
SWEDEN
LATVIA
BALTIC SEA
LITHUANIA
RUSSIA
WARSAW
BELARUS
GERMANY
CRACOW
CZECHIA
SLOVAKIA
UKRAINE
AUSTRIA
HUNGARY
ROMANIA

Professor Jan Pomorski
Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Lublin, Poland
ORCID: 0000-0001-5667-0917

WHAT IS 'POLITICS OF HISTORY'?

CONCERNING POLAND'S *RAISON D'ÉTAT**

(ad vocem)

Abstract
The term 'politics of history' can be encountered in the narratives created by three distinct types of social practice: (1) the social practice of **research** ('politics of history' is the subject of the research, and not the practice); (2) the social practice of **politics** ('politics of history' is practiced, and may be either an instrument for gaining and retaining power, and/or an instrument for realising the state's *raison d'état*); (3) the social practice of **memory** (where the practice of 'politics of history' also has a place, and is synonymous with 'politics of memory').
The author argues that political *raison d'état* requires Poland to pursue an active politics of history which should be addressed abroad, and proposes that its guiding ideas should be based on three grand narratives: (1) the fundamental role of 'Solidarity Poland' in the peaceful dismantling of the post-Yalta system in Europe, (2) the Europe of the Jagiellonians, and (3) the Europe of the Vasas, as constructs simultaneously geopolitical and civilisational, in which Poland performed an agential function.

Keywords: politics of history as a subject of research, politics of history as a subject of practice, politics of history as *raison d'état*

"Whoever does not respect and value their past
is not worthy of respect by the present,
or of the right to a future."

Józef Piłsudski

"Polishness – it is not Sarmatian-ness, it is not confined
to the descent from pre-Lechite peasants and warriors;
nor it is confined to what the Middle Ages made of them later.
Polishness – it is rather an amalgam of multiple sources;
something more effective than an uniform
indigenousness, in the way that steel – an amalgam
itself – is more effective than pure iron."

Tadeusz Kotarbiński

Tracing the history of the concept of 'politics of history' in Polish discourse would require the writing of a separate, very extensive article; as its roots reach back to Naruszewicz and Lelewel [Polish nineteenth-century historians], and was already present *expressis verbis* at the 1st Congress of Polish Historians convened in Cracow in 1880. And even if we had wished to have included a comparative, transnational perspective, and even if we were to have limited it to the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, a single volume would not have sufficed. I hope the initiators of this discussion were not thinking of lectures of the *Begriffsgeschichte* type; rather, I presume they wanted me to sketch a context in which it would make sense to discuss what this term is concealing today. It is in the methodologist's nature that, in proceeding to analyse a concept, they first like to establish/refine the semantic fields under discussion, in order that when participating in the debate we may be clear what we are actually talking about. Let us then proceed along that path.

We should note, first of all, that we may encounter the term 'politics of history' in the narratives produced by distinct types of social practices:

1. By the social practice of research (historical, politological, sociological, anthropological or psychological, to name only the most important), in which 'politics of history' is **the subject of research**, and not of practice;

2. By the social practice of politics, in which 'politics of history' is actually practiced, and may be:

a) an instrument for gaining and retaining power – in the case when the politics of history is directed at a society/nation; and/or

b) an instrument for realising **the state's** *raison d'état* – in the case when the politics of history is directed abroad, and is employed in confrontation with the politics of history of other countries;

3. By the social practice of memory (national/local/civic), in which the practice of 'politics of history' also has its place, and is synonymous with the 'politics of memory' implemented by a given community (and the institutions it establishes, such as the National Heritage Institute [*Instytut Dziedzictwa Narodowego, IDN*] or the Institute of National Remembrance [*Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, IPN*]), with the aim of:

a) maintaining its own identity, and

b) building that part of the community's **social capital** which is based on/results from past experiences and the emotional experience of its own history.

Secondly, in each of these three social practices, the term 'politics of history' functions in different semantic fields, fundamentally changing its referents, for example, what the term refers to (a methodologist would say, what it denotes). So in the first case, this area is defined as **historical knowledge** as a product of the social practice of research. In the second, the referents are defined as the practices of **politicising/mythologising history** (for more see my article, Pomorski 2017b, pp. 15–42); and in the third, the **symbolic domains** are created for the purposes of the **politics of memory**. Symbolic domains are by nature socially produced (e.g. in the form of a **national *imaginarium***; as Andrzej Leder put it,

> The *imaginarium* […] means the most important figures in a collectively lived drama, in which every experience is included. These will, for example, include the figure of the freedom-loving Pole, the Polish mother, the Jewish Commie, the German invaders and occupiers, barbaric Russia, the lord, the boor, and many others. The power of these figures is associated with the intense feelings with which those images are linked, those which have a certain moral topography within whom the drama develops. The interweaving feelings of pride, compassion, contempt or hatred allow the common experience of long-established sequences which organise collective events and commemorations. Such situations – for example, the anniversaries of the Smolensk disaster which are

> commemorated today – are social practices which marshal the imagination of the individual in accordance with the collective scenario (Leder 2014, p. 12).

– and the symbolic domains building the *imaginarium* may have nothing to do with history itself. This means that they do not have to comply with it (to be 'true' in the epistemological sense, as the notion complies with reality); it is only important that they are socially acceptable.

This is something very important: only in relation to a narrative produced within the social practice of research can the criterion of historical truth be applied. Speaking about the veracity of politics of history in the other two cases is **a semantic abuse!** In the case of the social practice of politics, the term 'politics of history' that appears in the narrative does not have the status of **cognitive value**, but rather one of **applied value**, autotelic from the perspective of the state (its '*raison d'état*'), or merely partisan, instrumental (subordinate to whether the group/party gains and retains power for its own sake). In the case of the social practice of memory, in turn, it is a question of social axiology – a system of values relating to the past (the **historical *imaginarium***) which are shared by the community.

