

MAREK SIOMA

Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin

ORCID: 0000-0002-4222-7719

THE FIRST TWO YEARS AT THE WAWEL CASTLE. THE ORIGIN OF THE CONFLICT OVER MARSHAL JÓZEF PIŁSUDSKI'S COFFIN (1935–1937)

*The great man has fallen so seriously ill that
modern medicine is completely powerless against it.*

S. Składkowski, *Strzępy meldunków*,
Warsaw 1988, p. 238.

Polish society was not prepared for Józef Piłsudski's death¹. His health condition was kept secret – partly because of the fear of how he would react and partly because of the conviction that he was unlikely to pass away at the age of 68². Some still hoped for his recovery³. The fact that he was incurably ill was known only to very few people, and very few people were with him during his last days⁴. His illness was unofficially discussed several days before his decease, but it was not until 11 May, 1935, that it was formally

¹ Aleksandra Piłsudska reminisced: 'When the news of [Piłsudski's death] spread around the country, it was received with stupefaction. Very few people knew about my husband's illness. [...] People cried on the streets. The entire nation went into mourning'. See A. Piłsudska, *Wspomnienia*, ed. A. Adamczyk, Warsaw 2004, pp. 347.

² British Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden, after his meeting with Piłsudski on 2 IV 1935, recalled that he had not been told that the Marshal's health condition was so serious, A. Eden Earl of Avon, *Pamiętniki 1923–1938*, vol. I: *W obliczu dyktatorów*, ed. S. Zabiello, transl. J. Meysztowicz, Warsaw 1970, p. 133 (English edition, p. 168). For critical opinions regarding Piłsudski's health condition see: K.J. Zamorski, *Dzienniki (1930–1938)*, ed. R. Litwiński and M. Sioma, Warsaw 2011, pp. 332, 344, 350.

³ F.S. Składkowski, *Strzępy meldunków*, introduction by A. Garlicki, Warsaw 1988, p. 237.

⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 238–239.

revealed. This was clearly due to the necessity of cancelling the meeting he was scheduled to hold with the head of French diplomacy, Pierre Lavale⁵. Piłsudski died in Belweder, on 12 May 1935, at 8.45 pm, fortified with the rites of the Catholic Church – a fact which proved extremely important in the context of his burial⁶.

The Wawel conflict has already been covered by scholars who have focused mainly on its *meritum*. They reconstructed, among other things, the dispute which continued from 24 June to 21 July 1937, and involved the Cracow archbishop, Adam Stefan Sapięha, on the one hand, and Poland's highest authorities, including President Ignacy Mościcki, on the other. The priest, Jerzy Wolny, has based his account of the conflict on church archives. Piotr Cichoracki and Heidi Hein-Kircher utilized the materials of the Chief Committee for the Remembrance of Marshal Józef Piłsudski (henceforward referred to as the NK)⁷. The topic has also been covered by Paweł Kajzer⁸. However, it can hardly be considered exhaustive – significant aspects of it are omitted from the research mentioned above, and also from the coverage given to it by the political commentators of the day (concerned mainly with discussing the culminating moments of the conflict – from June-July 1937) and from a variety of minor publications devoted to it. What is absent from the existing studies is, above all, an analysis of where the conflict originated. This article is an attempt to explain its causes and to provide a broader perspective within which to view the first two years of its duration. As such, it covers the period from Piłsudski's death to the escalation of the conflict on the afternoon 23 June 1937, when Prime Minister Sławoj Felicjan-Składkowski handed in his resignation to the President of the Polish Republic who then refused to accept it⁹. According to Wolny, the cult of Piłsudski was thus elevated to the position of representing the authority of the Polish Republic¹⁰.

The article is based on documents kept in the Archive of Modern Records in Warsaw and the Archive of the Metropolitan Curia in Cracow. In what follows, I rely mainly on letters exchanged between President Ignacy Mościcki and General Bolesław Wieniawa Długoszowski (Head of the Chief Committee's Executive Department – hereinafter – the WWNK)¹¹ on the one hand, and the archbishop Sapięha on the other.

⁵ Paryż o wizycie warszawskiej, „Gazeta Polska”, no. 129, 11 V 1935, p. 2; A. Garlicki, *Józef Piłsudski 1867–1935*, Warsaw 1990, p. 696.

⁶ Priest Władysław Kornilowicz, in a letter to Archbishop Adam Sapięha on 13 V 1935, wrote: “I gave the sick man sacramental absolution, anointed him with holy oils, and granted him indulgence in the hour of his death. Archiwum Kurii Metropolitarnej w Krakowie 5 (hereinafter: AKMKr.), Teki Sapiężyńskie (hereinafter: TS), ref. no. XVI/2, p. 5, List, 13 V 1935; On the Marshal's illness see: dr S. Mozołowski, *O chorobie poprzedzającej zgon Marszałka Piłsudskiego*, „Gazeta Polska”, no. 297, 26 X 1935, p. 5 and dr A. Stefanowski, *Przebieg choroby Marszałka Józefa Piłsudskiego*, „Gazeta Polska”, no. 297, 26 X 1935, p. 5.

⁷ J. Wolny, *Konflikt wawelski*, in *Księga sapiężyńska*, vol. II: *Działalność kościelna i narodowa Adama Stefana Sapięhy*, ed. J. Wolny and R. Zawadzki, Cracow 1986, pp. 111–179; P. Cichoracki, *Legenda i polityka. Kształtowanie się wizerunku marszałka Józefa Piłsudskiego w świadomości zbiorowej społeczeństwa polskiego w latach 1918–1939*, Cracow 2005, p. 325–370; H. Hein-Kircher, *Kult Piłsudskiego i jego znaczenie dla państwa polskiego 1926–1939*, transl. Z. Owczarek, Warsaw 2008, pp. 163–168.

⁸ P. Kajzer, *Mauzoleum marszałka Józefa Piłsudskiego na Wawelu w latach 1935–1989*, Cracow 2018, pp. 183–205.

⁹ Zdumiewające zarządzenie ks. metropolity Sapięhy. Samowolna decyzja przeniesienia trumny Marszałka Piłsudskiego. Nieprzyjęta prośba o dymisję Rządu, „Gazeta Polska”, no. 173, 24 VI 1937, p. 1.

¹⁰ J. Wolny, *Konflikt wawelski...*, p. 123.

¹¹ Archiwum Akt Nowych (hereinafter: AAN), Naczelny Komitet Uczczenia Pamięci Marszałka Józefa Piłsudskiego. Wydział Wykonawczy (hereinafter: NKUPMJPWW), ref. no. 1, p. 1.

THE WAWEL, ONLY THE WAWEL

The exchange of views began as early as 13 May 1935. That day the President of the Polish Republic turned to the archbishop and respectfully asked him to accept General Wieniawa-Długoszowski 'on his mission'¹². Worth noting here is the fact that the request was not couched in the form of an order or a suggestion with which the archbishop would have to comply. One, of course, could hardly expect the letter to assume such a form in the existing situation. Handwritten, on hand-made paper that was embossed with the design of a white eagle, the letter was addressed to a high-ranking clergyman responsible for the Wawel Cathedral and the burials in the royal crypt. The President was thus led to consider it appropriate to "ask", which was all the easier for him, since his action concerned the person of Piłsudski.

The place of the Marshal's burial had not been selected in advance. While announcing his last will, at the end of April 1935, he commented on the choice of the Wawel as his final resting place by saying "So be it"¹³. It should be remarked here that it was Piłsudski himself who de facto chose where to be buried¹⁴. He left a note entitled: in the event of my death. This note was discovered on 14 May 1935, in the General Inspectorate of the Armed Forces¹⁵. It was seen by his adherents in no other terms than those of absolute enforceability. Sapięha offered his account of the circumstances of taking his decision on the Marshal's funeral in *Pro Memoria* on 19 May 1935. It contained no reference to the arrangements he made with the Marshal two years before¹⁶. After all, these 'arrangements' were made during an informal conversation. However, the conversation must have been quite significant, especially in view of the fact that the Marshal 'acceded' to the request from Sapięha who during his exchange with Piłsudski in the early autumn of 1933 was to suggest: 'Mister Marshal! You had better hurry up and die while I am still alive'¹⁷.

In his letter to Sapięha on May 13 1935, President Mościcki expressed a desire to discuss with the archbishop all 'the terms and conditions of laying the late Marshal's body to its final rest'¹⁸. However, it was the President's representative who was supposed to negotiate the details of the funeral ceremony¹⁹ and who was, according to Wieniawa-

¹² AKMKr., TS, ref. no. XVI/1, p. 1.

¹³ W. Jędrzejewicz, *Kronika życia Józefa Piłsudskiego 1867–1935*, vol. II: 1921–1935, London 1977, p. 510; A. Piłsudska, *Wspomnienia...*, p. 348.

¹⁴ J. Wolny, *Konflikt wawelski...*, p. 114.

¹⁵ A. Garlicki, *Józef Piłsudski...*, pp. 696–697.

¹⁶ The phrase *Pro memoria* was used by Jerzy Wolny based on a document handwritten by Sapięha on 19 May, 1935, see: J. Wolny, *Konflikt wawelski...*, p. 114; there is no references to it in the document produced two years later. See: *Pro memoria abpa A.S. Sapięhy o „konflikcie wawelskim”* [in:] *Księga sapiężyńska*, vol. II, pp. 174–179.

¹⁷ Quot. after: J. Wolny, *Konflikt wawelski...*, p. 114.

¹⁸ AKMKr., TS, XVI/1, p. 1, List Mościckiego do Sapięhy, 13 V 1935.

