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SOME ASPECTS OF THE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE HUNGARIAN AND SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

Until 1947, the Intelligence Services in the Soviet Union operated within the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Defence. At that time, a special information committee was created under Vyacheslav M. Molotov's leadership, and the intelligence services were transferred to this committee. However, it was a short-term settling; in autumn 1949, the political intelligence was transferred under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while the military intelligence under the Ministry of Defence.¹

In the Spring of 1950, the Soviet government "set out from the unity of the political ideas and aims and the confidence between the Soviet Union and the people's democratic countries" forbade the Soviet Intelligence from performing any intelligence activity in these socialist countries.² At

¹ Лубянка, ВЧК–ОГПУ–НКВД–НКГБ–МГБ–МВД–КГБ. 1917–1960. Справочник, сост. А.И. Кокурин, Н.В. Петров, ред. Р.Г. Пихоя (Moskva: MF Demokratia, 1997), pp. 37–38.

² Москва и Восточная Европа. Становление политических режимов советского типа 1949–1953, ред. Т.В. Волокитина, Г.П. Мурашко, А.Ф. Носкова, Т.А. Покивайлова (Moskva: Rossijskaja političeskaja ènciklopedija, 2002), p. 631. It was the long-term consequence of György Pálffy's case. One of the communist leaders of the army, lieutenant-general György Pálffy was arrested in July 1949 in connection with the Rajk's case. He represented the 'military angle' in the lawsuit. After the arrest, Pálffy's home was searched and a Soviet radio transmitter and a code book were found. It turned out that Pálffy was in touch with Soviet military intelligence via the Soviet military attaché, M.A. Malevsky. Rákosi resentfully complained about this to Soviet leadership. As a direct consequence of Pálffy's case, ambassador Tishkov and Malevsky were ordered back to Moscow. The long-term consequence was that the Soviets prohibited their own intelligence work in the so-called people's democracies. Instead, official intelligence representative offices were set up at the Soviet embassies.

the same time, on 17 April 1950, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) decided to establish contact between the Soviet Intelligence and the competent authorities of these states “with the aim of mutual assistance in intelligence work against the capitalist countries and the Tito-clique”. For the sake of the cause, it was decided to create representations of the Soviet political intelligence and its apparatus in other socialist countries’ intelligence services, through which they can provide assistance to each other in intelligence work and carry out joint intelligence measures if necessary.³ The establishment of these representations also allowed an opportunity to control and supervise these partner services’ activity. Directives were sent to the Soviet ministers and ambassadors to inform the leaders of these countries personally about this decision and ask them about their opinions, requests, and proposals.⁴

On 5 June 1950, following the Politburo’s decision of the CC CPSU, Colonel Viktor Dmitrievich Filatov, “on a posting” in Poland between 1946 and 1950, was sent to Budapest.⁵ A five-member intelligence group arrived in Budapest together with him. They and their families were accommodated in villas.⁶

The main aims of the establishment of contacts were the exchange of intelligence information (about the political and economic situation in the Western countries, the conflicts inside the Western bloc, their secret scientific and technological achievements, inventions, etc.), mutual assistance in intelligence activities against the Western countries (first of all the United States and Great Britain) and Yugoslavia, and, if necessary, to carry out joint intelligence actions against them.

This mutual assistance in intelligence activity meant in practice consultations in the structural and technical questions of intelligence, use of the technical opportunities of their partners (dropping and infiltration of agents), assistance in making agents join the secret service, information to informants and agents about possible dangers, and mutual actions striving to uncover, discredit, and undermine ‘anti-democratic’ parties, organisations and persons.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid., p. 632.

⁵ Filatov Viktor Dmitrievich (1910–1972). From September 1939 to June 1941, he was in Sweden and Great Britain; from June 1941 to May 1943, an employee of the NKVD-NKGB; between May 1943 and June 1946, he served as SMERS head of counterintelligence; between June 1946 and June 1950, he was in Poland, while from June 1950 to May 1952, he was a representative of the Soviet Political Intelligence in Hungary. On 19 May 1952, he was relieved of his post, reduced to the ranks and moved to Murmansk.

⁶ V. Farkas, *Nincs mentség. Az ÁVH alezredese voltam* [No excuse. I was a Lieutenant Colonel at the ÁVH] (Budapest: Interart Stúdió, 1990), p. 289.

