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THE OPERATIONAL STRATEGY OF THE SECURITY SERVICE (SB) TOWARDS THE SECOND CIRCULATION IN THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC FROM 1980 TO 1990

The issue of ‘the second circulation’ publishing in the Polish People’s Republic has recently attracted the interest of scholars. Nonetheless, there are few publications that focus on – or point to – the operations of the communist repressive apparatus in relation to independent publishers.¹ In 2005, the annual *Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944–1989* issued an extensive article by Ewa Zając and Henryk Głębocki on the cooperation of two Cracow underground publishers, Henryk Karkosza² and

¹ More on research concerning the second circulation in Poland in: C. Kuta, *Nieczurowane. Z dziejów drugiego obiegu wydawniczego w Krakowie w latach 1976–1990*, Kraków 2019, pp. 13–20.

² Henryk Karkosza (b. 1953), a graduate of the Faculty of Law at Jagiellonian University; from 1976 until 1978 an officer of the Criminal Section of the Investigative and Forensic Section (Sekcja Kryminalna Wydziału Dochodzeniowo-Śledczego) of the Provincial Headquarters of the Citizens’ Militia (Komenda Wojewódzka Milicji Obywatelskiej, KWMO) in Tarnów; in 1978–1982 he worked for the PKO BP bank in Cracow. From 1978 he was the head of the Krakowska Oficyna Studencka, and later the KOS publishing houses. From September 1980 he was a member of Solidarity; in 1981 the head of the Solidarity Site Committee (Komisja Zakładowa Solidarności) in the PKO BP bank. He was interned from 13 December 1981 to 26 May 1982. Subsequently, he was the head of Oficyna Literacka, an underground publishing house; from 1985 he was a representative of the Independent Publishers’ Fund (Fundusz Wydawnictw Niezależnych). He evaluated applications for subsidies for other underground publishing houses in Cracow and was an intermediary in the transfer of money and equipment. From 1990 he was the owner of Oficyna Literacka, a publishing house. On 27 February 1979 he was registered by the Department III KWMO in Cracow as the secret collaborator (TW) “Monika” (no. Kr 21120), later as TW “Waldek”. On 12 January 1982 he was

Lesław Maleszka³, with the Secret Service (SB) of communist Poland.⁴ The article met with astonishment, sometimes even shock, from former anti-communist opposition activists. There were some who, unconvinced by the hard documentary evidence, even questioned the conclusions drawn by the authors. They believed that the Secret Service had not managed to infiltrate the structures of the underground publishing and had known little about its operations. However, this thesis was refuted by subsequent research and publications.⁵ Successively discovered sources that came under scrutiny proved that the SB officers had known much more than expected.

taken over by Inspektorat I WUSW in Cracow, and deregistered on 10 January 1990. See: records on Henryk Karkosza on the file cards of the Archiwum Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej Oddział w Krakowie [Archives of the Institute of National Remembrance in Cracow, hereafter AIPN Kr], 085/1, AIPN Kr, 089/1, AIPN Kr, 00142/1; H. Głębocki, “Karkosza Henryk”, in *Encyklopedia Solidarności: Opozycja w PRL 1976–1989*, vol. 4, eds. J. Olszsek et al. (Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2020), pp. 158–159; E. Zając, H. Głębocki, “‘Ketman’ i ‘Monika’ – żywoty równoległe”, *Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944–1989* 2005, no. 1, pp. 73–150; R. Terlecki, “‘Monika’, czyli ‘nieprzerwany dopływ informacji’”, *Biuletyn Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej* 2005, no. 3 (50), pp. 55–67; “Przypadek Henryka Karkoszy: Rozmowa M. Zarzyckiego z B. Wildsteinem i A. Mietkowskim”, *Karta* 2004, no. 41, pp. 143–135.

³ Lesław Maleszka (b. 1952), a graduate of the Faculty of Polish Studies at Jagiellonian University. From autumn 1976 he cooperated with the Workers’ Defence Committee (Komitet Obrony Robotników, KOR) and the Committee for Social Self-Defence KOR (Komitet Samoobrony Społecznej KOR); the founder of the Student Committee of Solidarity (Studencki Komitet Solidarności, SKS) in Cracow. From October 1977 he was an editor of the first independent students’ magazine *Indeks*. From 1980 to 1981 he was employed at the Information Division of the Inter-Enterprise Founding Committee (Sekcja Informacji Międzyzakładowego Komitetu Założycielskiego, MKZ) Kraków/Małopolska, later at Region Management (Zarząd Regionu) Małopolska. He was editor of the independent magazines *Goniec Małopolski* and *Aktualności*. Interned from 26 January to 14 June 1982. Subsequently, he wrote for underground magazines, e.g. *Tygodnik Mazowsze* and *Arka*, as well as in the Paris-based *Kontakt*. He edited books by the Oficyna Literacka publishing house. From 1987 to 1989, has was the editor of the underground *Bez dekretu*; from 1988 to 1990 editor-in-chief of *Nowohucki Biuletyn Solidarności*. In 1989 he founded the Cracow branch of the daily *Gazeta Wyborcza*. After 1990 he worked, among others, in the editorial office for the Cracow daily *Czas*. He was the deputy editor-in-chief of *Gazeta Krakowska* as well as editor of *Gazeta Wyborcza* (1994–2007). From February to April 1976 he was being investigated by the Department III KWMO in Cracow as part of the case of operational work (sprawa operacyjnego rozpracowania, SOR) code-named “Optymiści”. The SB recruited him for cooperation, so that from April 1976 to January 1990 as the secret collaborator (TW) “Ketman”/ “Return”/ “Tomek”/ “Zbyszek” he reported on people to the SB. See: E. Zając, H. Głębocki, “‘Ketman’ i ‘Monika’”, pp. 73–170; H. Głębocki, “Lesław Maleszka”, in *Encyklopedia Solidarności...*, vol. 4, p. 252.

⁴ E. Zając, H. Głębocki, “‘Ketman’ i ‘Monika’”, pp. 73–362.

⁵ More on this in: S. Cenckiewicz, “TW ‘Rybak’ – agent artysta: (Trójmiejski Sierpień ’80 w raportach konfidenta SB)”, *Arcana* 2005, no. 4–5 (64–65), pp. 314–315; R. Terlecki, “‘Monika’, czyli”, pp. 55–67; C. Kuta, “‘Pod kontrolą’ i ‘z zachowaniem możliwości

I believe that an analysis of the communist repressive apparatus in the years 1975–1990 cannot ignore the important issue of the operations toward independent publishers. The character of my paper is synthetic; it summarises the research conducted so far and points to the gaps and problems therein. Also, my objective has been to draw the attention of English-speaking readers to the complex issue of Secret Service operations toward underground publishers in Poland from 1976 to 1990, which is shown in a simplistic way in English-language publications, without proper reference to sources; occasionally it is even misinterpreted.⁶

Chief Directions of the Operational Activities

The attitude of the repressive apparatus toward independent publishers evolved along with the political situation. Operational activities, specific methods, and means depended on the current political situation and perspectives.⁷ The same tactics were used with regard to the activists of ‘the second circulation’ and the anti-communist opposition. Operational activities were undertaken, but there was no decision to eliminate underground publishing completely.⁸

sterowania”, *Glaukopis* 2011, no. 21–22, pp. 266–276; eadem, “Przypadek TW ‘Joanna’”, in *Osobowe środki pracy operacyjnej – zagadnienia źródłoznawcze*, ed. F. Musiał (Kraków: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2013), pp. 31–61; eadem, “Działania Służby Bezpieczeństwa wobec drugiego obiegu w okresie stanu wojennego na przykładzie Wydawnictwa im. gen. Nila Fieldorfa”, in *Drugi obieg w PRL na tle samizdatu w państwach bloku sowieckiego po 1956 roku*, eds. P. Gasztold-Seń, N. Jarska, J. Olaszek (Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2016), pp. 445–446; J. Olaszek, G. Wołk, “Drugi obieg wydawniczy w oczach Służby Bezpieczeństwa”, *Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość* 2013, no. 1 (21), pp. 369–435; “Analiza Departamentu III MSW na temat niezależnego ruchu wydawniczego w połowie 1987 r.”, comp. G. Waligóra in *Studia i materiały z dziejów opozycji i oporu społecznego*, vol. 5, ed. by Ł. Kamiński, G. Waligóra (Wrocław: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2006), pp. 170–182; G. Waligóra, “Służba Bezpieczeństwa wobec niezależnego ruchu wydawniczego w latach 1976–1980”, in *Drugi obieg w PRL na tle samizdatu...*, pp. 395–410; G. Wołk, “Służba Bezpieczeństwa wobec pism i wydawnictw drugiego obiegu w latach 1980–1990”, in *Drugi obieg w PRL na tle samizdatu...*, pp. 411–440.

⁶ For example S. Doucette, *Books Are Weapons: The Polish Opposition Press and the Overthrow of Communism* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2017), pp. 30–32, 60–67, 125–128, 166–169.

⁷ Archiwum Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej [Archives of the Institute of National Remembrance, hereafter AIPN], 001708/3129A, Andrzej Dudek, Nielegalny obieg wydawniczy na terenie Warszawy i województwa stołecznego w latach 1981–1987. Praca dyplomowa napisana pod kierunkiem kpt. dr. Marka Zielińskiego. Legionowo: Wyższa Szkoła Oficerska MSW im. Feliksa Dzierżyńskiego 1988, p. 9 (PDF).

⁸ Ł. Kamiński, “Władza wobec opozycji 1976–1989”, *Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość* 2003, no. 2, pp. 11–18.

At the early stage of the formation of the anti-communist opposition and the underground press, the Secret Service's tactics included harassment, threats, false accusations, as well as searches and provocations.⁹ The measures undertaken were "policing and prevention aimed at counteracting the production and distribution of illegal publications". Grzegorz Waligóra claims that "the lack of a decisive attack on the emerging publishing movement [was] an element of a general strategy against the unfolding organised opposition; a strategy adopted in the ministry in accordance with the principle: 'control is better than elimination'".¹⁰ For that reason, the operations of the communist repressive apparatus in the second half of the 1970s focused on so-called prevention and gathering of information. The aim was to identify the range of 'the second circulation' and to control it. The instruction 006/70 on the SB operations was the starting point.¹¹ The implementation of its guidelines against individual publishers and magazines of the second circulation entailed cases of operational verification or cases of operational surveillance and repression.¹² From 1976 to 1980, within the framework of these cases, all major publishing groups and titles beyond the reach of the communist censorship were under surveillance. In most cases, a tip or a copy of the forbidden paper were enough for the SB to initiate its operations.¹³ Sometimes a separate operation was carried out to focus on newspaper supplements or even individual articles.¹⁴

The units responsible for surveilling and repressing independent publishing were: Department III of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Departament III MSW) and its counterparts locally: Departments III of the Provincial Headquarters of the Citizens' Militia (wydziały III KWMO), and later also Departments III-1 (wydziały III-1). Initially, the SB's con-

⁹ G. Majchrzak, "Kierunek na nękanie: Działania SB w walce z opozycją w latach siedemdziesiątych", in *Opozycja demokratyczna w PRL w latach 1976–1981*, eds. W. Polak, J. Kufel, P. Ruchlewski (Gdańsk: Europejskie Centrum Solidarności, 2012), pp. 349–361.