¹⁹ AKMKr., TS, ref. no. XVI/3a, p. 10, [handwritten document] „Dlaczego zgodziłem się wprowadzić do katedry na Wawelu Marszałka Piłsudskiego”, Cracow 19 V 1935.

-Długoszowski's biographer, expected to make sure that Sapieha would not try to prevent Piłsudski's burial in the Wawel²⁰. The President's letter coincided with the actions taken by the archbishop, who realised that the general public expected the Marshal to be buried in the royal cemetery²¹. In the afternoon of the same day, he summoned a meeting of the Chapter of the Wawel Cathedral, during which it was decided to conduct Mass for Józef Piłsudski. Members of the Chapter also expressed an opinion that 'if required, they should permit the burial'²². However, Sapieha had some doubts about the person of Piłsudski²³ and had to deal with the objections raised by the Polish nationalists. There also existed a written declaration that the laying to rest of the ashes of Juliusz Słowacki in 1927²⁴ was to be the last burial to take place in the Wawel necropolis. However, once he realised, still before his meeting with Wieniawa-Długoszowski in Liszki, that 'it was almost necessary to give in and accede to the request', he decided to act like a politician²⁵. A few days later, on 19 May 1935, convinced of having made the right decision, he explained that his aim was to channel the social discontent and to prevent a hostile agitation against the Church²⁶. Of importance was also the consent given to the burial by the Pope who granted a dispensation from the canon 1205& of the Code of Canon Law²⁷.

On 18 May 1935, following the extraordinary, and even pompous²⁸, ceremony and in compliance with the arrangements between Sapieha and Wieniawa-Długoszowski, Piłsudski's body was placed into a silver coffin with small 'windows' in the crypt of St Leonard.

²⁰ J.M. Majchrowski, *Ulubieniec Cezara Bolesław Wieniawa-Długoszowski. Zarys biografii*, Wrocław-Warsaw-Cracow 1990, p. 181; Józef Warszawski suggested that Wieniawa-Długoszowski had not been appointed the NK's delegate in Cracow by accident. 'Only so brave a man' could be expected to succeed in making Sapieha, who was opposed to Piłsudski's burial in the Wawel, change his mind. See: J. Warszawski, *Studia nad wyznaniowością Józefa Piłsudskiego*, London 1978, p. 197.

²¹ AKMKr., TS, ref. no. XVI/3a, p. 10, [handwritten document] „Dlaczego zgodziłem się wprowadzić do katedry na Wawelu Marszałka Piłsudskiego”, Cracow 19 V 1935.

²² *Ibidem*.

²³ In expressing his doubts, Sapieha stated that there were many things about Piłsudski's behaviour that were wrong and inconsistent with such great distinction (being buried in the Wawel Cathedral), and that deserved to be strongly criticised. Especially his unfortunate and harmful surroundings have destroyed the image of him and his deeds. See *ibidem*.

²⁴ *Ibidem*.

²⁵ *Ibidem*.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 11.

²⁷ A. Vetulani, *Arcypasterz krakowski na przełomie epok Adam Stefan Sapieha w latach 1912–1939* [in:] *Kościół w II Rzeczypospolitej*, eds. Z. Zieliński, S. Wilk, Lublin 1981, pp. 119–120. §2. stated: „In ecclesiis cadavera ne sepeliantur, nisi agatur de cadaveribus Episcoporum residentialium, Abbatum vel Praelatorum nullius in propria ecclesia sepeliendis, vel Romani Pontificis, regalium personarum aut S.R.E. Cardinalium”. Zob. *Codex Iuris Canonici PII X Pontificis Maximi iussu digestus Benedicti Papae XV auctoritate promulgatus*, 1917, part II, p. 344, <https://www.pbc.rzeszow.pl/dlibra/publication/19164/edition/17423/content?ref=desc> [accessed 30 VI 2021].

²⁸ J. Jędrzejewicz, *Kronika życia Józefa Piłsudskiego...*, pp. 514–520; M. Gałęzowski, A. Przewoźnik, *Gdy Wódz odchodził w wieczność... Uroczystości żałobne po śmierci Marszałka Józefa Piłsudskiego 12–18 maja 1935 r.*, Warsaw 2005; Paweł Marek Mrowiński drew attention to an interesting similarity between the funeral ceremonies of Piłsudski and Słowacki. See: P.M. Mrowiński, „Bo królom był równy...” *Sprowadzenie szczątków Juliusza Słowackiego w 1927 roku jako dramat społeczny Victora Turnera*, „Vade Nobiscum” 2019, vol. XXI, p. 137.



Aleksandra Piłsudska at her husband's coffin in St Leonard's Crypt, 18 May 1935. Source: National Digital Archives (NAC) sign. 1-A-209-237.

WHAT ABOUT THAT COFFIN?

The Marshal's body was to be eventually laid to rest in the crypt under the Tower of the Silver Bells. This idea has never been regarded as a matter of controversy – especially as it eventually came to fruition²⁹. However, the analysis of sources shows that Sapieha and Wieniawa-Długoszowski were initially opposed to transferring the body³⁰. The archbishop changed his mind due to the great interest attracted by the Marshal's symbolic grave and the consequent threat posed by the 'pilgrims' for the remaining sarcophaguses found in St Leonard's crypt³¹. Worth mentioning here is the fact that the crypt is not large and everyone could touch the coffin located in the middle of it (photograph 2).

Iconographic material collected in the National Digital Archives (NAC) presents another riddle. It needs to be explained what coffin was actually displayed during the

²⁹ J.M. Majchrowski, *Ulubieniec Cezara...*, p. 183; AAN, NKUPMJP.WW, ref. no. 14, p. 307, List Sapiehy do Wieniawy-Długoszowskiego, 25 XI 1935.

³⁰ AAN, NKUPMJP.WW, ref. no. 14, p. 307, p. 314, List Sapiehy do Wieniawy-Długoszowskiego, 30 VI 1935.; It should be added that Sapieha changed his mind because of the public demands for depositing the body in a place reserved only for the Marshal. See: *ibidem*.

³¹ For more on the problem see: P. Kajzer, *Mauzoleum Marszałka...*, pp. 77–88.



Visitors looking at Józef Piłsudski's embalmed body, May 1935, Source: the National Digital Archive (NAC), sign. 1-A-326.

first few months which followed Józef Piłsudski's death. Assuming the dating of the photographs to be correct, it must be stated that for the first three months the body was exhibited in a coffin resting on the platform (photographs 1 and 2). Before 18 August 1935, the space around the coffin was rearranged. A wooden fence (most probably) was added. After 18 August the body was transferred to a silver coffin where it was clearly visible (photograph 3)³². This conclusion is drawn from the analysis of the photograph from NAC (catalogue number 1-A-313). It has not been possible to establish the exact date of transferring the body, and it seems even more difficult to offer a convincing explanation of why it was transferred.

Why was the silver coffin removed? Should this be put down to emotional (providing visitors with a better view of the 'sleeping' Marshal) or practical reasons? The answer may lie in Sapięha's letter to Jan Humpola on 5 June 1935, in which the archbishop asked the private chaplain to the President of the Polish Republic to intervene with Mościcki over the Marshal's ultimate resting place, the sarcophagus and the coffin's leakage³³. The last point,

³² This conclusion is formulated based on the analysis of the photograph from the National Digital Archives, ref. no. 1-A-313, in <https://audiovis.nac.gov.pl/obraz/23525/ec53fc9adabe15dc99e78d028a1fcd86/> [accessed 27 V 2021]; Paweł Kajzer argued that it had taken place on 21 X 1935, see: Kajzer, *Mauzoleum Marszałka...*, p. 162.

³³ AKMKr., TS, XVI/4a, p. 14, List Sapięhy do „Przewielebnego Księdza” (Jana Humpoli), 5 VI 1935.



The crystal coffin containing Józef Piłsudski's body, August 1935, Source: the National Digital Archive (NAC), sign. 1-A-319.

which may seem rather unimportant, was actually essential to the exhibition of the body. The problem was serious not only from the medical point of view. An army doctor, writes Wolny, 'was busy working at nights on the poorly embalmed body'³⁴ – a fact suggesting that the doctors from Warsaw were in a rush and committed mistakes³⁵. The reason for replacing the silver coffin with a crystal one was thus to provide a better protected space for the Marshal's body. This state of affairs indicate that the efforts undertaken to improve the process of embalming the body were effective. The body was exhibited in this way for the next four months, until 22 December 1935, when the NK consented to replace it in a closed coffin (in fact in a bronze sarcophagus)³⁶. The latter decision was enforced by Sapieha who in his letter to the NK's chairman on 3 November 1935, demanded that "the glass coffin be placed within a metal one and then, after appropriate adjustments, transferred to the crypt under the Tower of the Silver Bells, accessed directly from the outside"³⁷. It seems that the corpse was not transferred into the silver coffin. This is

³⁴ J. Wolny, *Konflikt wawelski...*, pp. 119–120; P. Kajzer, *Mauzoleum Marszałka...*, p. 161.

³⁵ In this context it is difficult to understand the opinion expressed by Paweł Kajzer who claimed that 'at the beginning the process of embalming went according to plan and until the end of 1935 the embalmed body was in good condition'. See: P. Kajzer, *Mauzoleum Marszałka...*, p. 183.

³⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 164.