Thirdly and finally, it is essential for the intersubjectivity of any further discussion of politics of history to clearly establish which of these three types of social practice is being referred to in any given statement by an author using the term 'politics of history'. Of course, this may be made more difficult by the fact that the commentators themselves commonly confuse these three types. At that point, it is appropriate to ask the supplementary question of which social practice the commentator is currently professionally involved in…

This simple procedure immediately regulates the discussion, which is important because both very well-known historians and the politicians who are willing to attach themselves to confuse these roles in public discourse, treating historical knowledge selectively and giving their own views on the status of **historical truth**. One can therefore make a concrete politics of history a subject of research (as in Poland, Russia, Germany, the United States and Israel,

at certain times and within the international system; or the Polish United Workers' Party, the SLD [Democratic Left Alliance], PSL [Polish Peasants' Party], PO [Civic Platform] or PiS [Law and Justice] within the party system) and talk about it while maintaining academic standards; one cannot, however, practice a politics of history (or a politics of memory) while justifying oneself by arguing for its scholarly/authentic nature. This latter case, of a historian in service to 'political reasons', was recently analysed by myself on the basis of *Pierwsza zdrada Zachodu* [The West's first betrayal] by Andrzej Nowak (Pomorski 2018; this is a continuation of a discussion of this work which we conducted within the pages of *Dzieje Najnowsze*, see Pomorski 2017, pp. 269–298; Nowak 2017, pp. 299–312; Nowak 2015). It is equally unjustified to deny someone the right to practice politics of history only because it is not entitled then to the status of veracity, which is a common argument put forward by those researchers who do not want to consent to the politicising/mythologising of history in its current version, or to a particular politics of memory (I analyse this situation in another article: Pomorski 2017c, pp. 121–141). Of course one may also completely deny historians/researchers the right to get involved in politics of history, repeating the arguments of the French philosopher Julien Benda in *La trahison des clercs* [The Treason of the Intellectuals]. For him, the involvement of intellectuals in politics was in fact a betrayal of their vocation; but in light of the experiences that the twentieth century brought us, is this purism of preserving the 'purity of historical research' not simply naive? For me it is. I agree here with Marek Cichocki as he wrote about politics of history:

> In my understanding, this is a reinforcement of the public discourse about the past, both inside the country and outside, through various forms of institutionalisation of this discourse. This institutionalisation is done at the level of central government, but also at the level of local institutions – the local government, the regions (Cichocki 2006).

The emphasis on the role of institutionalisation seems particularly important to me.

I will thus try to focus the remainder of my argument,

within the context of **how to understand and write about politics of history**, on three issues:

1. The role of the historians which they have to fulfil within the Academy itself (that is, their responsibility for providing academic historical knowledge on a given subject), but also their role in public life (for example their responsibility for the condition and shape of the community's historical consciousness with which they themselves identify; and to whom they address their message);

2. The **practice of politics of history** in Poland in recent years, as seen from the historian's perspective; and

3. The ways in which the historian participates in **the practice of the politics of memory**, for example the remembrance of what does/should serve the community's jointly shared values.

The historian within the Academy and in public life

For years, I have been of the opinion that the historians' task is above all to teach an understanding of worlds other than the one in which they and their audience live. Without the historian's cultural translation these worlds, distant from us in time, become incomprehensible to a modern audience after just one generation, let alone a century. Jerzy Eisler is right when he puts this issue into the context of a dialogue between 'nations' which succeed one another in history:

> So does everything I've written here allow us to show that a new Polish People's nation has been formed during the last 45 years? Have we ceased to be the compatriots of Jan Kochanowski, Maria Skłodowska-Curie and Jan Matejko? Should it be understood that the Polish language is embodied by Adam Mickiewicz, Henryk Sienkiewicz and Stefan Żeromski, whereas the language of the Polish People's Republic is embodied by, say, Władysław Machejek, Stanisław Ryszard Dobrowolski or Józef Ozga-Michalski? The temptation to answer in the affirmative is considerable, but I'm not sure whether that would be the right answer. Certainly a far-reaching transformation of society took place in post-war

> Poland, which was influenced by the migration of the people, and the civilisational advancement of millions of mostly young people, and the massification of culture, including wider access to the printed word, the fact of the liquidation of illiteracy, and many other factors – but can we speak of the creation of a new nation? It is essential to add that the Polish nation and its traditional values survived, as if somehow kept in deep-freeze within some circles, both among the émigrés and within the country itself. There were also a certain number – not even so very small – of people who had been impregnated for Communism, socialism, and the Polish People's Republic with all its baggage (Eisler 2016, p. 448).

It is impossible for the younger generation to understand the Polish People's Republic – without translating that culture into the one of today! Just as it would be difficult to understand quite how much, how deeply the legacy of that era is still rooted in us today. To reiterate, then: history is an effort in research and recognition, "at whose birth lies a need to know and understand others; lies the need and the will to coexist" ("I do not know whether this source of academic history is actually more important. Without it, it would take a long time before the 'story of the beginning' changes into history," wrote Witold Kula in his *Rozdziałki* [Chapters] evoking Herodotus; cf. Kula 1996, p. 134). History evolved only gradually from being an object of faith in the narrated past, over the centuries, into an object of knowledge of that same past, because it learned to explore the past (for example that which no longer exists and therefore cannot be directly observed) by indirect methods (see Pomian 1968, Pomian 2010). Academic historiography owes its status to that methodological revolution, and thanks to it, the historian is able to grasp cognitively that which is unobservable to the senses: to speak about the causes and effects of human activities, both individual and social; to show that those making history mostly operate in conditions of risk and uncertainty, not yet knowing what the future will bring. Their 'future', for the historians, is actually the past perfect, but in order to understand its heroes – the makers of history – he must accept them, and not researchers' perspective on the course of events. But at the same time, the historian must put into epistemological parentheses (for example suspend

the conferral of legitimacy before he verifies) the testimony of the witness himself (the historical source), just as he does with his own memory. Without this, there is no research! Historical knowledge and historical memory are two worlds, different, often incommensurate with each other. Their confrontation, especially in the area of political history, can sometimes be very tumultuous.

After all, history is nothing but the result of our actions, of our historical agency. The Americans were able to derive the foundation of all learning from case studies, by analysing why someone (or some institution/company) enjoyed success or suffered failure. This is intended to prepare their acolytes to function smoothly under conditions which will not really be analogous to those of the past, but rather may be similar to theirs; thus, the horizon of the case studies under consideration here is limited by default. In business, as a rule, the perspective does not go more than 10 years back. What happened in the past can also be an admonition or a warning to us. This, for example, is how Timothy Snyder has perceived the experiences of the twentieth century, and that is why he decided to give a lecture entitled *On tyranny. Twenty lessons from the twentieth century*, in which he states that freedom and democracy are under threat today, and require our constant vigilance and civic engagement (Snyder 2017). This is an example of how the historian can understand the social responsibility of his profession. It is the reverse of the metaphor (which I greatly dislike) of history as 'the opium of the masses', and thus its immediate association with the equally primitive thesis of religion playing the same soporific/enslaving role. If someone wants to subordinate a mass, a sovereign body, a nation or a society (however one may wish to name this mass entity) then – of course – the role of the opium can be filled by various factors, not just by religion or history. Sometimes it is enough to point to an alleged 'enemy', or reach for the arsenal of available economic resources (throwing the voters some of the proverbial sausage), to achieve the same effect. Thus, the key problem in analysing the 'opium of the masses' is always the perception of the fact that, in reality, it is a matter of retaining or losing one's own agency in the creation of History with a capital H. When someone deprives me of this agency, it is not so important what they are trying to anaesthetise me

with or get me hooked on, so that I lose my awareness of this agency, or never recover it…

But this is the sad truth: history when used for this purpose is able to wreak havoc, to produce 'historically captive minds', to paraphrase Miłosz. At that moment, history changes from an object of knowledge into an ideology, where the community's own past ceases to have any intrinsic value, and becomes a mere instrument in a game for… the future! And not a common future, let us add, because partisanship (according to the etymology of the word) refers only to a part, and not to the community as a whole. We then have to deal with what could be called a 'game of history', in which we are not an agent consciously creating our own history, but rather we are the subject of interventions, a kind of 'dark mass' that can be exploited with impunity, by playing on collective historical emotions for the player's own selfish, partisan purposes. We have seen too many examples of this over the past century.