¹⁰ G. Waligóra, "Służba Bezpieczeństwa wobec niezależnego ruchu wydawniczego", p. 396.

¹¹ See H. Głębocki, "'Biblia' Służby Bezpieczeństwa: Instrukcja nr 006/70", *Arcana* 2002, no. 46–47, pp. 40–73.

¹² On the cases of operational verification (SOS) and operational surveillance and repression (SOR) see F. Musiał, *Podręcznik bezpieki: Teoria pracy operacyjnej Służby Bezpieczeństwa w świetle wydawnictw resortowych Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych PRL (1970–1989)* (Kraków: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2007), pp. 242–248.

¹³ J. Ołaszek, G. Wołk, "Drugi obieg wydawniczy w oczach Służby Bezpieczeństwa", pp. 369–370; G. Waligóra, "Służba Bezpieczeństwa wobec niezależnego ruchu wydawniczego", p. 397.

¹⁴ J. Ołaszek, G. Wołk, "Drugi obieg wydawniczy w oczach Służby Bezpieczeństwa", p. 370.

trol over independent publishing did not encounter any major obstacles, primarily because there were only a few titles to deal with.

However, the situation would change when Solidarity made its appearance. The circumstances favoured the development of the second circulation, so a change in the strategy of the communist political police followed. Since the press of the trade union was published overtly, the SB had no difficulties identifying the names of the editorial staff, especially when (together with the addresses) they could be found in the imprint. At that stage the SB did not take steps to close down any independent titles or repress the trade union press. Also, it resorted less frequently to the means used previously, like searches or talks/interviews of a preventive and threatening character. Still, via personal sources of information¹⁵ it tried to influence the content of the publications and limit their scope (by taking over a considerable number of copies), and impede the functioning of the independent press (by controlling the import of printing equipment and blocking access to both paper and equipment).¹⁶ By the end of 1980, the functionaries of the repressive apparatus admitted that “they were more effective until August. This is proven by the fact that during the wave of strikes in July and August this year, the suspects did not manage to cause any harmful initiatives. Subsequently, because of the politico-operational situation, there have basically been no repressive and few preventive measures taken. As a result, countering the existing threats has been less effective.”¹⁷

At that time the Ministry of Internal Affairs were considering various modes of actions to limit the influence of independent publishing.¹⁸ In June

¹⁵ Personal source of information (osobowe źródło informacji, OZI), in the narrow sense, was a synonym for personal measures of operational work which include categories of people who collaborated with the communist regime. In a broader sense, it is anyone who broadened the knowledge of the SB functionary regarding the past, present or future state of operational work of the SB. See: F. Musiał, *Podręcznik bezpieki...*, pp. 87–168; *Osobowe źródła informacji: Zagadnienia metodologiczno-źródłoznawcze*, ed. F. Musiał (Kraków: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2008); W. Sawicki, “Osobowe źródła informacji organów bezpieczeństwa Polski Ludowej”, *Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944–1989* 2007, no. 1 (5), pp. 9–18.

¹⁶ AIPN Kr, 056/93, Kierunkowe plany pracy operacyjnej oraz sprawozdania Wydziału III-1 SB KWMO w Krakowie z lat 1977–1982, Analiza zagrożeń i oceny stanu bezpieczeństwa województwa miejskiego krakowskiego w instytucjach nadbudowy, Kraków, 29 XII 1980, c. 130 (PDF); J. Olaszek, G. Wołk, “Drugi obieg wydawniczy w oczach Służby Bezpieczeństwa”, p. 412; C. Kuta, *Nieczurowane...*, pp. 441–442.

¹⁷ AIPN Kr, 056/93, Kierunkowe plany pracy operacyjnej oraz sprawozdania Wydziału III-1 SB KWMO w Krakowie z lat 1977–1982, Analiza zagrożeń i oceny stanu bezpieczeństwa województwa miejskiego krakowskiego w instytucjach nadbudowy, Kraków, 29 XII 1980, c. 98 (PDF).

¹⁸ G. Wołk, “Służba Bezpieczeństwa wobec pism i wydawnictw drugiego obiegu”, p. 416.

1981, during a meeting of the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of National Defence, general Mirosław Milewski, head of the MSW emphasised: “The major target of our blows must be [...] the anti-Soviet actions and illegal publishing or the use of legal printing equipment for malevolent political activity.”¹⁹ In June 1981, an action plan was approved. It recommended “identifying illegal printing locales, its technical staff, editorial teams, distributors, and the locales where the publications are being stored. [Moreover,] eliminating the identified printing locales, conducting talks to deter and threaten people involved in illegal publishing, and initiating repressive actions (referring cases to appropriate offices and initiating preparatory proceedings) against improper persons.”²⁰

The so-called threatening initiatives focused on deterring as well as repressive actions were to lead to “the demands that private collections and the collections of trade unions or student organisations be eliminated. These included literature and press that had anti-state, anti-Soviet tendencies or anything published without a permit in the PRL.”²¹

At that time, all the SB’s concepts and action plans against the second circulation were primarily focused on the observing and gathering of information. This information was readily put to use when martial law was declared.²²

After 13 December 1981, the strategy against the second circulation was to change yet again. The SB, together with the Leadership of the II General Staff (Zarząd II Sztabu Generalnego) and the Internal Military Service (Wojskowa Służba Wewnętrzna), set to intensively eradicate the independent publishing movement. Irrespective of the Secret Service, military units surveilled the publishing underground’s distribution networks as well as the conspiratorial structures of the Solidarity underground.²³ The actions of the Department III MSW in this respect were coordinat-

¹⁹ AIPN, 1585/201, Kierownictwo Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych i Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej – spotkania w dn. 13 VI 1981 r. i 03 VIII 1981 r. Protokoły, Protokół spotkania kierownictwa MON i MSW, Warszawa, 13 VI 1981, c. 2–3.

²⁰ AIPN, 1585/1624, Zwalczenie politycznej opozycji, likwidacja zagrożeń dla ustroju i władzy, eliminacja źródeł napięć i konfliktów społecznych, Realizacja przez resort uchwał Plenum KC PZPR i IX Nadzwyczajnego Zjazdu PZPR oraz sejmowego oświadczenia premiera, Dyrektywy, korespondencja, Plan działań MSW w związku z uchwałą XI Plenum KC PZPR z 10 VI 1981 r. i sejmowym wystąpieniem premiera 12 VI 1981 r., Warszawa, 17 VI 1981, c. 33 (PDF).

²¹ Ibid., c. 34 (PDF).

²² C. Kuta, “Niezależny ruch wydawniczy 1980–1989”, in *NSZZ “Solidarność” 1980–1989*, vol. 2: *Ruch społeczny*, eds. Ł. Kamiński, G. Waligóra (Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2010), p. 301.

²³ “Jak wojskowe służby rozpracowywały ‘Solidarność’”, *Głos* 2006, no. 31.

ed by the Bureau of Studies (Biuro Studiów) established in June 1982.²⁴ The units of the Citizens Militia (MO) also joined the efforts to suppress the independent publishing movement. The functionaries of MO checked vehicles, apartments, and people; they verified whether the equipment and office supplies in state institutions and enterprises were being used ‘appropriately’. They also secured evidence of ‘criminal’ actions, detained people suspected of such actions, and handed them over to the SB.²⁵

At that time the chief objective of the communist repressive apparatus was to do away with the second circulation, which was to be achieved by “coordinating activities of political, legal and operational character.”²⁶ The operational steps included: prevention, identification, and detection of independent publishing houses. In line with the guidelines of the instruction 006/70, prevention consisted of “not allowing any activity which is hostile towards the People’s Republic of Poland to unfold and spread. This is done by exposing factors that contribute to its emergence, and creating conditions that make it impossible for certain people to engage in this activity, and, if they already have, to limit their negative impact.”²⁷

Publishing waned as a result of interning journalists, editors, printers, and distributors, as well as shutting down small publishing ventures that had been largely uncovered before 13 December 1981.²⁸

Another form of prevention consisted in warning talks with people cooperating with independent publishing houses. They were investigated within operational cases, whereas their family members were subject to preventive talks. As it was recorded, these talks “were fruitful only in several cases and only with people who had been disclosed at an early stage of their cooperation with a given publishing house.”²⁹ As for identifying the activity of certain publishing houses, personal sources of information and technical means of operational work were used: thorough examination of correspondence, surveillance, room bugging and telephone tapping.³⁰

²⁴ A. Zybortowicz, “Niewidoczna władza: Komunistyczne państwo policyjne w Polsce lat osiemdziesiątych”, in *Skryte oblicze systemu komunistycznego. Źródła zła...*, eds. R. Bäcker, P. Hübner (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo DiG, 1997), pp. 153–192; J. Błażejowska, *Papierowa rewolucja: Z dziejów drugiego obiegu wydawniczego w Polsce 1976–1989/1990* (Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2010), p. 196.

²⁵ See S. Rudka, *Poza cenzurą: Wrocławską prasą bezdebitową 1973–1989* (Warszawa–Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2001), pp. 129–131.

²⁶ AIPN, 001708/3129A, c. 92 (PDF).

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ A few secret collaborators were also interned, which was to lend them credibility in the eyes of the opposition. This was the case of Henryk Karkosza, Lesław Maleszka and Paweł Miłkasz. See: C. Kuta, “Przypadek TW ‘Joanna’”, p. 34.

²⁹ AIPN, 001708/3129A, c. 93 (PDF).

³⁰ Ibid., p. 95.