To fulfil these aims, the representative of the Soviet Union's foreign policy intelligence centre working at the Hungarian intelligence organisation maintained personal contacts with the leader of the latter and their deputy. The representative had operational associates and technical staff in Hungary. The Hungarian intelligence leader was required to help with arranging offices and homes for them and providing protection for these sites.⁷

There is no evidence on the concrete forms and cooperation methods in its first period. According to the Russian-language document dealing with the main tasks of the VIII/1 (Intelligence) department of the State Protection Authority (Államvédelmi Hatóság, or ÁVH) of 17 January 1952, the central intelligence target was Yugoslavia, where the infiltration of agents of Hungarian origin into the Yugoslav intelligence and counterintelligence organisations was the main aim. (Austria and Italy were also vital for Hungarian Intelligence because the most successful intelligence work against Yugoslavia would be done from there.)

At the end of 1953, the Hungarian Minister of the Interior, Ernő Gerő, asked the Soviet advisors to examine the Ministry of the Interior's intelligence work after the Ministry of the Interior absorbed the State Protection Authority. They concluded that intelligence work's first results could be seen, and there was certain progress in this activity. However, to solve more complicated tasks, it was regarded as indispensable to settle certain cadre-questions: to appoint a new, more suitable head of department instead of Gyula Gazdik, employ 13 new residents and increase the number of the employees at the Intelligence Department by thirty members. (So the total number, including the foreign residents, should reach 100.)⁸

Simultaneously, in the first half of the 1950s, the Soviet state security organs' official representatives also appeared at the Soviet embassy in Budapest. Their task was to assist and establish cooperation with the State Protection Authority. In the beginning, the assistance encompassed the establishment of the state security functions, the training of cadres, provision of advice and practical assistance. Later on, as the local staff gained experience, it also included coordinating operational plans, the exchange of obtained information and even the execution of joint operational measures. Cooperation with the state security organs of the so-called 'countries of people's democracies' was supervised by Aleksandr Michael Sakharovsky, one of the Soviet Intelligence leaders. The first KGB representative in Hungary between 1953 and 1956 was Colonel

⁷ Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára (hereinafter: MNL OL), M-KS 276, f. 65/182, ő. e.

⁸ Ibid., Ernő Gerő's letter to Mátyás Rákosi and Imre Nagy, 4 Jan. 1954.

E.T. Sinitzin, and his deputy was Colonel G.F. Grigorenko. To some extent, they were the ambassador's subordinates.⁹

At the beginning of 1955, parallel with the secret preparations for creating the Warsaw Pact Organization, steps were taken to develop closer cooperation between the state security services. The Soviets urged a more organised harmonisation and direction of the reconnaissance and counterespionage organs' activity. In order to discuss the typical tasks and duties, a meeting was called by Ivan Serov, the president of the KGB.

The representatives of the state security services in the Soviet bloc met in Moscow on 5–12 March 1955 and intensified their cooperation. Five main questions appeared on the agenda:

- unification of the efforts of the intelligence services of the participant countries against the USA and Great Britain;
- specification of the main guidelines/directives in the intelligence work;
- execution of joint measures against the main enemy;
- exchange of intelligence information and data concerning the hostile plans against the socialist bloc countries;
- coordination and mutual assistance in the field of radio prevention and operative technique.

Ivan Serov urged the partner services to infiltrate into the leading Western governmental, political, economic and defence institutions and organisations to gather information, and – based on properly elaborated plans – to perform active operational work to compromise, discredit and uncover the hostile endeavours of the 'imperialists'.

During this meeting, the field of intelligence activity was also divided between the participant countries, considering their geographical and other possibilities. Hungary was in charge of infiltration into the most critical governmental, political, economic institutions and objects of West Germany, the USA, Great Britain, France, Austria and Yugoslavia, and gathering scientific and technical intelligence information and infiltration in all capitalist countries, where the Hungarian intelligence organisation had real opportunities. The participants considered the joint measures and cooperation necessary in six areas: (1) to defeat the Paris treaty; (2) to work against the Gehlen Intelligence Organization; (3) to undermine the emigrants and compromise their leaders; (4) to cover the intelligence channels of the Vatican; (5) to exchange opportunities for the agents between the socialist countries; (6) to give assistance to Soviet intelligence in recruiting foreign agents.

⁹ O. Хлобустов, Неизвестный Андропов (Moskva: Jauza–Eksmo, 2009), pp. 20–21.