Towards the end of the twentieth century, university historians lost their monopoly – they ceased to be the sole guardians of the collective memory, determining what from the past will be saved from sinking into final oblivion, into the forgotten, especially in the era of mass media and widespread access to the internet, professional historians have lost their exceptional status – as the only guards of what will be saved from the past. Today, it feels like anyone can leave their digital footprint, and build up their digitalised history. In the eyes of my generation, then, the way in which the past is narrated is changing, and being democratised; this has become possible in many ways and from different points of view. Academic historiography must rise to this challenge, and we cannot fail to notice the tasks it faces in doing so today… Its narratives are constantly being confronted with the historical narratives present in the public sphere, many of which are being produced by the social practice of politics of history or the social practice of commemoration.

Of course, we are all aware that history is often written for patriotic reasons. And there is nothing scandalous (or 'bad') about that: history is in fact an extremely important factor in building the identity of a community; and experiences lived together build **social capital**, without

which we would lose our ontological historical security and the capacity for collective action/changing the world (I discuss this subject more broadly in an essay entitled '*Spoglądając w przeszłość. Codzienność w pamięci narodowej*' [Looking at the past. Everyday life in the national memory], Pomorski 2017d, pp. 151–164). Historiography – if it wants to be scholar – must, however, be intellectually ready to face the traps and limitations that these patriotic impulses can add to historical inquiry. For example one must remember, while pursuing national history, that from the perspective of historical survey, as Timothy Snyder says, "The nation is neither an object of faith, or mockery, but a subject of research" (Snyder 2003, p. 23). I personally agree with the opinion on this matter which was presented by Professor Krystyna Kersten [when she stated]:

> on the problem of keeping a balance between my antipathy to that which – according to my system of negative values – has been negative in the past of my country, of my nation, of my group, including the most drastic phenomena; and my awareness of the prevalence of many diverse arguments, and my understanding of the multitude of emotions connected to the past (especially those closest in time to us) in which our own lives are entangled. Everyone understands their calling to be a historian in their own way, and places their emphases in accordance with that. Because I am speaking of my own adventure, it comes to me to assert that I have been trying ever more insistently to eschew the tendency to beautify history, to smooth its sharper corners, its wounding edges; the tendency to show only the bright sides, to avoid the bitter sides. I treat my books and lectures as raw material, and at the same time, the dough from which I knead the independent judgements and opinions upon which the development of rational social thought and modern political culture depends. This is by no means inconsistent with working 'towards the consolation of the heart', for sustaining the national spirit, national integrity, traditions – unless we assume that this consolation and sustenance must be supported by ignorance, deceit and myths. But this would be a primitive approach. I am convinced that it is possible to reconcile a rational attitude towards one's own past with a deep attachment to it; the most advanced

> criticism with a love for that which is one's own, which is native to oneself (Kersten 1987).

How, then, do we avoid falling into the trap of nationalism, if we wish to write a history of the twentieth century within the paradigm of affirmative history? Can we recognise that the good of our own people is the most important thing, and look at popular history from the perspective of a national politics of memory? In fact, this is a question concerning the border between patriotism and nationalism. We can then refer to the lessons of twentieth-century history (for example by reading Judt, Snyder 2013); we can – should we so prefer – reach for *Pamięć i tożsamość* [Memory and identity], wherein we can find the thoughts of John Paul II, and consistently stick to them:

> A characteristic of nationalism is that it recognises only the welfare of its own people and inclines only to them, ignoring the rights of others. Patriotism, however, as the love of one's country, gives all other nations the same rights as its own, and is therefore the way to a well-ordered social love (John Paul II 2005, p. 73).

It is similar with the glorification of struggle and the martyrdom of Poles itself as part of the construction of our national identity. It is easy to disturb these proportions, which can also lead to nationalism. An anthropologist of contemporary culture, analysing the phenomenon of historical reconstruction dedicated to World War II, sees the danger in these terms:

> This is not the way to build. This nationalist thinking, built on opposition: us *versus* them. In this case, we're always the good guys, suffering and fighting against 'them', that is, the outside world. We're highlighting only one patriotic quality, teaching completely abstract things, like – how to die for the fatherland. Of course, people in the war gave their lives for the country, but that can't be a part of everyday awareness or of building our identity on that. Because the identity of the community is built in the broader sense, searching for what really connects people, rather than focusing only on your own environment and on being separated from the outside world.

> And in that case, it builds a very simplified attitude towards the world (Wojciech Burszta, interview for *Dziennik-Gazeta Prawna*: Burszta, Średziński 2016).

But the list of threats does not end there. There is also the issue of **the historian's freedom**, located in the context of his responsibility for the condition and shape of his countrymen's historical consciousness. One would like to ask after Witold Kula, 'Is the historian permitted everything?' 'Can every hypothesis be propounded?' The answer from the author of the *Rozdziałki* is firm:

> Of course not. It is sufficient to look at what is not permitted to the historian. He may juxtapose a sentence such as "On July 14, 1789 the Great French Revolution broke out" with another thesis. He may contest the date (dating it from the Assembly of the Estates, the convening of the Estates, etc.). [He can challenge] the adjective 'Great'. [He may eventually even challenge] the noun 'Revolution' (or perhaps 'counter-revolution'?). Hungary also had to wait for a declaration before they knew whether there had been a Revolution or a counterrevolution. (…) But somewhere there are limits to what a historian can do. Some things he cannot do. And it is worth exploring those boundaries (Kula 1996, p. 249).