³⁷ J. Wolny, *Konflikt wawelski...*, p. 121.

indicated by the size of both coffins and by the photographs that provide no evidence to the contrary. It is worth noting that the decision to change the venue of the burial did not resolve the issue of preserving and storing the body. The possibility of using a silver coffin coated with bakelite was still under consideration, as was the proposal to change the Marshal's dress. In the mid 1936 the chairman of the NK Medical Board General Stanisław Rouppert estimated the total cost at 50 000 zlotys (30 000 – the coffin and 20 000 – the Marshal's dress). This sum was quite substantial and the NK, as we are told by Piotr Cichoracki, could not afford to pay it³⁸.

THE DISPUTE. EPISODE ONE – A CRYPT, BUT WHICH ONE?

The consent to using a different coffin did not mean consent to act on the second proposal. The issue of transferring the body to another crypt, which Sapięha mentioned in his letter to Humpola on 5 June 1935 in the hope that 'it could be taken care of by the President himself, 'which is clearly the most desirable way of handling the situation'³⁹, gave rise to the conflict of 1937. Both sides of the conflict held different views of where to transfer the coffin. Realizing possible complications, Sapięha expected fast action. Towards the end of June 1935, he consented to move the coffin to under the Tower of the Silver Bells, noting that 'the access there is easier and the place is so honourable and so closely linked to the Castle and the Cathedral that transferring the body there will not look like much of a change'⁴⁰. He was even ready to go to Warsaw and meet with Wieniawa-Długoszowski and Prime Minister Walery Sławek to 'definitively settle the matter'⁴¹. The meeting actually took place, but it is hard to establish when both men met. When the meeting was over, Sapięha went away to undergo some treatment and the talks continued at a lower level.

Talks at the highest level were resumed, in changed circumstances, in September 1935, following the official visit paid to the Wawel Castle by the NK's delegation made up of Professor Wojciech Jastrzębowski, journalist Wojciech Stpiczynski, the representative of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs – engineer Stanisław Zaykowski, and the two representatives of the Cracow voivode – engineer Julian Wąsowski and engineer Józef Mach. The visit took place on 16 August and was attended by Father Stanisław Domasik, Canon of the Cracow Metropolitan Chapter. The conclusions of this 'special commission' suggested that it was most advisable for the Marshal's body to be laid to rest in... the treasury vault. Although one must say that Voivode Władysław Raczkiewicz did not fail to mention that no work would begin without 'Your Excellency's permission'⁴². It should

³⁸ P. Cichoracki, *Naczelny Komitet Uczczenia Pamięci Marszałka Józefa Piłsudskiego 1935–1939 – mechanizmy działania*, „Dzieje Najnowsze” 2002, no. 4, pp. 37–50.

³⁹ AKMKr., TS, XVI/4a, p. 14, List Sapięhy do „Przewielebnego Księdza” (Jana Humpoli), 5 VI 1935.

⁴⁰ AAN, NKUPMJP.WW, ref. no. 14, p. 314–315, List Sapięhy do Wieniawy-Długoszowskiego, 30 VI 1935.; AKMKr., TS, XVI/5, p. 15, List Sapięhy do Wieniawy-Długoszowskiego, 30 VI 1935.

⁴¹ AAN, NKUPMJP.WW, ref. no. 14, p. 315, List Sapięhy do Wieniawy-Długoszowskiego, 30 VI 1935.

⁴² AKMKr., TS, XVI/6, p. 18, List wojewody krakowskiego Władysława Raczkiewicza do Sapięhy, 29 VIII 1935.

be added that Professor Alfred Szyszko-Bohusz, who was in charge of the revitalisation of the Wawel Castle, was also the member of the Commission. However, he was not present during the visit mentioned above.

This phase of dealing with the Marshal's funeral was crucial to the conflict which in June 1937 would culminate in the public action against the archbishop. However, by the time it reached its climax, it had for two years continued at different levels, involving different people and concerning different issues. The two professors, each convinced of being right, were particularly fierce in arguing with one another over the look of the crypt. There was certainly some pettiness involved.

It is clear that the scope of the work to be carried out in the Wawel Cathedral, which can be inferred from the Technical Commission's proposals, could not gain approval from Sapięha who gave three reasons for refusing to support the proposed solution⁴³. All of the reasons concerned the vestry-vault⁴⁴. This was not the answer Raczkiewicz expected, especially because without Sapięha's formal permission, even preparatory work could not get off the ground. It must be noted that by mid-September 1935 work on the Marshal's final resting place had not only not begun, but the place had not even been selected. At the same time, the dispute was becoming increasingly visible. In October 1935 the archbishop's letter was discussed by the NK members who decided that 'General Wieniawa would go and personally sort the matter out with Sapięha'⁴⁵. It remains unknown whether the meeting was held. Both officials may have spoken over the phone⁴⁶. However, such a conversation seems unlikely in view of Sapięha's next letter, dated 3 November 1935. In it, the archbishop expressed concerns over press reports regarding the NK's plans for the Marshal's funeral, while at the same time reiterating his demand for the body to be enclosed in a metal coffin. He was afraid that the NK members had postponed resolving the issue in a way 'consistent with what we discussed'. There is no doubt that Piłsudski's coffin became a kind of easement for Sapięha. By interpellating Wieniawa-Długoszowski, whom he saw as a reasonable interlocutor, he sought a rapid and lasting solution to the issue. In pursuing this goal, he did not hesitate to turn to the president and ask him to 'step in with his authority'. At the end of the letter Sapięha assumed a harsher tone: 'I am expecting conclusions regarding the crypt. As I have realized, the only acceptable venue is that under the Tower of the Silver Bells, which is to be accessed directly from the outside. It is necessary to make a decision and get work started'⁴⁷.

⁴³ AKMKr., TS, XVI/7, p. 21–21v, Protokół spisany w wyniku konferencji odbytej w dniu 16 VIII 1935. w Urzędzie Wojewódzkim Krakowskim w przedmiocie urzędzenia krypty ś.p. Marszałka Józefa Piłsudskiego pod Skarbem Katedry Wawelskiej.

⁴⁴ AAN, NKUPMJP.WW, ref. no. 14, p. 309–310, Pismo Sapięhy do wojewody Władysław Raczkiewicza, 16 IX 1935.

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 309.

⁴⁶ See: AAN, NKUPMJP.WW, ref. no. 14, p. 312–313, Odręczny list Sapięhy do Wieniawy-Długoszowskiego, 4 VII 1935.

⁴⁷ AKMKr., TS, XVI/8, p. 24, List Sapięhy do Wieniawy-Długoszowskiego; the letter that reached the WWNK chairman did not contain the word 'soon'. See: AAN, NKUPMJP.WW, ref. no. 14, p. 308, List Sapięhy do Wieniawy-Długoszowskiego, 3 XI 1935, crossed out in the original text.

This firm approach proved effective. Two weeks later, on 18 November 1935, Wieniawa-Długoszowski and Father Domasik agreed that the crypt under the Tower of the Silver Bells would serve as the Marshal's final resting place⁴⁸. They also agreed that by 25 December 1935 the coffin would be closed and people would no longer be allowed to visit it⁴⁹. The WWNK also appointed a special commission⁵⁰ to carry out the task of preparing the crypt. The NK Head also declared that the cost incurred in the execution of the task would be covered by the NK – in accordance with the estimations prepared by Professor Szyszko-Bohusz and confirmed by the WWNK⁵¹.

However, it was not long before difficulties were encountered in the attempt to execute these decisions. They arose mainly because of the insufficient communication between the NK and the Ministry of Military Affairs. It turned out that it would not be possible to close the coffin within the time limit agreed upon by Domasik and Długoszowski, since Minister of Military Affairs, General Tadeusz Kasprzycki, had ordered the troops of all divisions to stand guard of honour by the crystal coffin. Only after this order had been carried out could the coffin be closed⁵². It is quite characteristic that officials from the Ministry of Military Affairs did not feel the need to inform either the archbishop or even Długoszowski of their plans. Consequently, it was only on 10 December 1935 that the latter asked Sapieha to postpone the closure of the coffin by one week, and Kasprzycki ordered Commander of the 5th Corps District General Aleksander Narbut-Łuczyński to apologise to the archbishop on behalf of the Minister. Sapieha was also asked to reschedule the event to 22 December⁵³.

The archbishop of Cracow complied with the request on, most probably, 11 December 1935. At that time, the mutual relations, especially those between Wieniawa-Długoszowski and Sapieha, were exemplary. The two men aimed for a rapid resolution of the issue, treating each other with courtesy and promptly responding to one another's proposals. Testifying to this is the letter which the NK chairman wrote to Sapieha on 12 December 1935. In it, the chairman expressed satisfaction about the agreement regarding the date of closing the coffin. He also informed the archbishop that the coffin 'will be ready by 22 December, which is also the day on which the body will be enclosed in it. A ceremony to celebrate this occasion will be simple. General Narbut-Łuczyński is in charge of it.

⁴⁸ The evaluation was prepared by Professor Jastrzębowski on 14 IX 1935. Jastrzębowski expressed an opinion that the crypt would remain in this provisional state 'for some 20–30 years'. See: AAN, NKUPMJP.WW, ref. no. 14, p. 342, List W. Jastrzębowski do Wieniawy-Długoszowskiego, 14 XI 1935.

⁴⁹ AKMKr., TS, ref. no. XVI/8a, p. 26, dated 18 XI 1935.

⁵⁰ In performing its tasks, the Commission included the following people: Wieniawa-Długoszowski (the chairman), Wojciech Stpiczyński (the deputy chairman), Professor Jastrzębowski (the chairman of the WWNK planning section), Professor Bohdan Pniewski and Professor Aleksander Bojewski (both from Warsaw) and Professor Alfred Szyszko-Bohusz, architect Franciszek Mączyński, architect Bohdan Treter (from Cracow). See: AKMKr., TS, ref. no. XVI/9, p. 27, List Wieniawy-Długoszowskiego do Sapiehy, 27 XI 1935.