To fulfil these tasks, the Hungarian side wanted to have closer connections with the Soviet Union and the socialist countries' state security services and fill the Intelligence Department of the Hungarian Interior Ministry and the foreign residencies with loyal, qualified cadres, who spoke foreign languages.¹⁰ According to the report of the Hungarian Minister of the Interior, the meeting was held in an informal and friendly atmosphere, the representatives of the Soviet state security organs were helpful and promised friendly support. In reality, the Soviets were most interested in close cooperation, and the head of the KGB set the tasks for the other services.

During the meeting, Serov – referring to the struggle within the Hungarian Workers' Party (HWP) – made a concrete remark on the Hungarian services: "The state security organs of the Hungarian People's Republic do their work in difficult circumstances, and he [Serov] hopes, the state security organs will do the work more successfully and effectively for the fulfilment of the tasks taken at the meeting".¹¹

The Politburo of the CC HWP discussed the report at their meeting on 25 March 1955, and passed a resolution. They considered it necessary to establish closer cooperation with the Soviet Union and other "friendly" secret services. The Politburo authorised the Interior Minister to establish working connections with the 'friendly' state security services to undermine the 'fascist' emigrants, infiltrate the Vatican's organs, and improve the reconnaissance activity against West German intelligence.¹² Concerning the joint measures of the intelligence services, we possess no evidence for this period.

The Hungarian revolution in October 1956 created a new situation. In addition to the advisors from Soviet state security organs, several KGB leaders (including Ivan Serov) and officers stayed in Hungary during the 1956 revolution. It was mostly them who carried out the arrests in November and December, and investigated the cases of arrested revolutionists. In November 1956, Serov kept Soviet party leaders informed on the KGB's retaliation measures.

Serov forced Ferenc Münnich, a minister of the new Kádár government at the time to issue a directive that ordered the establishment of political departments within the police to fulfil the role of former state security organs.

¹⁰ Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történelmi Levéltára (hereinafter: ÁBTL), 1.11.12, sz. n. 469. d. Jelentés, 13 March 1955. O.I. Közreadja, 'Jelentés a szocialista országok állambiztonsági vezetőinek titkos moszkvai tárgyalásáról, 1955. március 7–12', *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények*, 4 (2001), 689–706 (ed. by Imre Okváth).

¹¹ MNL OL, M-KS 276, f. 53/222. ő. e.

¹² *Ibid.*

Further, to develop Hungarian state security functions, he prepared various documents for János Kádár, for example, about these organs' organisational structure.¹³ Serov also initiated that a staff of 27 KGB advisors should be set up to organise operational work. Eighteen of these advisors were assigned to state security organs, five to the police and four to a state security unit that dealt with special techniques.¹⁴ On 3 December 1956, referring to their discussions with Serov, János Kádár and Ferenc Münnich requested 23 state security advisors from the CC CPSU. Based on talks with the Soviet Union's Ministry of the Interior, the KGB head found the Hungarian request feasible, not least because the requested 23 advisors were already in Hungary by then.¹⁵ In addition to the Soviet advisors to the Ministry of the Interior, a further thirteen persons were employed as interpreters at the Investigation Department, effective 15 November and 1 December 1956, respectively.¹⁶ In such circumstances, the Hungarian state security organs could not be regarded as independent or equal partners.

During the revolution of 1956, connections with most of foreign residencies were temporarily broken off, some of them were liquidated, while the activity of others was limited. The reestablishment of connections with the remaining residencies had already begun with Soviet help in the first half of November 1956. The reorganised Intelligence Department began their work with a small number of staff (30 persons); many former staff members were detached to investigate the case of the former Prime Minister, Imre Nagy and his associates.¹⁷ The Soviet advisors continued giving assistance in the Intelligence Department's everyday activities.

¹³ For details about the role of Soviet state security organs in the reorganisation of Hungarian political police, see M. Baráth, 'A politikai rendőrség újjászervezése 1956 után' [Reorganisation of the political police after 1956], *Történelmi Szemle*, 4 (2008), 535–63.