Let us then consider the following questions: what are we historians not allowed to do today? And which boundaries should we not cross? I have already spoken about the confusion of the roles of researcher and politician; likewise, about the bending of historical facts to fit previous political theses in the name of 'political logic'. Witold Kula directly links the problem of the historian's freedom with something else. "The thing is that every chapter of history will be written," he writes (Kula 1996, p. 61). This sentence appears when recalling the speech by Himmler, who told his accomplices, "This is an important chapter in history which has never to be written." What important thought does this sentence contain? What does Professor Kula mean to say here? He is referring to **the ruling class's constant temptation to destroy the evidence of their abuses of power – to erase those things which are uncomfortable for them from the collective memory**. Also,

in contrast to this temptation is the certainty that not only the poet but also the historian is keeping vigil: to ensure that someday every chapter of history will eventually be written. This is a kind of message from Kula to us historians. And also, it is a kind of prophylactic against the behaviour of those of us who have been tempted to 'use the eraser' on history – to omit the roles of those who are inconvenient from the perspective of current politics of history. Kula warns that these contemptible practices will be noted in the future, and that those who execute such commands 'from above' will not remain anonymous… Although at the same time, Kula is a realist, and is aware that "some historian will always be found" who will allow himself to be cast in the role of 'eraser' (Kula 1996, p. 170).

It is worth recalling that Kula had yet another apt metaphor for our profession: "History is a customs officer who does not pass counterfeit goods." (Kula 1996, p. 83). Because what would happen if we – as the class of researchers of the past – would let pass/turned a blind eye to/did not respond when someone tries to pass off 'counterfeit goods' onto the historical awareness of the Polish people? (Of course, Kula is aware that "some historian will always be found"; see his note from September 24, 1964 in which he uses the distinctive title *Whores* [*Kurwy*]; Kula 1996, p. 170).

The practice of politics of history in Poland from the historian's perspective

Politics of history is obviously not an invention of our time. Its origins can be traced to ancient Greece and Rome, where the veneration of the past and the historical pageants (staging glorious events from the past) played an important role in political practices. Politics of history has and has always had its subject (its creator) and its audience, whose support it sought. All the rest (the historical 'ornament') is just a tool in the game of power/the throne/the *raison d'état*. The practice of politics of history was and is an interesting subject for historical research (among the extensive literature, let me immediately recall here one great work, a book by Mariusz Mazur entitled *O człowieku tendencyjnym…: obraz nowego człowieka w propagandzie komunistycznej w okresie Polski Ludowej i PRL 1944–1956*

[On the biased man: the image of the new man in Communist propaganda during People's Poland and the Polish People's Republic, 1944–1956], Mazur 2009). This type of research is always based on the deconstruction of the assumptions standing behind the practice. Let us see how this might look in practice. Before I resort to contemporary examples, I suggest that we move back to communist times, because I may not be the only one who feels a sense of *déjà vu* when I listen to the statements some Polish politicians have made in connection with the 100th anniversary of independence.

Michał Głowiński, an insightful researcher into the 'Newspeak' of the time, read an article which appeared in *Życie Warszawy* in relation to the 60th anniversary of independence; and on April 13, 1978 he noted:

> This article is a call for national solidarity. Its starting point is the sixtieth anniversary of independence, which is appropriate for this year. The Polish People's Republic is not too enthusiastic about remembering 1918, so this is an interesting change. It is likely intended as a gesture to the public. However, this is quite a curious gesture, since this text appealing to patriotic feelings contains a discourse which crudely falsifies Poland's history of recent decades; repeating the most worn-out interpretations which clash with the publicly known facts. And using the same propaganda technique as during the commemorations of the Millennium [of Poland's conversion to Christianity]. People's Poland crowning the native history. With the difference that twelve years ago, the providential man was Gomułka, and now it is Gierek. History has become a pretext for renovation: injustice has been replaced by complete justice. This article is an interesting symptom of the state in which the propaganda finds itself, as it is fractured internally. It would have been effective if the anonymous author had decided to move away from the current official interpretation of history. But you cannot win on the basis of a heresy like that, even though it's primarily about the short-term effectiveness. Trying to connect dogma with the desire for direct influence always ends in failure. The patriotic *cliché* turns out to be just an empty phrase, nothing more (Commentary '*Aby Polska rosła w siłę, a ludzie żyli dostatniej*' [So that Poland may grow stronger, and the people live more prosperously], April 13, 1978. Głowiński 1993, pp. 110–111).

The texts commemorating the century of independence will not be invoked here, because all of our readers have access to them. These speeches full of pathos, pomposity and puff are still ringing in our heads, and the culmination is yet to come… It reminds me of a statement made by my teacher Professor Adam Kersten, under whom I had the honour to study as a historian: "The Polish nation is one big walking complex; may God finally allow us to normalise ourselves, that is, so we become able to see ourselves and our place in the world in the correct proportions" (Kersten 1974).

From the perspective of politics of history, it is not very interesting (if at all) what the building of the state in the period just after independence really looked like, and even less so what importance the ordinary citizens had in building this country, although the words 'nation' and 'sovereign' are no strangers to the lips of those celebrating the centenary.

But let us try to realise what challenges we faced before, just as a political nation, considering what the citizens in autumn 1918 had to face. The First World War was the collective 'suicide of Europe' – to use the metaphor of Andrzej Chwalba – the Europe which its people had known, as they entered the twentieth century with various hopes. The Great War had also given us Poles the opportunity to regain independence, after 123 years of slavery and after more than four years of murderous battles, where the front line repeatedly passed back and forth across the Polish lands, and – at the will of the invaders – 'brother faced brother with a rifle'. An opportunity taken thanks to a large number of favourable circumstances – including in particular the collapse of the three occupying empires at the end of the war – and the determination of a really small group of people, who then succeeded in rising above their personal and party interests and in joining together for the highest of stakes: Independence. Jerzy Eisler writes:

> In the case of Poland, the political miracle in the twentieth century took place twice. On two occasions a very important event took place, which on the basis of reasonable assumptions, in practice, no one would have been able to predict in advance. Naturally I am referring to everything that happened in 1918 and in 1989. Regardless of any differences between these two

> momentous events, what links them is this afore-mentioned unpredictability, as well as the disputes about who played a decisive role in them which went on for many years afterwards. In other words, the dispute is over which actions, which political options and finally which individuals Poland owed its independence to in 1918 and 1989 (Eisler 2016, p. 408).

