Revolutionary Experience (1945–1948). International Aspects of the Activity of the CPY

The end of the World War II at the same time marked the beginning of the breakup of the war coalition. The Soviet Union tried to consolidate its leading position in its own sphere of interest defined by inter-ally agreements made during the war. It was a heterogenous space in the national, political and economic sense where the local Communist parties that were envisaged to be a support to the future Sovietisation of the region, did not have a strong basis. The exceptions were Yugoslavia and, to some extent, Albania. The Yugoslav Communists, who managed to carry out a revolution during the anti-fascist struggle and in an absolutely strategic location, imposed themselves as an important ally. For the Yugoslav Communists, the Soviet Union represented not only an ally, but also the country that was a role model for the future transformation of the Yugoslav State and society, while for the Soviets Yugoslavia was more than a regional partner and faithful ally. Although the newly signed interstate agreements of a political, military and economic character announced the development of future cooperation, already at the beginning of 1947, the first signs of a more serious crisis in Yugoslav-Soviet relations appeared. The crisis had a number of causes, and it also threatened to become a serious conflict that would have lasting consequences for general relations between the two countries.

KEYWORDS

Yugoslavia, USSR, World War II, Communists, revolution, society, socialism

Komunistyczna Partia Jugosławii między modelem sowieckim a doświadczeniem rewolucyjnym (1945–1948). Międzynarodowe aspekty działań KPJ

Zakończenie II wojny światowej zbiegło się z początkiem rozpadu wojennej koalicji. ZSRR dążył do utrwalenia swej przywódczej roli we własnej strefie wpływu określonej porozumieniami zawartymi z sojusznikami w trakcie wojny. Był to obszar niejednorodny narodowo, politycznie i gospodarczo, w którym lokalne partie komunistyczne, mające się stać podporą przyszłej sowietyzacji regionu, nie cieszyły się silnym poparciem społecznym. Wyjątkami były Jugosławia i (w pewnym stopniu) Albania. Jugosłowiańscy komuniści, którym udało się przeprowadzić rewolucję w trakcie walki z faszyzmem, i to w niezwykle strategicznym regionie, jawili się jako ważny sojusznik. Dla jugosłowiańskich komunistów ZSRR był nie tylko sojusznikiem, ale zarazem krajem mającym służyć za wzór przyszłej transformacji państwa i społeczeństwa jugosłowiańskiego, zaś dla Sowietów Jugosławia była więcej niż tylko regionalnym partnerem i lojalnym sojusznikiem. Mimo że nowo podpisane międzypaństwowe traktaty polityczne, wojskowe i gospodarcze zapowiadały rozwój przyszłej współpracy, to już na początku 1947 r. pojawiły się pierwsze oznaki poważniejszego kryzysu w stosunkach jugosłowiańsko-sowieckich. Kryzys miał szereg przyczyn, a zarazem groził przerodzeniem się w poważny konflikt o trwałych skutkach dla ogólnych stosunków pomiędzy oboma krajami.

SŁOWA KLUCZOWE

Jugosławia, ZSRR, II wojna światowa, komuniści, rewolucja, społeczeństwo, socjalizm

ALEKSANDAR ŽIVOTIĆ – graduated from the Department of the History of Yugoslavia in the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade, in 2005. He gained his MSc, having defended the thesis *Yugoslavia and the Suez Crisis 1956–1957* at the abovementioned Department in 2007, where he also obtained his PhD degree in 2010, having defended his dissertation *Yugoslavia, Albania and Great Powers 1945–1961*. Between 2006 and 2012, he worked in the Institute of the Recent History of Serbia. From October 2012, he was Assistant Professor and then since June 2017 Associate Professor at the Department of the History of Yugoslavia in the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade University. He published the monographs: *Yugoslavia and the Suez Crisis 1956–1957* (Belgrade, 2008); *Yugoslavia and Arab-Israeli War 1967* (coauthored with D. Bogetic, 2010); *Yugoslavia, Albania and Great Powers 1945–1961* (Belgrade, 2011) and *A Unit of the Yugoslav People's Army on Sinai 1956–1967* (Belgrade, 2011), a collection of documents *Broken Monolith. Yugoslavia and World Politics 1942–1948* (Belgrade, 2012) coauthored with