¹⁴ See Serov's telegraph to the CC CPSU of 27 Nov. 1956 in: *Советский Союз и венгерский кризис 1956 года. Документы*, ред. Е.Д. Орехова, В.Т. Середя, А.С. Стыкалин (Moscow: Rosspen, 1998), pp. 704–05.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 720–21. New advisors were delegated to the Ministry of the Interior even after the revolution. For example in a letter dated 21 Jan. 1958, János Kádár requested a consultant for the Ministry of the Interior, for a period of one year. The Soviet Interior Minister Drozdov considered the request feasible and asked the CC CPSU for permission to dispatch the advisor to Hungary in first quarter of 1958, as per the conditions of the intergovernmental agreement signed on 7 February 1950. Государственный архив Российской Федерации (hereinafter: GARF), f. 9401, op. 2, d. 497.

¹⁶ ÁBTL, 2.8.1., sz. n. 576, Commands nos. 24 and 25 of the head of Department II of the Ministry of the Interior on personnel, 15 Nov. and 1 Dec. 1956. The number of interpreters decreased subsequently. For example, at the end of 1958, only one interpreter was employed instead of the former three at the Investigations Department. MNL OL XIX-B-1-au 16-746/1/58, Proposal of the Ministry of the Interior's Organisation Department on organisational changes regarding Department II/8, 28 Dec. 1958.

¹⁷ F. Kolláth, 'A hírszerzés helyzete 1956. október 23 – a és 1957 júliusa közötti időben', in *Történelmi hűség, politikai felelősséggel. 1. Állambiztonsági szekció. Az MSZMP*

The leading advisor in the Ministry of the Interior was A.D. Beschastnov. His deputy, Nikolai G. Turko, gave his Hungarian colleagues assistance mainly in the form of questions about the agent-network and operative activity. The Hungarian Minister of the Interior, Béla Biszku in December 1960 requested A.N. Shelepin to prolong the stay of Beschastnov's apparatus in Hungary in order "to give additional assistance to the state security services of the Ministry of the Interior as long as it is required".¹⁸

The Hungarian Intelligence Department employees had a talk with their Soviet counterpart in May 1959 about the situation and the main tasks of the intelligence work. According to the minutes made about this meeting, the head of Soviet intelligence drew attention to those tasks that Hungarian intelligence – considering the circumstances after the revolution's suppression in 1956 – had to focus upon. They drew up a list of tasks consisting of 12 points, which contained the main direction of the Hungarian intelligence activity (USA, Great Britain, West Germany and the Vatican), the tasks of the Hungarian Intelligence Department, the duties of the residencies, the preparation of the cadres for intelligence work and also the intelligence activity within the emigrant communities. The main directions for gathering scientific-technical information were also mentioned during the meeting, according to the minutes.¹⁹ Concerning the cooperation between the two secret services, the only available documents are the meetings' working plans and minutes. Unfortunately, we have no reports about the execution of the tasks given in the working plans and during the annual meetings. Besides, for the 1970s and 1980s, such sources are also lacking.

As far as we know, from that time on, the annual meetings between the Hungarian and Soviet state security services became common. The KGB representatives and the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior held the next meeting in Moscow between 19 and 21 July 1960. The head of the KGB, A. Shelepin and the Hungarian Minister of the Interior, Béla Biszku agreed on the concrete questions of the cooperation in intelligence and counterintelligence.²⁰ At that time, the cooperation almost exclusively meant the exchange and mutual provision of information and data.

The delegations of the two-state security services assessed the first results of the joint activity in Budapest held in 8–12 May 1961. Both

Belügyminisztérium Bizottsága elméleti tanácskozása (1982. június 16.). A Belügyminisztérium és szervei újjászervezése, a hatalom megszilárdításáért kifejtett tevékenysége, ed. J. Czink (Budapest: BM Könyvkiadó, 1985), pp. 24–26.

¹⁸ MNL OL XIX-B-1-ai 1-a-1468/1960 1292. fsz.

¹⁹ ÁBTL, 1.11.12, sz. n. 469. d. Feljegyzés a szovjet elvtársakkal folytatott megbeszélésekről, 1959. május 22 [Record of the conversation with the Soviet comrades, 22 May 1959].