⁵¹ *Ibidem*.

⁵² This was how Wieniawa-Długoszowski put it in his letter to Sapieha on 10 X 1935. In reality the Marshal's body was to be transferred to a new coffin-sarcophagus, to be made of bronze.

⁵³ AKMKr., TS, ref. no. XVI/10, p. 31, List Wieniawy-Długoszowskiego do Sapiehy, 10 XII 1935 na blankiecie „Dowódca 2. Dywizji Kawalerii”.

I have already discussed with him the form it should take. There will be no one from Warsaw but me and some doctors who will transfer the body⁵⁴. In this way the first dispute came to an end.

THE DISPUTE. EPISODE TWO – THE DECORATION OF THE CRYPT

Grounds for the second dispute appeared soon after the first one was over, and concerned the design work carried out on commission from Professor Szyszko-Bohusz. Professor Jastrzębowski went so far as to state that ‘these far-reaching changes seem out of place. It is certainly advisable to put the vaults in order, but the matter had been overemphasised in relation to the small crypt intended for the Marshal’⁵⁵. It is true that the NK provisionally accepted the design of ‘Piłsudski’s crypt’, but it also called for the reconstruction costs to be decreased and the renovation of the chapels of the Vasas and Potockis to be excluded from the whole project. In a letter to Professor Szyszko-Bohusz, Wieniawa-Długoszowski stated that ‘in addition to the renovation of the Tower of the Silver Bells, cost estimates should cover the expenses of only that which involves constructing the crypt and securing some access to it’⁵⁶. The manager of the Wawel renovation took these instructions into account, as reflected in the cost estimates sent to the WWNK on 17 January 1936⁵⁷. Two days before it was sent to Warsaw, the project was approved by Sapieha. Another step towards creating Piłsudski’s crypt was made, but work could not be started without the NK’s authorisation of both documents and without... money. The NK met these requirements during its session of February 1936, of which the archbishop was informed by Kazimierz Świtalski who also told Sapieha that he had been appointed the NK’s delegate in Cracow and that his main task was to ‘supervise the financing and construction of the crypt’⁵⁸. Świtalski also said that he had received an advance of 50 000 zloty to cover the expenses of building the crypt and ‘asked Sapieha to authorise Father Domasik as the parish priest of the Wawel Cathedral to grant the manager in charge of building the crypt permission to start work’⁵⁹. In his response six days later, Sapieha gave his permission to start construction work and expressed satisfaction that the allocated sum was in the neighbourhood of 200 000 zlotys. He wrote: ‘It is only right and proper for the sum to be expressed “in the neighbourhood of”, for these old and respectful walls make it difficult to predict all things that may have to be done in constructing the crypt and to estimate all costs that may eventually prove higher than

⁵⁴ AKMKr., TS, ref. no. XVI/11, p. 33, List Wieniawy-Długoszowskiego do Sapiehy, 12 XII 1935.

⁵⁵ AAN, NKUPMJ.P.WW, ref. no. 14, p. 340, List W. Jastrzębowski do Wydziału Wykonawczego, 26 XI 1935.

⁵⁶ AKMKr., TS, ref. no. XVI/12, p. 35, Pismo NKUPMJ.P.WW L.dz. 788/35/V, 12 XII 1935.

⁵⁷ AAN, NUKPMJ.P.WW, ref. no. 14, p. 278, Odręczne pismo Szyszko-Bohusza do NK, 17 I 1936.; Total cost estimates amounted to 231 823,25 zlotys. See: *ibidem*, p. 281–295, Kosztorys na wykonanie krypty Marszałka Polski Józefa Piłsudskiego w Katedrze na Wawelu (17 I 1936).

⁵⁸ AKMKr., TS, ref. no. XVI/13, p. 38, Pismo wojewody krakowskiego K. Świtalskiego, 21 II 1936.

⁵⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 38v.

anticipated⁶⁰. Undoubtedly, there was a reverse side to Sapieha's tactful and courteous letter. The archbishop was fully aware of the bad condition of the Wawel buildings and took the precaution of praising the decision to allocate a sum 'in the neighbourhood of'. This flexible approach was adopted irrespective of the fact that Sapieha's subordinate, Professor Szyszko-Bohusz, in estimating the cost of all works, offered the exact amount of 231 823,25 zlotys. It should be added here that money was not an issue in the conflict, as indicated by the report of the work carried out⁶¹. If the construction was brought to a halt, it was not because the budget earmarked for it was overspent, but because the way in which it was carried out was inconsistent with the project. The conflict regarding this issue arose in mid-1936.

As can be seen from the account above, the real work started only at the beginning of March 1936 and did not embrace all the elements of the crypt. Neither the project nor cost estimates took into account a sarcophagus in which to place the coffin. Although it has never been created, in the mid-1930s it became a matter of controversy⁶². Sapieha mentioned it in his letter to Świtalski on 27 February 1936 in which he reserved the right to consent to the sarcophagus' design in order, as he put it, 'to avoid possible misunderstandings'. In his opinion both parties should announce a contest for creating the sarcophagus, but this was not how things unfolded⁶³.

The work begun in the spring of 1936 proceeded quite smoothly, but at the end of May it was brought to a halt. Particularly interesting is the sequence of events that brought the halt about. It was Sapieha who triggered it, most probably when responding to a letter he received from the NK. Although the letter does not survive, its existence is indicated by Domasik's letter dated 24 May 1936. In recounting the details of the renovation work, Canon Domasik noted that he knew nothing about placing Szyszko-Bohusz's personal coat of arms within the crypt. He understood the decision to stop the work, but asked that it apply only to Pilsudski's crypt, and not to the Tower, whose renovation was about to be completed. He also added that he would only permit work approved by *Celsissimum*⁶⁴. In his opinion, suspending the work altogether could spark off a protest from 40 workers and deepen Szyszko-Bohusz's bitter mood. Domasik had a high opinion of the professor's work. He informed Sapieha that Szyszko-Bohusz wanted to use the saved money to renovate the most ruined parts of the chapel of the Vasas⁶⁵. The archbishop could not have received the letter immediately, since on 25 May 1936, Szyszko-Bohusz received from him an order to stop work on the crypt 'because of the coat of arms which was installed on the Tower without Sapieha's knowledge'⁶⁶. Since Szyszko-Bohusz

⁶⁰ AKMKr., TS, ref. no. XVI/14, p. 41, Pismo Sapiehy do Świtalskiego, 27 II 1936.

⁶¹ AAN, NKUPMJP.WW, ref. no. 14, p. 277, Pismo Osieńskiego do Szyszko-Bohusza, 9 VI 1936.

⁶² The gypsum model of the sarcophagus by Jan Szczepkowski, the contest's winner, is kept in the Church in Milanówek. It is not exhibited. See: <https://www.polskieradio.pl/130/5561/Artykul/1718247,Sarkofag-dla-marszalka-Jozefa-Pilsudskiego-Mamy-obowiazek-to-zrobic> [accessed 27 V 2020].

⁶³ AKMKr., TS, ref. no. XVI/14, p. 41–42, Pismo Sapiehy do Świtalskiego, 27 II 1936; The contest was unilaterally announced by the NK on 25 XI 1936. See: *Konkurs na sarkofag J. Pilsudskiego na Wawelu*, [Warsaw, 25 XI 1936 roku], pp. 1–3. This formally took place on 1 XII 1936. See: P. Kajzer, *Mauzoleum Marszałka...*, p. 167.

⁶⁴ AKMKr., TS, ref. no. XVI/20, p. 56v, Pismo ks. S. Domasika, 24 V 1936.

⁶⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 57, underlined in the original.

⁶⁶ AKMKr., TS, ref. no. XVI/16, p. 47, Odręczne pismo Szyszko-Bohusza do Sapiehy, 28 V 1936.

offered adequate explanations, the whole matter did not give rise to any serious conflict. However, it illustrates at least two significant things. The first concerns the insufficient exchange of information between the two sides, while the second relates to the existence of minor disputes not only between the NK and the Metropolitan Curia, but also within the Church. The incident was quickly cleared up. In a letter, dated 28 May 1936, Szyszko-Bohusz assured Sapieha of his true devotion⁶⁷. The archbishop accepted these assurances⁶⁸, for which Szyszko-Bohusz thanked him in a letter dated 30 May 1936, declaring: 'I will always do my best not to disappoint your trust'⁶⁹. The absence of sources makes it impossible to determine who drew Sapieha's attention to the coat of arms mentioned above. There are grounds to suggest that it may have been the WWNK, whose members were becoming increasingly critical of the discrepancy between the project and the existing state of affairs. This discrepancy concerned, among other things, the coat of arms⁷⁰. At that time, the situation was very dynamic and emotions blinded those involved in the conflict to the way things really were. The WWNK was so dissatisfied with the pace and quality of the work that it rejected the report of the Cracow Conservation Commission led by Michał Gnoiński, which on 4 June 1936 found Professor Szyszko-Bohusz's project doable and in line with the conservationist principles, thus accepting the outward descent near the chapel of the Potockis⁷¹. Sapieha, too, had some reservations regarding the entrance to the crypt. Szyszko-Bohusz, acting on the NK's request of 11 July 1936⁷², drew up a plan for a new entrance from behind the cemetery wall⁷³. In mid-July he presented the plan to the archbishop who, on 19 July 1936, introduced it to the Chapter of the Wawel Cathedral that rejected it. On the following day, Sapieha, in a letter conveyed to the NK by Szyszko-Bohusz, stated that 'making changes to the project so many times delays the work, creates chaos, and defers the transfer of the body to its final resting place'⁷⁴. This way of putting the matter indicates that the archbishop was increasingly concerned about changes suggested by Warsaw. There can be no doubt that from the perspective of Cracow and especially of the Wawel Castle, the renovation work, although improving the condition of the royal necropolis, disorganized the liturgical activity and above all disturbed... the peace of the dead. The only way out of the situation was to transfer Piśludski's coffin and finish the whole work as fast as possible.