Professor L. Dimic. In addition, he has authored *Yugoslav-Soviet Military Problems 1947–1957* (Belgrade, 2015); *Washington Conference 1951* (Belgrade, 2015); *Yugoslav-Soviet Relations 1939–1941* (Belgrade, 2016); a collection of documents *Yugoslavia-USSR. Summits and Talks at the Highest Level of the Leaders of Yugoslavia and the USSR 1965–1980* (Belgrade, 2016); *Международные отношения на Балканах в событиях и лицах* (Kursk, 2018); *Putnik's School of War. General Staff of the Army of the Kingdom of Serbia* (Belgrade, 2019); *Югославско-советские отношения 1939–1941* (РОССПЭН, Москва, 2019); *Югославско-советские военные противоречия 1947–1957* (РОССПЭН, Москва, 2019). He has edited 5 books of memoirs and published over 120 articles in national and foreign journals and collections of papers. He has been a visiting scholar in Moscow, Ljubljana, Athens, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw and London and a visiting professor in Moscow, Kursk and Ljubljana.

ALEKSANDAR ŽIVOTIĆ – dr, ukończył studia w Instytucie Historii Jugosłowiańskiej na Wydziale Filozoficznym w Belgradzie w 2005 r., tam też uzyskał w 2007 r. stopień magistra na podstawie pracy na temat Jugosławii i kryzysu sueskiego w latach 1956–1957, a także (w 2010 r.) doktorat na podstawie pracy na temat Jugosławii, Albanii i mocarstw światowych, w latach 1945–1961. W latach 2006–2012 pracował w Instytucie Historii Najnowszej Serbii. W październiku 2012 r. objął stanowisko adiunkta, a od czerwca 2017 r. – profesora nadzwyczajnego w Instytucie Historii Jugosławii na Wydziale Filozoficznym Uniwersytetu Belgradzkiego. Wydał szereg monografii: *Yugoslavia and the Suez Crisis 1956–1957* (Belgrad 2008); *Yugoslavia and Arab-Israeli War 1967* (we współpracy z Draganem Bogeticciem, 2010); *Yugoslavia, Albania and Great Powers 1945–1961* (Belgrad 2011); *A Unit of the Yugoslav People's Army on Sinai 1956–1967* (Belgrad 2011) oraz zbiór dokumentów *Broken Monolith. Yugoslavia and World Politics 1942–1948* (Belgrad 2012) (we współpracy z prof. Ljubodragiem Dimiciem), a także napisał *Yugoslav-Soviet Military Problems 1947–1957* (Belgrad 2015); *Washington Conference 1951* (Belgrad 2015) i *Yugoslav-Soviet Relations 1939–1941* (Belgrad 2016). Redagował zbiór dokumentów *Yugoslavia-USSR. Summits and Talks at the Highest Level of the Leaders of Yugoslavia and the USSR 1965–1980* (Belgrad 2016); *Международные отношения на Балканах в событиях и лицах* (Kursk 2018); *Putnik's School of War. General Staff of the Army of the Kingdom of Serbia* (Belgrad 2019); *Югославско-советские отношения 1939–1941* (Moskwa 2019), *Югославско-советские военные противоречия 1947–1957* (Moskwa 2019). Redagował pięć zbiorów wspomnień i ponad 120 artykułów w czasopiśmie krajowych i zagranicznych oraz monografiach wieloautorskich. Był badaczem wizytującym w Moskwie, Lublanie, Atenach, Pradze, Sofii, Warszawie i Londynie oraz profesorem wizytującym w Moskwie, Kursku i Lublanie.