More emphasis was put on channels of transferring publications from abroad. The focus was on “depriving the adversary of the means of mass impact, that is fighting their publications which would ensure control over and ultimately the obliteration of the underground structures.”³¹ There were attempts to infiltrate the publishing underground, identify it, and subsequently to undertake measures against specific printing houses and distribution points. In addition there were attempts to intercept publications intended for distribution; prepare disinformation materials in the printing houses that had been taken over; to arrest people who had become involved in independent publishing and replace them with secret collaborators of the SB.³²

The secret political police of PRL implemented three types of operational activities against independent publishing:

1. Surveillance and repression of people engaged in preparing publications, printing, and distribution, as well as dissolving publishing and distribution points
2. Negatively impacting the publishing profile of certain publishing houses; to infiltrate them with personal sources of information
3. Impacting the publishing by producing fakes which were to provoke, disinform, and discredit certain people and spread discord among various factions of the opposition.³³

The SB's Surveillance Activity

The first type of operational activity was undoubtedly a starting point for the other two. According to a departmental paper of 1985 on the ‘Specifics of an operational case of surveilling and repressing hostile written propaganda’, from 1976 to 1983 “there were 1400 cases of operational surveillance and repression of illegal written propaganda. 300 cases were recorded in 1984. At present, there are ca. 100 cases of surveilling people throughout the country”. It was emphasised that “despite long-term operations by the SB, it was impossible to eliminate the threats posed by illegal propaganda.”³⁴ Significantly, the concept of ‘hostile written propaganda’ was broadly understood by the SB. It included editing, distrib-

³¹ AIPN, 0365/112, vol. 2, Materiały Departamentu III MSW dotyczące opozycji antykomunistycznej w kraju, Nowe formy działania MSW, Warszawa, no date, c. 169 (PDF).

³² Ibid.

³³ C. Kuta, *Niecenzurowane...*, p. 444.

³⁴ AIPN, 001708/2136, Tadeusz Brzost, Specyfika prowadzenia sprawy operacyjnego rozpracowania na wrogą propagandę pisaną, Wyższa Szkoła Oficerska MSW im. Feliksa Dzierżyńskiego, Legionowo 1985 (praca dyplomowa napisana pod kierunkiem kpt. mgr. Stanisława Głąbińskiego), typescript, p. 25 (PDF).

uting, printing underground books and magazines, as well as preparing leaflets and graffiti.³⁵

A document drawn up in Department III of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, on the basis of the data sent from specific provincial headquarters, contains the results of work by the SB functionaries as well as the identification of the second circulation from 13 December 1981 till mid-1987.³⁶ The document shows that the SB knew about “411 illegal publishing houses”. At the same time, it was noted that “many illegal magazines and publishing houses are still beyond the reach of our operational control. [...] Within the framework of operational cases we are surveilling 241 magazines (58% of all titles published) and 23 publishing houses which is merely 15.2%.” It was emphasised that “some of our units control all – or almost all – magazines. Still, there are units where the number of magazines beyond our control is very high.”³⁷

While evaluating the stage of surveilling individual divisions of underground magazines, that is editorial and technical ones, as well as distribution, it was noted that especially the technical division “has been identified to some degree, whereas the systems of distribution [have been] to a considerable one. Nonetheless, it must be stressed that this element of publishing is easiest to verify as the adversaries must ‘expose themselves’ – this part of the work cannot be done in a strictly conspiratorial capacity.”³⁸ It was explained that “the poor quality of verification is the result of the lack of proper operational sources.”³⁹

While trying to detect the reasons for the unsatisfactory investigation into the second circulation, it was pointed out that often “after the case was over, we cut ourselves off from the data on the adversary.”⁴⁰ It was emphasised that this was especially the case with the titles that reactivated after a recess caused by the intervention of the SB: “It is true that, as a rule, the resources and forces are regrouped after our intervention. Still, we need to take pains not only to eliminate [the adversary], but to strengthen ourselves operationally. Then if a magazine reactivates, this

³⁵ More on the problem *ibid.*, pp. 7–15 (PDF): Rozdział pierwszy “Teoretyczne ujęcie propagandy pisanej”.

³⁶ “Analiza Departamentu III MSW na temat niezależnego ruchu wydawniczego”, p. 178. J. Olszek, G. Wołk, “Drugi obieg wydawniczy w oczach Służby Bezpieczeństwa”, pp. 369–435. Cf. G. Wołk, “Służba Bezpieczeństwa wobec pism i wydawnictw drugiego obiegu”, p. 422.

³⁷ “Analiza Departamentu III MSW na temat niezależnego ruchu wydawniczego”, p. 178.

³⁸ J. Olszek, G. Wołk, “Drugi obieg wydawniczy w oczach Służby Bezpieczeństwa”, p. 425.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

will no longer take us by surprise, nor will it be necessary to run around for a way to contact the adversary.”⁴¹

It was underscored that “there are cases in which we control a given magazine fully. It is only for operational reasons that we do not shut it down.” However, it was noted that there were very few such cases.⁴² The functionaries of the Department III of the Ministry of Internal Affairs admitted that “a considerable percentage of magazines, and publishing houses in particular, are beyond reach because our units avoid getting involved in such cases.”⁴³ It was assessed that “enterprise and over-enterprise magazines as well as regional magazines in small places are best identified. The functioning of illegal publishing houses is least identified.”⁴⁴

In order to be more effective in fighting the second circulation, the functionaries were encouraged to take “various organisational steps that will improve the level, quality, and effectiveness of actions.” Within the framework of operational surveillance and repression as well as cases regarding hostile elements (*sprawy obiektowe*, SO), they were also obliged to ‘operationally control’ all underground magazines and publishing houses in individual provinces. It was ordered that “personal and technical sources of information be expanded and operational combinations be implemented so that operational sources may deeply penetrate those circles which animate the illegal publishing movement.”⁴⁵

Apart from steps aimed at destroying the underground publishing movement and confiscating their output, the focus was on “the operational and physical protection of state and company printing houses as well as ensuring printing machines in state institutions are not used by the underground for illegal publications.”⁴⁶ For example, due to the tips by Henryk Karkosza, the SB gained information regarding publishing sites where Cracow underground publishers had their own men. On the basis of these tips, the SB functionaries had so-called preventive and inspirational talks with the management of state-owned printing houses so that their printing equipment was not used by the second circulation.⁴⁷

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid., p. 426.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ J. Olszek, G. Wołk, “Drugi obieg wydawniczy w oczach Służby Bezpieczeństwa”, pp. 181–182.

⁴⁶ AIPN Kr, 056/108, vol. 1, Kierunkowe plany pracy operacyjnej Wydziału III-1 SB WUSW w Krakowie oraz analizy stanu bezpieczeństwa z lat 1983–1986, Wytyczne planistyczne na 1984 r., Warszawa, 31 XII 1983, cc. 12–13 (PDF).

⁴⁷ AIPN Kr, 0101/98, SOR “KOS”, Wniosek o przeprowadzenie rozmów profilaktyczno-inspiracyjnych, Kraków, 23 VI 1981, c. 136 (PDF).

The SB showed greater zeal toward fighting the second circulation when it came to state elections or state celebrations of various anniversaries. In the second half of the 1980s, the stance of the authorities toward the opposition, the publishing underground included, changed. From that moment, fighting the second circulation was to take place in line with the provisions of the petty offences' code. In accordance with the Act of 24 October 1986, the appropriate offices could arrest or give a fine to anyone who "without the required permit makes, publishes, transports, transfers or distributes pieces of work and information expressed in print or otherwise, that leads to its preservation and distribution."⁴⁸ By referring to the provisions of the Act, it was legal to take away 'the instruments of the crime' from the detained. As a result, the confiscation of the printing equipment (cars above all) was a painful loss for underground publishers. In this way penal repression was replaced by financial.⁴⁹ Significantly, punitive measures were not used to a large extent, for fear of the West and economic sanctions. It was underlined that "in the 80s the socio-political situation of the country, the Ministry of Internal Affairs included, has been and is determined by our economic situation and the relations with capitalist countries. It is very difficult to impose criminal liability on the activists and cooperators of illegal publishing houses because their leadership is insufficiently identified (we have rich operational materials of little procedural value). Despite these difficulties, in many cases, we have managed to convict some people of anti-state actions."⁵⁰

At the end of the 1980s, "the people and works of genuine authority and artistic rank" were proposed to return to official circulation. In April 1986, at the meeting of the Political Bureau of KC PZPR (Biuro Polityczne KC PZPR), Czesław Kiszczak, the head of the MSW, argued that allowing the publication of certain books "would benefit Polish culture and would entail a significant benefit of a political and propaganda-focused character. Although, in such cases, we always have to be politically cautious and never go beyond the limits of reason."⁵¹ This form of 'stealing' authors from the second circulation, and publishing their works officially,

⁴⁸ DzU 1986, no. 39, item 193, Ustawa z dnia 24 października 1986 r. o zmianie niektórych przepisów prawa o wykroczeniach.

⁴⁹ G. Wołk, "Służba Bezpieczeństwa wobec pism i wydawnictw drugiego obiegu", p. 428.

⁵⁰ AIPN, 001708/3129A, c. 97 (PDF).

⁵¹ AIPN, 1585/1308, Biuro Polityczne Komitetu Centralnego PZPR – posiedzenia w dn. 15 IV 1986 r. i 22 IV 1986 r. Porządki dzienne, wystąpienie ministra Czesława Kiszczaka, informacje, notatki, propozycje, oceny, projekt planu, założenia programu, korespondencja, Wystąpienie ministra spraw wewnętrznych na posiedzeniu Biura Politycznego KC PZPR, Warszawa, 15 IV 1986, c. 128.

was a mode of fighting the second circulation, especially in the second half of the 1980s.⁵²

In mid-March 1987, in a writing addressed to all Provincial Offices of Internal Affairs, the deputy head of the SB and the director of the Department II of the MSW, general Henryk Dankowski, called for the preparation of questionnaires concerning the second circulation press and publishing houses, which he justified by the need to coordinate the work of the MO and the SB.⁵³ Within the MSW a special group to ‘review’ books and press of the second circulation was appointed. They were functionaries of the Centre for the Study of Politics and Propaganda of the Academy of Social Sciences (Centrum Studiów Polityki i Propagandy Akademii Nauk Społecznych), the Chief Political Board of the Polish Army (Główny Zarząd Polityczny Wojska Polskiego), the Academy of Internal Affairs (Akademia Spraw Wewnętrznych), as well as the Operational and Staff Group of the Secretariat of the Head of the SB (Grupa Operacyjno-Sztabowa z Sekretariatu Szefa Służby Bezpieczeństwa).⁵⁴ On the basis of their reviews, there were listings, specifications and characteristic drawn up. The publications were evaluated in terms of their harmfulness to the authorities – each review stated whether a given text may be published in the official circulation or whether the authorities should prevent this from happening.⁵⁵

From 1986 to 1987, the SB took four mass repressive actions code-named ‘Brzoza’ [Birch tree] against people engaged in independent publishing and opposition activists. Within the framework of this operation, there were so-called repressive and warning talks and, in some cases, searches. The objective was to paralyse the underground structures, to force as many people as possible to give up their dissident activity. The authorities wanted to make the impression that the SB knew a lot about the Solidarity underground.⁵⁶

⁵² C. Kuta, “Niezależny ruch wydawniczy”, p. 305; G. Wołk, “Służba Bezpieczeństwa wobec pism i wydawnictw drugiego obiegu”, p. 429.