However, Warsaw took a different view of things. The WWNK members were guided by a desire to build a crypt that would be simple and austere in form, but at the same time worthy of the First Marshal of Poland. Not without significance was the remark of the author of the plan for the new entrance who wrote: I think that the NK can settle the issue of the new entrance directly with the archbishop by transferring the ownership

⁶⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁸ AKMKr., TS, ref. no. XVI/21a, p. 65, List Sapiehy do Szyszko-Bohusza, 29 V 1936.

⁶⁹ AKMKr., TS, ref. no. XVI/17, p. 50, Odręczny list Szyszko-Bohusza do Sapiehy, 30 V 1936.

⁷⁰ AAN, NKUPMJP.WW, ref. no. 14, p. 346, Odpis uchwały Wydziału Wykonawczego, 1 VI 1937.

⁷¹ *Ibidem*, p. 199, Pismo wojewody krakowskiego do WW NK, 22 VI 1936.

⁷² *Ibidem*, p. 268, Pismo Wieniawy-Długoszowskiego do Szyszko-Bohusza, 11 VII 1936.

⁷³ *Ibidem*, p. 337, Pismo Szyszko-Bohusza do Wieniawy-Długoszowskiego, 22 VII 1936.

⁷⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 338, Protokół z posiedzenia Komisji Konkursowej na Sarkofag, 19 V 1937.

of the scrap of land that will take up part of the descent into the crypt's vestibule to the Cathedral Chapter.⁷⁵ No one from the NK picked up on this suggestion, which meant that Sapieha's decision to reject the plan for the new entrance remained in force. On 25 July 1936, three days after he received explanations from Szyszko-Bohusz, Tadeusz Brzek-Osiński, who served as secretary to the WWNK sent the correspondence mentioned above and 'the sketch of the crypt with an alternative entrance to it'⁷⁶ to Jastrzębowski for evaluation. A few days later, the professor replied to Wieniawa-Długoszowski that the last design of the entrance to the crypt under the Tower of the Silver Bells was the best and 'should therefore be adhered to'. He was also convinced that 'it would be possible to talk the archbishop into accepting it'⁷⁷. It should also be added that Professor Jastrzębowski was very enthusiastic in his support of the new entrance and highlighted all its merits. He made three small observations and declared that he was ready to go to Cracow and 'discuss them with Professor Szyszko-Bohusz'⁷⁸.

Nothing is known about the two artists meeting at that time in the old capital. The available sources indicate that on 8 August 1936, Szyszko-Bohusz informed Sapieha of the progress made, drawing his attention to the necessity of ordering a 'masonry machine to be used in the crypt's vestibule'⁷⁹. It would be nothing out of the ordinary, if it were not for the fact that the letter's content, and to an even greater extent its tone, were indicative of the confidence with which these decisions must have been made. Although Szyszko-Bohusz asked about Sapieha's commitment to his decision of 20 July 1936, he was actually convinced of its irrevocability⁸⁰. In his reply, dated the next day, Sapieha maintained his position. He also stated that no one from the NK had asked him to change it, and that it did not matter because he would not have done so anyway⁸¹. The inaction of the WWNK during that period seems hard to understand. It is also hard to suppose that the NK members tried to "play for time", especially as Sapieha kept pressing them to hasten the design and construction work. Szyszko-Bohusz, too, left no doubt as to where he stood on the matter. In a letter sent to the WWNK on 24 August 1936, he wrote that if the NK 'made no decision by the end of the week, he would continue to carry out his work according to the initial plan'⁸². Szyszko-Bohusz's position was confirmed by the archbishop in a letter sent to the NK on 27 August 1936. In it, Sapieha mentioned that a month earlier he refused to accept any changes to the design of the entrance to the crypt under the Tower of the Silver Bells⁸³.

⁷⁵ AAN, NKUPMJP.WW, ref. no. 14, p. 266, Pismo Szyszko-Bohusza do Wieniawy-Długoszowskiego, 22 VII 1936.

⁷⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 339, List Osińskiego do Jastrzębowskiego, 25 VII 1936.

⁷⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 336, List Jastrzębowskiego do Wieniawy-Długoszowskiego, 5 VIII 1936.

⁷⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁷⁹ AKMKr., TS, ref. no. XVI/18, p. 52, Pismo Szyszko-Bohusza do Sapiehy, 8 VIII 1936 o postępach prac nad kryptą.

⁸⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁸¹ AKMKr., TS, ref. no. XVI/19, p. 55, Pismo Sapiehy do Jaśnie wielmożnego Pana Rektora, 9 VIII 1936.

⁸² AAN, NKUPMJP.WW, ref. no. 14, p. 265, Pismo Szyszko-Bohusza do Wydziału Wykonawczego, 24 VII 1936.

⁸³ *Ibidem*.

THE DISPUTE. EPISODE THREE – THE FINAL DECISIONS

It is quite characteristic that the archival material (both ecclesiastical and secular one) does not enable us to reconstruct the way in which the situation unfolded from September 1936 to March 1937. This can partly be blamed on Sapięha's absence. From December 1936 to March 1937, he stayed in the Philippines where he participated in the International Eucharistic Congress⁸⁴. There is also no reason to believe that the mutual relations entered a 'dormancy phase' from which they were awakened only by the letter sent by Voivode Gnoiński to the NK on 11 March 1937. The voivode reported that the work carried out in the crypt under the Tower of the Silver Bells had already been completed, and that 'it is now possible to transfer Marshal Piłsudski's coffin'⁸⁵. Although he suggested that the transfer could be organised already in April, it took the NK one month to respond to his suggestion. On 10 April 1937, Brzęk-Osiński informed Gnoiński that the NK members, during the session held four days before, 'found all the relevant facts to be in favour of your proposal, but rejected it on emotional grounds'⁸⁶. Those participating in the session claimed that the coffin could not be transferred until the sarcophagus had been completed. This seems to have been a play for time, but the causes of it remain unknown. The Marshal's advocates had their own reasons for acting the way they did. At that time, the contest for designing the sarcophagus was far from decided, and there was no way of completing it within any foreseeable period of time. It is hard to deny that the archbishop was also right in trying to bring the matter to a definitive completion. By securing the support of the high-ranking representative of the state administration, he equipped himself not only with moral but also with material means to carry out the project. However, this was not simple, not least because of the opinion held by Professor Jastrzębowski, Szyszko-Bohusz's main adversary, who, on 8 May 1937, informed the NK that the work inside the new crypt had actually been completed, but raised doubts as to its 'ideological message'⁸⁷. Jastrzębowski, who at that time served as the Rector of the Academy of Fine Arts in Warsaw, criticised the crypt for its 'medieval heraldic decorativeness, which most people could not understand'. He opted for simplicity to be adopted in dealing with 'the person and deeds of Marshal Piłsudski'⁸⁸. The dispute between the two eminent authorities on art was personal in nature and had continued since Szyszko-Bohusz was made responsible for preparing the crypt. Jastrzębowski took his adversary to task for negotiating the project with Sapięha and not with the WWNK, while at the same time admitting that 'in architectural terms he had executed his work perfectly'⁸⁹. However, the Rector of the Academy of Fine Arts had more clout. On 11 May

⁸⁴ J. Wolny, *Konflikt wawelski...*, pp. 121–122.

⁸⁵ AAN, NKUPMJP.WW, ref. no. 14, p. 122, Oryginał pisma wojewody krakowskiego do WW NKUPJP, 11 III 1937.

⁸⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 110, Pismo M.T. Osińskiego do wojewody krakowskiego, 10 IV 1937.

⁸⁷ AAN, NKUPMJP.WW, ref. no. 14, p. 329, Pismo W. Jastrzębowskiego do Naczelnego Komitetu, 8 V 1937.

⁸⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 330.

⁸⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 331.

1937, during the WWNK's session, it was decided to inspect the crypt. The inspection took place eight days later. The conclusions arrived at by the WWNK's Head were in line with those presented by Jastrzębowski. Following up on these conclusions, Wieniawa-Długoszowski requested Szyszko-Bohusz to suspend the work until further decisions had been made by the WWNK⁹⁰.

The delay in transferring the coffin was also caused by the celebrations of the twenty fifth anniversary of Sapieha's appointment as the archbishop of Cracow, scheduled to take place on 13–15 June. With the celebrations over, Sapieha immediately (on 16 June 1937), inspected the crypt and then ordered the coffin to be transferred on 22 June 1937⁹¹, of which he informed Wieniawa-Długoszowski in a letter in which he also explained his point of view⁹². Taking advantage of the visit to be paid by King of Romania Karol II to the Marshal's grave at the end of the month, Sapieha decided, in good faith, to bring the whole matter to an end. At the same time, Lieutenant Colonel Alojzy Horak, Chief of Staff of the Fifth Corps District, informed General Kazimierz Schally, Chief of Military Cabinet of the President of the Polish Republic, of the positive outcome of the inspection⁹³.