²⁰ *Ibid.*, d. Feljegyzés, 1960. július 26. [Record, 26 July 1960].

parties were of the opinion that the elaboration of the agreement reached in the previous year in Moscow had to be continued, first of all relating to the infiltration of agents into various Western organisations. Regarding new events in international politics, it was considered necessary to make joint efforts to uncover and compromise the policy of the United States and its allies in the so-called 'Hungarian question', to obtain the documentation of the United Nations committee dealing with the Hungarian question, and to seek opportunities to allow the removal of this question from the agenda. The Hungarians undertook to hand over the analytical materials about the Hungarian emigrants, while Soviet intelligence promised assistance in the political and operative work among the Hungarian emigrants. They planned to increase the intelligence activity against the Free Europe Committee and Radio Free Europe, operational-agent activity in order to infiltrate the Western Intelligence organisations, cooperation between the residencies of Hungary and the Soviet Union in Austria, the United States, France and Italy, and to obtain secret scientific and technical documentation.²¹

According to the available archival documents, in Spring of 1962, in connection with the cooperation between Soviet and Hungarian intelligence, the question occurred to delegate the representative of the KGB to the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior. His tasks were specified in the cooperation's working plans; he was in charge of the coordination of the execution of the working plan, forwarding the Soviet requests to their Hungarian counterpart and vice versa. The Soviet consultant had to hand over the Soviet experiments and requests to the Hungarians, and he was also responsible for the exchange of information.²²

In the cooperation agreement signed at the end of June 1962, mutual assistance in the execution of intelligence and counterintelligence measures was provided, besides the exchange of information. It was also decided that the KGB representative office should be established at the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior. It would consist of the head of the representative office, his deputy, three operative officers and technical staff. According to the agreement, KGB covered the maintenance costs, and the Hungarians provided lodging, transport and medical attendance.²³

²¹ Ibid., d. Feljegyzés, 1961. május 11. [Record, 11 May 1961].

²² Ibid., d. Feljegyzés, 1962. április 24. [Record, 24 Apr., 1962].

²³ Ibid., 41-11-Sz32/40-68 469. d. Megállapodás a Szovjetunió Minisztertanácsa mellett működő Állambiztonsági Bizottság és a Magyar Népköztársaság Belügyminisztériuma közötti együttműködésről, 1962. június 26. [Agreement on the cooperation between the KGB and the Ministry of the Interior of the Hungarian People's Republic, 26 June 1962].

The exact date of the creation of the KGB representative office is still unknown. The documents mentioned so-called ‘liaisons’, but it is not clear whether they were identical to the members of the representative office or not.

In March 1964, at the time of Semichastny’s visit to Budapest, a final agreement was reached to create a KGB-representative office at the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior. Nikolai Grigoryevich Turko, the former deputy of the Soviet chief advisor in Hungary, was appointed as the head of the representative office. The latter arrived in Budapest on 1 November 1964.²⁴ According to Semichastny’s memoir, the KGB-representative office members were in close connection with the Interior Minister and with the chiefs of other institutions. The chiefs of the Intelligence Services were not enthusiastic about the close working connections between the rank-and-file informants; however, it was not strictly forbidden.²⁵

As already mentioned, the most important documents, which settled the concrete forms and tasks of the cooperation, were the bilateral agreements,²⁶ and working plans setting the priorities for the next calendar year. Such agreements between the Soviet and Hungarian Intelligence Services were concluded first on 26 June 1962, and were in operation for two years. According to Semichastny, the cooperation between the two intelligence services was friendly and was based on mutual confidence. Their activity scope was not strictly limited: their activities were concentrated on those fields where – given their cultural and historical traditions – they were more successful.²⁷

The Hungarian side also set a high value on the assistance of the Soviet specialist working in Hungary, who “with their remarks and proposals directed the work to the solution of the main questions”, and with whom they regularly consulted in concrete questions.²⁸ For example in 1962 the Hungarian and the Soviet advisors together settled the task of the agent living in the USA under the code name ‘Conte’, and the Soviet specialist also joined in the checking of the Canadian agent candidates (under the code name ‘Toulouse’ and ‘Hugo’). They also gave assistance

²⁴ MNL OL XIX-B-1-ai 1-a/1091/1964 2579 fsz. Szemichasztnov 1964. október 24-i levele Benkei Andrásnak. [Semichastny’s letter to András Benkei, 24 Oct. 1964].

²⁵ В. Семичастный, *Беспокойное сердце* (Moskva: Vargiusz, 2002), p. 217.

²⁶ Agreements of this kind were signed on 26 June 1962, 18 March 1964, 26 July 1966, 7 Dec. 1968, 9 June 1971, and 30 May 1973.

²⁷ Семичастный, *Беспокойное сердце*, pp. 216–21.