⁵³ AIPN, 0449/53, vol. 13, Materiały informacyjne Departamentu I MSW dotyczące X Kongresu ZSL i Międzynarodowej Konferencji Partii i Organizacji Chłopskich w marcu 1988 r., Pismo Podsekretarza Stanu w MSW gen. Henryka Dankowskiego do zastępców Szefów WUSW ds. SB, Warszawa, 17 III 1987, c. 13–15.

⁵⁴ AIPN, 1585/4589, Charakterystyka zwartych wydawnictw bezdebitowych kolportowanych w 1985 r. w Polsce, Warszawa, grudzień 1985 r., c. 4; AIPN, 1585/1308, Biuro Polityczne Komitetu Centralnego PZPR – posiedzenia w dn. 15.04.1986 r. i 22.04.1986 r. Porządki dzienne, wystąpienie ministra Czesława Kiszcza, informacje, notatki, propozycje, oceny, projekt planu, założenia programu, korespondencja, Pismo mjr. Wojciecha Garstki do wicedyrektora Gabinetu Ministra płk. Józefa Pechala, April 1986, c. 246.

⁵⁵ See AIPN, 1585/3910, Publicystyka opozycji w Polsce 1977, 1981–1986. Recenzje.

⁵⁶ C. Kuta, *Niecenzurowane...*, pp. 452–454.

In January 1987, at the meeting of the Political Bureau of KC PZPR (Biuro Polityczne KC PZPR), the head of the MSW, Czesław Kiszczak, admitted that operation ‘Brzoza’ covered over 4,700 people. He claimed that this bore fruit: “most of them gave up their activities and the equipment used for illegal purposes was handed over to the authorities (including printing equipment and many illegal publications).”⁵⁷ Still, the document of 30 June 1987, a summary of the situation, said that the so-called repressive and warning talks carried out as part of operation ‘Brzoza’ caused “the opponent to regroup so that the reconnaissance of what we already knew had to be made again from scratch.”⁵⁸

Surveilling and repressing independent publishing was still a priority for the SB. A document from January 1988 stated that “combating and limiting the technical potential of our political adversaries, which would halt their illegal written propaganda, has been and is one of the major tasks of the Secret Service of the MSW.”⁵⁹ It was postulated “that the political and propaganda activities toward many titles of the second circulation should be intensified. Due to their contents they may be easily demystified when appropriate arguments are used.”⁶⁰ The functionaries of the SB were still obliged to initiate “active reconnaissance and aim at the maximum limitation of the technical capabilities of the main editorial offices of illegal magazines and the most resilient publishing houses. This should be achieved by broad prevention, operational activities, making use of the provisions of the Code of Petty Offences, and the Penal and Fiscal Act.”⁶¹

The SB’s surveillance of the second circulation included probing into how it imported equipment and money from abroad. This was undertaken by Division XI of Department I of the MSW (Wydział XI Departamentu I MSW). According to Justyna Błażejowska, thanks to its informants the SB monitored 80% of transports from the West to the ‘Solidarity’ underground.⁶² The fact that the Secret Service tracked the smuggling of equipment and money, as well as controlled some of the underground printing houses was confirmed by Czesław Kiszczak. In 1991, he said that

⁵⁷ AIPN, 1585/15035, Biuro Polityczne Komitetu Centralnego PZPR – materiały z posiadzeń w dniach 27.01.1987 r., 03.02.1987 r. i 17.03.1987 r. Notatki, informacje, Wystąpienie ministra spraw wewnętrznych na posiedzeniu Biura Politycznego KC PZPR, Warszawa, 27 I 1987, c. 14.

⁵⁸ J. Olszek, G. Wołk, “Drugi obieg wydawniczy w oczach Służby Bezpieczeństwa”, p. 426.

⁵⁹ AIPN, 0296/242/1, Sytuacja społeczno-polityczna w kraju w 1988 r., Informacja dotycząca oceny nielegalnego czasopiśmiennictwa, Warszawa, 27 I 1988, p. 16 (PDF).

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² J. Błażejowska, *Papierowa rewolucja...*, p. 230.

“Information was more precious to us. The reports cracked the structures of the underground, their plans and intentions. We dealt with the equipment in the same manner – we attached signalling devices to them and knew where the publishing houses were. Some of them were controlled by us.”⁶³ Several years earlier he admitted that “the people of counterintelligence and intelligence embedded in domestic and foreign structures play a key role. Obviously, they are deeply secretive there. [...] Disclosing certain names would come as a shock.”⁶⁴ In 2006, Czesław Kiszczak repeated this when interviewed by Justyna Błażejowska and Paweł Wieczorkiewicz: “We could not take over everything as in this way the channel would be exposed. For example, there were 120 duplicators coming from Sweden, so we admitted half of them – each of them had a transmitter so we knew where, in which basement, it was being used. These were subtle, miniaturised devices fitted into their equipment. They were enough to give a signal so that we knew where the duplicator was. Of course the recipients of the equipment had no clue about the transmitters.”⁶⁵

General Władysław Pożoga spoke in a similar vein: “Sometimes we gave the order that a given parcel be intercepted at the border so as to please the press spokesman [...] More often we tracked the transport all the way to the destination point and we set the SB or MO on the new owners. There were cases where the transport staff was every inch our people and operatives.”⁶⁶

The verification of the statements of the communist apparatchiks is complicated because of the lack of source materials on the Department I MSW surveilling the transfer channels to Poland.⁶⁷ Nonetheless, on the basis of the research conducted so far, there is no doubt that it was profitable for the SB to control the second circulation also for material reasons – they could take over the money and high quality Western equipment.⁶⁸ For example, in the Cracow report of the Division III-1 WUSW

⁶³ W. Bereś, J. Skoczylas, *General Kiszczak mówi... prawie wszystko* (Warszawa: Polska Oficyna Wydawnicza “BGW”, 1991), p. 203.

⁶⁴ *Kto jest kim w Polsce inaczej*, part 2, comp. A. Kępiński, Z. Kilar (Warszawa: “Czytelnik”, 1986), p. 265 (in conversation with Czesław Kiszczak).

⁶⁵ Quoted after J. Błażejowska, *Papierowa rewolucja...*, p. 231.

⁶⁶ H. Piecuch, *Wojciech Jaruzelski tego nigdy nie powie* (Warszawa: “Reporter”, 1992), p. 259.

⁶⁷ Department I ran cases of investigation regarding the channels of transferring equipment from abroad e.g. operational checking out code-named “Promy”, “Czanel” or “Pajęczyna”. The materials of these cases were destroyed at the turn of 1989 and 1990. See G. Wołk, *Śłużba Bezpieczeństwa wobec pism i wydawnictw drugiego obiegu...*, pp. 430–432.

⁶⁸ E. Zając, H. Głębocki, “‘Ketman’ i ‘Monika’”, p. 101.

(Wydział III-1 WUSW) for the year 1986, it was stated that “in the wake of an operational combination, 3 high-class printing devices sent from the West to illegal structures were intercepted. Thanks to this the printing potential of the underground has been severely diminished.”⁶⁹

Irena Lasota, who organised aid to the Solidarity underground in Poland, admitted that “it was an open secret that [...] offsets with transmitters were sent to Poland. This of course made it possible to locate these offsets. I learnt about such a case in 1984.”⁷⁰ In the mid-1980s, the underground press took up the issue as well: “In the printing devices which ‘leaked’ from the ‘state sector’ (bought or borrowed from ‘safe’ people) there happen to be transmitters for radio tracking of the locales where the devices are used.”⁷¹

The activity of the underground publishing houses was under systematic scrutiny of the Analytical Group appointed by the MSW. From 1982 to 1989, Department III of this Ministry prepared detailed monthly, quarterly, and semi-annual reports on the second circulation. There were lists with exact numbers of confiscated publications, reams of paper, printing machines, duplicators, copiers, and other printing devices. The work of the Secret Service was being analysed and compared in the context of various provinces over the months and years. In the monthly *Oceny sytuacji polityczno-operacyjnej* [Evaluations of the political and operational situation], there were data regarding arrests, the number of books, reams of paper, printing materials, and equipment confiscated.⁷² The tables and charts of the Ministry make it possible to trace both the development of the second circulation and the effects of the SB operations (including the scope to which the publishing underground in the 80s was controlled).⁷³

⁶⁹ AIPN Kr, 056/111, Kierunkowe plany pracy operacyjnej Wydziału III-1 SB WUSW w Krakowie, sprawozdania oraz analizy stanu bezpieczeństwa za 1987 r., Sprawozdanie z realizacji planu pracy Wydziału III-1 w 1986 r., Kraków, grudzień 1986 r., c. 79 (DVD).

⁷⁰ “Milewski, czyli tajemnica poliszynela. Wywiad z Ireną Lasotą”, *Nowy Świat*, 26 May 1992.

⁷¹ More on this issue in: “Mieszanka informacyjna: Ubeckie nadajniki do namierzania drukami”, *Baza* 1985, no. 6 (June), p. 27.

⁷² See: AIPN, 01305/711, vol. 1, Ocena sytuacji polityczno-operacyjnej za okres styczeń–czerwiec 1983 r.; *ibid.*, vol. 2, Ocena sytuacji polityczno-operacyjnej za okres lipiec–grudzień 1983 r.; *ibid.*, vol. 3, Ocena sytuacji polityczno-operacyjnej za okres czerwiec–lipiec, wrzesień–grudzień 1982 r.; *ibid.*, vol. 4, Ocena sytuacji polityczno-operacyjnej za okres styczeń–czerwiec i listopad 1984 r.; *ibid.*, vol. 5, Ocena sytuacji polityczno-operacyjnej za okres marzec–czerwiec 1982 r.; *ibid.*, vol. 6, Ocena sytuacji polityczno-operacyjnej za okres styczeń–luty, lipiec–grudzień 1985 r.