Two days later, Sapieha received a letter from the priest Domasik. Declaring his absolute obedience, Domasik drew the archbishop's attention to 'details of technical nature' that hindered the transfer of the entire coffin⁹⁴. He also mentioned that Doctor Major Wiktor Kaliciński had informed him over the phone of his arrival in Cracow on Tuesday, 22 June 1937. It was very important information, of which neither Domasik nor Sapieha were probably aware. The metropolitan treated it as consent to transfer the coffin, for Kaliciński was the doctor who had embalmed Piłsudski's corpse and who then looked after it. There can be no doubt that the news of the archbishop's decision reached, on the evening of 18 June 1937, not only the WWNK but also the Ministry of Military Affairs, represented by Kaliciński. In contrast to the calm reaction of the Ministry, Wieniawa-Długoszowski reacted fiercely⁹⁵. He called a meeting for 2 pm on 19 June 1937. The few people in attendance were introduced to Sapieha's letter, and then, as we are told, 'have all found it necessary to prevent the transfer of the coffin which is the relic and property of the nation and which no one has the right to move'⁹⁶. In the evening of the previous day, Władysław Starzak, member of Parliament from Cracow, was asked to explain the situation to a small group of Piłsudski's former soldiers and to assign them the task of watching over the coffin. Brzęk-Osiński also suggested that it was advisable to inform

⁹⁰ AAN, NKUPMJP.WW, ref. no. 4, p. 340, Protokół posiedzenia, dobytego w Krakowie na Wawelu w dniu 19 V 1937.

⁹¹ J. Wolny, *Konflikt wawelski...*, p. 122.

⁹² AKMKr., TS, ref. no. XVI/23a, p. 71, Poufny list X. Metropolity Sapiehy do Wieniawy-Długoszowskiego, 17 VI 1937.

⁹³ AAN, NKUPMJP.WW, ref. no. 14, p. 109, Depesza ppłka dypl. Horaka do szefa Gabinetu Wojskowego Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej, 17 VI 1937.

⁹⁴ AKMKr., TS, ref. no. XVI/24, p. 72–73, List ks. S. Domasika, 19 VI 1937.

⁹⁵ The biographer of Sapieha was wrong to claim the following: 'I do not know how Sapieha's letter [on 17 June M.S.] was received in Warsaw. It may have been treated as one more attempt to settle the matter definitively'. See: J. Czajowski, *Kardynał Adam Stefan Sapieha*, Wrocław 1997, p. 84.

⁹⁶ AAN, NKUPMJP, ref. no. 14, p. 104, Protokół 48 posiedzenia Wydziału Wykonawczego, 19 VI 1937.

Mościcki of the situation. He believed that 'only a letter handwritten by the President could be effective'⁹⁷. Wieniawa-Długoszowski talked to Gnoiński⁹⁸, and Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły to General Narbut-Łuczyński. Eventually, it was decided to settle the matter with the help of Prime Minister Sławoj-Składkowski who was expected to keep strictly to the following resolution:

'The WWNK is categorically opposed to his Excellency Metropolitan's idea of transferring Marshal Piłsudski's body from the crypt of St Leonard to the crypt under the Tower of the Silver Bells. Mister Chairman has been requested to immediately inform the Prime Minister of the Department's position and to ask him to order the state administration to make sure that nothing will disturb the peace of the Marshal's body in the crypt of St Leonard until the Executive Department has set the date of transferring the body to the sarcophagus in the crypt under the Tower of the Silver Bells'⁹⁹.

The Prime Minister learned about the existing situation on the same day at about 3 pm. He assured Wieniawa-Długoszowski that he would take appropriate steps and that 'in case of a conflict' he would get in touch with the President. This was the key moment in the origin of the Wawel conflict, since, among other things, it was for the first time that the word 'conflict' had been uttered. It was used by Składkowski who was one of Piłsudski's most ardent followers. He revered the Marshal and could not imagine that anyone (even the prince of the Church) could desecrate his body, for this was how the transfer of the coffin was seen by the Marshal's former soldiers¹⁰⁰.

During the next four days, until the Prime Minister's failed resignation on the afternoon of 23 June 1937, events gained incredible momentum. Both sides sent letters and argued their cases, and both refused to change their respective positions. The discussion was confined to a few people. The public opinion was kept in the dark. If the issue of St Leonard's crypt was dealt with in the press, it was always in the context of the dispute over its look, and not over the transfer of the Marshal's body¹⁰¹.

Analysis of the events from the end of the second and the beginning of the third decades of June shows the mechanism of the escalation of the conflict. Its final outcome was determined by single words and by the conviction of each side of being right. On 19 June, during the rapidly called session of the WWNK, Wieniawa-Długoszowski made request to Sapięha not to transfer the Marshal's body to the crypt under the Tower of the Silver Bells until the coffin has been deposited in the sarcophagus¹⁰². In a response, dated the following day, the Cracow Metropolitan stated unequivocally that 'the respect and

⁹⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁹⁸ In a letter dated 19 VI 1937, Wieniawa-Długoszowski made Gnoiński personally responsible for preventing the transfer of the coffin. See: AAN, NKUPMJP, ref. no. 14, p. 103, Pismo Wieniawy-Długoszowskiego do wojewody krakowskiego, 19 VI 1937.

⁹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 104–105, Protokół 48 posiedzenia Wydziału Wykonawczego, 19 VI 1937.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 86, Protokół z 50-go posiedzenia Wydziału Wykonawczego odbytego w dn. 25 VI 1937.

¹⁰¹ To the statements that appeared in „Ilustrowany Kurier Codzienny” on 21 June 1937 (no. 170), Wieniawa-Długoszowski replied two days later. See: *Sprawa emblematów dekoracyjnych krypty Marszałka Piłsudskiego. Oświadczenie gen. Wieniawy-Długoszowskiego*, „Gazeta Polska”, no. 172, 23 VI 1937, p. 5.

¹⁰² AAN, NKUPMJP, ref. no. 14, p. 102, Pismo Wieniawy-Długoszowskiego do Sapięhy, 19 VI 1937; AKMKr., TS, ref. no. XVI/25, p. 76, Pismo L.dz. 309/37 Wydziału Wykonawczego Naczelnego Komitetu, 19 VI 1937.

concern for the condition of the Marshal's body leaves me with no choice but to carry out the decision I have made'. This, of course, meant that the archbishop had no intention of changing his order regarding the transfer of the body¹⁰³. However, he shifted the date of the transfer by one day. His letter reached Warsaw on Monday morning, 21 June 1937, and set off an avalanche of emotional events. On the very same day, a meeting was held at the 'Castle' (this was how the Presidential Residence in Warsaw was called), attended by Mościcki, Sławoj Składkowski, Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski, and Wieniawa-Długoszowski. No account of the debate held during the meeting survives. However, its participants agreed that the President of the Polish Republic would send Sapieha a handwritten letter asking him to 'abstain from transferring the body'¹⁰⁴. The letter's content is known¹⁰⁵. It contains a few warm lines requesting the archbishop not to transfer the coffin. However, it shows that Mościcki learned (at least officially) about the exchange of the correspondence regarding the matter in question as late as 21 June 1937. If the President was frank, it means that for two days the Prime Minister did not inform him of the existing situation. There is no evidence to suggest that the Prime Minister became personally involved in the dispute which, as he probably believed, would be easily resolved through official correspondence between Wieniawa-Długoszowski and Sapieha. However, the letter sent by the archbishop on 20 June 1937, containing his refusal to satisfy the NK chairman's wishes, was 'the last straw that broke the camel's back'. The head of the state had to be involved.

Mościcki took the matter so seriously that he asked General Schally to go to Cracow and personally hand his letter, dated 22 June 1937, to Sapieha. The latter's response came in the evening, brought by the general. It clearly fell short of the President's expectations. Sapieha again explained the reasons for his decision to refuse. He also declared: 'I am really sorry that I am the one who has to try to make sure that the Marshal's dead body is treated with due respect'. It was the line that must have hurt not only Mościcki. Sapieha unequivocally suggested that the authorities mishandled the whole problem and failed to understand the existing situation. Presenting himself as the only defender of the Marshal's dead body (was this 'title' justified?), he claimed that 'it was just a matter of moving it from one part of the royal cemetery to another'¹⁰⁶. He undoubtedly said here a word too much. Piłsudski's adherents regarded the transfer of the coffin not as a technical issue, but as an act of the greatest symbolic value. As we can see, the archbishop did not share this point of view.

23 June 1937 proved crucial to the conflict under discussion. In the evening of the previous day, Brzęk-Osiński and Member of Parliament Starzak got on a night train and went to Cracow with the goal of ensuring that the transfer of the coffin would be put off. They arrived in Cracow at 7 am. On the station's platform they met Doctor Major Kaliciński representing the Ministry of Military Affairs and Piotr Seip representing the

¹⁰³ AKMKr., TS, ref. no. XVI/27, p. 79–81, Odręczny list Sapiehy do Wieniawy, 20 VI 1937; AAN, NKUPMJP, ref. no. 14, p. 110–101, List A. Sapiehy do Wieniawy-Długoszowskiego, 20 VI 1937.

¹⁰⁴ AAN, NKUPMJP, ref. no. 14, p. 85, Protokół z 50-go posiedzenia Wydziału Wykonawczego odbytego w dn. 25 VI 1937.

¹⁰⁵ AKMKr., TS, ref. no. XVI/28, p. 84–85, List Ignacego Mościckiego do Sapiehy, 22 VI 1937.