Well, the job was done; the dream of several generations for a free Poland came true. But really, 11 November was only the beginning. It had a symbolic meaning, as did the First Cadre Company. It was necessary merely to fight for Poland, conducting the diplomatic battles on the international arena and the military battles to establish its final borders. But this is the part of history which we try to remember. So let us focus on the challenges flowing from the 'forgotten' history, on the battles which the ordinary people were fighting every day. Poland was reformed from the three partitions. How should those three lands, so different from each other, be reattached and made into a single state with a unified economic, social and civilisational organism? In practice the 'Independence' project meant hundreds of sub-projects, which laid the fundaments, and over time the foundation of the Second Republic; put forward in time and space and implemented by various entities. This was the everyday reality of Polish cities, towns and villages, inhabited by people of many nationalities and many religions, drawn together somehow in the process of building/becoming Poland. Without any grasp of this complexity, it is impossible to properly describe and understand what for these people the History of Poland (written with a capital H) was, of which they had become a part. To what extent did they feel like its co-authors? Did they identify with it? Did they treat Poland as a common home? These are the fundamental questions – for history and its creation. On contrary, politics of history favours (in its soft version) a historical 'disco-Polo' or (in the hard, Russian version) the so-called 'folk history' (see Volodykhin 1999; I wish to thank Professor Rafał Wnuk for drawing my attention to this article). Politics of history in the latter version leads directly to an **escape from freedom**, as Timothy Snyder very clearly shows in his latest book (Snyder 2018).

We have then, at least in my opinion, entered the twenty-first century with a deficit of critical history rather than an excess of it. In the current climate of political correctness in Europe, the 'time of memory' has come to predominate, rather than the 'time of history'. In Poland, in November 2000, posters and billboards sprang up displaying the question '*Poświęcić życie za Ojczyznę?!*' [Would you lay down your life for the Fatherland?!] as part of an exhibition entitled *Bohaterowie naszej wolności* [Heroes of our freedom], which is generally considered to mark the beginning of modern politics of history. The institutionalisation of this politics is primarily the creation of two institutions: the Institute of National Heritage, the first institution in free Poland whose main task was to carry out regular activities related to the promotion of heritage and national history; and the Institute of National Remembrance, whose aim – apart from investigating the crimes committed against the Polish nation – was to build up a kind of canon of national memory. The disputes and discussions involving the historians of the IDN and IPN in the public space during those years – over the meaning of the Warsaw Rising, about the 'Accursed Soldiers', about Jedwabne, about the successive Polish 'months', about the 'Round Table' and the transformation of 1989, about the 'Third' and 'Fourth' Republics, to mention only the most important – gave rise to a polarisation of positions about what should be included. But it should also be added that during those years those discussions were quite open, and the public actions accompanying them, both in the field of politics of history and in the politics of memory, were not threatened with 'nationalisation' – they retained their internal pluralism and autonomy. It is enough to invoke the case of the Museum of the Warsaw Rising. The introduction of a state monopoly on politics of history, as shown by the experience of the twentieth century, is not only an attack on civic freedom in the field of history, but it can also lead to the historical enslavement of the citizens' minds in the name of 'a sole historical truth' in the service of some bright future. "Everything must be done to ensure that the debate on Polish politics of history becomes a polyphonic school of civic thought and of concern for the state," wrote Rafał Stobiecki recently (Stobiecki 2018, pp. 112–124), an opinion which I fully share.

It is significant that the practitioner of a politics of history addressed to the domestic audience always appeals to the will of the sovereign and/or the will of the majority, which is intended to preordain the superiority of their arguments. Sometimes, in the name of a false sense of 'historical political correctness', they are even ready to reject the educational value of history, in order not to summon the conflicting contemporary 'spectres of the past', which we had to deal with to a certain extent during the [Polish] 'Third Republic'. I spoke and wrote about this before in 2008, at a conference entitled '*Pamięć i polityka historyczna. Doświadczenia Polski i jej sąsiadów*' [Memory and politics of history. The experiences of Poland and its neighbours] organised by the Łódź branch of the IPN (Pomorski 2008, pp. 107–116). **But making an appeal in politics of history that one has the right to the complete reinterpretation of history, simply because one is in government at the voters' will, is a far-reaching abuse of power!** The case of Barabbas finally disproves this thesis. Just because the majority, instigated by the chief priests, chose to release a criminal, does this disavow the testimony and message of Christ? Can He (or they) be erased from history simply because a 'majority' wants it? Some people have even tried to do just that… Let the stewards of contemporary politics of history be encouraged by this example to engage in some critical thinking… if they still can.

I am much more convinced by the opinion of Piotr M.A. Cywiński, director of the Auschwitz-Birkenau Museum:

> Above all, history is a source of warnings, and we should therefore concentrate more on what did not work out for us. I would prefer Polishness to be the reason for a commitment: to be aware that we have certain responsibilities and obligations. (Cywiński, Piegza 2018).

Similar is the final statement made by the former Polish Primate Archbishop Henryk Muszyński for *Przewodnik Katolicki*, which was circulated in the media, and which shares some ideological correspondence with Cywiński's thought:

> I do not question that in our history there have been great and praiseworthy deeds of which we can be proud of. But the problem is that we are afraid to admit that in our history,

> there have also been, and still are, moments which were vile and un-Christian. And further: we, the Poles, who taught Europe what solidarity is, are betraying this ordinary human and European solidarity today. While living in a global world, we want to isolate ourselves, to deal exclusively with our own problems. We are making a virtue out of our own isolation, and this is our drama […]. We do not have a sufficiently deep and consolidated identity, we cannot defend it, and that is why we are afraid of the one who is different and alien. It seems to us that he can threaten us, that he can change and destroy us. That's why we want to continue to defend ourselves against someone – so much so that we are ready to create a fictitious enemy, who is everyone who thinks differently, who believes differently, who is different from us ourselves (Muszyński 2018).

But is it possible perhaps to practice a kind of politics of history that would seek the answers to such fundamental questions as those raised earlier by Cywiński and Archbishop Muszyński? A politics of history in which the most important element would be, not the politicisation of history and the mythologising of one's own history, but rather something which served the historical ontological security of the Polish people, Poland's *raison d'état*? It is in this spirit that Jerzy Giedroyc used to speak; in his *Autobiografia na cztery ręce* [Autobiography for four hands] we find his interpretation of what Poland's interests really are:

> While not falling into national megalomania, we must conduct an independent policy, and not be a client of the United States or any power. Our main goal should be to normalise Polish-Russian and Polish-German relations, while simultaneously defending the independence of Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states, and maintaining close cooperation with them. We should realise that the stronger our position in the East, the more we will count for in Western Europe (Giedroyc 1999, p. 246; see Pomorski 2015, pp. 7–19).

For Giedroyc, the basis for our policy should always be **realism**, and making the best of favourable circumstances. Realism also meant being alert to the historical policies

of our neighbours, confronting their *raisons d'état*, both in recent history and the present day (the term '*raison d'état*' in the function guiding historical narrative is used similarly by Professor Marek Kornat in his recently published article '*O Powstaniu Warszawskim*' [On the Warsaw Rising]; Kornat 2018).