⁷³ More on this issue in: AIPN, 1585/2901, Zasięg wrogiej propagandy pisanej w 1982 r., Warszawa, 1982 r.; AIPN, 1585/2270, Wroga propaganda pisana, Warszawa, 1983 r.; AIPN, 1585/4612, Wroga propaganda pisana w latach 1982–1986, no date; AIPN,

“Fighting hostile written propaganda” was – apart from tracking and prosecuting the dissidents – the fundamental objective of Department III MSW and its counterparts locally. A detailed plan of operations for 1989 suggested that operatives “still penetrate and identify the personal staff and forms of activities of the major management of illegal publishing such as the Publishing Consortium (Konsorcjum Wydawnicze), the Independent Publishers’ Fund (Fundusz Wydawnictw Niezależnych) etc., and their connections with foreign sabotage centres and the management of the political underground in the country.” It was advised to “make wider use of the provisions of the Press Law and the Penal and Fiscal Act apart from the sanctions applied so far in accordance with the Code. A special emphasis should be placed on the application of financial sanctions – illegal publishing should be treated as a kind of economic activity that evades tax.”⁷⁴

The political changes that followed in 1989 made these plans obsolete. Still, until the very end, the Secret Service took pains to implement “a policy of selective repression aimed at causing financial losses and unsettling the organisational systems, thereby excluding people from this kind of activity.”⁷⁵

Impacting the Profile of Publications

‘Sweeping away’ the underground publishing houses and the editorial staff was not always the objective of the Secret Service. Influencing the publishing profile by infiltrating the second circulation with informants was another significant mode of action. The operational supervision of publishing houses was profitable for the SB – in this way it was able to limit the scope of their influence and infiltrate the dissident groups around them.⁷⁶ In a document of July 1982 prepared by the Bureau of Studies of the SB (Biuro Studiów SB), it was suggested that “sham, fake illegal groups should have the proper conditions and opportunities to ‘reveal themselves’ in the milieu and gain currency via oral and written propaganda. This may facilitate getting in touch with the conspiratorial structures under scrutiny, and, subsequently, their organisational mergence. Therefore, in justified cases, it is allowed to equip the groups with printing equipment so that

1585/636, Wroga propaganda pisana, Informacja miesięczna od stycznia 1987 do marca 1989 r. oraz kwartalne i półroczne za okres 1982–1988.

⁷⁴ AIPN, 0296/239, vol. 1, Ocena działalności i planowanie operacyjne Departamentu III MSW w 1988 r., Kierunki działania pionu III w 1989 r., Warszawa, 18 XI 1988 r., cc. 27–28 (CD).

⁷⁵ Ibid., c. 13.

⁷⁶ C. Kuta, “Przypadek TW ‘Joanna’”, p. 31.

they can produce controlled, diversionary propaganda. It was also suggested that in special cases, having ascertained that conspiratorial groups are looking for a printing base, such controlled sites should be prepared so that these groups use it in the future. By way of provocations and operational games, we should lead the groups under surveillance to these sites.”⁷⁷

The operatives of the SB, implemented within the underground publishing houses and around them, played an important part as well. Due to them, the communist Secret Service not only learnt how the structures and divisions of the second circulation functioned, but also knew the names of the people who made them, the printing locales as well as the places where paper and books were stored. Moreover, they could carry out all sorts of operational combinations and cause the milieu of publishers to disintegrate. For example, when the relations between underground publishers tightened after the Independent Publishers’ Fund (Fundusz Wydawnictw Niezależnych) was established in 1985, the SB informants in one of the publishing houses were used to infiltrate the other.⁷⁸

It was easier to introduce an operative to larger publishing teams, more difficult when it consisted only of several people. Also, it was more problematic to take measures on the basis of the information from an informant when only e.g. two people knew about a given case, the place of printing or storing materials, since this of course, entailed the unmasking of the source.⁷⁹

The actions of the informants exerted a significant influence on the underground publishing houses. For example, the co-founder of Wydawnictwo im. Konstytucji 3 Maja, Paweł Mikłasz⁸⁰, turned out to be a secret

⁷⁷ AIPN Kr, 010/12092, SOR “Znicz”, Wytyczne do pracy operacyjnej w zakresie ujawniania, rozpracowywania i likwidacji grup i struktur konspiracyjnych, 29 VII 1982, c. 53–67. Cf. E. Zając, H. Głębocki, “‘Ketman’ i ‘Monika’”, p. 95.

⁷⁸ C. Kuta, “Niezależny ruch wydawniczy”, pp. 310–311; eadem, “Działania Służby Bezpieczeństwa wobec drugiego obiegu w okresie stanu wojennego na przykładzie Wydawnictwa im. gen. Nila Fieldorfa”, in *Drugi obieg w PRL na tle samizdatu...*, pp. 445–446.

⁷⁹ C. Kuta, “Niezależny ruch wydawniczy”, p. 310.

⁸⁰ Paweł Mikłasz (b. 1946), an employee of the Association of Polish Artists of Theatre and Film (Stowarzyszenie Polskich Artystów Teatru i Filmu), member of the main board of the Polish Angling Association (Polski Związek Wędkarski), a journalist of the New York *Nowy Dziennik* and president of the association for the Memory of the Diaspora (Pamięć Diaspory). An activist of the Movement for Defence of Human and Civic Rights (Ruch Obrony Praw Człowieka i Obywatela, ROPCio) and the Young Poland Movement (Ruch Młodej Polski), the founder of the publishing houses: Wydawnictwo im. Konstytucji 3 Maja and Wydawnictwo Myśl. Mikłasz was interned from 21st December 1981 to 20 October 1982. From 1971 to 1989 he was registered as TW (no. 22916) by the Department III MSW under the code-names “Jan Lewandowski”/ “Stanisław Wysocki”/ “Rybak”/ “Zaniewski”. More on Mikłasz in: S. Cenckiewicz,

agent of the SB under the code name “Jan Lewandowski”/“Stanisław Wysocki”/“Rybak”/“Zaniewski”. In Cracow, the publishing house “Kos”, and later Oficyna Literacka, was run by Henryk Karkosza working under the code-name “Monika” and “Waldek”, whereas in the publishing house Wydawnictwo im. gen. Nila Fieldorfa, an important part was played by Maciej Kuncewicz who reported to the SB as “Joanna”.⁸¹

The SB were aware that because of the rules of conspiracy that were in force in the underground, informants were, almost never, capable of gathering full information on the way the printing and distribution of illegal written propaganda was organised.⁸² However, with the help of agents who played a central part in the operational activities, the Secret Service did their best to impact the content of magazines, fuel conflicts among editorial staff, and confiscate as many titles as possible.⁸³ Since it was impossible for the SB to eradicate the second circulation completely, or to control all printing and distribution locales, it strove to influence the institutions that supported the second circulation. For example, through Henryk Karkosza who represented Oficyna Literacka in the Independent Publishers’ Fund, the SB could control the latter.⁸⁴

The functionaries recognized the role of the agents in infiltrating the second circulation. In one of the departmental studies, it was stressed that “the use of the informants makes it possible to directly reach the subjects of the cases. Through our men, we are able to affect their actions and neutralise them. Therefore it is important that our informants give us up-to-

“TW ‘Rybak’ – agent artysta. (Trójmiejski Sierpień ’80 w raportach konfidenta SB)”, *Arcana* 2005, no. 4–5 (64–65), pp. 314–315; *Kryptonim “Klan”: Służba Bezpieczeństwa wobec NSZZ “Solidarność” w Gdańsku*, vol. 1: *Wrzesień 1980 – wrzesień 1981*, comp. M. Kruk, R. Żydonik, S. Cenckiewicz (Warszawa–Gdańsk: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2010), according to the index; *Marzec 1968 w dokumentach MSW*, vol. 2: *Kronika wydarzeń*, part 1, comp. F. Dąbrowski, P. Gontarczyk, P. Tomasiak, C. Wilanowski, P. Byszewski, Warszawa 2009, pp. 287–288, fn. 3.

⁸¹ Maciej Kuncewicz (b. 1958), an activist of the Independent Students’ Association (Niezależne Zrzeszenie Studentów, NZS) at Warsaw University of Life Sciences (Szkoła Główna Gospodarstwa Wiejskiego – Akademia Rolnicza) in Warsaw, editor at *Serwis informacyjny NZS SGGW – AR*, and subsequently of the magazine *BOK*. Connected with the Young Poland Movement (Ruch Młodej Polski) and the publishing house Wydawnictwo im. Konstytucji 3 Maja. More on this no. in: C. Kuta, “Przypadek TW ‘Joanna’”, pp. 31–61; eadem, “Działania Służby Bezpieczeństwa wobec drugiego obiegu w okresie stanu wojennego na przykładzie Wydawnictwa im. gen. Nila Fieldorfa”, pp. 441–454.

⁸² AIPN, 001708/2136, c. 36 (PDF).

⁸³ G. Waligóra, “Służba Bezpieczeństwa wobec niezależnego ruchu wydawniczego”, p. 398.

⁸⁴ AIPN Kr, 056/11, Kierunkowe plany pracy operacyjnej Wydziału III-1 SB WUSW w Krakowie, sprawozdania oraz analizy stanu bezpieczeństwa za 1987 r., Sprawozdanie z realizacji planu pracy Wydziału III-1 w 1987 r., Kraków, 18 XII 1987, c. 122 (DVD).

date information on plans, intentions, and organisational structures etc.”⁸⁵ Still, it was underlined that while recruiting an informant the functionaries encounter various difficulties of both a subjective and objective character. Among the subjective ones were: the lack of grounds for recruiting a given person and “poor preparation of operational talks which entails the unmasking of intentions.” The objective reasons included: “the inaccessibility of the milieu and the conviction that they can act with impunity.”⁸⁶

As for the historians and activists of the second circulation, their judgments concerning the scale of the SB’s infiltration vary. A significant number of people engaged in underground publishing may not have realised at that time to what extent the SB had infiltrated the conspiratorial structures.⁸⁷ Paweł Sowiński, a historian, claims that “there was limited knowledge on the part of the SB on these, generally confidential, undertakings.”⁸⁸ Grzegorz Waligóra evaluates this research issue in a similar manner: “Due to a network of secret collaborators, they strove to identify the dissident structures which functioned usually around distribution channels. [...] However, it seems that despite large operational and technical abilities, the SB was unable to control the publishing movement which developed spontaneously and dynamically. On the one hand, there was a fairly rapid development of printing techniques in the dissident milieu, and the appearance of new publications. On the other, the dissidents stuck to the conspiratorial rules and relied on ‘safe’ people. As a result, the SB’s efforts had a limited range.”⁸⁹

However, research conducted in recent years has proven that the SB knew much more about the second circulation than expected. Moreover, it succeeded in infiltrating the structures of underground publishing. The

⁸⁵ AIPN 001708/3129A, c. 96 (PDF).