¹⁰⁶ AKMKr., TS, ref. no. XVI/29a, p. 88, Odpis listu Adama Sapiehy do Prezydenta RP, 22 VI 1937.

firm Piotr Seip & Son which made the coffin and the bronze 'sarcophagus' (Seip was invited by Sapieha). They were both entrusted with the task of supervising the coffin's transfer. The situation might be considered funny, if it were not for the fact that the issue of transferring the body was becoming increasingly political. Three conceptions of protecting the coffin, put forward respectively by the state administration, the military circles and Piłsudski's former soldiers (those who served under him during the First World War)¹⁰⁷, were on the table at the conference that began that day, 23 June, at 9 am, at the Provincial Office in Cracow. The voivode made it clear that the Prime Minister's order forbade him to take any steps. Sapieha's decision was not considered for implementation in spite of the fact that Major Kaliciński was known to be in Cracow in connection with the problem under discussion. Nothing is known about the action taken at that time by Sapieha, but its consequences indicate that he was not going to change his mind. He must have been informed of the meeting held at the Provincial Office, but it is hard to say whether he knew that the WWNK was in perpetual session in Warsaw and maintained constant communication with the Prime Minister. However, it is clear that with each passing hour the situation became increasingly serious.

The involvement of the state authorities in the Wawel conflict entered its critical phase. The government was unanimously in support of the position of the WWNK; at the Castle, the President of the Polish Republic held meetings with the Prime Minister, the General Inspector of the Armed Forces, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the WWNK's Chairman. In Cracow, the state and military administration was awaiting decisions from Warsaw. This situation continued until 2 pm, when the message intended for Brzęk-Osiński and Major Kaliciński reached Cracow: 'Solemnly on behalf of the President, Marshal Rydz-Śmigły and Prime Minister Składkowski – none of us is allowed to take any action on our own account'¹⁰⁸. The same order was issued by Marshal Rydz-Śmigły to the Commander of the 6th Infantry Division, General Bernard Mond and Lieutenant Colonel Horak. General Mond gave the press a brief statement that 'on behalf of the Cracow Garrison, he solemnly protests against the archbishop's decision'¹⁰⁹.

The state's highest officials tried in this way to keep the situation under control, awaiting the archbishop's final decisions. However, Sapieha had no intention of giving up the idea of transferring the coffin. The preparations to move it continued for the whole week. Objections raised by Father Domasik¹¹⁰ were cut short by the archbishop with an imperious 'Be quiet!', while the priest, Stefan Mazanek, stated 'there is no one to order us about here'¹¹¹. The archbishop's determination may have stemmed from the conviction that the state authorities might want to change their decision regarding the final resting place of Piłsudski's coffin and leave it in the royal crypt of St Leonard

¹⁰⁷ AAN, NKUPMJP, ref. no. 14, p. 85, Protokół z 50-go posiedzenia Wydziału Wykonawczego odbytego w dn. 25 VI 1937.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 86.

¹¹⁰ AKMKr., TS, ref. no. XVI/26, p. 78, Odręczny list Szyszko-Bohusza do Sapiehy, 20 VI 1937.

¹¹¹ AAN, NKUPMJP, ref. no. 14, p. 86, Protokół z 50-go posiedzenia Wydziału Wykonawczego odbytego w dn. 25 VI 1937.

which then would have to be emptied of all the other sarcophaguses¹¹². This account is in conflict with all the official enunciations, but it cannot be ruled out that Sapieha heard rumours to that effect. However, he is unlikely to have taken them seriously into consideration. He may have mentioned them among his relatives and acquaintances, but his final decision was determined by the completion of the crypt under the Tower of the Silver Bells, the unrealistic time frame for completion of the sarcophagus (its plaster cast had not yet been made) and the damp and lack of space in St Leonard's crypt. The Romanian monarch's official visit was used as a pretext. The coffin was transferred on 23 June 1937 at 11.47 pm.

In the afternoon, when it became clear that the highest authorities' requests and appeals were of no avail, the Prime Minister decided to hand in his resignation. In a letter to the President of the Polish Republic, he argued that he had failed to ensure the carrying out by the Polish citizen of the will of the Head of State¹¹³ (which was actually the government's task) regarding the nation's cult of Marshal Piłsudski. A few hours later, Wieniawa-Długoszowski came up with the communiqué intended for the Polish Telegraphic Agency. Having been approved by the government, it was published the following day in the Press. In it, the WWNK stated that 'the responsibility for transferring the coffin with Piłsudski's body lies exclusively with the archbishop Sapieha'¹¹⁴. The conflict had entered another phase, that of the hatred campaign, which constitutes the dispute's episode four.

The events that followed were unprecedented in inter-war period. Paweł Żółtowski, Adam Sapieha's cousin, was justified in writing that 'the government press launched an unbelievable – both in form and content – attack on him'¹¹⁵. For Piłsudski's adherents and for those who wanted to seize the opportunity to show their enmity towards the Church, the Metropolitan Sapieha became the number one public enemy.

There can be no doubt that the way in which the conflict unfolded shows what the Marshal's coffin meant to his adherents, and also what they wanted it to become. Regarding it as a secular relic, deposited for all eternity in the Wawel Cathedral, the resting place of Polish kings, they believed that no one, including the prince of the Church, Adam Sapieha, could without their consent take any decisions regarding it. Standing guard over this way of thinking was General Wieniawa-Długoszowski, the Marshal's long-term aide, who in the years 1935–1938 served as the Chairman of the Committee for the Remembrance of Marshal Józef Piłsudski (the NK). He proved capable not only of trying, but actually of performing the task, with which he had been entrusted, very well. Putting a lot of effort, along with other members of the NK's Executive Department, into promoting Marshal Piłsudski's cult, he participated in the creation of the crypt under the Tower of the Silver Bells. However, the performance of this relatively simple task led to the outbreak of the conflict in June 1937, for which both sides were responsible, but the secular one to a somewhat greater degree. However,

¹¹² Biblioteka Polska w Londynie, ref. no. rkps. 570, P. Żółtowski, *U schyłku życia. Na marginesie wspomnień z lat 1889–1976*, no. 2, p. 195.

¹¹³ M. Sioma, *Sławoj Felicjan Składkowski (1885–1962). Żołnierz i polityk*, Lublin 2005, p. 310.

¹¹⁴ *Zdumiewające zarządzenie ks. metropolity Sapiehy...*, p. 1.

¹¹⁵ P. Żółtowski, *U schyłku życia...*, p. 195.

it is clear that the conflict arose because those involved in it were unable to cooperate and eventually failed to reach an agreement. No one was willing to take a step back. Consequently, the Polish (and not only Polish) public opinion could for a month observe, with a mixture of curiosity, disbelief and embarrassment (some even gave vent to their hatred of the Church), the unprecedented events in the course of which both sides resorted to different information strategies. Those strategies as well as diplomatic actions pursued by Poland and the Vatican are the two issues that should attract scholarly attention in the future.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ARCHIVES

Archival Sources

Archiwum Akt Nowych w Warszawie
Archiwum Kurii Metropolitarnej w Krakowie
Biblioteka Polska w Londynie

Printed Sources

Codex Iuris Canonici PII X Pontificis Maximi iussu digestus Benedicti Papae XV auctoritate promulgatus, 1917, p. II, p. 344, [in:] <https://www.pbc.rzeszow.pl/dlibra/publication/19164/edition/17423/content?ref=desc> [accessed 30 VI 2021].

Pro memoria abpa A.S. Sapiehy o „konflikcie wawelskim” [in:] *Księga sapieżyńska*, vol. II, ed. J. Wolny and R. Zawadzki, Cracow 1986.

Jędrzejewicz W., *Kronika życia Józefa Piłsudskiego 1867–1935*, vol. II: 1921–1935, London 1977.

Konkurs na sarkofag J. Piłsudskiego na Wawelu [Warsaw, 25 XI 1936].

Diaries and Memoirs

Piłsudska A., *Wspomnienia*, ed. A. Adamczyk, Warsaw 2004.

Eden A., *Pamiętniki 1923–1938*, vol. I: *W obliczu dyktatorów*, ed. S. Zabięło, transl. J. Meysztowicz, Warsaw 1970.

Składkowski F.S., *Strzępy meldunków*, ed. A. Garlicki, Warsaw 1988.

Zamorski K.J., *Dzienniki (1930–1938)*, eds. R. Litwiński i M. Sioma, Warsaw 2011.

MONOGRAPHS

Cichoracki P., *Legenda i polityka. Kształtowanie się wizerunku marszałka Józefa Piłsudskiego w świadomości zbiorowej społeczeństwa polskiego w latach 1918–1939*, Cracow 2005.

Czajowski J., *Kardynał Adam Stefan Sapieha*, Wrocław 1997.

Gałęzowski M., *Przewoźnik Andrzej. Gdy Wódz odchodził w wieczność... Uroczystości żałobne po śmierci Marszałka Józefa Piłsudskiego 12–18 maja 1935 r.*, Warsaw 2005.

Garlicki A., *Józef Piłsudski 1867–1935*, Warsaw 1990.

- Hein-Kircher H., *Kult Piłsudskiego i jego znaczenie dla państwa polskiego 1926–1939*, transl. Z. Owczarek, Warsaw 2008.
- Kajzer P., *Mauzoleum marszałka Józefa Piłsudskiego na Wawelu w latach 1935–1989*, Cracow 2018.
- Majchrowski J.M., *Ulubieniec Cezara Bolesław Wieniawa-Długoszowski. Zarys biografii*, Wrocław–Warsaw–Cracow 1990.
- Sioma M., *Stawoj Felicjan Składkowski (1885–1962). Żołnierz i polityk*, Lublin 2005.
- Warszawski J., *Studia nad wyznaniowością Józefa Piłsudskiego*, London 1978.