When I am asked about **politics of history** in the context of **Poland's** *raison d'état*, I would like to follow the example set by Giedroyc and suggest two guiding ideas as the goals for our country's politics of history (a basis for the story/narrative of Poland aimed at international consumption). The first would refer to our most recent history; the second to our historical heritage. Both must bear a positive message (and under no circumstances one of martyrdom or messiah-hood – the contemporary world would not 'buy' that), appeal to the emotions and stimulate the historical imagination. I suggest that the first role should contain the idea that **the post-Yalta system in Europe was peacefully dismantled thanks to Poland and the Polish people**. Yalta saw the development of a system which was 'thrashed out' by the war-weary great powers, and which for decades divided and petrified not only our continent but the whole world, separating Western civilisation from the communist system. Almost everyone thought that it had to be like that; and almost everyone came to terms with the situation, but not the Poles. They developed a model of resistance and civic activism which dismantled the system from within. The Polish experience – led by the revolution of 'Solidarity'–, the success of the Polish path of resistance, and the road to independence and full sovereignty, became an inspiration and a model for other nations in our part of Europe to follow. As a result, before the startled eyes of the West and the equally astonished Moscow, the post-Yalta system collapsed, and the Soviet Union broke up. Without what happened in Poland, this would have been impossible – that is the most important message of this narrative.

The second guiding principle, this time referring to our historical heritage, is the story about the **Europe of the Jagiellonians, created by Poland as a specific type of community of political** (not ethnic) **nations, which may**

still be a motivation and a source of inspiration for today's European Union and the attempts to reform/revive it. This idea, in turn, has the advantage of being based on the famous appeal by Pope John Paul II entitled 'From the Union of Lublin to the European Union' referring to the 450th anniversary of its enactment, which falls next year. It also offers the opportunity to recall and proclaim within Europe the idea of a political nation, which was devised and developed by Marshal Józef Piłsudski and continued by his political heirs, led by Jerzy Giedroyc, where not nationalism and ethnicity, but a communally shared system of state and civic values is given pride of place.

A 'Europe of the Jagiellonians' could be an excellent metaphor for our foreign policy while not highlighting its Polonocentrism, which would immediately be met with unfavourable reactions. It is enough to refer to the map of Europe at that time to show what power and what potential this area has for the future. Let us remember that the idea of 'the Europe of the Jagiellonians' has a contemporary political emanation in the form of the *Trójmorze* (Three Seas) idea, which is a strategic concept in Poland's current international politics. However, it is not and cannot at all be (due to its intellectual collapse or deficit, whichever you want) the idea as branded by people such as Marek Jan Chodakiewicz (see the excellent demythologisation and deconstruction of his book by the IPN's historian Sławomir Łukasiewicz posted on the website www.ohistorie.eu: Łukasiewicz 2018; Chodakiewicz 2016).

Complementing the politics of history towards the North should be '**the Europe of the Vasas**'; let us remember that during the reign of this dynasty the Baltic Sea was a 'local lake', and Warsaw served for a time as the capital of the whole region. Until now, no one had been able to use this concept politically, but it would be something worth doing! Each of these three guiding ideas for Polish politics of history targeting the external market – **(1) the peaceful dismantling of Yalta, (2) the Europe of the Jagiellonians and (3) the Europe of the Vasas** – offers great opportunities in the field of public history (as well as modern, multimedia messages, for example in the form of **historical video games**), and thus to influence public opinion in Europe and around the world. I admit that

I dream of millions of young people around the world playing not only the Polish videogame 'Witcher', but also 'God's Playground', based on Polish history; and for some time my doctoral candidates and students and I have been trying to work on exactly that.

The practice of the politics of memory, from a historian's perspective

Towards the end of the last century,

> in what seemed to be a natural way, memory began to be placed in opposition to history, to be described as counter-history, and the discourse of memory was described as an anti-historical discourse. (…) While history was defined as an instrument of pressure and identified with modernism, the state, imperialism, scientism and anthropocentrism, memory was treated as a healing remedy and an instrument of redemption, in terms referring to postmodernism and the 'liberation' of those groups whom history had deprived of their voice (Domańska 2002, p. 16).

In a sense, this juxtaposition of memory against history has become a hallmark of postmodernism itself, but the politics of memory is not confined to it. '**All over the world, we are experiencing the arrival of the time of memory**', the prominent French historian Pierre Nora – by no means a postmodernist – wrote many years ago in his essay '*Czas pamięci*' [Time of memory]. The essay was included in a special edition of *Res Publica Nowa* entitled '*Pamięć i historia*' [Memory and history], which called attention to the materialisation of memory in contemporary culture in the form of memorials, cemeteries and museums (Nora 2001, p. 37).

In connection with this, researchers of historical discourse have noted that the postmodern poetics of memory operates in a quasi-religious form of discourse, and leads to the creation of a completely different style of thinking, researching and writing about the past, whose dictionary is filled with concepts which are strangers to academic history, such as shame, guilt, redemption, atonement, forgiveness,

consolation, fulfilment and catharsis. Memory seems to be a kind of 'cultural religiosity', a way of 'mesmerising' our sense of the past (cf. Klein 2000, pp. 127–150). Just browse the back numbers of the journal *History and Memory. Studies in Representation of the Past*, published quarterly since 1988, to see how far the postmodern humanities of memory have deviated from what was once considered standard in classical historiography.

The 'practice of memory' in the community version – including in places for the public commemoration of historic people or events, in the form of monuments, plaques or names for streets, city squares and roundabouts – always says more about today's times than about history itself. In this regard, a politics of memory may be more an expression of symbolic violence against existing tradition than a desire to 'straighten' the winding paths of history. They are ruled by emotions more than by rational arguments, and in the social dimension, also by a need to react. For example, this was the intention behind the demolition in 1924–1925 of the Russian Orthodox Cathedral of the Exaltation of the Cross, which had been erected in 1870–1876 on today's Lithuanian Square [*plac Litewski*] in Lublin, and the use of materials from the demolition to construct… the Soldiers' House in honour of the [Polish] Legionnaires. In a similarly symbolic gesture by my generation, after the turning point of 1989, demands were made to remove the so-called monument of gratitude to the Soviet Army from that same square – I remember the passionate speech by Norbert Wojciechowski on the matter, during an election rally held by the Lublin region's Civic Committee, which I was leading at the time. Likewise were the subsequent efforts made by Zbigniew Wojciechowski to carry out an original project from 1937 and set up an equestrian statue of Marshal Józef Piłsudski. These were significant examples of 'the practice of memory' in my home town of Lublin.

Timothy Snyder drew attention to an important phenomenon, differentiating the practice of memory from historical practice:

> Because memory is in the first person, it can be constantly revised, and it becomes more personal with time. Whereas

> history, at least in principle, takes the other direction: as it is revised, it becomes ever-more open to the perspective of third parties and thereby potentially universal. A historian can start with concerns which are immediate and personal – they perhaps have to be – and then work away from them. Sublimating his starting perspective, he comes up with something altogether different (Judt, Snyder 2013, p. 306).