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ For example, Seweryn Blumsztajn claimed that the functionaries of the SB “knew little because they gained knowledge from the informants. And since everything was taking place among friends, they did not have inside informants.” (After: R. Spalek, “Gracze” – Komitet Obrony Robotników w propagandzie PRL, stereotypach oraz dokumentach Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych”, *Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość* 2003, no. 2, p. 90). Mirosław Chojecki, on the other hand, thought that “the functionaries were not capable of associating facts and drawing conclusions based on them. The SB knew only what we ourselves told them or what ‘secret collaborators’ (who were not always quick-witted) reported. [...] The SB in the PRL was as inept as the whole authority was at that time.” (M. Chojecki, “Moje teczki”, *Zeszyty Historyczne* 2005, item 152, p. 231).

⁸⁸ P. Sowiński, *Zakazana książka: Uczestnicy drugiego obiegu 1977–1989* (Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 2011), pp. 307–308.

⁸⁹ G. Waligóra, “Służba Bezpieczeństwa wobec niezależnego ruchu wydawniczego”, p. 398.

SB built publishing houses which it controlled with the help of agents and functionaries. For example, Marian Pękalski, a functionary of Department II MSW was the head of *Oficyną Wydawniczą Rytm* under the fictitious name “Marian Kotarski”.⁹⁰

At the present stage of research, it is hard to accurately measure the degree to which the second circulation had been infiltrated. Not least because most of the documents on this issue have been destroyed. Nonetheless, on the basis of the conclusions drawn by researchers so far, we can be certain that the operations of the agents did impact the functioning of the second circulation. An informant of the SB was not in every publishing house. However, due to the relations between the houses, tightened especially after founding the Independent Publishers’ Fund, agents in one publishing house could be used to surveil others. Also, the SB worked towards recruiting informants from various levels of a given underground publishing house.

Impacting Underground Publishing with Fakes

Another type of operational activity against the second circulation was generating publishing content. This meant introducing fake magazines and leaflets fabricated by the SB although ‘signed’ with the names of independent publishers and organisations. This kind of operation was used already at the early stage of the second circulation. For example, issue number 7 of the *Podaj dalej* magazine issued by the Student Committee of Solidarity (Studencki Komitet Solidarności)⁹¹ in Wrocław was published with the date

⁹⁰ More on this issue in: W. Domagalski, “Towarzysz porucznik idzie do podziemia”, *Uważam Rze* 2012, no. 25, pp. 27–28; S. Cenckiewicz, *Niejawne szwadrony bezpieczeństwa*, ibid., pp. 30–33. Marian Pękalski (b. 1950), a functionary of the repressive apparatus. From 21 September 1989 he was a major in the army. From 1 April 1974 he was an inspecting officer in Department II KWMO in Szczecin; from 26 June 1980 a junior inspecting officer in Division IV of Department II, MSW; from 1 August 1981 an inspecting officer in Division VI of Department II, MSW; from 1 November 1982 a senior inspecting officer of Division X Department II, MSW; from 1 October 1988 a senior specialist in Division VI Department II, MSW. He was dismissed from service on 15 June 1990. See AIPN, 0604/1840, vol. 1–2, Akta osobowe Mariana Pękalskiego.

⁹¹ The Student Committee of Solidarity (Studencki Komitet Solidarności, SKS) was established on 15 May 1977 in Cracow as a response to the murder of Stanisław Pyjas, a student at Jagiellonian University who cooperated with the Workers’ Defence Committee (KOR). SKS was a dissenting voice of the student community against the communist regime. It focused on issues connected with the academic milieu, it brought into effect the idea of creating social movements. In the following months, the academic community in Warszawa, Gdańsk, Wrocław, Poznań and Szczecin followed suit and appointed their own SKSs. The activists of SKS played an important role in creating Solidarity and the Independent Students’ Association (Niezależne Zrzeszenie

20 February 1979. A few days later, at the University of Wrocław, there appeared the same issue produced by the SB with the date 28 February. Both issues had three pages but varied in content. In the fake issue there was for example a libel against the opposition poet Leszek Budrewicz showing him as “a loony activist who scribbles anti-system slogans in [public] toilets.”⁹²

It was in the 1980s that even more SB fakes saw the light of day. For example, in autumn 1981 in Cracow, the alleged issue 9 – marked as a ‘Special edition’ – of *Po prostu bis* magazine came out. It turned out to be forged (issue 9 of the magazine was published along with issue 10).⁹³

Szczepan Rudka has determined that the functionaries of the SB in Wrocław were very committed to fabricating fakes. The fruit of their endeavours were counterfeits of the magazines: *Jedności silni*, *Jutrzenka*, *Na indeksie*, *Samarytanka*, *Z dnia na dzień* and *Solidarność Chemików* [The Solidarity of Chemists].⁹⁴ The SB issued the latter under the title *Solidarność Chomików* [The Solidarity of Hamsters]. The SB functionaries were especially ardent when it came to tackling the magazine *Solidarność Walcząca* [Fighting Solidarity]. In the fake issue that the SB prepared and distributed, there were false statements and messages, fake or contorted interviews with Kornel Morawiecki, the leader of the Fighting Solidarity Movement, as well as articles aimed at putting a wedge between its members.⁹⁵

Forging the underground magazines was a task undertaken both at the local and national level. It is sometimes difficult to discern whether a given print is authentic or whether it is the SB counterfeit. Also, it is difficult to estimate the general number of counterfeits produced by the SB, including the range of their distribution, and impact.⁹⁶

Studentów, NZS). More on this issue in.: H. Głębocki, *Studencki Komitet Solidarności w Krakowie 1977–1980: Zarys działalności* (Warszawa: “PiT”: Wydawnictwo NZS, 1994); J. Szarek, *Czarne Juwenalia: Opowieść o Studenckim Komitecie Solidarności* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak, 2007).

⁹² K. Dworaczek, *Studencki Komitet Solidarności we Wrocławiu 1977–1980* (Wrocław: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2011), pp. 177–178; M. Kała, “Podaj dalej”, in *Encyklopedia Solidarności: Opozycja w PRL 1976–1989*, vol. 1, eds. M. Łatkowska et al. (Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2010), pp. 354–355.

⁹³ C. Kuta, *Nieczenzurowane...*, p. 445.

⁹⁴ S. Rudka, *Poza cenzurą...*, p. 127

⁹⁵ A distortion of Kornel Morawiecki’s statement is a good example of sophisticated manipulation and disinformation on the part of the SB. His words: “And the underground must last, fear less at present and play the angles more. It should broaden the distribution and strengthen the structures” were changed by the SB functionaries into: “And the underground should last, fear for a while and expose itself. It should broaden the distribution and reveal its structures.” See S. Rudka, *Poza cenzurą...*, pp. 122–124.

⁹⁶ More on counterfeits in: *ibid.*, pp. 121–127; J. Błażejowska, “‘Chciałem mieć w ręku broń’ – zadrukowane kartki papieru. Pisma pozacenzuralne 1980–1989/1990”, in *NSZZ “Solidarność” 1980–1989...*, vol. 2, pp. 236–238; P. Zwiernik, “‘Bibuła’ SB”, in

Another way to limit underground publishing was the propaganda exposure of the shutdown of certain duplicating plants, especially those connected with major magazines or milieus. Thus, in Cracow there were attempts to make use of the cracking down of the printing houses of *Biuletyn Małopolski*, *Hutnik*, *Montinowiec*, *Serwis Informacyjny* as well as the printing house of the Confederation of Independent Poland (Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej, KPN) at Skalica Street⁹⁷ In June 1983, after the SB shut down the printing house *Hutnik* in the Kazimierzowski district, the TV showed the apartment in which the underground printing had taken place, and the local paper *Dziennik Polski* unambiguously informed that many elements of the printing equipment were ‘from abroad’. Obviously, pointing to the source of the equipment was supposed to compromise the second circulation: “Concentrated printed inks are an example: some of them were in the original cans of condensed milk by Nestlé. Those who took pains to prepare this parcel for the Polish underground carefully secured the paints with a layer of wax, and packed them in tight plastic bags.”⁹⁸ The paper *Głos Nowej Huty* spoke in a similar vein:

“Yet again and beyond all doubt, it has turned out who supports this propaganda using indispensable means and literature that supplements the messages of the opposition. Yet again, the ideologists from Parisian *Kultura* reveal themselves (many various publications of Instytut Wydawniczy of this milieu were found at the underground printmakers). Yet again the centres of sabotage receive support: they supply the underground printing houses with high-quality ink concentrate slyly hidden in factory-sealed cans of condensed milk produced by Nestlé (France). Irrespective of the other elements of equipment, the printing houses in particular, those who inspired these actions, who supplied the necessary equipment and materials exposed their addresses. So we deal with Western centres of diversion which are most hostile toward Poland and to its politico-social order. Indeed, rare are such consummate ideological affinities [...].”⁹⁹

Technical Means of Operational Work

The repressive apparatus employed all available methods and operational means against the underground publishing. Several departments cooperated while undertaking various activities; auxiliary divisions also

Papierem w system: Prasa drugoobiegowa w PRL, eds. M. Marcinkiewicz, S. Ligarski (Szczecin: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2010), pp. 126–133.

⁹⁷ More on this issue in. C. Kuta, *Nieczenzurowane...*, p. 446.

⁹⁸ “Czarny piątek krakowskiego podziemia”, *Dziennik Polski*, 13 June 1983.