²⁸ ÁBTL, 1.11.12, 67/9-2829/66 (470. d.), Feljegyzés a Szovjetunió állambiztonsági Bizottság és a Magyar Népköztársaság Belügyminisztériumának hírszerző szerve közötti együttműködésről, 1966. június 13. [Record about the cooperation between the KGB and the Intelligence Services of the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior, 13 June 1966].

to their Hungarian counterparts to compromise De Gaulle's assailant, Lajos Marton.²⁹

The common tasks fixed during the negotiations in March 1963 already exceeded the information exchange frameworks, and they aimed to implement cooperation and coordination also in their practical operative activity. In the working plan for joint intelligence actions in 1963, agent exchange was also planned. The working plans and reports about their implementation mention the code name of these actions, but unfortunately, these documents are not in possession of the Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security.

The minutes of the negotiations in March 1963 fixed the range of questions, where widening or deepening of the cooperation was needed. Among them the intelligence opportunities to obtain confidential information about: the strategic military plans of the United States and NATO, the political and economic plans and practical measures of the USA and their allies in connection with the Soviet Union, Hungary and the socialist bloc, the foreign and military policy of West Germany, the intelligence activity of Western countries against the Eastern bloc, the political conceptions of the United States and their allies in connection with important international problems (disarmament, the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, the German peace treaty, the question of West Berlin), the strategic plans of the USA and Western countries in connection with the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin-America, as well as differences of opinions between the Western states.³⁰

The KGB promised assistance to Hungarian Intelligence to elaborate on Hungarian emigrants' cases living in Canada, Brasilia, Argentina, West Germany and Austria, and loyal emigrants' operational and political usage. The Hungarian side promised information about the emigrant centres' situation and tips on persons who were suitable to be recruited. The two parties agreed to take active measures to build into the national armies of the Latin-American, Central and Near East and South-Eastern Asian countries and use these opportunities in the socialist camp's political

²⁹ Ibid., sz. n. 470. d., A Szovjetunió Minisztertanácsa mellett működő Állambiztonsági Bizottság és a Magyar Népköztársaság Belügyminisztériuma közötti együttműködés fejlődése 1962-ben, 1963. március 5. [Progress in the cooperation between the KGB and the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior in 1962, 5 March 1963].

³⁰ Ibid., Feljegyzés a szovjet Állambiztonsági Bizottság képviselőivel Moszkvában 1963. március 11. és 18. között megbeszélte legfontosabb kérdésekről, 1963. április 6. [Record of the negotiations between the representatives of the KGB in Moscow from 11 to 18 March 1963, 6 April 1963].

interests. The dissemination of brochures and leaflets was also planned as an active measure. The exchange of information about scientific and technical achievements, scientific research (first of all, energy and atomic research), and the examination of people working in this field as potential recruits, was also part of the cooperation.³¹

The tasks specified in the agreement became part of the foreign residencies' working plans. The aims given in the agreement in 1963 were not fulfilled, however, the cooperation became stronger, and the volume of received and forwarded information was increasing. (In 1963 the Hungarian secret services forwarded to the Soviets 268 political and economic items, 22 scientific items and received 177 political and six scientific items.)³²

The cooperation between the Soviet and Hungarian intelligence services was most intensive in the scientific-technical line; Kuznecov's visit in Budapest in 1962 also was a contribution to it. The latter settled the main guidelines and topics that Hungarian Intelligence was to focus on.³³

After the signing of the agreement in 1963 the so-called 'Active measures department' was created in the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior with the principal and practical assistance of the Soviets. The main tasks of the department were: (1) deepening the conflicts between the NATO-countries; (2) uncovering the 'neo-colonialist policy' of the capitalist countries (first of all, the USA and West Germany) in the Third World; (3) deepening the conflicts inside the Vatican, as well as disturbing the relationships between the Vatican and the capitalist countries; (4) uncovering the attempts directed against the neutrality of Austria, and preventing Austria from joining hostile alliance system; (5) undermining

³¹ Ibid., sz. n. 470. d., Feljegyzés a Szovjetunió Minisztertanácsa mellett működő Állambiztonsági Bizottság és a Magyar Népköztársaság Belügyminisztériuma között a hírszerző és kémelhárító intézkedések koordinálása terén fennálló együttműködés eredményének az összegezésével, továbbzélesztésével, valamint egyes közösen végrehajtandó intézkedésekkel kapcsolatban folytatott megbeszélésről, 1963. március 18. [Record on the negotiations between the representatives of the KGB and the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior, 18 March 1963].