The necessity to push through one's own limits, including an excessive reliance on collective memory, is a constant challenge for the historian. It is worth recalling the words spoken by Andrzej Leder uttered in the context of the '**dreamed-of revolutions**':

> Who took this revolution away from us? This question plays out on two completely different levels. One of them is the level of historical facts: the things and events that really happened, and were then documented and described, or their material traces are still available today. If we can talk about a 'stolen' revolution at this level, that's because it was stolen by German and Russian power from the Polish political subject.
> The second level concerns social consciousness and the unconsciousness associated with it. Much more enigmatic [level] – so much so that sometimes it is simply negated – is the actual course of the social process, which it is crucial to understand. It is also essential in order to explain the astonishing absence in contemporary thinking and discourse of that – real – revolution, an event which affects our current situation at the most fundamental level. How is it possible that an event of such scale and with such a profound effect was so poorly represented in the discourse which expressed, or rather created, the contemporary awareness of the Polish people? Who 'stole' from our awareness this sign, this symbol, [it] is significant [such question]. And so the second way of understanding that this revolution was stolen is located at the level of the transformations of social consciousness and unconsciousness (Leder 2014).

The practice of memory happens in the public consciousness and unconsciousness. It is a game that takes

place in symbolic domains, as Lech M. Nijakowski was able to show so well (Nijakowski 2006). It has been accompanied by a return to the 'memorial consciousness' (a term introduced into scholarly circulation by Pierre Nora) which has been observable in Europe since the 1970s. For modern society, it is equally important to **console the memory** and replace passive sorrow with active mourning. As Paul Ricoeur wrote:

> To avoid recurrences, one needs to console the mind. Honest memory is always a consolation. But a mendacious memory and instrumental oblivion, which uses oblivion to avoid embarrassment, always hurts and rankles. (Ricoeur 2002, p. 48).

It is worth recalling in this context that Krzysztof Pomian talked about the dialectic of two possible memories which was possible at that time: **the memory of the victors** and **the memory of the vanquished** as sources of social tension. Therefore, at the end of these considerations, let's quote Paul Ricoeur once again:

> It is important to educate by showing the reasons, the motives, the memory of the other participants in the conflict. And apart from education, public debate is needed – the collective consideration of alternative scenarios of history, to confront the memories of the various parties to the conflict, to commemorate the tragic events. And mourning is important. Not just passive sorrow, but active mourning for those whom we have lost, and those whom we have excluded, and for that which has been irretrievably lost. (Ricoeur 2002, p. 56).

Only then can the practice of memory serve to maintain the identity of the community and build up its social capital. This will be well understood by anyone who has had the opportunity at least once to actively participate in the concerts organised by the Museum of the Warsaw Rising every 1st August: '*Warszawiacy śpiewają (nie)zakazane piosenki*' [Varsovians sing the (un)forbidden songs].

* The paper contains the author's position referring to the issues touched upon in the editorial discussion published above.

References

Burszta, Średziński 2016: Burszta, Wojciech, and Średziński Przemysław. "Rekonstrukcje historyczne to wtłaczanie w umysły młodych ludzi zupełnie fałszywego wyobrażenia wojny, męczeństwa i cierpienia" [Historical reconstructions force completely false ideas of war, martyrdom and suffering into the minds of young people]. *Dziennik Gazeta Prawna*, August 20, 2016. https://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/opinie/artykuly/529189,wojciech-burszta-wywiad-rekonstrukcje-rozmowa.html.

Chodakiewicz 2016: Chodakiewicz, Marek Jan. 2016. *Międzymorze*. Warsaw: 3S Media: Fundacja Niezależny Zespół Badawczy.

Cichocki, 2006: Cichocki, Marek. "Polityka historyczna – za i przeciw" [Politics of history – for and against]. *Mówią Wieki* 8, August 17, 2006: 10–17.

Cywiński, Piegza 2018: Cywiński, Piotr, and Piegza, Szymon. "Dyrektor muzeum Auschwitz-Birkenau: to miejsce nie powinno być zakładnikiem polityki [Wywiad]" [Director of the Auschwitz-Birkenau Museum: This place should not be hostage to politics (Interview)]. *Onet.pl.* Accessed January 15, 2019. https://Cracow.onet.pl/piotr-cywinski-kl-auschwitz-muzeum-nie-jest-zakladnikiem-polityki-wywiad/w0xepfq.

Domańska 2002: Domańska, Ewa. "Introduction". In *Pamięć, etyka i historia: anglo-amerykańska teoria historiografii lat dziewięćdziesiątych (antologia przekładów)* [Memory, ethics and history: Anglo-American theory of historiography in the 1990s (anthology of translations)]. Ed. Domańska E. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie.

Eisler 2016: Eisler, Jerzy. 2016. *Co nam zostało z tamtych lat? Dziedzictwo PRL* [What do we have from those years? The heritage of the Polish People's Republic]. Warsaw: PWN.

Giedroyc, 1999: Giedroyc, Jerzy. 1999. *Autobiografia na cztery ręce* [Autobiography for four hands]. Ed. Pomian K., 2nd ed. Warsaw: "Czytelnik".

Głowiński 1993: Głowiński, Michał. 1993. *Peereliada. Komentarze do słów 1976–1981*. Warsaw: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy.

John Paul II, 2005: Jan Paweł II [John Paul II]. 2005. *Pamięć i tożsamość: rozmowy na przełomie tysiącleci* [Memory and identity: personal reflections]. Cracow: Społeczny Instytut Wydawniczy Znak.

Judt, Snyder 2013: Judt, Tony, and Snyder, Timothy. *Thinking the Twentieth Century*. London: Vintage 2013.

Kersten 1974: Kersten, Adam. 1974. *Romans i historia* [Adam Kersten interview]. *Spojrzenia* 6.

Kersten 1987: Kersten, Krystyna. 1987. "Moja przygoda z historią najnowszą" [My adventure with recent history]. *Przegląd Powszechny* 3: 368–388. https://kerstens.org/fundacja/Krystyna/badania/KK_Przygoda9.shtml.

Klein 2000: Klein, Kerwin Lee. 2000. "On the Emergence of Memory in Historical Discourse". Special Issue, *Representations* (*Grounds for Remembering*) 69 (Winter): 127–150.

Kornat 2018: Kornat, Marek. "Powstanie Warszawskie ukazało Zachodowi prawdziwe oblicze Sowietów" [The Warsaw Rising revealed the true face of the Soviets to the West]. *WPolityce*, August 1, 2018. Accessed January 15, 2019. https://wpolityce.pl/historia/406238-tylko-u-nas-prof-kornat-o-powstaniu-warszawskim.