⁹⁹ “Refleksje obywatelskie”, *Głos Nowej Huty* no. 24 (1983), pp. 1–2.

played an important role. The underground's correspondence was surveilled, people were observed and wiretapped. Even though it was emphasised that "the results of these measures are scant [which] is related to the fact that the adversary – while devising the rules of conspiracy – knows the methods employed by the SB. Therefore, they do not talk about organisational matters, there are codes in their letters and notes, and hints in their conversations. They have also succeeded in developing effective methods of making a clean gateway thus outwitting the observers."¹⁰⁰

The functionaries of the SB referred here to 'Mały konspirator'¹⁰¹ and claimed that the second circulation based its "conspiratorial methods on the war experience of M[iroślaw] Chojecki's mother."¹⁰² Nonetheless, the

¹⁰⁰ AIPN, 001708/3129A, c. 95 (PDF).

¹⁰¹ [Cz. Bielecki, J. K. Kelus, U. Sikorska], *Mały konspirator* (Wrocław: Agencja Informacyjna Solidarności Walczącej, 1983). This publication was reprinted several times. Its instructions were a manual of the underground conspiracy.

¹⁰² AIPN, 001708/3129A, c. 95 (PDF). His mother was Maria Stypułkowska-Chojecka, code-named "Kama" (1926–2016), an educator and, during World War II, a liaison officer of the Battalion Parasol of the Home Army (Armia Krajowa, AK). She started conspiring against the Germans on 3 August 1942. In August 1943 she was directed to the Gray Ranks Assault Groups (Grupy Szturmowe Szarych Szeregów) under the Directorate of Diversion of the Home Army (Kedyw KG AK), Special Unit "Agat" (Oddział Specjalny "Agat") later known as "Pegaz". While preparing for individual actions, she was a member of the intelligence unit of the warrant officer "Rayski" (Aleksander Kuniński, the head of the intelligence unit "Osa"–"Kosa", and subsequently "Agat", "Pegaz", "Parasol"). She completed a military, sanitary and underground communication course as well as the Substitute Course of the Agricola Reserve Cadet School (Zastępczy Kurs Szkoły Podchorążych Rezerwy Piechoty "Agricola"). In "Agat" – "Pegaz" – "Parasol" she was a liaison officer and conducted reconnaissance before the attacks on the high functionaries of the Gestapo and the German administration. She took part in preparing and conducting 7 special combat operations: "Frühwirth", "Weffels", "Braun", "Kutschera", "Koppe", "Stamm", "Hahn". She took part in the Warsaw Uprising. More on her at <https://www.1944.pl/powstancze-biogramy/maria-stypulkowska,42972.html>, accessed 13 July 2021; "Przejsz próby. Rozmowa z Marią Stypułkowską-Chojecką", comp. K. Sobczyńska, *Podkowiński Magazyn Kulturalny* 2007, no. 52, <http://podkowińskimagazyn.pl/nr52/kama.htm>, accessed 13 July 2021.

Maria Stypułkowska-Chojecka's son, Mirosław Chojecki (b. 1949), a chemist, underground publisher, film producer and employee at the Institute of Nuclear Research (Instytut Badań Jądrowych) during 1974–1976. Chojecki arranged aid to the repressed workers from Radom and Ursus plant; he was a member of KOR, later of KSS 'KOR'. From 1976 to 1977 he was a printer at KOR's *Komunikat* and *Biuletyn Informacyjny*. The founder, editor, printer and organiser of the production at the independent publishing house 'Nowa' until 1981. In the period 1976–1980 he was repeatedly detained. On 25 March 1980 he was arrested; on 7 April he started a hunger strike to protest against the prosecutor not presenting the charges; on 10 May he was acquitted and subsequently accused of stealing a duplicator and sentenced to one and half years in prison with a suspended sentence. In August 1980, during the strike at the Gdańsk Shipyard (Stocznia Gdańska), he organised the printing of independent publications. He was the head of the publishing unit NSZZ Solidarność Region Mazowsze. In October 1981

SB managed to obtain some information from wiretaps and use it to, for example, verify data collected in different ways. The document Wykaz zastosowanych źródeł PT i PP wraz z wynikami eksploatacji według stanu na dzień 22 marca 1985 r. emphasised the operational benefits of Division III WUSW in Cracow due to wiretapping. It was mentioned that “making use of telephone tapping code-named “Czak” in the operational uncovering people code-named “Siodło”, from 22 September 1984, has fully confirmed the legitimacy of this form of operational technique. Until now we have gathered a lot of relevant data concerning the subject and his mother who is also of interest to Division III of the local WUSW. Many contacts have been exposed, as well as people who help the subjects in conducting their hostile activity.” It was underlined that wiretapping

he went to Paris where he stayed after martial law was introduced in Poland. In the period 1982–1989 he collaborated with the Brussels Coordination Bureau of Solidarity Abroad (Biuro Koordynacyjne Solidarność za Granicą); the founder and publisher of the monthly *Kontakt* in Paris from 1982 to 1990. The founder and head of the Audio-Kontakt company during 1983–1990; from 1985 to 1990 Video-Kontakt. From 26 October 1976 he was being checked out by Division III-A/III/III-1/III-2 KSMO within the case of the operation code-named “Komitet”, from 27 December 1983 to 24 January 1990 by the Division XI of Department I within the case regarding hostile elements (sprawa obiektowa, SO) code-named “Insekt”. After he was detained in Radom on 1 October 1976, as a result of the conversation with SB functionaries, Chojecki was treated as “a temporarily enlisted secret collaborator (TW)”. According to the records on card EO-4/73, on 12 October 1976 Mirosław Chojecki was registered by Section VI B Division III-A KSMO (Sekcja VI B Wydziału III-A KSMO) in Warsaw as TW “Radomiak” (no. 16061). The given date of enlistment is 11 October 1976. Moreover, the record said that the enlistment made by Second lieutenant. Zenon Skoczylas was uncompelled. It was also recorded that the enlistment took place under the SO ‘Atom’ which focused on securing the activity of the Institute of Nuclear Research. These records agree with the annotations on card EO-4-B/72. The records on cards EO-4-73 and EO-4M/74 as well as in the registration journal in the Provincial Office of Internal Affairs [SUSW] in Warsaw under the no. 16061 say that on 13 October 1976, Skoczylas’ superiors approved the enlisting of TW “Radomiak”. However, the SB functionaries failed to proceed from the formal enlisting (when a person signs a commitment and gives the first pieces of information) to the actual recruitment (holding regular meetings with TW who performs tasks commissioned by the SB). On 21 October 1976, during a conversation with the SB functionaries at KDMO in Żoliborz, Chojecki explicitly declared that he would not cooperate. Also, he told his friends about his contacts with the SB, and at the Institute of Nuclear Research he posted a notice saying that the SB tried to force him to cooperate. At the end of October 1976 he joined KOR. Both this and his firm refusals during subsequent attempts by the SB to force him to cooperate resulted in his being registered (on 28 October 1976) as a person investigated within SOR “Komitet”. See K. Biernacki, “Chojecki Mirosław”, in *Encyklopedia Solidarności...*, vol. 1, pp. 79–80. More on this issue in: J. Błażejowska, “Sprawa werbunku Mirosława Chojeckiego: Radom, 30 IX/1 X 1976 r.”, *Zeszyty Historyczne WiN-u* 2009, no. 31, pp. 41–47; eadem, *Papierowa rewolucja...*, pp. 101–110; C. Kuta, “Sprawa Chojeckiego”, *Biuletyn Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej* 2018, no. 1–2, pp. 153–164.

code-named “Bojownik” used since 6 April 1984 within SOR “Bojownik” “fully meets the requirements for this form of operational technique [as] when it was being used, we have obtained a lot of important information regarding the subject, his plans, contacts, and intentions. The information helped us catch one of the subjects in hiding.”¹⁰³

Sometimes the information gained from wiretaps was camouflaged so that it gave the impression that it was coming from operational contacts. Such was the case of SOS “Greta” run by Division III-1 WUSW in Cracow from 1987 till 1989 against Krystyna Ryczaj-Ryczek. The information from the wiretaps was camouflaged and said to have come from the following operational contacts: “Topola”, “Kombi” or “Renata”. I have analysed this case in the afore-mentioned book.¹⁰⁴ Here I will shortly explain why and in what way it is possible to verify that it was about camouflaged wiretaps and not operational contacts. The first proof is the annotation in the list of personal sources of information used in SOS “Greta”: next to the above-mentioned operational contacts, the comments say “unregistered”.¹⁰⁵ Also, the information ascribed to the alleged operational contacts confirms this. One has to bear in mind that sometimes information obtained by technical means may be found ‘processed’ in the files so as to pass for the tip of a fictitious personal source of information. In such cases, fictitious personal sources of information – a secret collaborator (TW) or operational contact (KO) – were to camouflage room bugging or a covert search. However, the formal construction of such a note differs from a real tip. Moreover, the description of the situation suggests it did not come from a secret collaborator (TW). A fictitious personal source of information is not connected with any specific person or registered in the General Information File (Kartoteka ogólnoinformacyjna, KOI). Therefore, we must exclude situations in which information from the wiretap was ascribed to the real secret collaborators (TW). To prove a given personal source of information is fictitious, one may verify whether it is registered in the records, and whether it appears in the operation fund – that is whether he/she was given a salary for cooperation. It is also

¹⁰³ AIPN Kr, 056/108, vol. 2, Kierunkowe plany pracy operacyjnej Wydziału III-1 SB WUSW w Krakowie oraz analizy stanu bezpieczeństwa z lat 1985–1986, Wykaz zastosowanych źródeł “PT” i “PP” wraz z wynikami eksploatacji według stanu na dzień 22 III 1985 r., Kraków, 22 III 1985, cc. 69–70 (DVD). See also C. Kuta, *Niecenzurowane...*, pp. 610–611.

¹⁰⁴ C. Kuta, *Niecenzurowane...*, pp. 611–612.