³² Ibid., A Szovjetunió Minisztertanácsa mellett működő Állambiztonsági Bizottság és a Magyar Népköztársaság Belügyminisztériuma közötti együttműködés fejlődése 1964-ben. [The progress in the cooperation between the KGB and the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior in 1964]; *ibid.*, 41-11-Sz-440/1/65 470. d., Jelentés a Szovjetunió Állambiztonsági Bizottsága és a Magyar Népköztársaság Belügyminisztériuma között a hírszerző munka koordinálásával kapcsolatban kötött megállapodás végrehajtásáról [Report on the fulfilment of the agreement between the KGB and the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior about the coordination of the intelligence activity].

³³ Ibid., 41-11-Sz-440/1/65. 470. d.

the ‘reactionary’ Hungarian emigrants, and discrediting its leaders. The discrediting of American policy in Vietnam was also regarded as an essential task. The Soviet advisors gave assistance in preparing the state security employees for foreign postings. Most of the tools and forms of the so-called ‘impersonal communication’ were also worked out following the advisors’ instructions.³⁴

As a result of the agreement signed in Moscow in 1963 and the negotiations in March 1964 in Budapest, the cooperation between the two intelligence services – especially in exchange of scientific-technological and economic-political information – became more effective. From Semichasty’s visit (15 March 1964) to 1 June 1966, the Hungarian Intelligence Services received 341 political and 56 economical-technical information from their Soviet counterparts and forwarded 322 political and 70 economical-technical ones.³⁵ From March 1964 to March 1965 the Services collaborated in six concrete operations, and the cooperation between the residencies of the two countries also became closer. The Soviets assisted in the creation of the Hungarian intelligence residencies in Canada and Brazil, while the Hungarians forwarded their secret employees working in Asian and African countries to the Soviet services.

According to the agreements concluded in the 1970s, the main areas and directions of the cooperation did not change radically. However, some corrections and shifting of emphasis took place. In the second half of the 1970s, intelligence activity placed more stress on the struggle against the Southern wing of NATO, the Near East region and the so-called ideological diversion.³⁶ In the minutes of the bilateral meetings from the beginning of the 1980s, the uncovering and breaking of the Chinese residencies’ intelligence activity also appeared. In the minutes of the negotiations between 28 and 29 December 1981, where the results of the cooperation since April 1977 were evaluated, it was stated that “the State Security Services of the two countries will use all disposable

³⁴ Ibid., 41-11-Sz, Összefoglaló jelentés a Magyar Népköztársaság Belügyminisztériuma és a Szovjetunió Minisztertanácsa mellett működő Állambiztonsági Bizottság közötti együttműködésről, 1966. Június 29. [Summary report on the cooperation between the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior and the KGB, 29 June 1966].

³⁵ The exchange of the political and economic information was unbroken also in the following years. The Hungarian services sent their requests and concrete questions every year to their Soviet counterparts, although 15–20 per cent of the received information did not answer the asked questions.

³⁶ ÁBTL, 1.11.12, 67/34-166/77, Jelentés a szovjet hírszerző főcsoportfőnökség vezetőjével történt tárgyalásokról. 1977. Április 27. [Report about the negotiations with the chief of Soviet Intelligence, 27 Apr. 1977].

opportunities to uncover and break hostile plans and intentions directed against the liquidation of socialism in Poland”.³⁷

In the Spring of 1989, preparations were made to elaborate on the new, modernised version of the bilateral agreement signed in 1973. In the meeting held in the Ministry of the Interior on 2 May 1989, the Head of the III/II Department József Horváth evaluated the cooperation between the two intelligence services. In his opinion in the past the relationship between the two organs was based on open cooperation, mutuality and the respect for sovereignty; however, he mentioned that “the intention to direct politically was perceptible in it”.