Kula 1996: Kula, Witold. 1996. *Rozdziałki*. Warsaw: TRIO.

Leder 2014: Leder, Andrzej. 2014. *Prześniona rewolucja. Ćwiczenia z logiki historycznej* [The dreamed-of revolution. Exercises in historical logic]. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej.

Łukasiewicz 2018: Łukasiewicz, Sławomir. "Wojny koncepcyjne historyków. Na marginesie książki Marka Jana Chodakiewicza o »Międzymorzu«" [War of concepts among historians. On the margins of Marek Jan Chodakiewicz's book on the 'Interseas' initiative]. *Ohistorie*. July 20, 2018. Accessed January 15, 2019. http://ohistorie.eu/2018/07/20/wojny-koncepcyjne-historykow-na-marginesie-ksiazki-marka-jana-chodakiewicza-o-miedzymorzu/.

Mazur, 2009: Mariusz, Mazur. 2009. *O człowieku tendencyjnym…: obraz nowego człowieka w propagandzie komunistycznej w okresie Polski Ludowej i PRL 1944–1956* [On the biased man: the image of the new man in Communist propaganda during People's Poland and the Polish People's Republic, 1944–1956]. Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej.

Muszyński 2018: "Abp Henryk Muszyński: Zdradzamy europejską solidarność" [Archbishop Muszynski: We are betraying European solidarity]. *Więź*. July 13, 2018. Accessed January 15, 2019. http://wiez.com.pl/2018/07/13/wiezcytuje-abp-muszynski-zdradzamy-europejska-solidarnosc/.

Nijakowski, 2006: Nijakowski, Lech M. 2006. *Domeny symboliczne. Konflikty narodowe i etniczne w wymiarze symbolicznym* [Symbolic domains. National and ethnic conflicts in the symbolic dimension]. Warsaw: SCHOLAR.

Nora 2001: Nora, Pierre. 2001. "Time of memory". *Res Publica Nowa* 7: 37–43.

Nowak 2015: Nowak, Andrzej. 2015. *Pierwsza zdrada Zachodu. 1920 – zapomniany appeasement* [The West's first betrayal. 1920 – the forgotten appeasement]. Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie.

Nowak 2017: Nowak, Andrzej. 2017. "Czy w polityce historycznej jest miejsce na kategorię »zdrady«?" [Is there

a place in politics of history for the category of 'betrayal'?]. *Dzieje Najnowsze* 3: 299–312.

Pomian 1968: Pomian, Krzysztof. 1968. *Przeszłość jako przedmiot wiary. Historia i filozofia w myśli średniowiecza* [The past as an object of faith. History and philosophy in medieval thought]. Warsaw: PWN.

Pomian 2010: Pomian, Krzysztof. 2010. *Przeszłość jako przedmiot wiedzy* [The past as an object of knowledge]. Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.

Pomorski, 2008: Pomorski, Jan. 2008. "Ucieczka od historii jako element poprawności politycznej" [Escaping history as an element of political correctness]. In *Pamięć i polityka historyczna. Doświadczenia Polski i jej sąsiadów* [Memory and politics of history. The experience of Poland and its neighbours]. Ed. Nowinowski S.M., Pomorski J. and Stobiecki R. Łódź: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Ibidem, Instytut Pamięci Narodowej – Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu: 107–116.

Pomorski 2015: Pomorski, Jan. 2015. "Jerzego Giedroycia rozumienie historii" [Jerzy Giedroyc's understanding of history]. In *Giedroycia rozrachunki z historią i polityką. Studia i szkice w czterdziestą rocznicę "Zeszytów Historycznych"* [Jerzy Giedroyc settles his accounts with history and politics. Studies and sketches on the fortieth anniversary of 'Historical Notebooks']. Ed. Nowinowski S.M. and Stobiecki R. Łódź: Wydawnictwo Ibidem.

Pomorski 2017a: Pomorski, Jan. 2017. "Appeasement jako ostrzeżenie. Rozważania o historiografii i polityce historycznej (Wokół »Pierwszej zdrady Zachodu« Andrzeja Nowaka)" [Appeasement as a warning. Reflections on historiography and politics of history (on Andrzej Nowak's *The West's first betrayal*)]. *Dzieje Najnowsze* 3: 269–298.

Pomorski 2017b: Pomorski, Jan. 2017. "Polityzacja/mitologizacja historii, czyli w czym neuronauka (i metodologia) może pomóc badaczowi historii

najnowszej?" [The politicisation/mythologisation of history: how can neuroscience (and methodology) help the researcher of recent history?]. *Historia@Teoria* 4 (6). https://pressto.amu.edu.pl/index.php/ht.

Pomorski 2017c: Pomorski, Jan. 2017. "Dylematy polskich historyków AD 2017. (Raz jeszcze o polityzacji/mitologizacji historii)" [Dilemmas of Polish historians AD 2017. (Once more on the politicisation/mythologisation of history)]. *Historia@Teoria* 4 (6). https://doi.org/10.14746/ht.2017.6.4.02.

Pomorski 2017d: Pomorski, Jan. 2017. "Spoglądając w przeszłość… Studia i szkice metahistoryczne" [Looking into the past… Metahistorical studies and sketches]. Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej.

Pomorski 2018: Pomorski, Jan. 2018. "Historyk w służbie 'rozumu politycznego' (prof. Andrzejowi Nowakowi »wirtualnie« do sztambucha)" [A historian in the service of 'political reason' (To Professor Andrzej Nowak 'virtually' in the *album amicorum*)]. *Ohistorie*. July 17, 2018. Accessed January 15, 2019. http://ohistorie.eu/2018/07/17/historyk-w-sluzbie-rozumu-politycznego/.

Ricoeur 2002: Ricoeur, Paul. 2002. "Rewanż pamięci" [The vengeance of memory]. In Żakowski, Jacek and Kieres, Leon, *Rewanż pamięci* [The revenge of memory]. Warsaw: SIC!.

Snyder 2003: Snyder, Timothy. 2004. *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus 1569–1999*. London: Yale University Press.

Snyder 2017: Snyder, Timothy. 2017. *On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century*. London: Vintage Digital.

Snyder 2018: Snyder, Timothy. 2018. *The Road to Unfreedom. Russia, Europe, America*. London: Vintage Digital.

Stobiecki 2018: Stobiecki, Rafał. 2018. “Mimo wszystko w obronie »polityki historycznej«” [After all, in defence of ‘politics of history’]. *Więź* 1 (Spring): 113–124.

Volodykhin 1999: Volodykhin, Dmitri. 1999. “Феномен Фольк-Истории” [Phenomenon of the folk history]. *Международный Исторический Журнал* 5. http://scepsis.net/library/id_148.html.