¹⁰⁵ AIPN Kr, 010/12298/DVD, SOS “Greta”, Wykaz osobowych źródeł informacji wykorzystywanych w sprawie, p. 13. The same document is among microfilmed materials: AIPN Kr, 0101/452/D, SOS “Greta”, Wykaz osobowych źródeł informacji wykorzystanych w sprawie, J1A11.

worth remembering that the information obtained through operational technique measures was subject to strict confidentiality.¹⁰⁶ It was to be used only to verify and supplement the data obtained in the course of operational surveillance. The documentation of the division of operational technique was not subject to registration in Department “C”.¹⁰⁷ This meant that the information carrier, as well as the documentation of the technical division were stored in the archive at Department “T” for the period of time specified in the archive regulations. After that they were destroyed. Moreover, in accordance with Regulation no. 0068/68, the audio tapes of room bugging were kept for ten days, and of telephone tapping for five days. In 1979 it was decided that printouts of telegraph wiretaps could be stored for five days, and video tapes with spying on someone (observation) could be stored for a month.¹⁰⁸ The departmental instruction of 1985 settled that materials obtained by technical means could be passed along to the prosecutor’s office only by virtue of the decision of the Minister of Internal Affairs.¹⁰⁹

Clandestine vantage points were also used to surveil people engaged in underground publishing. For example, Plan wykorzystania zakrytych punktów obserwacyjnych of August 1982, stated that in line with the order

¹⁰⁶ See *Instrukcje, wytyczne, pisma Departamentu IV Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych z lat 1962–1989. Wybór dokumentów*, comp. A. Dziurok, F. Musiał (Kraków–Katowice 2017: Wydawnictwo Avalon), (*Normatywy aparatu represji*, vol. 5), p. 777: *Instrukcja dyrektora Departamentu IV MSW nr 002/80 o systemie pracy informacyjno-analitycznej w Departamencie IV MSW i jego odpowiednikach terenowych* [17 VIII 1980 r.].

¹⁰⁷ See *Instrukcje pracy pionów pomocniczych Urzędu Bezpieczeństwa i Służby Bezpieczeństwa (1945–1989)*, comp. M. Komanińska (Kraków: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2010) (*Normatywy aparatu represji*, vol. 1), p. 251: *Instrukcja nr 003/58 o zasadach stosowania i wykorzystywania podsłuchu pokojowego (PP) i telefonicznego (PT) oraz podglądu i dokumentacji fotograficznej (PDF)* [24 III 1958 r.]; *ibid.*, p. 261: *Zarządzenie nr 0068/68 ministra spraw wewnętrznych w sprawie stosowania i wykorzystywania podsłuchu pokojowego (PP), podsłuchu telefonicznego (PT) oraz podglądu i dokumentacji fotograficznej (PDF)* [15 VII 1968 r.]; *ibid.*, p. 270: *Zarządzenie nr 0047/79 ministra spraw wewnętrznych w sprawie stosowania i wykorzystywania techniki operacyjnej* [27 XII 1979 r.].

¹⁰⁸ See: *ibid.*, 261: *Zarządzenie nr 0068/68...*; *ibid.*, p. 274: *Załącznik do Zarządzenia nr 0047/79 ministra spraw wewnętrznych z dnia 27 XII 1979 r.* See also M. Komanińska, *Pod obserwacją i na podsłuchu: Rzeczowe środki pracy operacyjnej aparatu bezpieczeństwa w województwie krakowskim w latach 1945–1990* (Kraków: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2014), pp. 271–272.

¹⁰⁹ AIPN Kr, 051/8, vol. 1, Zarządzenia, decyzje, pisma okólne, obwieszczenia, rozkazy i wytyczne KdsBP, MSW i KGMO oraz inne akty prawne z lat 1955–1990, Niepublikowane wykonawcze akty normatywne do ustawy o urzędzie ministra spraw wewnętrznych i zakresie działania podległych mu organów wraz z komentarzem, Instrukcja z 25 IV 1985 r. o szczegółowych sposobach, trybie i taktyce postępowania przy stosowaniu środków technicznych, c. 101.

of Wiesław Działowski, the Deputy Commandant for the Security Service KWMO in Cracow, 38 addresses of Solidarity activists and people engaged in conspiratorial activity in hiding were selected.¹¹⁰

Secretive searches were an effective measure: “Also secretive searches bear good operational fruit. Thanks to them we gather information without unmasking what we are interested in and what we know about the organisational structure. We obtain various information regarding the organisation, the cooperators, and plans, while analysing the materials which have been taken over during searches”.¹¹¹

Control over the majority of underground publishing structures was surely more effective due to the synchronised use of both agents and operational technique. Personal sources of information played a crucial part, however, there were cases where the course of the case was decided by the use of operational technique.

Conclusions

There is certainly a connection between the dynamics with which the second circulation developed and the Secret Service’s activities in response to it. The repressions may have contributed to limiting the functioning of some structures. Not only did the SB know a lot, but it also made use of this knowledge for operational purposes and long-term analyses. On the basis of operational materials and reports, lists of magazines were made along with statistics and thorough analyses of periodicals and the output of the second circulation.¹¹² Paradoxically, it is the departmental papers, written by the functionaries on the basis of operational materials during the first stage of research on independent publishing, that were the source of information.¹¹³ Today they may be compared with catalogs and bibliographies of the second circulation.

¹¹⁰ AIPN Kr, 0101/356, SOR “Peleton”, Plan wykorzystania zakrytych punktów obserwacyjnych, Kraków, 12 VIII 1982 r., c. 46 (DVD).

¹¹¹ AIPN, 001708/3129A, c. 96 (PDF).

¹¹² See e.g. AIPN, 001708/3763, Roman Brzóska, Artur Kamiński, Ruch wydawniczy tzw. drugiego obiegu na terenie kraju w latach 1982–1988. Praca dyplomowa napisana pod kierunkiem mjr. dr. Jana Golca. Legionowo: Wyższa Szkoła Oficerska MSW im. Feliksa Dzierżyńskiego 1989, pp. 31–36 (PDF).

¹¹³ For example D. Cecuda, *Leksykon opozycji politycznej 1976–1989* (Warszawa–Toruń: Trust, 1989). The book contains the most important encyclopaedic information about organisations, publishing houses and publications of the political opposition since 1976. The author, a functionary of Bureau C of the SB (AIPN, 0242/1064, Akta personalne funkcjonariusza SB Dariusza Cecudy), gathered this information for a departmental publication. However, due to the political changes that took place in 1989, the book appeared in a commercial publishing house and ended up available in bookstores.

Despite the fact that the documentation has largely been destroyed, it is still possible to reconstruct the mechanism of the communist repressive apparatus against the underground publishing movement. Although it is difficult to precisely assess the degree of infiltration by the Secret Service, on the basis of the research conducted so far we may conclude with high probability that it was significant. The research shows that the mode of operation of the SB was, above all, to gather information, to repress, and to prevent (manipulate). The SB knew a lot about the underground publishing movement, so the first task was being accomplished. It also fulfilled the repressive function, even though successive amnesties in the 1980s weakened its impact to a large degree. An evaluation of the preventative (manipulative) function is problematic. On the basis of the surviving sources, it is difficult to discern whether the SB managed to successfully neutralise the opposition milieu involved in the second circulation. It might be helpful to research the role of agents in the management of underground publishers, as well as cases of quitting or limiting the activity of certain people under operational investigations run by the SB; here, in many cases, operational talks played a significant part.¹¹⁴ Repressive measures were used against printers in particular, while manipulation (disintegration and dis-instrumentation) was used against the editorial staff, publishers, and distributors.¹¹⁵ In light of this, a number of former opposition activists claim that the SB was ineffective, and its sole productive measure was repression.

Research on the communist repressive apparatus against independent publishing has undoubtedly changed the way we perceive this form of activity from the anti-communist opposition. Moreover, it has contributed to clarifying certain doubts and research gaps.

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¹¹⁴ Operational talk (rozmowa operacyjna) – one of the various methods of operational work. A functionary of the SB would personally meet with a subject so as to obtain information that is operationally useful, or that may impact the attitude and behaviour of a given person. See F. Musiał, *Podręcznik bezpieczeństwa...*, pp. 219–228.

¹¹⁵ Disinstrumentation (Dezinstrumentalizacja) – an operational measure aimed at purging a person or a group of people of their equipment. See *ibid.*, p. 328.

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Strategia działań Służby Bezpieczeństwa wobec drugiego obiegu wydawniczego w latach 1980–1990. Analiza syntetyczna na wybranych przykładach

Streszczenie: Zagadnienie drugiego obiegu wydawniczego w PRL w ostatnim czasie cieszyło się sporym zainteresowaniem badaczy, powstało jednak niewiele publikacji opisujących działania komunistycznego aparatu represji w stosunku do niezależnego ruchu wydawniczego bądź ten wątek uwzględniających. Przez wiele lat dominowało przeświadczenie, że Służbie Bezpieczeństwa nie udało się przeniknąć do jego struktur i że niewiele wiedziała o ich działalności. Najnowsze badania z pewnością zmieniły sposób postrzegania tej formy aktywności opozycji antykomunistycznej. Odnajdywane sukcesywnie źródła pozwoliły wyjaśnić niektóre wątpliwości i uzupełnić luki w dotychczasowej wiedzy. Świadczą m.in. o tym, że funkcjonariusze bezpieki wiedzieli znacznie więcej, niż do tej pory sądzono.

Niniejszy tekst ma charakter syntetyczny. Stanowi podsumowanie dotychczasowych badań nad tym aspektem funkcjonowania komunistycznego aparatu represji w latach 1980–1990, jakim były jego działania podejmowane wobec niezależnego obiegu wydawniczego, oraz próbę wskazania luk i problemów badawczych. Jego celem jest również zwrócenie uwagi czytelnika anglojęzycznego na złożoność tego tematu, który w publikacjach anglojęzycznych jest przedstawiany w dużym uproszczeniu, bez odwoływania się do źródeł, i nie zawsze właściwie interpretowany.

Słowa kluczowe: drugi obieg wydawniczy, niezależny ruch wydawniczy, wydawnictwa niezależne, wydawnictwa podziemne, bibuła, komunistyczne tajne służby, Służba Bezpieczeństwa

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Abstract: The issue of second circulation publishing in the Polish People's Republic has recently attracted considerable interest among researchers, although there have been few publications describing the activities of the communist repression apparatus in relation to the independent publishing movement or taking this theme into account. For many years, the prevailing perception was that the Security Service had failed to penetrate its structures and that it knew little about their activities. Recent research has certainly changed the perception of this form of anti-communist opposition activity. Sources have been successively found that have made it possible to clarify some doubts and fill in the gaps in previous knowledge. Among other things, they testify to the fact that Security Service officials knew much more than has so far been believed.

The present text is synthetic in nature. It summarises previous research on this aspect of the functioning of the communist repressive apparatus between 1980 and 1990, namely its actions against the independent publishing circulation, and attempts to identify gaps and research problems. It also aims to draw the attention of English-speaking readers to the complexity of this issue, which is presented in a highly simplified manner in English-language publications, without reference to sources, and not always interpreted correctly.

Keywords: second circulation publishing, independent publishing movement, independent publishing, underground publishing, samizdat, communist secret service, Security Service

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