At the end of June 1989, a working committee was established to draft a new bilateral agreement. The Head of the Intelligence Department, János Bogye, considered it inconsistent with Hungary’s national interests and – in political, juridical and professional respects – was against signing a new agreement.³⁸ However, the KGB representative office in Hungary remained in place until the political system changed. On 28 September 1989, at a meeting of Deputy Minister Sándor Ilcsik and the head of the KGB representative office, Major General Rostislav Vasiliev Yuschuk, an agreement was made that earlier forms of cooperation must be changed and that a part of them should be ‘covered up’, meaning that the representative office was proposed to continue operation under a diplomatic coverage. From then on, their office was not at the Ministry of the Interior but at the Soviet Embassy. However, the Ministry of the Interior continued to provide them with cars, furnished lodgings and paid their rent and related expenditures.³⁹

Presumably, the Soviet advisors left Hungary in the first six months of 1990, after the establishment of new Hungarian national security organs

³⁷ Ibid., 555. d., Jegyzőkönyv a Magyar Népköztársaság Belügyminisztériumának küldöttsége és a Szovjetunió Állambiztonsági Bizottságának küldöttsége közötti tárgyalások eredményeiről, 1981. december 29. [Minutes on the negotiations between the delegations of the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior and the KGB, 29 Dec. 1981].

³⁸ Z. Krahulcsán, ‘KGB és III. Főcsoportfőnökség: egy kapcsolat vége... (?) A szovjet-magyar állambiztonsági együttműködés szabályozása 1989-ben’ [The KGB and the III Department: end of a connection... (?). The regulation of the Hungarian and Soviet state security cooperation in 1989], *Betekintő*, 4 (2007), https://betekinto.hu/sites/default/files/betekinto-szamok/2007_4_krahulcsan.pdf, accessed 21 Jan. 2021.

³⁹ ÁBTL, 1.11.1. 111. d. 4-657/1989. Emlékeztető a Belügyminisztérium területén működő szovjet képviselői munkatársainak elhelyezésével és ellátásával kapcsolatos megbeszélésekről, 1989. október 6. [Memo of a meeting about the accommodation and boarding of associates of the Soviet representative office at the Ministry of the Interior, 6 Oct. 1989].

on 14 February 1990. The new organs did not need the services of the Soviet advisors.

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Wybrane aspekty współpracy między węgierskimi a sowieckimi służbami wywiadowczymi

Streszczenie: Wiosną 1950 r. rząd sowiecki zakazał prowadzenia działań wywiadowczych wobec tzw. krajów demokracji ludowej. Równocześnie, 17 kwietnia 1950 r. Biuro Polityczne KPZR postanowiło nawiązać kontakty między służbami wywiadowczymi ZSRR i krajów socjalistycznych, aby je wspierać w działaniach wywiadowczych przeciw krajom zachodnim i „klice” Josifa Tito oraz stworzyć w tych krajach przedstawicielstwo polityczne wywiadu sowieckiego. Na Węgrzech metody i sposoby współpracy wypracowano w maju 1950 r., kiedy to przybyła na Węgry również pierwsza grupa sowieckich doradców. W początkowym okresie współpraca dotyczyła wymiany informacji wywiadowczych, później objęła także doradztwo w kwestiach strukturalnych i technicznych, korzystanie z możliwości wywiadowczych partnerów oraz wspólne działania.

Słowa kluczowe: tajne służby, KGB, wywiad, Iwan Sierow, współpraca, Węgry, ZSRR

Magdolna Baráth (ur. 1964), dr, jest doradczynią ds. stosunków międzynarodowych w Archiwum Historycznym Węgierskiej Służby Bezpieczeństwa, redaktorką węgierskiego czasopisma historycznego „Múltunk”. Doktorat z dziedziny filozofii historii otrzymała w 2012 r. W latach 1987–1998 była archiwistką w Instytucie Historii Politycznej w Budapeszcie, następnie od 1998 do kwietnia 2017 r. kierowała działem w Archiwum Historycznym Węgierskiej Służby Bezpieczeństwa. Jej zainteresowania badawcze dotyczą historii Węgier po II wojnie światowej, stosunków węgiersko-sowieckich po 1945 r. oraz działań węgierskich służb bezpieczeństwa i wywiadu wobec węgierskich emigrantów.

Abstract: In the spring of 1950, the Soviet government forbade intelligence work against the so-called people's democratic countries. Simultaneously, on 17 April 1950, the Politburo of the CPSU decided to create links between the intelligence services of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries in order to help them in the intelligence against the Western states and "Tito's clique" and to create Soviet political intelligence representation in these countries. In Hungary the ways and methods of the cooperation were worked out in May 1950 and the first group of Soviet advisors also arrived. In the first period the cooperation meant the exchange of intelligence information, later it included also advice on structural and technical questions, using the intelligence opportunities of the partners, and joint actions.

Keywords: secret services, KGG, Intelligence, Ivan Serov, cooperation, Hungary, Soviet Union

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