Articles

- Cichoracki P., *Naczelny Komitet Uczczenia Pamięci Marszałka Józefa Piłsudskiego 1935–1939 – mechanizmy działania*, „Dzieje Najnowsze” 2002, no. 4.
- Mrowiński P.M., „*Bo królem był równy...*” *Sprowadzenie szczątków Juliusza Słowackiego w 1927 roku jako dramat społeczny Victora Turnera*, „Vade Nobiscum” 2019, vol. XXI.
- Vetulani A., *Arcypasterz krakowski na przełomie epok Adam Stefan Sapieha w latach 1912–1939*, [in:] *Kościół w II Rzeczypospolitej*, ed. Z. Zieliński and S. Wilk, Lublin 1981.
- Wolny J., *Konflikt wawelski*, [in:] *Księga sapieżyńska*, vol. II: *Działalność kościelna i narodowa Adama Stefana Sapiehy*, eds. J. Wolny and R. Zawadzki, Cracow 1986.

Articles from daily newspapers

- Mozołowski S., *O chorobie poprzedzającej zgon Marszałka Piłsudskiego*, „Gazeta Polska”, nr 297, 26 X 1935.
- Paryż o wizycie warszawskiej*, „Gazeta Polska”, no. 129, 11 V 1935.
- Sprawa emblematów dekoracyjnych krypty Marszałka Piłsudskiego. Oświadczenie gen. Wieniawy-Długoszowskiego*, „Gazeta Polska”, no. 172, 23 VI 1937.
- Stefanowski A. dr, *Przebieg choroby Marszałka Józefa Piłsudskiego*, „Gazeta Polska”, no. 297, 26 X 1935.
- Zdumiewające zarządzenie ks. metropolity Sapiehy. Samowolna decyzja przeniesienia trumny Marszałka Piłsudskiego. Nieprzyjęta prośba o dymisję Rządu*, „Gazeta Polska”, no. 173, 24 VI 1937.

Net Graphy

- <https://audiovis.nac.gov.pl/obraz/23525/ec53fc9adabe15dc99e78d028a1fcd86/> [accessed 27 V 2020]
- <https://www.polskieradio.pl/130/5561/Artykul/1718247,Sarkofag-dla-marszalka-Jozefa-Pilsudskiego-Mamy-obowiazek-to-zrobic> [accessed 27 V 2020]

The First Two Years at the Wawel Castle. The Origin of the Conflict Over Marshal Józef Piłsudski's Coffin (1935–1937)

The death of Poland's First Marshal was used by his adherents for political purposes. Piłsudski's funeral ceremonies constituted an unprecedented and symbolic event aimed at highlighting his greatness and merits and portraying him as one of Poland's most

distinguished citizens. The ceremonies continued for a few days (and the national mourning for six weeks). The Chief Committee for the Remembrance of Marshal Józef Piłsudski was set up with a view to honouring the Marshal and his deeds. The Committee's efforts were coordinated by the Executive Department (the WWNK), whose main task was to make sure that the coffin with Piłsudski would be deposited in the crypt under the Tower of the Silver Bells. Because of the scope of work to be carried out in the Wawel Cathedral, constituting property of the Catholic Church, the task was extremely difficult to carry out. It did not take long before it became clear that the goals pursued by both sides (secular and ecclesiastical one) were significantly different. The divergence of opinions led to the conflict that broke out almost immediately after Piłsudski's body had been deposited in the coffin, and continued until 1937.

This article deals with the origin of the conflict which has so far received little attention from scholars, who have focused mainly on the events which, taking place in June and July 1937, formed the most important part of it. Analysis of the source material has enabled the reconstruction of the events from 1935–1937, thus ensuring the possibility of looking at the issue from a new perspective and explaining the reasons for the escalation of the dispute over Piłsudski's coffin. As shown in the article, the irresponsibility of Piłsudski's adherents on the one hand, and Archbishop Sapieha's obstinacy on the other, led to one of the greatest social crises in the inter-war Poland. The author takes his account to 23 June 1937, that is, to the point where the conflict got out of the cabinets of those directly involved in it and became a public issue.

The author's aim in this article was also to reproduce the whole process leading to the outbreak of the conflict in 1937, and to show the role played in it by particular individuals whose behaviour and attitude created a situation in which none of the sides felt responsible for the conflict's outbreak and none was prepared to make any concessions. The conflict was brought to an end after months of efforts involving the President of the Polish Republic and both Polish and Vatican diplomacies. It is hard to say how it affected the public. It certainly affected the way in which Archbishop Sapieha was perceived. Suffice it say that some demanded that he should be imprisoned in the Bereza Kartuska prison.

KEYWORDS

the Wawel Conflict, the coffin, Józef Piłsudski, Adam Stefan Sapieha, Bolesław Wieniawa-Długoszowski, the Chief Committee for the Remembrance of Marshal Józef Piłsudski

Dwa pierwsze lata na Wawelu. Geneza konfliktu o trumnę marszałka Józefa Piłsudskiego (1935–1937)

Śmierć Pierwszego Marszałka Polski została wykorzystana przez jego zwolenników w maju 1935 r. i czerwcu – lipcu 1937 r. w sposób polityczny. Uroczystości pogrzebowe były bezprecedensowym, a zarazem symbolicznym wydarzeniem. Wykorzystane środki służyły podkreśleniu wielkości i zasług Józefa Piłsudskiego, jako ponadprzeciętnego obywatela-

la Rzeczypospolitej. Uroczystości pogrzebowe trwały kilka dni, żałoba narodowa sześć tygodni. Utworzono Naczelny Komitet Uczczenia Pamięci Marszałka Józefa Piłsudskiego z zadaniem kompleksowego uhonorowania postaci Zmarłego. Całość działań koordynował Wydział Wykonawczy, dla którego najważniejszym zadaniem stało się doprowadzenie do złożenia trumny w krypcie pod Wieżą Srebrnych Dzwonów na Wawelu. Zadanie było niezwykle trudne z uwagi na zakres i stopień prac w Katedrze Wawelskiej, będącej we władaniu Kościoła katolickiego. Odmienność celów obu stron (świeckiej i kościelnej) bardzo szybko dała o sobie znać doprowadzając do konfliktu, który rozpoczął się praktycznie natychmiast po złożeniu ciała i trwał do lata 1937 r.

Artykuł dotyczy genezy sporu, wątku dotychczas marginalizowanego. Badacze koncentrowali się przede wszystkim na najważniejszym momencie konfliktu, tj. wydarzeniach z czerwca i lipca 1937 r. pomijając przyczyny, które doprowadziły do jego wybuchu. Analiza materiału źródłowego pozwoliła odtworzyć wydarzenia z lat 1935–1937, dzięki czemu możliwe było spojrzenie na ten problem badawczy z innej perspektywy. Efektem są ustalenia dotyczące przyczyn eskalacji sporu o trumnę Piłsudskiego. Powodem była nieodpowiedzialność akolitów, ale też i upór metropolity krakowskiego Adama Stefana Sapiehy, co doprowadziło do jednego z największych kryzysów społecznych dwudziestolecia międzywojennego w Polsce. Rozważania kończą się na 23 czerwca 1937 r. a więc w momencie, w którym konflikt z „gabinetowego” stał się ogólnonarodowym.

Celem było również pokazanie długiego i jak się okazało banalnego procesu dochodzenia do wybuchu konfliktu w czerwcu 1937 r. oraz roli poszczególnych jednostek, których postawa i działania doprowadziły do sytuacji, w której żadna ze stron, nie czując się odpowiedzialną za zaistniałą sytuację, nie chciała ustąpić. Kryzys ostatecznie, po miesiącu intensywnych działań z udziałem Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej oraz dyplomacji polskiej i watykańskiej, udało się zażegnać. Trudno zobrazować jego społeczne konsekwencje, ale miał on niewątpliwie wpływ na postrzeganie osoby arcybiskupa Sapiehy, jeśli zważyć na fakt, że demonstrujący domagali się umieszczenia go w Berezie Kartuskiej.

SŁOWA KLUCZOWE

Konflikt wawelski, trumna, Józef Piłsudski, Adam Stefan Sapieha, Bolesław Wieniawa-Długoszowski, Naczelny Komitet Uczczenia Pamięci Marszałka Józefa Piłsudskiego

MAREK SIOMA – a historian, received a habilitation degree from the Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin in 2014 (PhD in 2002). He graduated in history from the same University in 1995. His scholarly interests include the Piłsudski camp, especially its elite, the process of its decomposition and the camp's youth movement (the Youth Legion). He is the author of 3 monographs, 59 scholarly articles, and a variety of minor texts. In 2009–2015 he served as secretary to the Lublin Section of the Polish Historical Association. Since 2009 he has been in charge of the history competition organized in the Lublin district. Head of the Institute of History of the Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin in 2016–2019, he now works at the Department of Methodology and Research of the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries.

MAREK SIOMA – historyk, w 2014 roku uzyskał stopień doktora habilitowanego na Uniwersytecie Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej w Lublinie. Doktorat w 2002 roku. Badania naukowe prowadzi nad obozem piłsudczykowskim koncentrując się na jego elitach, dekompozycji i ruchu młodzieżowym (Legion Młodych). Opublikował i zredagował trzy monografie. Autor 59 artykułów naukowych i wielu mniejszych tekstów. W latach 2009–2015 sekretarz Oddziału Lubelskiego Polskiego Towarzystwa Historycznego. Od roku 2009 przewodniczący olimpiady historycznej w okręgu lubelskim. W latach 2016–2019 dyrektor Instytutu Historii UMCS. Pracuje w Katedrze Metodologii i Badań nad XX–XXI wiekiem.